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ABSTRACT

TECHNO-SALVATION: DEVELOPING A CHRISTIAN HERMENEUTIC OF
ENHANCEMENT TECHNOLOGY

By
Richard L. Wilson
May 2017

Dissertation Supervised by Darlene Fozard Weaver, PhD
A cadre of scientists, philosophers, and ethicists labeled transhumanists and
posthumanists argue that by strategic use of technology we can greatly enhance human
beings into our next stage of evolution. Rather than leave the evolutionary process to
natural results, transhumanists and posthumanists want to shape humanity to meet our
own desires. This direct goal of changing human beings has profound implications for
Christian faith and practices. At the same time, there is no reason to think that the
utilization of technological enhancements will not happen. As such, to best meet the
challenge, it is unavoidable for Christians to engage transhumanism and posthumanism in
an attempt to help guide which technologies should be pursued and which should be
avoided. This project works toward that end.

iv

Beginning with competing views of what it means to be human the common
positions of physicalism and substance dualism are shown wanting despite strong
arguments in their favor. This project argues for a middle position – ensoulment – that
attempts to take the best of both approaches but minimize their weaknesses. Likewise,
this project examines the moral positions that propose the only moral criteria that matters
is either “personhood only” or “human nature only.” Both of these positions are likewise
found wanting and a third mediating position is pursued – an agency of relational
responsibility. With these preliminary issues established, this project then proceeds to
develop a hermeneutic of enhancement from a Christian perspective. The hope is that by
following this model, Christians can help guide, accept, or reject various technologies as
they are presented. The push for human enhancement cannot be stopped – there are
simply too many goods to be obtained by their pursuit. However, any particular
enhancement is not inevitable, and by utilizing the hermeneutic proposed in this project
Christians can principally evaluate which enhancements should be allowed and which
should be avoided.
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Chapter 1
Enhancement Technology and the Need for a Hermeneutic
I will be advancing two main theses. The first is that some possible posthuman
modes of being would be very good. . . . The second thesis is that it could be very
good for us to become posthuman.
— Nick Bostrom, “Why I Want to be a Posthuman When I Grow
Up”, 29
The most significant threat posed by contemporary biotechnology is the
possibility that it will alter human nature and thereby move us into a “posthuman”
stage of history.
— Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future, 7
1.1 Introduction
Technological advances are rapidly altering the world around us. Accompanying
these swift changes, a group of scientists, philosophers, futurists, and ethicists – called
“transhumanists” – plot a direction for humanity that is at once fascinating and chilling.
For if their prognostications should come to pass, then what we know as the human race
will likely cease to exist – and a “posthuman” future awaits.1 Theologian Ted Peters
expresses this dual uneasiness well. He says, “the transhumanists propose a technology
that will enhance our humanity, or at least the intelligent aspect of humanity. On the other
hand, once technology takes over and replicates itself, it will leave our present stage of
humanity in the evolutionary dust.”2 Indeed, if the transhumanist’s predictions are correct

1 While often linked, “tranhumanism” is distinct from “posthumanism” and should be kept
separate. One can be a “transhumanist” without being a “posthumanist,” but one cannot be a
“posthumanist” without also being a “transhumanist.”
2 Ted Peters, “Progress and Provolution: Will Transhumanism Leave Sin Behind,” in
Transhumanism and Transcendence: Christian Hope in an Age of Technological Enhancement, ed. by
Ronald Cole-Turner (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 77.
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then we will want to cease existing in our current feeble state and instead embrace the
progressive technological leaps they advocate.
The human condition is wonderful, but limited. We get sick; we are not as
intelligent as we would like; we grow old; we suffer emotional anguish; and eventually
we die.3 Transhumanists are not content to leave humanity in this state. By intelligently
utilizing technology and scientific research, transhumanists want us to take control of our
collective future. We can make ourselves better.4 We can end disease, lengthen our
lifespans, increase our intelligence, and enhance our emotional responses.5 We can make
all of our lives better by implementing the advances afforded by scientific discovery. We
no longer need to be guided by the fickle whims of the Darwinian paradigm. We can
direct our own evolution in order to meet our own desires.6
The transhumanist allure is appealing. After all, who does not want to be – or
have their children be – healthier, smarter, and live longer? These yearnings are prevalent
among all people. What is different are the means to achieve these ends as well as the

3

Ibid., 65.

4 Stephen Garner, “The Hopeful Cyborg,” in Transhumanism and Transcendence: Christian Hope
in an Age of Technological Enhancement, ed. by Ronald Cole-Turner (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown
University Press, 2011), 87. Anders Sandberg makes the same observation. “Transhumanism and the
Meaning of Life,” in Religion and Transhumanism: The Unknown Future of Human Enhancement, ed. by
Calvin Mercer and Tracy J. Trothen (Denver, CO: Praeger, 2015), 3.
5 The first article of the Transhumanist Declaration (2012) reads: “Humanity stands to be
profoundly affected by science and technology in the future. We envision the possibility of broadening
human potential by overcoming aging, cognitive shortcomings, involuntary suffering, and our confinement
to planet Earth.” The Transhumanist Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science,
Technology, and Philosophy of the Human Future, ed. by Max More and Natasha Vita-More (Malden, MA:
John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 54.
6 Ted Peters, “Progress and Provolution,” 65. Charles T. Rubin notes this same trend. Eclipse of
Man: Human Extinction and the Meaning of Progress (New York: New Atlantis Books, 2014), 125. Also
see, Braden Allenby and Daniel Sarewitz, The Techno-Human Condition (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press,
2011), 3.
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possible consequences of pursuing such goals. Many Christian theologians are skeptical
of the transhumanist’s claims.7 They are not skeptical in the transhumanist’s ability to
bring about their stated goals (though it is sometimes that too), but rather in that the
intended goal will actually be achieved. Will living an indefinite life-span actually make
one “happy”? Does it provide meaning? Why would living longer necessarily infuse
meaning in one’s life? How will it be determined who becomes enhanced? Will
enhancement just increase the disparity between the powerful and the underprivileged?
Other questions like these arise and the answers are not always easy. This project seeks to
answer some of these questions, but primarily, this project will chart a course for
deciding which technologies could be accepted as well as which should be rejected.
Scientists are already incorporating many of these technologies, and their impact on
society will be felt. For enhancement technologies affect us all, both directly and
indirectly. Thus, Christians should have a voice in which technologies should be pursued
since technological advances will influence how Christians live their lives before God.
Technology that fulfills the “Great Commission” and draws people to God may find
Christians endorsing it, but technology that appears to draw people away from God may

7 For example Brent Waters says that transhumanism offers a “counterfeit salvation” and is
“predicated on a death wish.” Brent Waters, “Whose Salvation? Which Eschatology?” in Transhumanism
and Transcendence: Christian Hope in an Age of Technological Enhancement, ed. by Ronald Cole-Turner
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 173-174. Ted Peters calls transhuman notions of
progress “naïve” because it often fails to account for human proclivities towards evil. Ted Peters,
“Transhumanism and the Posthuman Future: Will Technological Progress Get Us There?” in H+:
Transhumanism and Its Critics, ed. by Gregory R. Hansell and William Grassie (Philadelphia: Metanexus
Institute, 2011), 148. Criticism is not just limited to Christians however. Hava Tirosh-Samuelson offers a
strong Jewish critique of transhumanism as well. For example, she laments that transhumanism is “the
gradual transition from biological humanism to mechanical posthumanism, its telos. . . . [H]uman
enhancement is but the beginning of a process in which humanity will bring about its own demise,
supplanting it with virtual existence.” Hava Tirosh-Samuelson, “Utopianism and Eschatology: Judaism
Engages Transhumanism,” in Religion and Transhumanism: The Unknown Future of Human Enhancement,
ed. by Calvin Mercer and Tracy J. Trothen (Denver, CO: Praeger, 2015), 162—163.
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find Christians denouncing it. This project is designed to help Christians navigate the
technological landscape so as to evaluate which technologies could lead to spiritual
growth and which may lead to spiritual deprivation.
1.2 Definitions
There are a few terms and concepts that will be referenced throughout this project.
As such, it is necessary to define the limits of each term to avoid confusion. While the
following terms are presented as being in opposition to each other for purposes of
understanding, in reality, they often go together and are not necessarily opposed to one
another.
1.2.1 Transhumanism and Posthumanism8
Prominent transhumanist, Max More notes there is no one definition of
transhumanism, because transhumanism is more of a movement than a well-defined
concept. There are general agreements on what transhumanism is, but there is no one
correct definition. Transhumanism is typically thought to be a “philosophy of life” that
attempts to relieve “human limitation” through the use of technology.9 Likewise, leading

8 More detail of the historical backdrop for transhumanism and posthumanism can be found in:
Max More, “The Philosophy of Transhumanism,” in The Transhumanist Reader: Classical and
Contemporary Essays on the Science, Technology, and Philosophy of the Human Future, ed. by Max More
and Natasha Vita-More (Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 8—12; Nick Bostrom, “A History of
Transhumanist Thought,” http://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/history.pdf (accessed March 19, 2015); and
Michael S. Burdett, “Contextualizing a Christian Perspective on Transcendence and Human Enhancement:
Francis Bacon, N. F. Fedorov, and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin,” ed. by Ronald Cole-Turner (Washington,
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 19—35.
9 An early definition that More attributes to the movement says that transhumanism is: a
philosophy of life that seeks “the continuation and acceleration of the evolution of intelligent life beyond its
currently human form and human limitations by means of science and technology, guided by lifepromoting principles and values.” Max More, “The Philosophy of Transhumanism,” in The Transhumanist
Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, Technology, and Philosophy of the Human
Future, ed. by Max More and Natasha Vita-More (Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 3.
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transhumanist intellectual Nick Bostrom identifies transhumanism as a “loosely defined
movement” that “promotes an interdisciplinary approach to understanding and evaluating
the opportunities for enhancing the human condition and the human organism opened up
by the advancement of technology.”10 Bostrom gives a complementary notion of what
transhumanism is in his FAQ.11
In general, transhumanism can be understood as an “intellectual and cultural
movement” with a focus on “improving the human condition” by the prudent use of
technology. This does not mean that any and all technologies should be pursued, for there
is a recognition that some technological means may be truly bad for humanity. 12 Of
course, the key is determining which technologies are and are not bad for humans.
Overall, however, there is a sense that the use of technology can make things better for
us.
The implications of this approach, though, involve the conclusion that it “is not
our human shape or the details of our current human biology that define what is valuable

10 Nick Bostrom, “Transhumanist Values,” http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/values.html.
(accessed March 19, 2015). Bostrom gives the same definition in his article “Human Genetic
Enhancements: A Transhumanist Perspective,” http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/genetic.html (accessed
March 19, 2015). Which is a reprint from the Journal of Value Inquiry 37, no. 4 (2003): 493—506.
11 “Transhumanism is a way of thinking about the future that is based on the premise that the
human species in its current form does not represent the end of our development but rather a comparatively
early phase. We formally define it as follows:
(1) The intellectual and cultural movement that affirms the possibility and desirability of
fundamentally improving the human condition through applied reason, especially by developing and
making widely available technologies to eliminate aging and to greatly enhance human intellectual,
physical, and psychological capacities.
(2) The study of the ramifications, promises, and potential dangers of technologies that will enable
us to overcome fundamental human limitations, and the related study of the ethical matters involved in
developing and using such technologies.” Nick Bostrom, “The Transhumanist FAQ: A General
Introduction.” http://www.transhumanism.org/resources/FAQv21.pdf. (accessed March 19, 2015).
12 Bostrom spends a significant amount of space trying to identify possible problems with
enhancement technology. See Nick Bostrom, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios
and Related Hazards,” http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.pdf (accessed, September 3, 2015).
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about us, but rather our aspirations and ideals, our experiences, and the kinds of lives we
lead.”13 That is, there is paradigm shift in understanding what it means to be human, and
what really are true human goods. With our technical control over biology, we are free to
make humanity after our own goals and desires. A tempting yet terrifying offer. It is
tempting because of the various goods promised, but it is terrifying because of the
potential abuse by nefarious people. In the end, transhumanists often leave it to the
individual to decide if enhancement is “right for them.” Thus, individual autonomy plays
a key role in promoting the transhumanist agenda. Given our technological
accomplishments, can we really deny the desire of some people who wish to pursue
transhumanist ends? Especially if it does not harm others?
There is no one type of transhumanist. Instead, it is a general approach to science
and life. The basic philosophical approach for transhumanists is thoroughly rooted in the
enlightenment.14 Transhumanism stresses personal improvement, human reason, science,
technology, and a rejection of the religious. Transhumanists are interested in the progress
of the human species, not necessarily perfection.15 Given the fact that humans are the byproduct of an evolutionary process, transhumanists believe we have the prerogative to
direct the next stage of our evolution. We no longer need to be tied to the capricious
whims of Darwin’s system. By utilizing technology, we can lift ourselves by our own
intellectual bootstraps.

13 Bostrom, “The Transhumanist FAQ,” http://www.transhumanism.org/resources/FAQv21.pdf.
(accessed March 19, 2015).
14

More, “The Philosophy of Transhumanism,” 4.

15

Ibid., 5.
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Posthumanism is a slightly different viewpoint in the enhancement debate and
should be distinguished from transhumanism. As noted above, transhumanists are
interested in providing for human enhancement. There is no necessary connection with
the end results of enhancement technologies leading to a new species. Posthumanism,
however, sees the outcome of enhancement technologies being an entirely different
species – one that is no longer human.16 Hence, “posthuman” literally means “after
human(s).” And given the various changes proposed by transhumanists, an enhanced
human future is “fully posthuman.”17
Following Nick Bostrom, a “posthuman” can be defined as a being with at least
one “posthuman capacity.”18 A “posthuman capacity,” he says, is a “general capacity”
exceeding its natural maximum limit.19 That is, the maximal limit cannot be reached
without the use of technological help. A “general capacity” is categorized as “healthspan”
(the ability to remain physically and mentally productive), “cognition” (one’s ability to
remember, reason, focus, and understand), and “emotion” (the ability to enjoy life and
respond to situations and people appropriately).20 As such, someone who obtains either a

16 David Hopkins puts it this way, transhumanism “attempts to free us from the human condition
by enhancing desirable human traits to an extent that surpasses the limits of the class. The posthuman
approach attempts to free us from the human condition by changing the source organism so radically that
the resulting beings would not longer be human at all.” Patrick D. Hopkins, “A Salvation Paradox for
Transhumanism: Saving You versus Saving You,” in Religion and Transhumanism: The Unknown Future
of Human Enhancement, ed. by Calvin Mercer and Tracy J. Trothen (Denver, CO: Praeger, 2015), 73.
17 Ted Peters, “Progress and Provolution,” 65 (emphasis in original). Peters notes, that should
transhumanism achieve its goals, the posthuman is what awaits. Ibid., 66.
18 Nick Bostrom, “Why I Want to Be Posthuman When I Grow Up,” in The Transhumanist
Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, Technology, and Philosophy of the Human
Future, ed. by Max More and Natasha Vita-More (Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 28.
19

Ibid., 28—29.

20

Ibid., 29.
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greater than naturally allowed lifespan; a greater than naturally possible intellect; or a
greater than naturally allowed emotional spectrum (or control), would be considered a
“posthuman.” Again, this is because no “mere” human – however great – would be able
to obtain these abilities without the help of technological interference. For the posthuman
advocate, the greatest Einstein that humanity can naturally produce would pale in
comparison to the lowliest cognitively enhanced posthuman person. Likewise, no matter
how long humans can naturally live, it will not be able to exceed the hundreds – or even
thousands – of years posthuman proponents are trying to achieve.21
There are significant similarities and differences between transhumanism and
posthumanism. Again, not all transhumanists are posthumanists, but all posthumanists are
transhumanists. The “end goal” for posthumanists appears to be “grander” than that of the
transhumanist. Whereas the transhumanist wants to improve the human condition – it
does so without the express intent of bringing forth a new species. That is,
transhumanism is not necessarily connected to the conviction that homo sapiens will
cease to exist as a result of our technological progress. Posthumanism, though, sees the

21 One immediate objection that appears when posthumanists discuss lengthening lifespans to
multiple centuries is the potential impact of overpopulation, and with it the increased stresses that it puts on
the planet’s resources. Earth appears to already be negatively impacted by billions of (relatively) short lived
humans. How much more of an impact would billions upon billions of (relatively) long lived humans affect
the planet?
There are often two responses by posthumanists. The first is to limit the number of persons able to
achieve multi-century lifespans. Aubrey de Grey takes this approach. See his, “Aging, Childlessness or
Overpopulation: The Future’s Right to Choose,” http://www.sens.org/files/pdf/ed7-4.pdf (accessed January
4, 2016). Under this proposal, those who choose to live longer than normal lives will forfeit the right to
have children. If this proposal is adopted, then the number and impact of humans currently on Earth should
remain stable. The second approach championed by Mark Walker is to earnestly pursue cognitive
enhancement so that we will have the ability to solve this problem. As far as Walker is concerned, we mere
humans cannot solve the complex problems facing us – overpopulation and climate change are just two
examples. Hence, we need enhancement technologies just to avoid extinction. See his, “Ship of Fools: Why
Transhumanism Is the Best Bet to Prevent the Extinction of Civilization,” in H+: Transhumanism & Its
Critics, ed. by Gregory R. Hansell and William Grassie (Philadelphia: Metanexus Institute, 2011), 94—
111.

8

extinction of homo sapiens as a near certainty given the pressures that will be put on them
by an advanced society of persons with posthuman capacities. In a Darwinian sense, if
survival of the fittest is really determinative of who survives and who does not, and if the
posthuman is supremely more fit than mere humans, then it is only a matter of time
before the merely human is completely replaced by the posthuman.
1.2.2 Therapy and Enhancement
There is a common distinction in bioethics between therapeutic and enhancement
technology. The supposed difference is that “enhancement” technologies build on what is
normally the case, while “therapeutic” technologies repair and replace what is normally
the case. This leads Karen Lebacqz to remark that the interesting question is what counts
as a genuine “enhancement.”22 Prosthetic limbs, for example, are normally thought to be
“therapeutic” while many plastic surgeries are thought to be purely “enhancement.”
However it is possible for a prosthetic enhancement to be a cosmetic therapy.23

22 Karen Lebacqz, “Dignity and Enhancement in the Holy City,” in Transhumanism and
Transcendence: Christian Hope in an Age of Technological Enhancement, ed. by Ronald Cole-Turner
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 51.
23 When a soldier loses a leg to a grenade, a prosthetic leg can be attached giving the soldier a
modicum of mobility that they once had. Current prosthetic technology is not nearly as efficient or useful
than our normal limbs. However, it is not difficult to imagine the day when prosthetic limbs are not only
equal to natural arms and legs, but better – stronger, more sensitive, and resistant to damage. Likewise,
patients disfigured by disease or some injury can undergo plastic surgery. Those seeking therapeutic plastic
surgery are often seen as brave and noble for wanting to gain a semblance of their life pre-deformation.
However, those who seek plastic surgery who are not disfigured and have no medical need to do so, are met
in society with a slightly different reaction – not necessarily rude, but not with overwhelming approval
either. For example, suppose two people get face lifts. The first patient has had a hard fight with skin
cancer and wants to “balance” out her facial features. Very few people would question such a motive for
wanting this therapeutic treatment. Patient number two, however, just cannot stand the fact she has “crow’s
feet” and “laugh lines.” We may not feel anger at the second patient, nor may we want to deny someone the
opportunity to undertake this procedure, but the motivation for this surgery is less morally satisfying than
for the first patient. Another related, and actually more relevant concern for enhancement technology, is the
increasing cases of Body Identity Integrity Disorder (BIID). This is when someone feels as though they
should be without a leg or an arm. That is, even though they have a perfectly functional normal body part,
they feel as though they should not have it. It is not too much of a stretch to imagine people in the not too
distant future who identify with being a cyborg – even though they have a properly functioning arm or leg,
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Interestingly enough, what this implies is that the difference between enhancement and
therapy cannot be based on the actual techniques utilized.24 For the same technology may
be either used for therapy or enhancement. This, of course, is part of the problem in the
enhancement debate: it is easier to identify a “disease” or “defect” than it is to identify
what is “normal.”25 The underlying difference between therapy and enhancement is
simply the motivation for the procedure. The same technique can be used for both. This
means that one cannot appeal to the technology itself as the reason to forgo enhancement
– for the same technology may be needed for therapeutic reasons.26
From this it follows that the difference between therapy and enhancement is based
on the most hidden of factors – purpose. As such, below are the following working
definitions that will guide this project. “Therapy” is the utilization of technology (usually
medical) to restore lost capacities or to raise abnormally low capacities to abilities within
the “normal” human spectrum. “Enhancement” is the utilization of technology (not
necessarily medical) to increase normally functioning capacities towards or surpassing

they will feel as though they should have a cybernetic one. See Sabine Müller, “Body Integrity Identity
Disorder (BIID) – Is the Amputation of Healthy Limbs Ethically Justified?” The American Journal of
Bioethics 9, no. 1 (2009). In other words, cosmetic therapeutic treatments are often morally uncontroversial.
If someone wants to have breast reconstructive surgery after a mastectomy, there is hardly anything
controversial about this. However, cosmetic enhancement treatments give one greater moral pause. Can
breast enhancement be morally justified? Likewise, the same question can be applied to any cosmetic
treatment. Please note, that I am not saying that cosmetic breast enhancement or face lifts or any other
surgery may not possibly be justifiable. Rather, I am simply noting that the motivation for the treatment is
the delimiting factor that determines the morality of the action. Therapeutic treatments tend to be morally
uncontroversial, but enhancement treatments are more likely to be morally controversial.
24 Lisa Sowle Cahill, Theological Bioethics: Participation, Justice, Change (Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Press, 2005), 236.
25

Ibid.

26 Aristotelian causes can be used to distinguish between therapy and enhancement. In both
therapy and enhancement the formal, efficient, and material causes are the same. “What the technology
does and is,” “who creates the technology,” and “out of which the technology is created,” is exactly the
same for either therapy or enhancement. The lone distinguishing factor is in the final cause – the purpose,
the telos, or the “why” of the technology.
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the upper limits of the “normal” human spectrum. These definitions are flexible enough
to account for a variety of scenarios using the same technology, but make the key
distinction regarding the purpose of using that technology.27
1.2.3 Moderate Enhancement and Radical Enhancement
A much fuller account of the distinction between moderate and radical
enhancement will appear in chapter 6. For now, it should be noted that “moderate” and
“radical” for this project refer to the moral dimension of enhancement technology.
“Moderate” enhancements are relatively morally unproblematic – that is, any attending
moral issues with the proposed enhancement do not restrict the possibility of pursuing its
benefits. “Radical” enhancements, however, are relatively morally problematic – the
attending moral issues with these proposed enhancements restrict their pursuit until it can
be shown that they are not actually “radical.” Stated another way, the terms “moderate”
and “radical” when applied to enhancement technologies will be understood in a
normative sense – that is, moderate enhancements are morally permissible, but radical
enhancements are not. This is not to be confused with the descriptive aspects of
enhancement technologies, which refer to the objective abilities of the technology. Part of
the problem is that the normative and descriptive notions of enhancement technologies
are so intertwined that separating one from the other is often a difficult task.
For example, Nicholas Agar says that “radical” enhancement “improves
significant attributes and abilities to levels that greatly exceed what is currently possible

27 Gilbert Meileander remarks “I think, however, that the difference between therapy and
experiment continues to be of moral importance.” Gilbert Meilaender, Bioethics: A Primer for Christians
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1996), 107. What Meileander calls “experiment” could be
replaced with enhancement. His point stands that there is a moral difference between the two, and the point
of differentiation is found in the final cause of the action itself.
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for human beings.”28 Likewise, he says “moderate” enhancement “improves significant
attributes and abilities to levels within or close to what is currently possible for human
beings.”29 Notice how Agar combines the normative and descriptive features for
enhancement technology. For Agar, an enhancement is “radical” if it “greatly exceeds”
our current abilities – but this is a descriptive notion of “radical” that he also takes to
imply a moral imperative of avoidance. In a similar manner, “moderate” enhancements
are “within” reach by humans naturally – again, this is a descriptive notion laden with
moral implications of permissibility. Basically, Agar combines the objective and moral
dimensions for “moderate” and “radical” enhancements – a move this project
distinguishes. Another example may help illuminate what is happening. Agar indicates
that a (objectively) “radical” enhancement, say significant life extension ala Aubrey de
Grey (aiming for multi-millennia life-spans), is also a (morally) “radical” enhancement.
Hence, it should not be pursued. This project however, may still arrive at the same
conclusion as Agar, but distinguishes between these two senses of “radical.” While it
may be objectively “radical” to enhance life-spans thousands of years – what this project
calls “extreme enhancement” is a descriptive term of the objective limits of the
technology – it is only if demonstrated to be morally “radical” that the pursuit of this
enhancement would be indefinitely prohibited.30 For the time may come when some
28 Nicholas Agar, Truly Human Enhancement: A Philosophical Defense of Limits (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2014), 2 (emphasis in original).
29

Ibid., (emphasis in original).

30 “Extreme” enhancement is descriptive and references the objective limits of a given technology.
“Radical” enhancement is normative and refers to the morality of the technology. For example, increasing
the human lifespan to multiple centuries would be technically “extreme” but it may still be morally
permissible and hence it would not be considered “radical.” If, per chance, it could be determined that
drastically increased lifespans is morally problematic, then this would be deemed a “radical” enhancement
– whether the technical aspect were extreme or mundane.
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enhancement currently deemed morally “radical” may, in fact, one day be deemed
morally “moderate.” Again, the issue here is not so much the actual “technique” that is
involved (which could be either “extreme” or “mundane”), but rather the moral
permissibility of the “technique” (which could vary between “moderate” and “radical”).
For the purposes of this project, then, the term “moderate enhancement” will
generally refer to enhancement technologies that are normally thought morally
permissible. The term “radical enhancement” will generally refer to enhancement
technologies that are normally thought morally impermissible. These terms are not to be
confused with “mundane enhancements” or “extreme enhancements” which refers to the
spectrum of indirect and direct or obtrusive objective technologies. “Mundane” and
“extreme” pertain to the technique applied, not its moral acceptability. Again, more
details about these distinctions will be found in chapter 6.
1.3 Importance of the Topic
How we approach the issue of enhancement will largely determine the future of
our society. Will our society be one of technological hybridized citizens or will it remain
largely “natural”? Likewise, it seems unrealistic to assume that technological
advancement will simply cease. The opposite has been, and appears to continue being the
case. Not only will technological advancements happen, the rate of technological
advancement is exponential.31 Also, depending on the enhancements we accept or reject

31 Posthuman proponent, Ray Kurzweil, has utilized this insight to great success. This exponential
gain in technological resources is often known as Moore’s Law and states that the processing power of
computers doubles about every 18-24 months. This is not linear growth, this is exponential growth. Gordon
Moore, who worked with Intel, noted that the transistors on a circuit board doubled about every two years.
Thus the processing power doubled about every two years. Kurzweil has successfully extrapolated this idea
from computer circuitry and has applied it to technology in general. And, should he be believed, it does
indeed appear that historically speaking our technological advances follow an exponential curve. It starts
out (painfully) slow, but by the time of Francis Bacon and the scientific revolution, measurable gains can
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says something about how we view the human person. As Alison Adam notes, if the
transhumanist sees the human mind as what is essential, then the “desires are to make the
body obsolete, to play god in artificial worlds, and to download minds into robots. Such
desires are predicated on the assumption that if a machine contains the contents of a
person’s mind then it is that person. The body does not matter; it can be left behind.”32
For some transhumanists, the human body is not something “sacred” but is expendable,
changeable, or replaceable. Mary Ann Doane remarks, “The concept of the ‘body’ has
traditionally denoted the finite, a material limit that is absolute — so much so that the
juxtaposition of the terms ‘concept’ and ‘body’ seems oxymoronic. For the body is that
which is situated as the precise opposite of the conceptual, the abstract. It represents the
ultimate constraint on speculation or theorization, the place where the empirical finally
and always makes itself felt.”33 For the contemporary transhumanist, this is no longer the
case. The body is not static. It can – and sometimes should – be changed. Indeed, the
lines that traditionally have been “considered natural” are now blurred with the rise of
genetic manipulation, nanotechnology, robotics, and information technologies.34 At the
end of the day, the transhumanist issue cannot be avoided.35 Society will need to address

clearly be charted. Ray Kurzweil, Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology (London:
Penguin, 2005).
32 Alison Adam, “Feminist AI Projects and Cyberfutures,” in The Gendered Cyborg: A Reader, ed
by Gill Kirkup, Linda Janes, Kath Woodward, and Fiona Hovenden (New York: Routledge, 2000), 281282.
33 Mary Ann Doane, “Technophilia: Technology, Representation, and the Feminine,” in The
Gendered Cyborg: A Reader, ed. by Gill Kirkup, Linda Janes, Kathryn Woodward, and Fiona Hovenden
(New York: Routledge, 2000), 110.
34

Garner, “The Hopeful Cyborg,” 87.

35 Ted Peters notes (following Ronald Cole-Turner) that breakthroughs in new technology requires
the “need for new ethics” to meet the challenge. Peters, “Progress and Provolution,” 64.
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the topic of human enhancement, for human enhancements of some sort are not only
inevitable, they are already here.
1.3.1 The Power of Therapeutic Technology
Therapeutic technologies can help people recover a semblance of lost capacity
due to some sort of ailment or disfigurement. Prosthetics give amputees a level of
freedom unavailable without the artificial limb. Pharmaceuticals return a sense of
normalcy to many people suffering from headaches, high blood pressure, mental illness,
and a host of other issues. Nano-technology is going to significantly alter how medicine
is practiced, as doctors will be able to manipulate human tissue at the most basic
molecular levels.36 Genetic engineering promises to end certain ailments and
limitations.37 To the degree that technology returns a sense of ability to the life of the
person, its development and distribution are almost guaranteed. The goods of regaining
lost capacities, seems to outweigh just about any concern one may have.
Theologian Gerald McKenny remarks in this regard, that the enhancement debate
is forced upon us by the therapeutic applications of technology. He says, that some
technologies provide more than mere “instrumental” ends. Rather, these new
technologies are creating new “ends” – a new telos.38 Therapeutic technologies are
36 Robert A. Freitas Jr., “Welcome to the Future of Medicine,” in The Transhumanist Reader:
Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, Technology, and Philosophy of the Human Future, ed.
by Max More and Natasha Vita-More (Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 67—72.
37 James C. Peterson, Changing Human Nature: Ecology, Ethics, Genes, and God (Grand Rapids,
MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 78.
38 For example, he cites selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) as a way to control
depression (i.e., therapeutic application), but this has become a way to alter one’s personality (i.e.,
enhancement application). These SSRIs have created a whole new way for people to develop themselves
and express who they want to be. The reality is that, “Biomedical technologies help determine which
aspects of ourselves – our personalities, bodies, capacities, and performances – we attend to in our selfforming practices; stimulate and direct desires for self-alteration; form our desires into deliberate projects;
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powerful because they create possibilities for people to regain lost capacities as well as
create new ones.39
1.3.2 The Promise of Enhancement Technology
Given that the line between therapy and enhancement is not always clear, the
obvious question is: why not choose to be enhanced if given the option?40 The
transhumanist claim is that humans have been able to change their biology through use of
indirect / external enhancements for millennia, but “for the first time they are becoming
capable of changing their biology deliberately, in accordance with what they value, on

and bring certain features of ourselves and our activities to our attention while suppressing others.
Technology in such instances is not merely a means to an end but also projects new ends, reshapes existing
ends, orients us to both new and existing ends, and reorders priorities among ends.” Gerald P. McKenny,
“Technology,” in The Blackwell Companion to Religious Ethics, ed. by William Schweiker (Malden, MA:
Blackwell Pub., 2005), 462-463.
39 Charles T. Rubin notes that artificial retinas are already being implemented to restore eyesight
as well as tiny “telescopes” to correct macular degeneration. These therapeutic advances will very likely
“bleed over” into the enhancement realm as time passes. Charles T. Rubin, Eclipse of Man: Human
Extinction and the Meaning of Progress (New York: New Atlantis Books, 2014), 125. Cf. FDA, “FDA
approves first retinal implant for adults with rare genetic eye disease,”
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm339824.htm (accessed March 16,
2016). And FDA, “FDA Approves First Implantable Miniature Telescope to Improve Sight of AMD
patients,” http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm218066.htm (accessed
March 16, 2016).
40 Prosthetic limbs enable the amputee to regain a measure of mobility once lost. Should the
technology sufficiently advance, then there is no reason to think that prosthetic limbs could not be
objectively “better” than natural arms and legs. Theoretically, an artificial arm could be stronger, faster,
perform more delicate movements, be more sensitive, and more durable than any natural arm. Given these
(theoretical) benefits of the artificial limb, why would a healthy person not choose to replace natural body
parts for synthetic? For it would appear that they not only retain the abilities of the natural limb, but replace
its limitations with something objectively better. If it is difficult to think of yourself undergoing such a
transformation, then imagine an army of cybernetic soldiers who have each opted (or have been forced) to
undergo this type of synthetic enhancement. If prosthetic limbs can offer a level of control unobtainable by
natural appendages, then will surgeons be “encouraged” to replace their natural arms for cybernetic ones? It
seems possible that real, tangible goods can be obtained by pursuing these enhancements. Stronger, faster
soldiers. Smarter, more agile surgeons. Everyday citizens freed from the obvious limitations of the natural
body.
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the basis of scientific knowledge, rather than haphazardly.”41 The philosopher Allen
Buchanan reminds us that critics of enhancement often forget how much more productive
and useful enhancements will make us.42 Cognitive enhancements will make us more
productive intellectually. Longevity enhancements will allow us to be productive for
longer. Emotional enhancements will allow us to be productive even in traumatic
situations. Indeed, he says, these realities are almost certainly in the near future.
Enhancement technology will happen and it will diffuse.43 How this happens can be
mostly directed by government intervention.
The boundaries that separate the natural from the artificial have blurred. Indeed,
for technological man, technology shapes his life, his identity, and his future.
“Technology shapes every aspect of human life, and human identity becomes fluid,
because it is forever being shaped by technocultural forces, and thus one cannot be cut off
from their influence.”44 Our very selves are shaped (and determined to a large degree) by
our technology.
Human evolution has long been shaped by environmental pressures, and even
more recently shaped indirectly by our own mastery of the natural world. Humans have
thus been at the mercy of the natural evolutionary process, but with the transhumanist
agenda this is no longer the case. With the technological progress we are witnessing, it is
becoming an increasingly pressing question if we want to remain wholly biologically

41 Allen Buchanan, Beyond Humanity?: The Ethics of Biomedical Enhancement (Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press, 2011), 41 (emphasis in original).
42

Ibid., 45.

43

Ibid., 53.

44

Summarizing Donna Haraway, Garner, “The Hopeful Cyborg,” 89.
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human. This future of technologically advanced humans is obviously not without its
critics. And the debate itself has devolved into two broad camps. Theologian Karen
Lebacqz remarks, “The enhancement debate appears as an ‘either/or’— either
enhancement threatens something about our human dignity because it defies limits
intrinsic to human beings and hence to human dignity, or enhancement may contribute to
human dignity.”45 These are stark distinctions, and the best option is not necessarily clear.
For those who predict that a transhumanist (or even posthumanist) future is imminent, it
is best to side with technological enhancement since this is the most prudent way to
survive and flourish in a dangerous world. To do well in a complex and hazardous world,
you will need every advantage available. Like Bostrom, Buchanan notes that not only is it
not wrong to enhance oneself, it may in fact be morally obligatory to do so.46
One way transhumanists are enhancing people is through life extension
technologies. There are two views on how to overcome death: radical life extension, or
cybernetic immortality.47 Aubrey de Grey opts for the former, while Ray Kurzweil
prefers the later. Aubrey de Grey finds death “repugnant.”48 As such, he is a leader in the
anti-aging movement. While de Grey searches for the fountain of youth in various
biological technologies, Ray Kurzweil sees death as an obstacle to overcome by utilizing

45

Lebacqz, “Dignity and Enhancement in the Holy City,” 51 (emphasis in original).

46

Buchanan, Beyond Humanity?, 91.

47

Peters, “Progress and Provolution,” 67.

48 Aubrey de Grey, “The Curate’s Egg of Anti-Anti-Aging Bioethics,” in The Transhumanist
Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, Technology, and Philosophy of the Human
Future, ed. by Max More and Natasha Vita-More (Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 215—219. For
an elaboration on de Grey’s proposal, see Aubrey de Grey and Michael Rae, Ending Aging: The
Rejuvenation Breakthroughs That Could Reverse Human Aging in Our Lifetime (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 2007). Please note that this does not mean that the person would then be “immortal.” Accidents
could still happen and death will still occur – just not by aging.
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human cybernetic technology.49 Kurzweil is optimistic that death will be overcome by
changing our very substrate – that is, by abandoning our bodies. Accordingly, about the
year 2045, humans will quite literally be able to “upload” consciousness and live a
digitally based existence.50 The implication of this, is that one would live as long as there
are processors able to accommodate such a “mind.” Thus, life would be nearly indefinite.
More about Kurzweil’s approach to cognitive enhancement will be pursued in chapter 6.
Specifically, his notion of mind-uploading will be the case study in which the theological
hermeneutic be employed as an evaluative tool.
Another way transhumanists are altering humanity is through cognitive
enhancements. Theologian David Grumett remarks that “fundamental to the
transhumanist worldview is the accelerating growth of intelligence and reflection.”51
Surely, cognitive enhancement is uncontroversial. For as Allen Buchanan notes,
cognitive enhancement may help solve some major issues heretofore previously
unsolved, and likewise help alleviate many minor issues (i.e., lost keys; phone numbers;
etc.).52 For transhumanist proponents, there should hardly be any controversy over
whether humans should strive to be as intelligent as possible. If intelligence can be
enhanced by technology, then great. But this desire for intelligent growth can be seen also
in the notion of the “singularity” (mentioned above). Transhumanism supports not only

49 David Grumett, “Transformation and the End of Enhancement,” in Transhumanism and
Transcendence: Christian Hope in an Age of Technological Enhancement, ed. by Ronald Cole-Turner
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 46.
50

Kurzweil, Singularity is Near, 7.

51

Grumett, “Transformation and the End of Enhancement,” 42.

52

Buchanan, Beyond Humanity?, 47.
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the (comparatively) mundane enhancements proposed by Buchanan, but by extension, it
supports the (comparatively) extreme enhancements proposed by Kurzweil. Cognitive
enhancement is not just a slight “boost” in memory or logical reason, but encompasses a
revolutionary re-understanding about what it means to “know” or to be a “person.”
Further, transhumanists want to alter human emotions as well – to make the
emotions “better.” 53 Neuroscientist Michael Spezio understands emotional enhancement
better as “emotional control” to the point of suppressing emotions.54 Allen Buchanan, on
the other hand, sees no problems with utilizing “drugs or other biomedical interventions”
to “sustain a valuable relationship.”55 That is, if technology (pharmaceutical or otherwise)
can be used to enhance emotional attachments and help relationships better flourish, then
this would seem to be a point in favor of emotional enhancement. Nick Bostrom admits
that therapeutic interventions are clear enough, but beyond that it is difficult to know

53 Related to, but distinct from, “emotional enhancement” is the notion of “moral enhancement.”
Emotional enhancement is the control and expansion of feelings, moods, and attitudes. An emotionally
enhanced person (in theory) should be able to control the time and intensity of their emotional state. Moral
enhancement refers to the ability to act appropriately in a given situation. Presumably, a morally enhanced
person would be able to act appropriately despite intense emotional moments. For example, “crimes of
passion” occur when someone is so emotionally overcome with anger, grief, etc. that they commit a
heinous act, but because of their emotional state their responsibility for the act is often thought to be less
than someone who premeditates a similar heinous action. As such, emotionally enhanced beings should (in
theory) never commit a crime of passion as they should be able to control their emotions. Likewise, if they
are also morally enhanced, then they should (in theory) avoid committing heinous actions even in the
presence of increased emotions. Emotions may indicate the direction of appropriate moral action, but they
cannot be determinative of what the appropriate moral action is. Anger at injustice may reveal that some
change needs to take place, or some person needs to be punished, but it does not grant me the right to
execute justice as I may see fit. Just because someone makes me angry by cutting me off in traffic and
driving dangerously, it does not give me the right to run them off the road – even if they should be arrested
and have their license revoked. Thus, we can see the connection and distinction between emotional and
moral enhancement. Emotions are about feelings and may point to appropriate moral actions, but morality
is appropriately performing or abstaining from some action regardless of the emotions involved.
54 Michael L. Spezio, “Human or Vulcan? Theological Consideration of Emotional Control
Enhancement,” in Transhumanism and Transcendence: Christian Hope in an Age of Technological
Enhancement, ed. by Ronald Cole-Turner (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 146.
55

Buchanan, Beyond Humanity?, 109.
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what would count as an enhancement.56 For example, while we may be able to
understand emotional correction for depression or some other debilitating condition, it is
more difficult to understand what it would be like for someone to be “too happy.”
Likewise, why would being “too happy” be a bad thing? Since happiness is often thought
the ultimate goal of all actions, saying “happiness” is bad seems counter-intuitive. But
there is another problem as far as Bostrom is concerned. Namely, if the posthuman
emerges it is entirely possible that they will have access to emotions that we are literally
incapable of having unless enhanced to their level. The problem for us mere humans is
that we just simply have no way of knowing what these new and novel emotions would
feel like.57 The key concern for Bostrom is whether it is possible to have these new
“posthuman emotions” without diminishing other (valuable) emotions or
characteristics.58 At this point, we simply do not know enough to determine if new (or
even more powerful) emotions would displace currently valuable emotions. Bostrom is
confident that an enhanced posthuman mind should be able to navigate the variety of
experiences with more skill than we unenhanced beings can. Indeed, given our
unenhanced desires for better emotive experiences, it is not difficult to find posthuman
emotive improvements even more attractive.59
Finally, transhumanists are convinced enhancement is necessary to gain and
maintain possessed “goods.” Feminist philosopher Donna Haraway insightfully remarked

56

Bostrom, “Why I Want to Be Posthuman When I Grow Up,” 37.

57

Ibid.

58

Ibid., 38.

59

Ibid., 38.
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that the lines between what is natural and artificial were blurring, and that the “machines
are disturbingly lively, and we ourselves frighteningly inert.”60 The traditional
distinctions between biological organisms and technology apply less and less.
Technology is becoming more lifelike, while humans are becoming more machinelike.61
Our technology is slowly replacing us. This news, however, is not necessarily
detrimental. If there is any regret that machines (or any other technology) are replacing us
then this assumes that there is something valuable in humans that is lost in this
replacement project. Yet, there is also reason to think that something is not lost in the
replacement, but rather gained.62 As such, “deliberate self-transformation might be
dignity-enhancing or dignity-reducing.”63 Motivation for enhancement matters, and
motivations that are external to the person’s desires may compromise their dignity.64
However, it is also likely that not choosing to be enhanced could also diminish human

60 Donna J. Haraway, “A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in
the 1980s,” in The Gendered Cyborg: A Reader, ed. by Gill Kirkup, Linda Janes, Kathryn Woodward, and
Fiona Hovenden (New York: Routledge, 2000), 52.
61 Echoing Haraway’s observation, Gerald McKenny notes that ethical evaluations of technology
in the twentieth-century believe “that, left to itself, technology steadily encroaches on and eventually
replaces human activities and capacities or even human nature itself. While the uniqueness and inevitability
theses can be applied equally to the machine age, the replacement thesis captures what is most distinctive
of the post-machine era of technology.” McKenny, “Technology,” 464.
62 “It is thus possible to argue that the act of voluntary, deliberate enhancement adds to the dignity
of the resulting trait, compared to possessing the same trait by mere default.” Nick Bostrom, “Dignity and
Enhancement.” http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/dignity-enhancement.pdf (accessed, September 17,
2015), 12.
63 See Bostrom, “Dignity and Enhancement,” 15, and Lebacqz, “Dignity and Enhancement in the
Holy City,” 54.
64

Lebacqz, “Dignity and Enhancement in the Holy City,” 54.
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dignity.65 Allowing humans and technology to merge has the potential to produce real
goods for people.
Indeed, for many transhumanists the “rub” is the social cost of not enhancing
people.66 While individuals are the primary objects for enhancement technology, it needs
to be remembered that the benefits of enhancement are not merely private but communal.
As people become enhanced social benefits will be increasingly manifest.67 Further,
philosopher Mark Walker is even more direct in his claim that transhumanism is the best
hope for the preservation of civilization.68 Left to our own devices, humans are likely to
initiate our own extinction. There are enormous problems on the horizon and the only
ones that can solve them in all of their complexity is a society of enhanced beings.69
Thus, what we see from the preceding are two claims: first, enhancement technology is
needed to gain new goods; and second, enhancement technology is needed to keep old
goods. In both cases, enhancement technology is needed.

65

Ibid.

66

Buchanan, Beyond Humanity, 50.

67

Ibid., 49.

68 Mark Walker, “Ship of Fools: Why Transhumanism Is the Best Bet to Prevent the Extinction of
Civilization,” in H+: Transhumanism and Its Critics, ed. by Gregory R. Hansell and William Grassie
(Philadelphia: Metanexus Institute, 2011), 95.
69 Ibid., 108. Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson concur with this assessment. For them, the key
may not be so much in developing technology to solve our problems (though they are not against that), but
rather that we will need moral enhancements to guarantee that we do not cause a mass extinction. As they
see it, we have the ability to eliminate humankind from existence now, and the best way to prevent this
disaster is if we become so morally repulsed by the thought via enhancement that mass extinction scenarios
become a moral impossibility. See their, “Getting Moral Enhancement Right: The Desirability of Moral
Bioenhancement,” Bioethics 27 no. 3 (2013): 124—131.
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1.3.3 Some Problems with Enhancement Technology
Those who resist transhumanism’s siren call are sometimes criticized for having
“Luddite sensibilities.”70 But the resistance to transhumanism cannot be completely
dismissed as being simply anti-technology. There are tangible concerns
anthropologically, ethically, and theologically.71 Anthropologically, transhumanism
assumes a particular form of evolutionary theory, one that is often interpreted to reduce
or even eliminate human dignity.72 Transhumanists often are not aware of their own
underlying assumptions and the resulting implications.73 Based in this particular view of
evolutionary theory, if ethics simply arises out of the needs of the herd, then it is difficult
to see how ethics can be truly binding. Rather, it seems that ethics could be nothing more
than an epiphenomena and would vary from person to person. This is not to say that
transhumanists cannot develop a working ethical system, but instead that any ethical
system based on epiphenomena cannot be ultimately binding on everyone.
A common criticism (though not without its own problems) is that transhumanism
is a denial of “human dignity.” The challenge is that enhancement may decrease human
dignity by either: 1) choosing the wrong traits to enhance; or 2) lose our dignity in the
process of becoming enhanced.74 Transhumanist proponents are thoroughly aware of

70 Celia Dean-Drummond, “Taking Leave of the Animal? The Theological and Ethical
Implications of Transhuman Projects,” in Transhumanism and Transcendence: Christian Hope in an Age of
Technological Enhancement, ed. by Ronald Cole-Turner (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press,
2011), 116.
71

Peters, “Progress and Provolution,” 77.
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these types of criticisms. For guarding against “unfortunate” outcomes is a common topic
among proponents.75 Thus, ethical considerations occupy a central place in thought of
many transhumanists. Buchanan, for instance, sees the central problem of enhancement
technology as the slow diffusion of beneficial enhancement technologies.76
One concern is that enhancement technology can be “exploitive.” Theologian Lisa
Sowle Cahill remarks that research in biomedical technologies is shaped by the “forprofit mode of the market” and “market demand.”77 Money is often not directed to areas
that necessarily help the most people, but rather goes to where investors can reap the
greatest financial reward. Scientists and educators seek grants in areas people are willing
to pay, and very few grants pay for healthcare in third-world countries.78 Transhumanism
tends to value technique over all else, and may not recognize this tendency. As such,
many transhumanists miss that “today’s technology is still supported and guided by

75 See for example, Bostrom, “Existential Risks.” Bostrom lists four types of risks: 1) Bangs are
the most obvious and (near) instantaneous disasters. These include nan-technology gone awry, nuclear
holocaust, rogue AI, biological pathogens, etc.; 2) Crunches are events that do not destroy humanity, but
prevents humans from further developing. These include depletion of resources, poor governmental
decisions, technological stagnation, etc.; 3) Shrieks are technologies that humans desired and implemented,
but ended being bad for humanity. These include rogue AI (again), an uncontrolled uploaded intelligence,
poor global governance, etc.; and 4) Whimpers are anticlimactic ends to humanity – like the embers of a
fire going cold. This risk is not so much found in humanities failures, but its successes. In these scenarios,
we simply run down and run out of energy. Examples include evolutionary change that ends the species,
running up against physical limits, etc. Likewise, Allen Buchanan devotes significant space evaluating
possible threats posed by enhancement technology. See his Beyond Humanity? chapter 6. The key
difference between enhancement critics and proponents is not so much that proponents ignore the potential
dangers, but that proponents do not see the potential dangers as sufficient for not pursuing enhancement.
Indeed, proponents see it as more dangerous to not pursue enhancement. See Walker, “Ship of Fools,” 94—
111.
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78 Research out of Oxford shows a significant increase in healthcare funding for Third-world
areas, but even with about $14 billion dedicated in 2005 (and more each year) this only comes from a
couple of sources. See David McCoy, Sudeep Chand, and Devi Sridhar, “Global Health Funding: How
Much, Where it Comes From and Where it Goes,” Health Policy and Planning 24 (2009): 407—417.
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yesterday’s bourgeois values.”79 To the degree these values are exploitive, they may
manifest in transhumanist pursuits. For Cahill, the major argument against enhancement
technologies, then, is not that they are unnatural to the human, but that they are unfair to
the non-enhanced.80 Transhumanism tends to “conflate” biological evolution and
technological progress, and when coupled with Darwinian pressures of self-preservation
married with a laissez-faire capitalism, the result is that the least powerful and most poor,
will be sacrificed to the promise of enhancement.81 New technology favors those in
positions of power. Which has the potential of simply entrenching their power even more.
Thus, transhumanist ethics is divided between two opposing forces: 1) capitalist values of
Darwinian survival-of-the-fittest; and 2) benevolence to the community.82 Critics of
transhumanism fear – with justification – that benevolence to the community will loseout when these two values conflict. And they will conflict.
Likewise, critics fear that enhancement technology can be “distributively unjust.”
Theologian Celia Dean-Drummond remarks that “one of the buried ethical problems with
transhumanism is the health injustice that it seems to promote, the disproportionate
spending on what might be termed exotic science, even while claiming to be an aspiration
for the majority of people, because such an aspiration is out of touch with even the most
simplistic concrete models of economics and development.”83 Similarly, Cahill argues
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that enhancement technology of “normal” traits is distributively unjust, since the money
that goes to making us “better than well” could be used to supply “clean water, food,
basic health care, prenatal care,” and go to AIDS prevention and research.84 Each of these
projects is more worthy of our funding than fringe research that will benefit a few
privileged individuals.85
As it turns out, according to these critics, transhumanism is an exercise in social
Darwinism at the financial level. “Transhumanism is not a philosophy for the losers, for
the poor who are slated to be left behind in the struggle for existence.”86 Only the wealthy
will (at least initially) be able to afford the technological benefits transhumanist science
has to offer. Thus, there is an inconsistency in the transhumanists claims that they want to
benefit all humanity but at the same time divert resources to fringe enhancement
technology research while forgoing therapeutic medical treatment that is available now
for many underprivileged. As such, transhumanists claims of benevolence, altruism, and
autonomy seem hollow.87
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Cahill, Theological Bioethics, 218.

85 As Ted Peters notes, “only the wealthy sectors of the modern economy are sufficiently flushed
with money to afford to invest in GNR.” (GNR means Genetics, Nano-technology, and Robotics.) Because
of this fact, what the donors want, the donors get – in this case, research into fringe technologies. Peters,
“Progress and Provolution,” 71.
86

Ibid.

87 To be fair to enhancement researchers, many are just providing the research their financial
backers want. Likewise, the potential for valuable research for all humanity will be found by these
researchers. This critique is a general claim against our priorities as a society. That is, people give a lot of
money to some fringe science project, but neglect real tangible needs facing millions every day. As such,
this criticism is not limited to enhancement technologies alone, but can be applied to many technologies
currently enjoyed by the world’s most privileged people. Do we need so much funding for research into
makeup, sexual performance pills, or entertainment?
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Further, many critics of transhumanism believe enhancement technology makes
some problematic assumptions about human nature. Transhumanists make several
general assumptions about human anthropology. Mostly, this revolves around the notion
that humans are merely biochemical machines. That is, humans can be reduced merely to
their biological parts.88 If “humans” are nothing but a collection of biochemical reactions,
then it makes no sense to talk of some static “nature.” For the transhumanist, “human
nature” is at best a heuristic of language – it does not really exist. Modern humans are
merely the current end product of a process that did not have them in mind and will
discard them at some point in the future. This ever changing process diminishes the idea
that humans could be the result of a divine act of creation.89 For the average
transhumanist the “I” is an illusion created by a brain trying to make sense of its
surroundings. There is no real self. Just “a symbolic and emotional system that is
constructed to reflect a judiciously compressed and distorted version of the actual mind
of which it’s a part. None of us is really our selves.”90 This view – that humans are best
understood in reductionist’s terms – has garnered the most resistance by transhumanism’s
critics. Any position that says our common experience of our selves is wrong – such as

88 Ibid., 75. This is something of an inconsistency with Buchanan. He laments the physicalist
reductionism of humanity on one hand (cf., Ibid., 43), but embraces it in the other (cf., his discussion on
evolution, Ibid., 155—158). Likewise, James Hughes takes contemporary neuroscience to mean that a
“substantial self” is an illusion – that is, humans are merely their biochemical parts. James Hughes,
“Transhumanism and Personal Identity,” in The Transhumanist Reader: Classical and Contemporary
Essays on the Science, Technology, and Philosophy of the Human Future, ed. by Max More and Natasha
Vita-More (Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 228—229.
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90 Ben Goertzel, “Artificial General Intelligence and the Future of Humanity,” in The
Transhumanist Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, Technology, and Philosophy
of the Human Future, ed. by Max More and Natasha Vita-More (Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons, 2013),
130—131.
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the idea that the “self” is simply an illusion – carries an enormous burden of proof. For it
seems obvious “Our bodies are ourselves: yet we are also more than our bodies.”91 We
assume our “self” is real, not illusory. That our language, “me”, “us”, “we”, “them”, “I”,
and so on apply to real people, real minds, real selves. Some Feminist scholars have taken
issue with predominate assumptions in transhumanist literature that assume a masculine,
western, modern, capitalistic perspective.92 From their perspective the problem with
transhumanism is that it offers too simple a construction of the human person – it does
not account for the “complex, and context-dependent, approaches to the ‘biological’
world.”93 Thus, even while enhancement technologies could contribute to alternative
understandings of the human body, proponents of enhancement technology are often
stuck within their own social location and make judgements about the human body from
that position.94

91 Lynda Birke, “Biological Sciences,” in Blackwell Companions to Philosophy: A Companion to
Feminist Philosophy, ed. by Alison M. Jaggar and Iris Marion Young (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.,
1998), 194.
92 For example, feminist author Lynda Birke criticizes any approach that fully embraces “the
logical positivism that characterizes scientific thinking” and neglects “the social situatedness of the knower
and on the theory-laden nature of scientific inquiry.” Birke, “Biological Sciences,” 195.
93 Ibid. Bioethicist Amy Michelle DeBaets concurs that humans cannot be simply reduced to
neurological information patterns in the brain. “We humans are not merely the sums of our brains; we are
embodied beings whose experience of the world is heavily dependent upon the types of bodies that we
have.” Amy Michelle DeBaets, “Rapture of the Geeks: Singularitariansim, Feminism, and Yearning for
Transcendence,” in Religion and Transhumanism: The Unknown Future of Human Enhancement, ed. by
Calvin Mercer and Tracy J. Trothen (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2015), 184. For thinkers like DeBaets,
humans are simply not reducible to functioning brains or wills. Rather, humans are fully embodied
creatures.93 Critiquing Kurzweil directly, DeBaets remarks that Kurzweil’s vision of a future singularity is
based in his wealthy, privileged status, as a white Western man – and his visions of an “ideal” future are
reflective of his social situation. Ibid., 185—191.
94 One issue that should be addressed is how enhancement technology reinforces or is challenged
by a socially constructed view of the body. Feminist philosopher Judith Butler remarks that one's gender is
the product of one's performance (i.e., habits) over time, but what people perform is a direct result of the
actions they think are acceptable per their cultural and social conditioning. Thus, deep identity
producing issues such as one's gender are the products of what one's society thinks is “normal.” See her
Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’” (New York: Routledge, 1993), 1—16. Feminist
philosophers Judith Lorber and Patricia Yancey Martin concur with Butler's observations. They remark,
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Likewise, some critics fear that enhancement technology may endanger currently
possessed “goods.” There are three goods often mentioned as being endangered by
transhumanism: the natural body, human dignity, and religion. The displacement of the
natural body – even in light of many transhumanists aspirations to enhance physical
sensation – is desirable only within a particular masculine, western, and privileged

“people whose bodies comply with valued conventions are admired, praised, and held up to others as ideals
to be emulated. In short, by judging, rewarding, and punishing people of different body sizes, shapes,
weights, and musculature, members of a social group persuade and coerce each other to construct socially
acceptable – and similar-looking – bodies.” Lorder and Martin, “The Socially Constructed Body: Insights
From Feminist Theory,” in Illuminating Social Life: Classical and Contemporary Theory Revisited, ed. by
Peter Kivisto, 4th ed. (Los Angeles: Pine Forge Press, 2008): 230.
This is important for our purposes because if it is the case that how we view the body (and what is
“normal” for the body) is a product of one's culture and not just a biological reality, then it follows that
enhancement technologies engineered to reinforce certain notions of what the body should be (whether
male or female; size; shape; etc.) is to a significant degree determined by one’s society and will reflect that
society’s values (for good or for ill). Thus, it is possible that some enhancement projects reinforce a view of
the human person that prioritizes certain “types” of people over others, thus reinforcing current power
structures. For example, Ray Kurzweil has an alternate female persona (Ramona) that he adopts sometimes
online. One could say that this just shows how blurry the line is between males and females. However, the
way Kurzweil portrays Ramona reinforces Western Masculine stereotypes of what the “perfect” woman
would look like. Feminist Theologian Amy Michelle DeBaets takes exception to Kurzweil's
presumptiveness as a middle-class male to: 1) know what it is like to actually be a woman; and 2) to
reinforce a particular stereotype of women that many feminist authors are trying to eliminate. DeBaets says
it is fine if Kurzweil wants to pretend to be a woman in virtual space, but she states he clearly does not
know what it is like to be a real woman. For Kurzweil’s descriptions of womanhood reinforce western
masculine notions of perfect femininity. DeBaets, “Rapture of the Geeks,” 185. This is a significant
shortcoming as far as DeBaets is concerned. What can be applied specifically to Kurzweil, can be applied
to the transhumanist movement in general.
One does not have to accept only this vision of the enhancement project as a reinforcement of
sexual and gendered prejudices of the body. Some enhancements may actually serve to subvert and
possibly eliminate such prejudices. For example, coupling certain cybernetic notions of what the body
should be like, with a transference of neural activity to those bodies, and having undergone moral
enhancement, (theoretically) it would be possible that future cybernetic bodies are androgynous (unless
chosen otherwise) and thus people would be able to experience the world through these cybernetic
interfaces (sometimes as male and othertimes as female – if these terms even still retain meaning at that
point). Likewise, with the (presumed) judgements made via moral enhancement, whether one chooses a
male, female, or androgynous body, there would be no negative moral judgment made toward that person.
Of course, even under this conception the choice of which bodies to inhabit (or avoid altogether) is likewise
the result of the communal and social judgements of our future and enhanced selves. As such, the issue
of whether we will ever exculpate ourselves from having a socially constructed view of the body, the
answer appears to be "no." However, given the current trends in enhancement technology, the day is
coming when we may be able to pick how that body looks and responds to environmental
and social elements.
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status.95 Similarly, others fear that transhumanism will introduce the loss of human
dignity. There is a fear that applying technology to our inner-selves will dehumanize us
and cut us off “from our otherwise spontaneous joy at being natural creatures.”96 Celia
Deane-Drummond is concerned that people who choose to forgo enhancement will be
deemed irresponsible by the enhanced class. The pressure to sacrifice one’s values for the
sake of cyberculture would be immense.97 Critics are anxious that the push to make
people “better” at nearly all-costs will actually cost us ourselves. It is a devil’s bargain.
Finally, religion too becomes precarious in a society based strictly on philosophical
naturalism and empiricism. Indeed, many transhumanists see religion as “palliative for
people faced with death. Religion brings an acceptance of death, and comfort with that
acceptance.”98 Since many transhumanists hope to alleviate death through technological
might, religion is an obstacle for motivating people to pursue life-extension

95 As such, some feminist philosophers and theologians cast a skeptical eye to transhumanism’s
promises. For example, Alison Adam says transhumanism’s masculine cyberculture which attempts to
transcend the body “holds little obvious appeal for feminists.” Adam, “Feminist AI Projects and
Cyberfutures,” 282. For Adam, there are some real goods associated with the body that many
transhumanists dismiss as a relic of the past. For instance, per transhumanist predictions, shopping in a
retail store is a thing of the past – online shopping is the future. But for Adam, this “denies the complex
physical and emotional pleasures of bargain hunting [or] the serendipitous find.” Ibid. One could easily add
the comradery of shopping with friends, trying on clothes to see if they fit, handling various gadgets to
judge weight, etc. As simple as this pleasure is, it is something she does not wish to forgo – yet its
disappearance is all but guaranteed in the transhumanist vision of the future. Her humble plea is that “some
of us may not wish to lose the pleasures of the meat [i.e., body].” Ibid. Adam wants to retain the complex
bodily emotions and experiences that transhumanism would dismiss.
96 Ibid., 76—77. Leading transhumanist critic Francis Fukuyama is confident that enhancement
technologies will eventually sacrifice human dignity. Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future:
Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (New York: Picador, 2003), 173.
97 The dignity of the unenhanced person may not be “violated” per se, but it would certainly be
diminished as the burden to yield to technique would increase. Indeed, this pressure raises the specter of
eugenics, and it hangs over the transhumanist agenda like a dark cloud. The idea of a “shared human
condition” – which Catholic social teaching is hinged – would be void in a transhumanist future, since there
would be no shared human condition. Dean-Drummond, “Taking Leave of the Animal?,” 124.
98
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enhancements. For there is no need to pursue technological immortality if religious
immortality is an easier route. Transhumanism tends to dismiss religious belief as
outmoded, anti-progress, and too conservative – religion is a roadblock to enhancement.99
Transhumanists see religion as an “atavistic commitment to the past . . . [resisting]
anything new.”100 But theologians are not resistant to change per se, but rather are
resistant to “the naïveté on the part of those who put their faith in progress, especially
technological progress.”101 The problem is human hubris in thinking we know what is
best. Our intentions are often good, but the unintended consequences can be disastrous.
We have a naïve “sense of control or false sense of dominance that technological
victories over nature might elicit.”102 In a very real sense, we do not control our
technologies – they control us. And yet, we operate as though we are in total control of
our respective destinies.
1.4 Assumptions of the Dissertation
This project operates from a Christian perspective, but it is not a biblical study
interacting with transhumanism. Rather, this project will act on the assumption that the
Bible has authority for Christians. Likewise, my starting points can be identified as
having a basis in the Bible. However, it is not necessary for someone to read this project
and carry the same assumptions. The argument should be able to stand on its own. As
such, while this is not a biblical study into transhumanism, the biblical basis for my
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religious convictions will appear mostly in this section and only periodically in the
following chapters.
My perspective is that of an Evangelical Protestant who is greatly influenced by
the Catholic intellectual tradition – especially by the thought of Thomas Aquinas. As
such, the use of the term “Christian” in this dissertation applies to anyone who identifies
with the beliefs and practices of the three great branches of the Christian tradition:
Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Protestant.103 While this project will try to
represent what C. S. Lewis called a “mere Christianity,”104 it is recognized that not all
Christians fall into neat categories, nor will all Christians agree with my assumptions.
Thus, what follows is a brief itemization of what I understand as common to almost all
(traditional) Christians.105
First, there is one God who exists eternally (1 Tim. 1:17) in a triune nature –
Father, Son, and Holy Ghost (Matt. 28:19; 2 Cor. 13:14). This God is omniscient (Ps.
139), omnipotent (Ps. 115:3), omnibenevolent (1 John 4:8), omnipresent (Heb. 4:13),
immaterial (John 4:24), immutable (Mal. 3:6), and self-existing (John 5:26). This God is

103 While I will attempt to represent a position compatible with all three traditions, a note needs to
be said about their differences. Most of the differences revolve around how groups view the authority of the
church magisterium. Catholics have historically held the Pope and cardinals as representative of the
Christian faith and are generally accepted as authoritative on matters of life and faith. Eastern Orthodox,
likewise, looks to Bishops as authoritative in the Church, but rejected the Catholic notion that the Pope is to
supersede regional Bishops in authority. Further, Protestants (typically) reject the Catholic magisterium as
being representative of all Christians for faith and practice. For Protestants, there is a stress on individual
righteousness before God, and one’s own personal relationship with God through Christ. This means that
Christians need no other mediator to God other than Christ. In any case, these differences should not really
come “into play” for this project.
104

C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (1943; repr., New York: Touchstone, 1996).

105 Many of the elements that follow should be recognizable to anyone who is familiar with the
“great” creeds of Christendom: Apostolic, Nicene, Chalcedonian, and Athanasian. See Philip Schaff, ed.
The History of the Creeds, vol. 1 of The Creeds of Christendom: With a History and Critical Notes (1931;
repr., Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1983).
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distinct from its creation (Gen. 1:1), and anything that does not have the principle of
existence in itself, owes its existence (ultimately) to God (Ex. 3:14; Col. 1:15-17).
Further, the second person of the Godhead became incarnate in the Jewish
peasant, Jesus of Nazareth (John 1:1, 14). Jesus lived an impeccable life (Heb. 4:15),
preached the arrival of God’s Kingdom (Mark 1:15), performed miracles (Mark 1:34),
and disrupted local political and religious institutions (Mark 11:15-19). For causing these
disruptions He was thus crucified under Pontius Pilate the day before the Jewish Passover
(Luke 23). On the following Sunday he was resurrected and began appearing to His
disciples and a few skeptics over a period of forty days (Luke 24; 1 Cor. 15:3-8). After
forty days, Jesus ascended into the heavens with the promise of returning at some point in
the future (Acts 1:9-11).
Third, Jesus’ crucifixion somehow satisfies the “sin debt” humans owe to God
(Heb. 9:24-28). Humans are naturally sinful (Rom. 2:9-20), meaning we are selfish, selfcentered, and we often neglect God’s direction to attend to God Himself, fellow man, and
creation. Believers in Jesus are “covered” by Jesus’ death and their sins are not
accountable to them in the final judgment (Rom. 5:6-11). Jesus’ resurrection, however,
shows His mastery over death (1 Cor. 15:26-28) and the promise of new life to those that
believe in Him (1 Cor. 15:57). All humans will be resurrected into new bodies (1 Cor.
15:51-52; Rev. 20) – some to blessedness, others to punishment.
Fourth, humans are made in God’s image (Gen. 9:6). We are inspirited bodies;
“dust that breathes”106 (Gen. 2:7); body and soul (1 Thess. 5:23). We have both an inner

106 William Schweiker, Dust that Breathes: Christian Faith and the New Humanisms (Malden,
MA: Wiley-Blackwell Pub., 2010).
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and outer life – spiritual and physical. Our spiritual life is nourished by worshipping God,
participating in various sacraments, prayer, and service to others. Those who trust in
Christ are called to live holy lives. There are other religious assumptions as well, but for
the purposes of this project these should suffice.
Just as there are religious assumptions, there are also a few philosophical
assumptions. This project will defend those philosophical assumptions at the appropriate
time. For example, it is assumed that humans are a body and soul unity. That is, before
even engaging in arguments about human nature, I have already adopted a position on
this issue. However, it is recognized that this position must be argued for, not simply
presupposed. What humans “are” is a significant question, and one that is crucial to the
thesis of this project. Hence, merely assuming a main point would be inadequate for
anyone skeptical of the project.
Another assumption is that technology is important, but it is not inevitably
progressive. That is, not all technology leads to good. Technology is neutral and may be
used for good or bad. It just so happens that some technologies are capable of magnifying
good or bad effects. Computers for example can be used to help people (as in the case of
medical testing, academic research, and data collection) or it can be used to harm people
(cyber-bullying, falsifying information, soliciting immoral activity, etc.). Are computers
good or bad? The answer, of course, is neither. But what is true of computers is true of
almost all technology.107

107 Transhumanist proponent Mark Walker says something similar in what he calls the “dual use”
of technology. In the same way that a particular technology may be coopted for some other (unintended)
use, so too can a particular technology be coopted for good or bad ends. Walker, “Ship of Fools,” 101.
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One last assumption to be addressed is the issue of Darwinian evolution. For the
purposes of this project I will assume standard evolutionary theory. I recognize that
within certain Christian circles this is unwarranted maneuver. However, this project is not
dedicated to either defending or attacking biological evolution. Rather, it is addressing a
particular issue (i.e., human enhancement) and how Christians can determine to accept or
reject different enhancements. Indeed, for Allen Buchanan, evolution is the primary
driver of our moral development.108 As such, I will attempt to meet the challenge “head
on,” rather than proposing a completely different set of parameters to carry the
discussion.
Likewise, under the assumption that humans have, and are, evolved the question
of whether there even is a human nature takes on a different tone than if humans are
specially created. For under a strict “creationist” viewpoint, humans have an essential
nature that is given directly by God and is incapable of changing. Christians who accept
evolutionary theory have a couple of options at their disposal. First, many Christians have
conceded that the physical body evolved over time, but maintain that God creates a
distinct soul for each person (usually at conception). But this maneuver seems to run into
the problem of being an arbitrary addition. For it attempts to make a distinction when no
clear line seems possible. Put differently, if humans evolved, at what point did our
ancestors gain a soul? There seems to be too much continuity to allow for an arbitrary
distinction.109 A second option, following Nancy Murphy is to maintain that humans do
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Buchanan, Beyond Humanity?, 75.

109 Nancy Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2006), 48—49. Theologian Terrence Nichols acknowledges this problem and offers an intriguing
alternative explanation. He says that the issue is not the creation of the soul per se, but rather the
relationship God has with the soul that “raises the soul” to the level of a human being in God’s image.
Under this conception, there is a continuous biological line from our earliest ancestors to today, but the
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not need souls to be thought “different” from other mammals. Indeed, she takes it that our
humble background in evolutionary development is “deeply biblical.”110 Evolutionary
theory, thus, challenges traditional essentialism (though, interestingly, does not do away
with it necessarily), and within the enhancement debate it challenges any antienhancement argument based on some essential nature. Therefore, part of this project is
dedicated to exploring if anything identifiable as “human” can be found even in light of
an evolutionary backdrop.
1.5 Format of the Dissertation
1.5.1 Thesis and Argument of the Dissertation
This project seeks to provide a paradigm for Christian theologians to talk about
human enhancement in light of the transhumanist goals.111 In what follows I will argue
that Christians can allow for forms of “moderate enhancement” but should resist
engaging in forms of “radical enhancement”. The reason for this distinction, how it is
made, and why the distinction matters has been discussed somewhat above and will
continue to be revealed as the project proceeds. Suffice to say at this point, that the
transhumanist agenda and enhancement technologies in their “radical” form is at
fundamental odds with Christian theology in ways that “moderate” enhancement is not.
souls of only the most recent ancestors – Nichols suggests Cro-Magnon as the starting point – had a nascent
relationship with God. Nichols reasoning here is that it is at this stage in human evolutionary history that
our ancestors began to observe burial practices due to an apparent belief in an afterlife. See Terrence L.
Nichols, The Sacred Cosmos: Christian Faith and the Challenge of Naturalism (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos
Press, 2003), 140, 176—177.
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111 Again, please note that “enhancement” should not be considered synonymous with
“transhumanism.” All transhumanists are for enhancement, but not all those for enhancement could be
labeled transhumanists. As should become clear, transhumanism is a general philosophical outlook in
regards to the use of enhancement technologies.
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This project will show that Christians can embrace many forms of enhancement
technology without having to sacrifice significant theological commitments.
“Acceptable” forms of enhancement (i.e., moderate) are contrasted with “unacceptable”
forms of enhancement (i.e., radical). Embracing radical enhancement would require
considerable theological abandonment, for radical-enhancement makes assumptions
about human persons at odds with traditional Christian notions. Likewise, this project
will offer a way to navigate the spectrum of enhancement technologies. It will propose a
hermeneutic that can be used by Christians (or if slightly modified by anyone else) who
want to think through the implications of enhancement technologies. This project’s thesis
therefore can be stated as such: Based in a philosophical ensouled understanding of
human agency and a robust theological understanding of the imago Dei, Christians can
allow and endorse modes of “moderate enhancement,” but should avoid promoting,
participating, and probably should encourage the prohibition of most forms of “radical
enhancement.”
1.5.2 Methodology
Methodologically, this project will be mainly dialectical. It will assess arguments
and counter-arguments on various related topics in hopes that an appropriate resolution
can be reached. The reason for this approach is two-fold: first, it is hoped that it will
reduce the possibility of error in thought. Faulty arguments should not knowingly be
held. Secondly, proper conclusions are often gray – not black-and-white. True answers
are rarely “clear cut.” While the central path is often difficult to walk – as it “takes fire”
from both sides – it more often than not avoids the excesses and errors of
counterbalancing rivals. This is a decidedly Aristotelian approach to the topic. In the
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same way Aristotle saw a golden mean for ethical action, the principle of finding a
middle path in difficult topics characterizes the whole of Aristotle’s thought. For
example, Aristotle’s hylomorphism is a half-way point between monism and realism –
neither a denial of essences, nor a full acceptance of their separated existence. Likewise,
he saw humans as neither gods nor beasts, but something in the middle. This theme of
navigating extremes is a hallmark of Aristotle, and it is a quality this project attempts to
emulate.
Further, this approach invites conversation from non-theologians. While this
project will take a primarily theological stance, it will not be limited to such a narrow
discussion. I will attempt to think about this topic “Christianly,” but will not restrict my
interlocutors to only Christian sources. While I am trying to understand the implications
of this topic for Christian theology, I do not want to limit the implications to Christian
theology alone. The transhumanist agenda will affect all of humanity, not just Christians.
This approach mirrors that which William Schweiker calls “multidimensional
thinking.”112 In multidimensional thinking a range of disciplinary fields are employed to
answer a basic question. The fear is that by sticking to one “autonomous” discipline, the
answer(s) provided will be too limiting to meet our needs as multidimensional beings. As
Schweiker notes, “the burden placed on any intellectual practice aimed at knowledge is to
specify those points at which it is linked to other disciplines given shared interests.
Knowledge is a complex, reflexive network; it is a space of warranted intelligibility or

112 William Schweiker, “On Religious Ethics,” in The Blackwell Companion to Religious Ethics,
ed. by William Schweiker (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2005), 4.
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reasonability.”113 Essentially, we need a broad scope to determine the legitimacy of an
answer to a question. The narrow focus that comes from an autonomous approach may
yield important information but will nevertheless be ultimately incomplete. Hence, there
is the need for interdisciplinary studies which look for “lateral links” upon reflection and
communication of shared ideas.114
Theologically this project is an act of reflection. It will engage with the Christian
past and present in hopes of charting an appropriate course for the future. Christianity, as
an historically rooted and conditioned tradition, is not static – it is alive and evolving.
The Christian faith, while maintaining a traditional stability, is at the same time dynamic
and ever developing.115 Theological judgments are not simply repetition of past
conclusions, rather they are informed by the past but made alive as they are engaged with
present realities. Following Alistair McFadyen’s observation, theology is “expected to
illuminate secular discourses, drawing them into relation to a theological framework: to
the attestation of the triune God’s relation to, presence and action in the world.”116
Theological reflection is to be in conversation with secular disciplines, for if all “truth” is
God’s truth, then wherever truth is found, so too is God. McFadyen succinctly states it
this way, “the theological task is to discern and then show to secular discourse its own
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Ibid.
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Ibid.

115 Alistair McFadyen, Bound to Sin: Abuse, Holocaust and the Christian Doctrine of Sin (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 51.
116

Ibid., 52.
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inner truth. If truth is one in God and God is related to the whole of reality, then nothing
that is true about the world can be unrelated to God.”117
1.5.3 Forthcoming Chapters
Chapter 2 takes up two competing views of human nature. It will contrast
physicalist notions of human nature against those of substance dualists. The physicalist
position is often thought to be a purely “scientific” view of human nature. This position is
the primary transhumanist view of humanity. That is, that humans are merely evolved
animals. This mere physicalist approach to human nature is almost universally adhered to
by transhumanists and most rely on standard philosophers and biologists as sufficient
grounds for accepting this view of humanity. This will be contrasted with substance
dualism in which humans are thought to be souls with a body. This approach not only
acknowledges that there is an immaterial aspect to humans, but this immaterial aspect
actually is the most important thing about us. For it is within the soul that our identity,
emotions, memories, and intellect are found. After elaborating both of these views, this
chapter will offer a brief evaluation and show the inadequacies of both viewpoints.
Chapter 3 proceeds in three parts. The first will examine the historical roots of
ensoulment as established by Aristotle and Aquinas. The second part looks at the
philosophical account of human nature. Looking at contemporary topics on the
philosophy of mind will provide a foundation for discussing ensoulment. Indeed, this
chapter argues that this approach best establishes our daily experience of our own lives.
The third section will then consider two theological notions important to the discussion
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Ibid., 54.
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on human nature – the imago Dei and being loved by God. This section will look at the
theological basis for teaching humans are in a special relationship to God and creation.
This chapter will end with a discussion on what is thought to be the best understanding of
human nature in considering the scientific, philosophical, and theological evidence.
Chapter 4 takes a moral turn and compares the ethical notion of “personhood”
versus “human nature.” Transhumanists tend to avoid the idea of “human nature” since
most do not think the term has any merit (per, their physicalist notions covered in chapter
2). Rather, they rely on concepts of “personhood” to develop ethical positions on what is
or is not appropriate in relation to some enhancement technology. This chapter has two
main sections. The first presents the common transhumanist notion that “personhood” is
the only morally relevant criteria for ethics. Usually this is based in some type of capacity
that is able to be performed by the subject. The second section will argue that
“personhood” is inadequate as the sole basis for an ethical system – “personhood” is
simply too limiting to account for all situations. Thus, a robust form of “human nature” is
needed, but even human nature has its limitations. This chapter will conclude that
“human nature” should play a role in determining moral issues, for “what” something is
greatly determines “what” it is due. What is needed, however, is a robust view that
combines aspects of both “personhood” and “human nature” to arrive at an acceptable
moral vocabulary.
Chapter 5 is thus an attempt at establishing that moral vocabulary left by the
inadequacies of “personhood” and “human nature.” This chapter will argue for the
sufficiency of “human agency” as the proper moral grounding for discussing
enhancement technologies. Indeed, this chapter will argue that an Agency of Relational
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Responsibility (ARR) is the most appropriate moral language for our discussions about
enhancement technologies. ARR acknowledges a thick understanding of the concept
“good” coupled with the realization that “good” is apprehended not in isolation, but in
community with others. Likewise, ARR takes relationality and responsibility as essential
contributions for understanding the lived human experience. As relational, humans have
a view of self, society, and recognize specific power relations (both justified and
unjustified). As responsible, humans derive their sense of justice from a community
which is interpreted through their individually lived experience. This impacts both what
is meant by freedom and limitation on human action. Human actions are ultimately
interpreted by the context of that action and judgements of good or bad are based on the
assumption of that context. As such, given the values that have developed within a given
community, certain actions are quite literally impossible for the person to perform freely.
This, of course, would be a type of limitation to their freedom of action as well as a
limitation on what others can expect and demand of any given human agent. This chapter
will conclude that in light of the previous chapters, human persons have an inviolable
nature which is respected by ARR – this conclusion should guide future action and
deliberation of consequences for future actions.
With these previous issues established, chapter 6 examines the difference between
“moderate” and “radical” enhancement. This chapter will look largely to the work of
Nicholas Agar as the primary expositor of this position. Following Allen Buchanan, it
will show why a true “pros” and “cons” approach to enhancement technology is actually
wrongheaded. Likewise, it will show why being “pro” or “anti” enhancement is actually
impossible in our given societal context. This chapter will show what makes any given
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enhancement “radical” and why it is important to make the designation. Further, this
chapter will introduce a way to consider thinking about enhancement technologies in
relation to the previous issues discussed. That is, it presents a theological hermeneutic for
considering enhancement technologies.
Chapter 7 is the culmination of preceding work. It is here were it will be reiterated
why Christians can accept “moderate enhancement” but not “radical enhancement.”
Likewise, this chapter will delineate additional problems Christian theology will need to
address should we actually obtain “radical enhancement.” The ultimate plea of the
chapter is not novel, but it seems to be the motivating factor for much of the enhancement
agenda – what proponents of radical-enhancement seek, Christians offer in the hope of
resurrection.
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Chapter 2
Anthropological Alternatives: Physicalism and Substance Dualism
Our nature no doubt contributes something important to the general shape of
morality and of the good life for us. It is quite another matter to think that an
appeal to human nature can tell us whether we should undertake this or that
enhancement or to avoid enhancements altogether.
— Allen Buchanan, Beyond Humanity, 7
If technology is replacing human characteristics then despite the urgency it
imposes – at stake is nothing less than the future of human nature and activity – it
makes the ethical task remarkably clear. The task is (1) to determine which
characteristics cannot be replaced without destroying human nature itself; and (2)
to establish why human nature, so understood, should not be destroyed. It is, in
short, to come up with a normative conception of the human.
— Gerald P. McKenny, “Technology”, 465
2.1 Introduction
Gilbert Meileander remarks that bioethics has lost its notion of the soul. That is,
bioethics “has to some considerable degree turned away from exploration of the most
fundamental questions about who we are and should be.”1 He continues to note that all
methods and theories operate from some background beliefs (i.e., worldview). It is,
therefore, incumbent upon us to examine those background beliefs that led to the
rejection of a belief in the soul. Likewise, it needs to be explored if there are some
reasons that commend themselves to thinking the soul is a real thing.
But, if there is anything such as a soul, then this would be part of the nature of
human beings, which is also a highly disputed concept. Given this controversy, it seems
nearly impossible to state when human nature has been violated, whether through
inappropriate actions or illicit use of technology. Not only do those with different

1 Gilbert Meileander, Body, Soul, and Bioethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1995), 2.
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worldviews disagree over what it means to be human, but those with the same worldview
do not have a singular notion of what it means to be human.2 Lisa Sowle Cahill remarks
that religious traditions do not offer any “absolute definitions” of human nature, hence
even religions cannot “specify clearly what is and is not a transgression, in the sense of a
breach or change of the ‘the natural’ that upsets divinely ordained limits.”3
How then shall we proceed? On one hand, enhancement technology wants to
make humans better, but on the other hand, there is no agreement on what it means to be
human – and thus, what human characteristics can or should be improved.4 Gerald
McKenny rightly notes that the enhancement debate is ultimately about determining a
“normative conception of human nature.”5 First, there is the need to identify which, if
any, human characteristics can be enhanced without destroying the human. The second,
task is show why humans are valuable. But both of these tasks need a robust view of
human nature. Yet, not all views of human nature are compatible. For the philosophical
materialist, it is the body alone that is human. Hence, any understanding of humanity not

2 This does not mean, however, that consideration of worldviews is unimportant. Indeed, it is
necessary given the impact one’s worldview has on their perception of humanity. As Terrence Nichols
agrees, “Our concepts about human origins, nature, and destiny are critical for our conceptions of who we
are and what we should do in this life. . . . If we see ourselves as mere collections of molecules, the
accidental spin-offs of a random process, with no intrinsic meaning or purpose in life, and no hope of
afterlife, a negative self-concept is likely.” Terrence L. Nichols, The Sacred Cosmos: Christian Faith and
the Challenge of Naturalism (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2003), 125.
3 Lisa Sowle Cahill, Theological Bioethics: Participation, Justice, Change (Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Press, 2005), 222.
4 Indeed, there is a real sense that enhancement technologies require a reevaluation of what it
means to be human. “The emerging revolution in biotechnology challenges us to redefine human nature for
the sake of technological development. Advances in genetic engineering, pre-implantation genetic
diagnosis, cybernetics, robotics, and nanotechnology depend in large measure on our willingness as a
culture to recast what it means to be human” C. Ben Mitchell, “The Audacity of the Imago Dei: The
Legacy and Uncertain Future of Human Dignity,” in Imago Dei: Human Dignity in Ecumenical Perspective
(Washington, DC: The Catholic University Press of America, 2013), 79—80.
5 Gerald P. McKenny, “Technology,” in The Blackwell Companion to Religious Ethics, ed. by
William Schweiker (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2005), 465.
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ultimately rooted in that material basis will be considered an inadequate view of humans.
On the other hand, a number of philosophers and theologians will point out that there are
aspects to humans that simply cannot be reduced to a materialistic basis. And if this is so,
then any mere physicalist view of human nature would by necessity be inadequate as a
complete understanding of what humans are.
This chapter examines two competing views of human nature. The first approach
is that of the philosophical naturalist – often called just materialism or physicalism. This
position states that humans are ultimately reducible to their bio-mechanical parts – there
is no spirit, no soul, and no (immaterial) mind. Darwinian evolution fully explains human
nature as exemplified in the thought of Charles Darwin and E. O. Wilson. This leads to
two philosophical conceptions for a physicalist basis for mind: eliminativism and
functionalism. Daniel Dennett and Jerry Fodor provide the relevant insight for these
ideas.
The second part of the chapter examines the case for substance dualism. This
position holds that humans are a soul with a body. That is, aspects of humanity are best
explained by postulating the existence of an immaterial mind / soul that is somehow
connected to the body. While this position has fallen on hard times in recent decades, it
still enjoys support from some notable personalities. A brief history of this position as
expounded by Plato, St. Augustine, and Descartes will be followed by its modern
formulation by Richard Swinburne, and J. P. Moreland and Scott Rae.
The last section sums up these two positions by briefly evaluating the primary
criticisms of both physicalism and substance dualism. It will be shown that physicalism
powerfully provides empirical evidence for a biological basis of personality and identity,
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but does so at the expense of basic human experience. That is, if physicalism is correct
then much of our direct (and seemingly undeniable) experience of the world is merely
illusory. Likewise, substance dualism provides a satisfying account of personal
experience in the world, but it does so with two major drawbacks: first, it has difficulty
(historically speaking) in accounting for the interaction between the soul and the body;
and second, it seems difficult (if not impossible) for a third party to identify anyone. That
is, the first problem is explaining how both the soul / mind moves the body to interact
with the world and how the body affects the soul / mind, and the second problem is
trusting that the person with whom we are speaking really is that person and not some
other soul / mind.
2.2 Physicalism
Philosophical naturalism and materialism are the dominant positions among
professional philosophers and scientists as well as transhumanists.6 For these thinkers,
souls (if there is such a thing) are “in” bodies only metaphorically – immaterial souls
simply do not and (probably) cannot exist.7 Humans are nothing more than bodies and
brains.8 The view that there is only a material reality goes by a couple of different names:
philosophical materialism, materialism, naturalism, philosophical naturalism, and

6 Charles T. Rubin remarks that physicalists (i.e., scientific materialists) view humans as
“sophisticated machines.” And as such, transitioning humans into a transhuman or posthuman future is “no
big deal.” Charles T. Rubin, Eclipse of Man: Human Extinction and the Meaning of Progress (New York:
New Atlantis Books, 2014), 93.
7 And if “souls” really do exist in this view, then they must be viewed epiphenomenally and thus
would be dependent on the physical body.
8 Ric Machuga, In Defense of the Soul: What it Means to be Human (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos
Press, 2002), 19.
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physicalism. For the purposes of this project we will use the term “physicalism” to
describe the view that there is no supernatural reality beyond the material universe.
Yet, while physicalism is taken to normally mean that there is no supernatural
reality, there is a subset of Christian Physicalists. This group of scientifically minded
theologians accept the normal scientific thesis of the universe (and all that is in it) as
operating according to normal physical / material laws, but that nevertheless there
remains a God outside of the universe.9 The impact of what is in the universe and how the
universe should be understood, however, is almost indistinguishable from their secular
counterparts. For example, Nancy Murphy (a prominent Christian Physicalist) maintains
that humans are only physical entities, we have no “additional metaphysical element such
as a mind or soul or spirit.”10 That is, she accepts the standard physicalist explanation of
human beings. We are, according to this position, nothing but a biochemical organism.
However, she wants to avoid the reductionism that normally attends this viewpoint. Thus
for Murphy, we are “complex physical organisms, imbued with the legacy of thousands
of years of culture, and . . . the Breath of God’s Spirit; we are Spirited bodies.”11 Humans
are oriented to the supernatural even though there is no literal “soul” to save. Thus, the
resurrection of the body plays a prominent role in Murphy’s thought. Nevertheless, when
we consider all of those things that have traditionally been thought to evidence a soul –

The similarity to 18th century deism is apparent. Stated differently, these theologians seem to
have taken up the mantle of the 18th century deists, in which God exists but does not really interact with the
world. Rather, God created the world and wound it like a clock and just observes it from a distance as it
runs its natural course.
9

10

Nancy Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? (New York: Cambridge University Press,

2006), ix.
11

Ibid., (emphasis in original).
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consciousness, memory, dispositions, etc. – Murphy says are now under the “province of
brain studies.”12 For Murphy there is only brain – there is no such thing as what
traditionally called “mind.” Memories, desires, etc. are a function of the brain.
Murphy accepts the standard biological / scientific understanding of the human
person as merely a biological system – a special biological system, but a biological
system nonetheless. For her, what has traditionally been thought of as evidence of mind,
is now under the province of neuroscience. Thus, she follows the secular notions of what
it means to be human, and what it means to be alive. Now, when biologists ask what are
the requirements for “life” the answer is: “self-maintenance, growth, and reproduction.”13
Indeed, mechanistically inclined physicalists are confident in the ability of the physical
sciences to discover how the brain works so that, in theory, a computer could be created
that expresses what we consider “mind.” What “the uneducated call ‘souls’ are really
nothing but brains, i.e., complex machines.”14 Murphy states the issue well: “The
physicalist thesis is that as we go up the hierarchy of increasingly complex organisms, all
of the other capacities once attributed to the soul will also turn out to be products of
complex organization, rather than properties of a non-material entity.”15 Below we will
look at the physico-biological bases for humans as well as the physico-psychological

12 “Nonetheless, let us consider what characteristics your soul would have to retain for it to be
recognizably you who gets to heaven. Your consciousness, your memories, your likes and dislikes,
perhaps? But, as we have just seen, these are all the province of brain studies.” Ibid., 69.
13

Ibid., 57.

14

Machuga, In Defense of the Soul, 36.

15

Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?, 57 (emphasis in original).
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bases for mind. Note well, that these issues are intimately tied and cannot be completely
separated.
2.2.1 Humans as Only Physical and Biological Organisms:
The Biological Basis for Human Nature
According to Nancy Murphy, there have been three main revolutions within
Christian thought in 2000 years. The first was the abandonment of Aristotelian physics in
the 17th century. The second was the adoption of Darwinian style evolution of human
development. And the third is the current advancement in neuroscience on the nature of
human persons – where operations once identified with the soul are now identified with
the brain.16 But it is important to note that the development of modern neuroscience is a
direct product of looking at the Darwinian revolution in biological sciences, which is
itself the result of the rejection of Aristotelian physics.
The power of the Darwinian thesis, and the favorite argument put forth by
physicalists, is that the powers of natural selection guided the “phylogenetic continuity”
of nature. Humans are just one of the products of this natural process over millions of
years. By favorable reproductive rates and survival of the fittest, humans have climbed
the evolutionary scale, but at bottom, we are merely biological creatures. Thus, what our
ancestors called “souls” is nothing more than folk psychology.17 As Murphy puts it: “all
of the human capacities once attributed to the mind or soul are now being fruitfully
studied as brain processes – or, more accurately, I should say, processes involving the
brain, the rest of the nervous system and other bodily systems, all interacting with the

16

Ibid., 40.

17

Machuga, In Defense of the Soul, 36.

51

socio-cultural world.”18 One understanding of this view of the human is that we are only
one of the many animals on the planet, and do not have any special status. The line
between humans and animals is blurred the more we look at our biological beginnings.19
This section will briefly expound the historical position of this idea as found in
Charles Darwin and E. O. Wilson. Afterward we will look at the two most common
positions on the nature of mind in academic literature today: eliminativism and
functionalism. Eliminativism says that “mind” is simply identifiable with certain brain
states, and thus we can do away with any talk of “mind.” Functionalism says that a
“mind” is present when the biological parts are functioning properly. Daniel Dennett is
utilized to explain aspects of eliminativism, while Jerry Fodor is used as an exponent of
functionalism.
2.2.1.1 Humans are a Product of Evolution – Historical Background: Charles Darwin
Charles Darwin is credited with being the one who formalized a workable theory
of evolution for the modern scientific community. Through his travels on the H.M.S.
Beagle and observations from the Galapagos Islands, Darwin hypothesized that the
variation in different species could be accounted for by environmental, reproductive, and
genetic factors. “Guided” by natural selection, the surviving members of a species pass

18

Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?, 56.

19 “Biology and evolutionary theory over the last two centuries have simultaneously produced
modern organisms as objects of knowledge and reduced the line between humans and animals to a faint
trace re-etched in ideological struggle or professional disputes between life and social sciences.” Donna J.
Haraway, “A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s,” in The
Gendered Cyborg: A Reader, ed. by Gill Kirkup, Linda Janes, Kathryn Woodward, and Fiona Hovenden
(New York: Routledge, 2000), 52.
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their traits on to the next generation.20 Certain environmental pressures may favor one
trait over others. As such, species that can adapt to this pressure survive and pass their
genetic material on to the next generation. Those that cannot adapt or do not have the
appropriate genetic material will die out and their genetic lineage ceases.21 This process
of modification by descent is slow. It is recorded in geological timescales. Hence, a
species’ stability is the most deceptive aspect of its existence given how we do not notice
its transformation.22 Sometimes a genetic variation occurs which is so momentous that
the advantage gained eventually becomes present throughout the entire species. When
enough of these mutations prevail, a new species is introduced. Extrapolated to the entire
biosphere, a plausible account for the genetic similarities and differences among all living
creatures on earth emerges. Darwin’s grand idea of descent with modification gave
scientists a way to explain multiple criteria in an elegant system. Natural selection
coupled with environmental pressures and genetic reception could (in theory) account for
all of the variety of life found on earth. When applied to humans, it follows that humans
are just one branch along the evolutionary tree of life.23

20 Darwin defines natural selection as the “preservation of favourable [sic] variations and the
rejection of injurious variations.” Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species, 1859, reprint, 2nd ed. (Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), 102.
21

Ibid., 103.

22

Put differently, because species change so slowly, we mistakenly think they have an unchanging

essence.
23 Darwin states “probably all the organic beings which have ever lived on this earth have
descended from some one primordial form, into which life was first breathed.” Ibid., 303. Humans may
have different capacities than other creatures, but in a Darwinian sense of evolution, there is nothing
“special” about human beings. We are simply one among the many different types of terrestrial creatures.
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This “natural selection” works by the accumulation of infinitesimally small
inherited variations which prove to be valuable for survival.24 And it is important for the
purposes of this project since it acts as the basis for the biological understanding of how
modern homo sapiens have evolved. If it is the case that modern humans are the product
of a purposeless biological process, then the transhumanist agenda in wanting to wrest
control of human evolution from this blind process has significant merit. Why leave the
next stage of human evolution to chance?
2.2.1.2 Humans are a Product of Evolution – Contemporary Grounding: E. O. Wilson
E. O. Wilson, the famous Harvard biologist, has made significant contributions in
the way of the evolutionary and biological origins of sociability. Taking his knowledge of
evolutionary biology to the human person, Wilson is confident that humans can be
understood in completely biological terms – indeed, he thinks biology is the “key” for
understanding human nature.25 He says evolution can account for the origins of humanity
(and to a degree determines our future), current scientific studies can fully account for
how the human mind and body operate, and a thoroughgoing knowledge of biological
sociology can explain how humans are to act. This “consilience” among various branches
of human knowledge can provide a robust view of human nature.26 In Wilson’s
estimation, biology can tell us what humans are, neuroscience can tell us what and how

24 “Natural selection can act only by the preservation and accumulation of infinitesimally small
inherited modifications, each profitable to the preserved being.” Darwin, On the Origin of Species, 74.
25

Edward O. Wilson, On Human Nature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), 13.

26

Edward O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1998),

81.
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humans think, and bio-sociology can tell us how humans should act.27 Thus, there is no
need to introduce any notion of an immaterial “mind” or “soul.” Indeed, for Wilson we
are on the verge of a complete scientific understanding of all relevant criteria for what
makes humans “human.”28 The brain is simply an organ for survival and reproduction –
its ability to reason is a side-effect of needing to meet these two primary purposes.29
It is not surprising that Wilson, the model biologist, sees biology as the clue to
achieving total consilience.30 Nor is it difficult to see why the scientists and materialists
are so confident in what science can do and will prove. The past four hundred years have
been one massive success story regarding the advances of science. Once the universe was
scrutinized against basic physical laws and supernatural causes were removed from the
equation, scientific learning exploded.31 There seemed to be absolutely nothing that a
philosophically materialistic view of science could not answer. “All roads to the truth will

27

Ibid.

28

Ibid.

29

Wilson, On Human Nature, 2.

30 “Everything in this world is organized in terms of a small number of natural laws and that these
laws comprise the principles underlying all branches of learning.” Amitrajeet Batabyal, “Book Reviews,”
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 12 (2000): 223. Wilson states, the “most complex
systems known to exist in the universe are biological, and by far the most complex of all biological
phenomena is the human mind. If brain and mind are at base biological phenomena, it follows that the
biological sciences are essential to achieving coherence among all the branches of learning, from the
humanities on down to the physical sciences.” Wilson, Consilience, 81.
31 In each area in which supernaturalism held sway initially, but was then challenged by scientific
evidence, supernaturalism lost. “During the seventeenth century, through what has become known as the
scientific revolution, a mechanistic view of nature gradually displaced a more organic view of nature—at
least among the best educated and scientifically inclined. Over the next three centuries, this mechanistic
view was to become the dominant view of the world. Left behind were the Aristotelian and Thomistic
approach, with its talk of act and potency, form and matter, formal and final cause, as well as the
Neoplatonic approach, represented by Bonaventure, and (in a very different way) by the tradition of
Renaissance magic, a vitalist view of nature, epitomized in Paracelsus. The ‘mechanistic philosophy,’ as it
was called, entailed major changes in the understanding of matter, of causality, and of God.” Terrence L.
Nichols, The Sacred Cosmos: Christian Faith and the Challenge of Naturalism (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos
Press, 2003), 41.
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be scientific.”32 When this long success story is applied to our current topic we can see
why scientists are so confident that eventually philosophers and theologians will give-in
and admit to the materialistic basis of mind. Philosophers and theologians of mind have
assigned so many emergent properties to physical reactions, that it is only a matter of
time before the entire mind is shown to have a material basis.
It is believed that the elements for what makes the brain work (neurons,
neurotransmitters, etc.) are fairly well known. What is lacking is an understanding of
what brings them together to create cognition and consciousness.33 However long it takes
to completely map the brain and all of its connections, Wilson is confident that this will
be accomplished. And given the successful history of science, he considers it a forgone
conclusion that the physical basis of mind will be mapped through its patterns of neural
activity.34 At bottom, humans are simply a biological species born in an environment
conducive to evolutionary advancement.35 The brain was shaped by epigenetic rules (i.e.,
hereditary regularities in development) through the millennia.36 There is nothing
immaterial about this process. According to Wilson, what the Enlightenment started and

32 Charles Gillispie, “E. O. Wilson’s Consilience: A Noble, Unifying Vision, Grandly Expressed,”
in Amercian Scientist, www.americanscientist.org/bookshelf/id.2479,content_true_css_print/bookshelf.aspx
(accessed March 27, 2012).
33

Wilson, Consilience, 109.

34

Ibid., 135. For Wilson the issue is when this will happen, not if.

35 “Among paleolithic peoples, the genes imprinted upon individual minds certain pathways for
mental development, certain epigenetic rules which, taken together, compose the complex that is human
nature.” Gillispie, “E. O. Wilson’s Consilience: A Noble, Unifying Vision, Grandly Expressed.”
36

Wilson, Consilience, 223.
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Romanticism continued, but ultimately failed to provide is nearly within our grasp – “the
physical basis of mind.”37
Given this biological reality there are a number of consequences that follow. That
the brain is a machine geared for survival is the most obvious.38 For our purposes,
though, we will only examine some areas to which Wilson draws specific attention:
objective knowledge; artificial intelligence; and free will. The first fallout from a
materialistically based reality is that scientific inquiry can yield objective knowledge. 39
The argument runs as such: There is a universe outside our brain and only crazy persons
(and some philosophers) doubt its real existence. Our brain synthesizes the sensory inputs
imposed on it from this reality and creates concepts – there is no “ghost in the machine”
or soul putting this data together. However, this data is subject to perspective distortion.
“The proper task of scientists is to diagnose and correct the misalignment. . . . No one
should suppose that objective truth is impossible to attain . . . . In particular it is too early
for scientists, the foot soldiers of epistemology, to yield ground so vital to their
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Ibid., 61.

38 Ibid., 96. But also, what we call “meaning” is nothing but the “linkage among neural networks.”
Likewise, “decision making,” is simply “competitive selection among scenarios” looking at “winning
scenarios” or “favorable states.” What we call “mood” is simply a “persistent form and intensity of
emotion.” Further, “creativity” is no more than the brain’s ability to “generate novel scenarios and settle on
the most effective among them.” However, if the brain cannot stop producing multiple scenarios, the brain
can rightfully be called “insane.” Ibid., 115.
39 “Criteria of objective truth might be attainable through empirical investigation. The key lies in
clarifying the still poorly understood operations composing the mind and in improving the piecemeal
approach science has taken to its material properties.” Ibid., 60.
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mission.”40 Wilson staunchly defends the possibility of objective knowledge despite cries
that our individual perspectives mitigates such an understanding.41
The second consequence for Wilson is that since all thought is determined by
biochemical and neural stimulation, in theory it is possible to have a true “artificial
intelligence” (AI). However, though this is theoretically true, in practice it will be a long
time before science has a sufficient grasp of the inner-workings to make a true AI.42
Given our current technology we can only approximate AI. It is not enough, he says, to
approximate the functional complexity of the brain, because the continuous flux of
mental activity is to a large part regulated by emotions. As such, to have a true AI would
also need an account of a true “artificial emotion” (AE) and science has a long way to go
in developing anything of this sort. This will require an all new type of computation.43

40

Ibid., 60-61 (emphasis in original).

41 This is one of the areas in which I tend to agree with Wilson. While I think the possibility of
objective knowledge/truth is there, discovering it can be difficult. On this we agree. Beyond this simple
agreement, however, I disagree with his understanding of what it means for something to be objectively
true. First, he limits knowledge to only that which is empirical, but since this is itself not an empirical claim
it is self-defeating and not a source of knowledge. Second, it is doubtful if in his materialistic system if
“we” can actually “understand” anything at all. If our “minds” are our “brains” and “think/understand” as a
necessary biochemical reaction, then it is difficult to see how we can “know” anything – since it would
require my brain’s neural activity to ascent. But in his system, “I” cannot “choose.” For there is no “I,” nor
is there “choice” – the brain just does what it does.
42 Ibid., 120-121. It should be noted that several transhumanists are quite optimistic about the
emergence of AI within the next few decades. Indeed, Ray Kurzweil is banking on AI by the year 2045.
See his The Singularity is Near (New York: Viking, 2005). Ben Goertzel is likewise optimistic about the
prospects of AI emerging in the near future. See his “Artificial General Intelligence and the Future of
Humanity,” in The Transhumanist Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science,
Technology, and Philosophy of the Human Future, ed. by Max More and Natasha Vita-More (Malden, MA:
John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 128—137.
43 Wilson, Consilience, 123. But note that some transhumanists are confident that this new type of
computation is indeed possible. Ray Kurzweil remarks that researchers have been experimenting with
parallel functioning hardware like “neural chips” – systems based on the structure of the human brain – for
many years. In other words, the computation likely to result in a true AI will not really resemble standard
computer programming languages like Basic, Pascal, C++, and the like. See, Ray Kurzweil, “The Evolution
of Mind in the Twenty-First Century,” in Are We Spiritual Machines?: Ray Kurzweil vs. the Critics of
Strong A.I. (Seattle, WA: Discovery Institute, 2002), 38—39.
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The third consequence for Wilson is that since humans are biochemical machines,
and since chemical reactions occur in repeatable (and seemingly necessary) patterns, the
question arises – can humans actually exercise free will? Physicalism seems to demand a
negative answer, but if the answer is “yes” then physicalism would seem false.44 If
humans are but an extravagant biochemical machine, then their (re)actions should be just
as determined as any other chemical process. Wilson phrases the dilemma nicely when he
says:
An old impasse nonetheless remains: If the mind is bound by the laws of physics,
and if it can conceivably be read like calligraphy, how can there be free will? I do
not mean free will in the trivial sense, the ability to choose one’s thoughts and
behavior free of the will of others and the rest of the world all around. I mean,
instead, freedom from the constraints imposed by the physiochemical states of
one’s own body and mind.45
Wilson’s answer attempts to bypass the horns of the disjunctive dilemma. He
says, in principle individuals do not have free will, but the processes involved in brain
chemistry are so complex that it is the same as if the individual had free will.
So there can be no simple determinism of human thought, at least not in
obedience to causation in the way physical laws describe the motion of bodies and
the atomic assembly of molecules. Because the individual mind cannot be fully
known and predicted, the self can go on passionately believing in its own free
will. And that is a fortunate circumstance. Confidence in free will is biologically
adaptive. Without it the mind, imprisoned by fatalism, would slow and
deteriorate. Thus in organismic time and space, in every operational sense that
applies to the knowable self, the mind does have free will.46

44 All chemical reactions occur due to the properties of the chemicals and elements involved, not
because the elements and chemicals “choose” to act in a certain way – sodium does not “choose” to react
violently when mixed with water, it just does.
45

Wilson, Consilience., 119.

46 Ibid., 120. Terrence Nichols notes that this (mis)understanding about the reality of free-will is
common among naturalistic philosophers. Nichols, The Sacred Cosmos, 126.

59

From the clothes you wear to the political policies you endorse, every action is
ultimately tied to a chemical / electrical reaction in the brain. The illusion of freedom is
an adaptive quality that aids survival. For, if we ever knew how determined we were,
then it would drive us to depression – which is detrimental for survival.47
2.2.2 Humans as Only Physical and Biological Organisms:
The Physical Basis for Human Cognition
2.2.2.1 Eliminatvism – Mental States are Just Brain States: Daniel Dennett
Two concepts from Daniel Dennett important to this discussion are: first, his
notion that the “self” should be viewed narratively; second, his argument about the
“intentional stance.” In regard to the narrative-self position, it is popular among modern
physicalists to outright deny any notion of there being an actual “self.” Indeed, given the
common understanding that the mind is just the brain at work, and that the body is a
Humean bundle of parts, the idea of some stable “self” appears incoherent.48 There is,
though, a collection of particles that combine to make a being that sometimes refers to
itself as “I”. However, Dennett finds this talk unsatisfying. These two options – either the
soul exists or the “self” is wholly unreal – are simply too limiting for his taste and thus he
seeks a middle ground.49 For when we use personal pronouns and reflective words, we
really think we are referring to something. Now, Dennett would agree with these
philosophers and scientists that there is no substantial form to the human person, and
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Wilson, Consilience., 119-120.

48 He rejects the notion that there is some immaterial mind / soul that is true self and he denies that
the “self” is wholly unreal. If there is no underlying substantial form, then there can be no self. Thus, terms
like “self”, “me”, “you”, “we”, etc. are simply shorthand for the current conglomeration of biological parts
at that moment. There is no literal “you” or “me”. “I” do not exist, for an “I” is not a physical thing.
49

Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1991), 413.
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certainly nothing like the traditional religious or philosophical notion of a soul. But he
hesitates to say that our language is wholly incorrect. For Dennett it appears some sort of
“selves” obviously exist now even if there was a time when there were no selves.50
Rather, there is something to be said about the notion of “self.”51 Thus, he develops his
idea of the narrative-self.
For Dennett – and like Wilson above – the basis of the self is biological.
Biological selves are useful for distinguishing between different biological entities, but it
is too “porous” to be of any use in developing an individual identity.52 There are few (if
any) clearly defined boundaries. Yet, psychologically we think that what is “in” us is part
of us, but this does not seem correct either – otherwise intestinal parasites would be
considered part of “us” too.53 We tend to think what is outside of us is something
“other.”54 Evolution has shaped us to respond to outside stimuli – this is an adaptive
feature. All animate creatures respond to outside stimuli – only humans, however, seem
to regularly decide how to act.
Thus, there is an aspect to humans that appears to be unique among biological
beings – we can create an “extended phenotype.” Simpler creatures still seem to have

50

Ibid.
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Ibid., 412-413.
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The “boundaries of a biological self are porous and indefinite.” Ibid., 414.

53 For example, humans are hosts to many parasites from worms (which we do not need) to
bacteria (which are essential to our survival). These parasites are both distinct and part of our “selves.”
Even psychologically we tend to think that what is “in” us is part of us, but what leaves us is distinct
(swallow some spit that is in your mouth, no big deal. Now collect your spit into a cup and then drink it,
pretty gross).
54

Ibid.
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some sense of “self” and extend themselves through “extended phenotypes.”55 For
Dennett, the creation of this self is a biological product of evolution. It is a survival
mechanism that enables the passing on of genes to have a sense of “self.”56 When
reflecting on human behavior it may appear as though there is some immaterial soul
driving our complex (and beautiful) behavior but there is no such thing. Upon reflection
we see that human boundaries expand and shrink – humans make grandiose claims and
retract regrettable statements.57 It is not hard to see that humans and animals present
“themselves” differently. Whereas animals use “things” as extended phenotypes, humans
use “words” – ideas.58 We concoct stories about ourselves.59
It is the story, the narrative, that accompanies this particular collection of
biological parts that makes me “me”. Now this narrative-self is not itself a “thing” but it
is real. For Dennett a close analogy would be the concept of a “center of gravity.” In the
same way that physicists utilize the concept of a center of gravity to find the “center” of
an object, so too do humans use a center of narrative gravity to find the “self.”60 Centers

55 Beavers build dams, crabs acquire shells, birds build nests, termites build dirt towers, etc. These
creatures, however, respond to instinct, not deliberation. Humans alone create a “self” through words and
deeds. Ibid., 415-416.
56

Ibid., 416.
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Ibid., 417.
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Ibid.

59 “Our tales are spun, but for the most part we don’t spin them; they spin us. Our human
consciousness, and our narrative selfhood, is their product, not their source.” These stories, then, attempt to
weave a coherent narrative. Ibid., 418.
60 “Like the biological self, this psychological or narrative self is yet another abstraction, not a
thing in the brain, but still a remarkably robust and almost tangible attractor of properties, the ‘owner of
record’ of whatever items and features are lying about unclaimed.” Ibid. That is, a thing’s center of gravity
is not an actual part within an object, but it is not unreal either. It is a fiction, but it is a magnificent and
useful fiction as it helps to explain the phenomenon.
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of gravity really exist, but they exist as an aspect of a thing not as a reality on its own. So
too, the narrative-self really exists, but it exists as a concept and not a reality on its own.
“Selves” are the centers of narrative gravity.61
We may use the term “soul” in our everyday language for convenience but it is
misguided to think it is real.62 Some may want to retain the use of the term “soul” for
moral reasons, since the notion of a soul appears to allow society to lay blame or praise
on individuals as there is some continuous entity that performed the moral act, but
Dennett thinks this is wrong headed.63 Rather Dennett asserts that the only way to retain
free-will and moral responsibility is to relinquish any notion of the soul.64 The “self” is a
representation of one's center of narrative gravity. It is an abstraction accumulated by
different attributes and various interpretations. It is a fiction, but it is a “magnificent
fiction.”65 Thus, moral responsibility attaches to people because of the narrative that is
created by their actions. Though important for the cognitive development of the person it
is important to remember there is no immaterial “self” just the material “self.”
This idea that the narrative-self is a concept leads us to the second of Dennett’s
contributions, and that is the notion of the “intentional stance.” In regard to the
“intentional stance,” in the philosophy of mind a perineal problem for physicalist
conceptions of mind is how the brain / mind can account for intentionality – being about
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something else.66 Physicalists have a hard time saying how something material – the
brain – can intend, or be about, something else that is material. Intentionality appears to
be inherently immaterial. Dennett takes it that he has solved this problem by developing
the idea of the intentional stance.67 Basically, the intentional stance is explaining a certain
behavior of an entity by attributing to it beliefs and desires – or more accurately, what
looks like beliefs and desires, but really is not. We treat the thing as having a mind (even
though it really does not) in order to make sense of its actions and reasoning. The
presence of an actual “mind” is unnecessary, for what matters are the beliefs and desires
of the being.68
However, for Dennett, the intentional stance can be used to “unravel” all sorts of
mysteries related to the mind – from how we account for similarity in thought among
people to how we attribute “mind” to inanimate objects.69 The basic strategy for applying
the intentional stance is simply to just treat the subject as if it really does have a mind all

66 “Intentionality in the philosophical sense is just aboutness. Something exhibits intentionality if
its competence is in some way about something else.” Daniel Dennett, Kinds of Minds: Towards an
Understanding of Consciousness (New York: BasicBooks, 1996), 35 (emphasis in original).
67 See the discussion by John Heil on this topic. John Heil, Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary
Introduction, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2004), chapter 11. He says, the “intentional stance is the
strategy of interpreting the behavior of an entity (person, animal, artifact, whatever) by treating it as if it
were a rational agent who governed its ‘choice’ of ‘action’ by a ‘consideration’ of its ‘beliefs’ and
‘desires’” (Dennett, Kinds of Minds, 27 emphasis in original). For Dennett, we “routinely adopt [this
position] toward one another” and as a result anthropomorphize various things (people, animals, nature,
etc.). Ibid.
68 As will be discussed in chapter 3, Edward Feser points out a significant hurdle for Dennett’s
position on the intentional stance. He says, “For us to take a stance toward something, including the
intentional stance, is itself a manifestation of intentionality; so we can’t coherently suppose that
intentionality is a mere artefact of the stance we take toward ourselves.” In other words, for Dennett’s
position to make sense, he must utilize intentionality, but this is precisely what he denies exists. Thus, if
Dennett, is right about the intentional stance, then he must at the same time be wrong about the intentional
stance. Edward Feser, Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner’s Guide (Oxford, UK: Oneworld Pub., 2006), 191.
69

Dennett, Kinds of Minds, 27.
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the while cognizant of the reality that it does not have one literally.70 Adopting the
intentional stance is highly useful when interacted with complicated machines (artificial
or biological).71 As Dennett puts it, “You predict its behavior as if it were a rational
agent.”72
But, how should we understand intentional objects? Dualistic minded
philosophers have opted for an “intrinsic intentionality” – that is, there is something
about a baked apple that communicates to the observer (i.e., red, apple-shaped, fragrant,
yummy, etc.). Dennett finds this explanation inadequate. Rather, there is only a “derived
intentionality.” We easily see that conventional messages are derived. We understand the
contents of a shopping list only because we are familiar with language, lists, the items
listed, and the practice of going shopping for food. But what applies to our conventional
practices also applies to our natural observations. Its only because of our past experiences
with baked apples that we know they are good for eating. Hence, even the baked apple
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Ibid., 27—28.

71 For example, suppose you are playing chess against a computer. You can take the intentional
stance with the computer and simply assume that it has “goals” (i.e., capture your king) that are achieved
by performing certain maneuvers that it “believes” (i.e., moving the knight to E7 will put your king in
check) will best achieve its goal. Now, the computer does not literally have a mind, but in order to
complete the game of chess, we treat it as if it had a mind.
72 Dennett, Kinds of Minds., 30—31. If you treat the computer as an “intentional system” – you
have essentially anthropomorphized the computer. But this anthropomorphism takes place with every
“intentional system.” “We treat all intentional systems as if they were just like us – which of course they
are not.” Ibid., 33. What makes something an intentional system is when its “behavior is
predictable/explicable from the intentional stance.” Ibid., 34. It seems then that intentional systems have
thoughts, and for Dennett, they do. Their thoughts (i.e., perception, identifying, recalling, etc.) are limited
to the particular way that the system thinks. For example, suppose that there is a freshly baked red apple on
a counter. Since humans are limited to sight along a narrow “visible” band of the electromagnetic spectrum,
what the person sees is a red apple. Now, some animals can see along other wavelengths (e.g., infrared –
like rattlesnakes), if these animals were to look at the apple what would they “see”? They would see a
warm object in the shape of an apple. The experience of the same baked apple is different for the person
and the animal. The question then becomes, of what is it that is being “thought” by the person and the
animal? Dennett’s answer is the “intentional object.” The baked apple is what the various thoughts are
about. Ibid., 37.
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(as an eatable object) is no less a derived intention than the shopping list. Indeed, for
Dennett, there is no benefit of assuming an intrinsic intentionality that cannot be at least
as explanatory (if not better) than derived intentionality.73 What then is the use of
intrinsic intentionality? None. Derived intentionality of an intentional object provides the
basis for thought in an intentional system. There is no need to resort to some immaterial
soul or mind or self to account for this behavior. It is completely explicable in terms of
evolutionary biology.
Thus, the intentional stance and the narrative-self are similar in this respect – they
presuppose the existence of something else even though it does not exist in order to make
sense of the phenomena. Hence, this is why Dennett is being categorized as an
eliminativist – he has removed the immaterial “self” and reinterpreted the language of
self in material terms. Dennett takes it that the narrative self and intentional stance are
sufficient for explaining why we experience and utilize terms of “self” as well as believe
that actual immaterial “minds” exist. Both are ultimately figments of our imagination, but
useful for engaging with the world.
2.2.2.2 Functionalism – Mental States Result from a Properly Functioning Brain: Jerry
Fodor
It should come as no surprise that empirically minded scientists and philosophers
seek an “experiential basis of concepts” to account for “various verbal and non-verbal
responses to specified stimuli.”74 Any given (re)action must have some cause. Part of the
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Ibid., 55.

74 Jerry Fodor, “Materialism,” in Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem, ed. by David M.
Rosenthal (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1971), 129.
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impetus for this conviction is that the unity of science demands that various phenomena
be reduced to their constituent parts. Hence, if there is some psychological phenomena,
then the empiricist is bound to explain it in materialistic terms as basically as possible.75
Jerry Fodor takes it that there are a number of ways to explain psychological phenomena.
Dualism is the most problematic as it seems to undermine the unity of scientific
experience. This leaves materialistic approaches like Behaviorism and Identity Theory as
the only major competitors. For Fodor, both Behaviorism and Identity Theory are
insufficient to account for psychological phenomena, thus Fodor opts for functionalism.76
Suppose you observe the neurological event of someone experiencing pain. Say,
they are being poked with a needle. If their experience of the pain (p) is identical to the
neurological event (n) which you observed, then it follows that you (y) observed their
pain.77 But this process is explicable in wholly materialistic terms. The poking needle
caused the neurons to fire in a particular way which causes the person to experience pain.
This event was registered on some machine and observed by you. If you could stimulate
the nervous system to replicate the neurological pattern without the needle poke, then the
person should still “feel” pain, even though the needle were no longer present. This is
taken as evidence that the inferred entities (IEs – in this case the IE is the experience of
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Ibid., 128.

76 Fodor begins his analysis by acknowledging that our everyday ordinary language expresses
culturally accepted views. Ibid., 130. Of course, our culturally accepted views could be wrong.
Nevertheless, our common language usage is the starting point. He takes it that behaviorism cannot actually
“link” our actions with our mental perceptions of the world with logical necessity. However, this does not
mean that dualism is acceptable either, since there is a “peculiar intimacy of the relation between
statements about behavior and statements about mental states.” Ibid., 131. In short, behaviorism lacks the
logical necessity empiricism needs to explain our experience of inferred entities (IEs) and dualism neglects
the physical basis for desire to explain certain behaviors related to IEs. What is needed is a middle path.
And the middle path that Fodor proposes (i.e., functionalism) is in-line with materialism.
77

Put as a formula it would go like this: If y observes n, and n is identical to p, then y observes p.
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pain) can be explicable in wholly materialistic terms. And for Fodor, the possibility to
observe IEs is essential for materialism as an explanatory model.78 For it is in
materialism’s ability to explain the observable world that unifies scientific knowledge.79
For Fodor, identity theory (IT) is insufficient to account for the psychological
phenomena.80 Fodor then reasons that psychological phenomena need not be superfluous
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Ibid., 134.

79 At this point, Fodor needs to address a couple of objections to materialism. The first objection is
Leibniz’s Law of Indiscernibles (LLI). Now LLI holds that “if x is identical with y, then every
nonintensional predicate true of x is also true of y and vice versa.” Ibid., 135. That is, if x is really identical
to y then there are no instances in which y has some predicate that is not also shared by x. For if there were
any differences, then they would not be identical. This comes into play as an objection that a neurological
event is identical to the experience of pain. Can x be identical to y? Are neurological events identical to
mental states? If they are identical, then there should be no aspect of one that is not shared with the other.
Likewise, if it can be shown that either y or x have some feature not shared by the other, then they are not
identical, and Fodor’s hope of an observable IE is negated.
Similar to LLI is the Law of Transferable Epithets (LTE), which holds that “if x is identical with y,
and if Fx makes sense (is linguistically possible), then Fy must also make sense (be linguistically
possible).” Ibid. Fodor takes it that if LTE were true that this would have ramifications for a materialistic
view of IE. As a crude example, reconsider the person experiencing pain above. Suppose that the
neurological event took place four inches from the base of their skull. Because the neurological event (n) is
supposed to be identical with the pain (p) it would follow that p took place four inches from the base of the
skull. But surely, this doesn’t make sense. It seems reasonable to say that a pain (p) occurred four inches
from the base of the skull, but it seems false to say that the neurological event (n) was experienced four
inches from the base of the skull. The pain would be experienced wherever the needle poked the person.
This is taken as a primary objection to materialistic accounts of IE. Fodor remarks that there are three
common responses to this type of argument – and none of them are successful. Ibid., 136—139. First, if
one simply denies that n took place four inches from the base of the skull, then this both neglects
neurological sciences which do account for neurological events and gives too much power to linguistic
oddities – and materialism cannot be ultimately threatened by the idiosyncrasies of language. Even if
language is limited, this is no reason to abandon materialism. Secondly, one could claim that LTE is an
invalid way of reasoning. Denying LLI may result in contradiction, but denial of LTE does not. However,
LTE does have good scientific grounding, so dismissing it as unnecessary seems a bit extreme. For
example, the statement “Earth is round” is identical with some statement like “the Earth can be
circumnavigated.” Is it possible to imagine a scenario in which Earth could not be circumnavigated (in
principle) and yet be round? Of course not. The Earth being round and circumnavigable go hand-in-hand,
but denying the Earth’s roundness does not logically entail the impossibility of circumnavigation (e.g.,
suppose the Earth were a cube). The final argument is to point out that by using LTE materialist can be
shown to use psychological states to ultimately dismiss the existence of psychological states. Fodor’s reply
is that this is merely a restriction on grammar, not a restriction on materialism.
80 For physicalism to unify scientific knowledge, an appropriate materialistic account of
psychological states must address a number of problems. As such, can IT – where certain psychological
states are understood to just be brain states – be a sufficient explanation of psychological phenomena? For
Fodor, the answer is no. IT upholds materialism’s insistence that psychological states are reducible to
material basis, but does so at the expense of arbitrarily restricting forms of “inference that otherwise
appears to be valid: the inference from ‘Having an X is just being in state Y’ to ‘an X is a Y.’” Ibid., 139. If
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to understanding mind. Why should psychological phenomena necessarily be a danger to
materialism? They shouldn’t. Hence, they should be taken as part and parcel with our
materialistic explanation of the world. Thus, Fodor opts for a functionalist view of
psychological phenomena. This is established in two phases. The first phase attempts to
refer to psychological states according to the “mechanisms responsible for the production
of behavior”81 – their function. The second phase, explores the biochemical systems that
create the functional characteristics as found in phase one.82 This allows for the
unification of science under materialistic terms, and avoids the problems inherent in IT,
behaviorism, and dualism.
For Fodor, then, materialism as expressed in functionalism is a superior way to
examine psychological phenomena. It also has the added benefit, he believes, of avoiding
reductionism, for psychological phenomena (e.g., sensations) cannot be simply examined
in terms of their neurological parts. The function of “pain” is system-wide – it involves
the whole entity. It cannot be reduced to simply different neural firings. The difference
here is considering in what something consists versus what role something plays. To
merely ask the question of what something consists, is to ask a reductive type question.
This is legitimate, to be sure, but limiting. In what does “pain” consist? A series of neural

IT is true, this inference is invalid. But for Fodor, surely this inference makes sense. As such, he must look
for some other materialistic thesis to account for psychological phenomena in a materialistic outlook.
81 Ibid., 140. At this level we can distinguish between psychology and neurology. Psychology is
the study for explaining the overall pattern of behavior. Why are certain actions performed? What is being
intended? And so forth. Neurology, on the other hand, is examining the “hardware” of the brain. Two
different brains may have the same psychological function. For example, a basic calculator and a smart
phone may both be able to consider equations like “2+2=4” and thus they have the same “psychological”
function. But how they operate to derive their respective conclusions is determined by different
“neurology.” This insight leads Fodor to reject IT. The neurology does not need to be the same as the
psychology to produce the same results.
82

Ibid., 142.
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firings, sure. But this fails to account for why “pain” hurts. The further question is
needed, of what role does “pain” play? The function of “pain” is more holistic and thus a
more satisfying account. “Successful functional analysis . . . requires an appreciation of
the sorts of activity that are characteristic of a mechanism and of the contribution made
by the functioning of each part of the mechanism to the economy of the whole.”83 As
such, functionalism allows for reductive analysis of a system (i.e., psychological in terms
of brain states), but also allows for analysis at a higher functional level. This preserves
the unification of scientific experience.
2.3 Substance Dualism
After mounting an argument there is no soul or mind, Nancy Murphy makes the
following point that no amount of “accumulation of data can ever amount to a proof that
there is no immaterial mind or soul in addition to the body.”84 Yet, she insists the idea of
a “soul” is a Western philosophical concept, not a Hebraic concept.85 The idea of the soul
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Ibid., 144.
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Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?, 69.

85 There is ample reason to think that Murphy is simply wrong to assert the notion of a soul is
(only?) a “western” philosophical concept. Various non-western religions also retain some notion of a spirit
or soul that is essential to a proper view of human nature. Native American burial practices are specifically
designed to respect and “feed the departed spirit.” The common Hindu belief of reincarnation is wholly
predicated on the idea that people are essentially spiritual beings. Likewise, some forms of Buddhism (i.e.,
Pure Land) believe that human souls depart to paradise upon death. Winfried Corduan, Neighboring Faiths:
A Christian Introduction to World Religions (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1998), 181. William
A. Young, The World’s Religions: Worldviews and Contemporary Issues, 2nd ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Princtice Hall, 2005). Terrence Nichols remarks “most religions, including tribal religions (e.g., traditional
African and Native American religions), Hinduism, and Christianity, have traditionally held that the
animating force in a person is a soul.” Nichols, The Sacred Cosmos, 126. The notion of an immaterial soul
is a worldwide phenomenon.
However, Murphy could reply that all she means to say is the notion of a soul does not derive
from within Judaism. In other words, she could be saying that if Judaism had never had any contact with
other belief systems, then no notion of the soul would have developed. I find this thesis highly unlikely. J.
P. Moreland and Scott B. Rae, Body and Soul: Human Nature & the Crisis in Ethics (Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity Press, 2000), 27—33. Nichols, The Sacred Cosmos, 127—130.
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was an explanation for certain capacities and functions of human behavior – but
biologically, the soul is no longer needed and is wholly unnecessary.86 Nevertheless, the
notion of a soul has a long and venerable history. Below are some of the historical and
contemporary arguments utilized for believing that humans are more than merely
biological organisms.
2.3.1 Substance Dualism – Plato, Augustine, and Descartes
That humans have a soul of some sort has a long and venerable history in both
religious circles and philosophical circles. This fact in itself does not prove that souls
exist, but the persistence of the belief in souls may say something about our common
experience with the world that is worth exploring. Here we will look at the classical
arguments as put forth by Plato, Augustine, and Descartes. These classical authors argue
that humans are best understood as body and soul. With the mind and soul often being
thought to be interchangeable.
Plato’s Republic ultimately discusses Plato / Socrates’ vision of the ideal State
that will allow humans to flourish.87 The goal is for human happiness, but there is a
particular way in which the parts must fit together to achieve that happiness. Further, how
Plato views the State has implications for human nature, since for Plato, the State and
human nature are mirrors of sorts and have a similar hierarchy (Rep. II, 368e).88 Having a

86

Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?, 69.

87 It is often difficult to determine where Socrates’ ideas end and Plato’s begin. Some scholars
speculate (with good reason!) that Plato simply uses Socrates as a mouthpiece for his own ideas. For ease
of use, however, I will attribute the ideas to Plato. See A. E. Taylor, Socrates: The Man and His Thought
(New York: Doubleday, 1952), 25—27.
88 All references are to the Republic are found in John M. Cooper, ed. Plato: Complete Works
(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1997), 971—1223.
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proper view of the human nature in turn, provides a clue for how people are to obtain
happiness and how they are to live with others (II, 369d).
When the State is operating properly, then it will exhibit wisdom, courage, and
moderation – and the proper balance of these is justice. The person too will be living a
“just” life if they are wise, courageous, and moderate in the right proportions. When
people are acting with virtue, this is an indicator that they are in proper balance and their
soul is “healthy” (ὑγίειά – IV, 444d). When people are not in balance they experience
conflicting inclinations. To explain this conflict and need for balance, Plato relies on the
notion of the soul.89
Plato believes there is a soul because he is convinced that there is a “world of
forms” and that the human mind has beheld this world of forms, thus the need for an
immaterial aspect to humans is apparent. The forms are intellectual realities and can only
be “seen” by intellect (which is inherently immaterial), thus if the forms are immaterial
then the intellect that beholds them must also be immaterial.
For Plato then, an analysis of human knowledge will reveal the immaterial nature
of the soul. As such, we can turn to Plato’s account of how humans obtain knowledge of
the forms. For Plato, true philosophers (the wise) love the sight of truth (V, 475e), and
though people love to see beautiful things, the wise person will want to know the nature

89 The different parts of the soul incline one to different desires, and the solution to control them is
found in ordering the soul properly (IV, 441d—e). The rational part (i.e., rational power) of the soul is
equated with the ruling class, and as the ruling class rules the State so too does reason rule the rest of the
soul (IV, 441e). The irrational aspect of the soul is like the merchant class which must be restrained but
provides clues on what the body and soul need or want. The spirited part is equated with the guardians and
just as the guardian class is employed to defend the State, so too does the spirited part of the soul give the
person “gumption” (ἀνδρεῖον – IV, 442b).
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of beauty itself (V, 476b—d).90 So how does one achieve knowledge? Plato’s strategy to
answer this question is to analyze what it is we “see.” And here he finds the relevant
insight. Things are visible, but not intelligible. Forms are intelligible, but not visible (VI,
507b).91 The mind is able to know the forms because the “good” is the cause of the forms
and is also itself an object of knowledge.92 To know what is “good” is to know the forms
(VI, 509b), for the other forms owe their being to the “good.” To have knowledge is not
to know things, but forms.93 But the only way for the intellect to know an immaterial

90 Hence, Plato is after knowledge, not mere opinion (V, 476d). Opinion is neither ignorance nor
knowledge (V, 478c), but is undesirable since it is only half-way between knowledge and ignorance (V,
477a—b). So, opinion is clearly not knowledge, which is what Plato is after (V, 478a).
91 For example, I can see triangular shaped things, but I never see any true (perfect) triangles.
Every triangle in my experience is in some way defective – even if only slightly so. “Triangle” as a
geometric concept is pure only in its form, not in any instantiation. Thus, in a way, the mind and sight are
similar. The understanding is kind of like seeing. But what the mind “sees” is intelligible forms
(“triangleness” itself), not things. He says, “understand the soul in the same way: When it focuses on
something illuminated by truth and what is, it understands, knows, and apparently possesses understanding,
but when it focuses on what is mixed with obscurity, on what comes to be and passes away, it opines and is
dimmed, changes its opinions this way and that, and seems bereft of understanding” (VI, 508d).
“οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὧδε νόει: ὅταν μὲν οὗ καταλάμπει ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τὸ ὄν, εἰς
τοῦτοἀπερείσηται, ἐνόησέν τε καὶ ἔγνω αὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν ἔχειν φαίνεται: ὅταν δὲ εἰς τὸ τῷ σκότῳκεκραμένον,
τὸ γιγνόμενόν τε καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, δοξάζει τε καὶ ἀμβλυώττει ἄνω καὶ κάτω τὰςδόξας μεταβάλλον, καὶ ἔοικεν
αὖ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντι.”
92 “What gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower is the form of the
good. And though it is the cause of knowledge and truth, it is also an object of knowledge. Both knowledge
and truth are beautiful things, but the good is other and more beautiful than they” (VI, 508e). “τοῦτο τοίνυν
τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν δύναμινἀποδιδὸν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν
φάθι εἶναι: αἰτίαν δ᾽ ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας, ὡςγιγνωσκομένης μὲν διανοοῦ, οὕτω δὲ καλῶν ἀμφοτέρ
ων ὄντων”
93 Using the example of a triangle we can describe what Plato has in mind here. When we are
young we encounter triangular shaped things (i.e., image, or imagination). We see these flat three sided
figures and begin with basic judgements about it. It is called a “triangle,” for example. As we grow we gain
certain beliefs about triangles – they exist, they have only three sides and three angles, etc. At this point we
do not quite understand triangles, but neither are we ignorant of them (i.e., belief / opinion). As we reflect
on the nature of the triangle, we discover that the sum of their interior angles add up to 180 degrees.
Likewise, we may discover properties of right triangles like the square of the sides equals the square of the
hypotenuse (i.e., thought). At this level we are approaching knowledge of triangleness. Once we recognize
that we have never encountered a true triangle, but we are able to recognize what a triangle is (i.e.,
knowledge of the form) we can be said to have knowledge of the triangle. This illustration shows that for
Plato, knowledge is in knowing the immaterial form of things. This is brought out more expressly in the
Phaedo where Plato expounds on his doctrine of recollection. The same idea is at play there as here,
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form is for itself to also be ultimately immaterial. And since the intellect is the ruling
power of the soul, it follows that the soul is itself immaterial. Here then is why Plato
thinks humans have an immaterial soul – the human intellect is able to behold immaterial
forms.94
Saint Augustine operates within a neo-Platonic framework wedded to a Christian
view of persons. Humans are terra animata “animated earth” or “earth with a soul.”95 He
makes distinctions between the body and soul, with the soul being better than the body.96
For on Augustine’s theory of being, souls are higher on the scale than physical bodies.
Indeed, for Augustine, the soul “rules” the body in the same way that God “rules” our
souls. Thus the soul inhabits a middle ground in which it needs God as its master, but the
body as its slave. For the soul needs the body to perceive the world.97 But the soul does
poorly when it obeys the whims of its “slave.” Hence, to retain the right order of being,
the soul should obey God and the body should obey the soul.
As an argument that the soul and body are distinct, Augustine notes that the
power to think is not a physical ability. Likewise, the ability to judge and reason is higher
however. The mind knows because at some point it was beholding the immaterial forms. The implication is
the same – the mind is immaterial.
94 Plato goes on to discuss the analogy of the Cave, but it is irrelevant for our purposes at this
point. All that needed to be established is how Plato establishes his account of the dual nature of human
beings.
95 As he says, “For it was into a face of earth that God breathed the breath of life when man was
made a living soul; as if it were said, Thou art earth with a soul, which thou wast not; thou shalt be earth
without a soul, as thou wast” (CoG 20.20). Saint Augustine, The City of God, trans. by Marcus Dods (New
York: Modern Library, 2000), 742 (emphasis added). “quod eras antequam esses animatus (terrae quippe
insufflauit Deus in faciem flatum uitae, cum factus est homo in animam uiuam); tamquam diceretur: ‘Terra
es animata, quod non eras; terra eris exanimis, sicut eras.’”
96 Saint Augustine, The Essential Augustine, ed. by Vernon J. Bourke (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett
Pub., 1974), 45.
97

Ibid., 46—47.
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than the objects it considers. For example, the ability to reason about apples is itself a
higher capacity than the apple itself. Mental activities are better than bare physical
existence. Thus, Augustine concludes that the rational soul cannot be corporeal.98 As
further evidence that the mind is different (and better) than the body Augustine notes that
the mind can consider “color” without being able to currently see anything – as when one
dreams about a rainbow. This ability shows that the mind is different than body. For if
mental events were purely physical, so he reasons, then we could not consider “color”
without it being present to our senses.99
Augustine believes that thoughts can be abstracted from phantasms, but in this act
the mind prefers to contemplate the unchangeable rather than the changeable. That is, the
mind would rather focus on “beauty” per se rather than to perceive beautiful things (i.e.,
paintings, landscapes, etc.). But if the mind is able to make this distinction, then it
follows that the mind is able to know the unchangeable (7.17.23). And what is
unchangeable cannot be material which often changes. Likewise, what beholds the
immaterial cannot itself be material, thus it follows that the mind – the soul – must be
immaterial.
Considered the “Father of Modern Philosophy,” Rene Descartes ushered in a
wave of European rationalism.100 Consumed with how to overcome doubt and achieve
certain / absolute knowledge, Descartes performed a number of thought experiments. The

98 Ibid., 58. It should be noted that Augustine considers the rational soul and the ability to think as
a one and the same substance. For Augustine, it is the rational soul that thinks in its entirety. That is, it is
the whole soul that thinks, remembers, and wills. Ibid., 68, 77.
99

Ibid., 72.

100 Francis H. Parker, The Story of Western Philosophy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 1967), 177.
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most famous was enclosing himself in a vault to block out as many of his senses as he
could. Utilizing the approach dubbed, “methodical doubt,” he tried to question the truth
of everything of which he could think – the physical world, his senses, and even the
principles of mathematics.101 The one truth, however, that he could not doubt no matter
how hard he tried was that he existed – cogito ergo sum. From this unshakeable starting
point, Descartes built a philosophical system that delineated what was real and what was
unreal based on human rational abilities. Part of what his insight required is that people
are really minds whose bodies are extended in space. If you remove the body, the mind
remains. Humans are ultimately and essentially immaterial souls.
There are several arguments that Descartes gives for thinking that the soul is
immortal (and thus immaterial, not to mention existing). The first is by noting the rational
capacities of humans compared to mere machines and other animals. But for out puposes,
the second, and more popular, way that Descartes argues for the existence and
immortality of the soul is found in the Mediations on First Philosophy. In the sixth
meditation he begins by recalling a number of early beliefs about the soul that he would
later come to repudiate.102 However, Descartes eventually came to believe after engaging

101 It should be noted as well that Descartes begins his system with a rejection of the AristoThomistic understanding of formal and final causes. This assumption drives his views of material reality.
Nichols, The Sacred Cosmos, 135.
102 First, that physical sensation is merely corporeal. Second, that we know different things simply
by having different sensations. Third, our ideas are brought about by empirical observation. Fourth, our
ideas of sensations are vivid and prominent. Fifth, as such nothing in the intellect was not first in the
senses. Finally, he could not separate thought from his body. “I had some reason for holding that the body I
called ‘my body’ by a special title really did belong to me more than any other body did. I could never
separate myself entirely from it, as I could from other bodies.” Rene Descartes, Meditations on First
Philosophy, in Descartes: Philosophical Writings, trans. and ed. by Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Thomas
Geach (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1971), 111—112 (emphasis in original). “Non etiam sine
ratione corpus illud, quod speciali quodam jure meum appellabam, magis ad me pertinere quàm alia ulla
arbitrabar: neque enim ab illo poteram unquam sejungi, ut a reliquis.”
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in methodical doubt, that he could put no faith in his senses, since they can be
deceived.103 Indeed, the same “sense” can be experienced either when asleep or awake.104
For Descartes, the experience of eating an apple can occur when you are awake or asleep.
The experience is the same. Hence, he concludes that it appears our reason can produce
objects of sensation.105 Thus, our senses cannot be fully trusted.
Now, any clear and distinct idea must be from God who cannot deceive.106 For
while all that belongs to us is consciousness, it cannot be doubted that we are closely
bound to our body. However, the clear and distinct idea of “me” is unextended, thus, “I”
must be distinct from my body.107 For Descartes, the only thing that matters is that “I” am
a conscious being.108

103 Ibid., 113. “I have had many experiences that have gradually sapped the faith I had in the
senses. It sometimes happened that towers which had looked round at a distance looked square when close
at hand . . . And there were countless other cases like these, in which I found the external senses to be
deceived in their judgment.” “Postea verò multa paulatim experimenta fidem omnem quam sensibus
habueram labefactarunt; nam & interdum turres, quae rotundae visae fuerant è longinquo, quadratae
apparebant è propinquo . . . . & talibus aliis innumeris in rebus sensuum externorum judicia falli
deprehendebam.”
104

Ibid.

105

Ibid., 113—114.

106

Ibid., 114. This assertion was “proved” in Meditation 3.

107 Ibid. That is, “I” can imagine myself being disembodied. Descartes takes this to mean that “I”
am not my body. If “I” were my body, then the “I” could not even be thought to exist without the body –
but the “I” can be thought to exist without the body.
108 He says, “Now I know that I exist, and at the same time I observe absolutely nothing else as
belonging to my nature or essence except the mere fact that I am a conscious being.” Ibid. “ex hoc ipso
quòd sciam me existere, quòdque interim nihil plane aliud ad naturam sive essentiam meam pertinere
animadvertam, praeter hoc solum quòd sim res cogitans.” This argument will be reasserted by modern
defenders of substance dualism, since this is quite possibly, the most powerful rational argument for the
immateriality of the soul.
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Descartes notes that our bodies work like a machine even without the presence of
a mind. The body, he says, is a machine.109 Likewise, the body is divisible and separable.
However, the mind is not.110 For Descartes, it makes no sense to talk about the mind
being “cut off” from itself the way a foot can be cut off the body. The mind wills, feels,
and understands – it is one thing.111 Further, the mind is not affected by all parts of the
body – just the brain (and even then possibly just one small part of it).112 The body may
experience a sensation or not, but the brain can experience the same effect. That is,
science tells us that if there is a pain in the foot it is because nerves are disturbed.113
These nerves link with others up the spinal cord and into the brain where the sensation of
pain is experienced. As such, it is conceivable to illicit pain or pleasure by pressing the
correct nerve, without ever actually affecting the corresponding organ. 114 That is, one
could experience pain “in the foot” without the foot actually being damaged as long as
the correct nerve(s) were being disturbed. Thus, Descartes concludes that it appears that

109 “Fitted together and made up of bones, sinews, muscles, veins, blood, and skin in such a way
that, even if there were no mind in it, it would still carry out all the operations that, as things are, do not
depend on the command of the will, nor, therefore, on the mind.” Ibid., 120. “si considerem hominis
corpus, quatenus machinamentum quòddam est ex ossibus, nervis, musculis, venis, sanguine & pellibus ita
aptum & compositum, ut, etiamsi nulla in eo mens existeret, eosdem tamen haberet omnes motus qui nunc
in eo non ab imperio voluntatis nec proinde a mente procedunt, facile agnosco illi aeque naturale fore.”
110 Ibid., 121. If a body part is lost (i.e., an arm), part of the mind is not also lost. Many people lose
an appendage, but are no less of a person. We can imagine ourselves being torn apart limb by limb, but
remaining the same person. But we cannot do that with our mind.
111

Ibid.

112

Ibid.

113

Ibid., 122.

114

Ibid.
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the experience of sensation is merely for the well-being of the person (so they avoid
pain).115 The actual person, however, cannot be equated with their body.
In summary, then, working through his own personal struggles seeking certain
absolute truth – indubitable knowledge. Descartes utilizes methodical doubt to question
the existence and rational stability of as many things as he can in order to find that which
cannot be doubted. His search leads him to the popular notion – cogito ergo sum. As far
as Descartes is concerned, he is a thinking thing. But thinking things are not extended.
That is, they do not have matter. As such, the “I,” the “soul,” the “me,” for Descartes just
is the mind. “I” am a “soul” which is a “mind” and it is called “me.”
Sifting through the material above the following conclusions about Descartes’
view of the human person emerge. First, the “I” is the soul.116 Second, the soul does not
give life to the body – the body is its own substance and a type of machine.117 Thus the
body and soul are separate substances and can each be understood without reference to
the other. Third, any notion of the soul giving capacities, powers, or properties must be
incorrect – contra Aristotelian notions of souls granting vegetative and sensitive
powers.118 Fourth, given that the soul is not extended, it follows that it cannot be located

115

Ibid., 123.

116 Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro, A Brief History of the Soul (Malden, MA: WileyBlackwell, 2011), 67.
117

Ibid., 68.
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Ibid.
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“in space.”119 Fifth, likewise, the body can be divided into parts, but the soul cannot.120
Sixth, it follows therefore that the mind is a “thinking thing” unlike the body.121 Seventh,
sensations (such as pain) are located in the soul, because the soul feels that sensation.122
And eighth, because of this “the soul is joined to the entire body, even though it is not
located in space.”123 Descartes’ influence on the modern defenders of substance dualism
should be obvious.
2.3.2 The Modern Non-Physical Basis for Human Cognition: Substance Dualism –
Richard Swinburne, and J. P. Moreland and Scott Rae
Given the historical importance and pedigree of substance dualism, its staying
power is easily understood. Here we will look to some contemporary defenses of the
notion that humans are more than their physical parts. One particularly powerful
philosophical argument will continually arise can be called the “conceivability argument”
– the idea that “If it is even conceivable that a mind could exist without a brain, then
mind and brain can’t be the same thing.”124 For, if it “is entirely conceivable that one
could exist as a disembodied mind, with one’s body and brain, and indeed the entire

119 Ibid., 70—71. “A soul is that which is non-extended and, thereby, without any shape in a given
space, is not divisible into parts and is not moveable in the sense that it cannot change spatial position.
Therefore, Descartes believes that a soul is not located in space, period,” 72. Please note that his suggestion
that the soul may possibly link to the brain (pituitary gland, specifically) seems to go against this idea of the
soul be non-extended.
120

Ibid., 71.

121

Ibid.

122 Ibid., 75. Descartes “believes that our pains are located in our souls, which are not themselves
located in space, although they are represented as being present in the different extremities of our physical
bodies.”
123

Ibid., 76.

124

Feser, Philosophy of Mind, 34.
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physical world, being nothing but a figment of one’s imagination. But then it is
conceivable and therefore at least metaphysically possible for the mind to exist apart
from the brain. Therefore, the mind is not identical to the brain.”125 The roots of this idea
can be found in Descartes, but it has found new life with a number of contemporary
philosophers who resist the growing physicalist account of human beings. Below we will
examine the arguments of Richard Swinburne, and J. P. Moreland and Scott B. Rae.
Combined, they make an impressive case for the acceptance of an immaterial aspect to
human nature.
Richard Swinburne, the famed Oxford professor, takes it as fairly obvious that
humans are more than physical constructs. For he notes that humans engage in multiple
different mental events: sensations; thoughts; “purposings” [sic]; desires; and beliefs.126
These various events interact, somehow, with brain events. Swinburne sees an intimate
relationship between the brain and the mind, but denies that the brain is what gives rise to
the mind, hence he rejects epiphenomenalism. This form of dualism is substance dualism,
in which human persons are seen to have two parts – a physical body and a mental soul.
Swinburne’s account of dualism is rather broad, as he sees any aspect of reality that
exhibits physical and mental accounts as containing a mixed mental property.127

125

Ibid., 32.

126 Richard Swinburne, “Dualism and Personal Identity,” in Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and
Guide, ed. by William Lane Craig (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 496.
127 Ibid., 497. If something is a mixed mental property, then it exhibits both physical and mental
characteristics. For example, words on a page. There is the physical paper and physically inked shapes of
the letters. But there is also a mental component – the particular ordering of letters and spaces creates
words and statements which have meaning in a particular language.
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Looking at humans, though, Swinburne sees the soul as the “necessary core” for
one’s existence.128 The soul is the unifying factor for the person. Thus, the “person is the
soul together with whatever, if any, body is linked temporarily to it.”129 Swinburne
defends this proposition in two stages: first, he notes that physical descriptions of
personhood are insufficient to account for personhood; and second, the soul is a better
container for personal identity than the physical body. In the first stage, the key question
for the physicalist is – how much of the body must remain for me to retain my identity?
The physicalist’s answer would seem to be necessarily linked to the brain. For I can lose
my arms and legs and still be “me.” But if I suffer a serious head trauma, I may lose my
sense of “self.” The brain is obviously important since, for both physicalists and dualists,
it is the locus of mental events, character, beliefs, desires, memory, and all other mental
states. But this just raises a second question – how much of the brain can change and I
still retain my identity? Swinburne considers two scenarios and concludes that any
indication that people are more than their biological parts is enough to establish a base
notion of soul.130

128

Ibid.

129 Ibid. It should be noted that Swinburne does not want to identify people as being their souls the
way Descartes does (according to Swinburne). J. P. Moreland and Scott Rae also identify people with their
souls. J. P. Moreland and Scott B. Rae, Body and Soul: Human Nature & the Crisis in Ethics (Downers
Grove: IL: InterVarsity Press, 2000), 168. Swinburne, presumably, would disagree with Moreland and Rae
as well.
130 First, the brain operates in two hemispheres. Generally, the right hemisphere controls the leftside of the body, and the left hemisphere controls the right-side of the body as well as is a major contributor
to speech. Further, these two hemispheres interact in a way that gives the person the perception of a near
seamless experience of the world. Likewise, if some part of the brain is damaged, other parts sometimes
“pick up the slack” – demonstrating the plasticity of the brain. For Swinburne, in our normal everyday
experiences of the world we recognize that almost all people’s brains operate according to two normally
functioning hemispheres – and yet, we recognize that these two hemispheres together only make one
person (p1) . But, he asks, what would happen if we were somehow able to transplant one of the
hemispheres into some other body, so that it shared a hemisphere with someone else (p2)? Would this now
be one person or two people in new bodies? Swinburne takes it that there would now appear to be two
people in one body. Swinburne, “Dualism and Personal Identity”, 498. What to make of the new “person”
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Swinburne concludes that these thought experiments show “that there is
something other to the continuity of the person than any continuity of parts of brain or
body.”131 Persons simply cannot be reduced to their brain. This is because knowledge of
what has happened to a person’s body (or brain) is insufficient for knowing what has
happened to the person. Thus, persons are not to be simply identified with their bodies.132

(p3) who just had the two hemispheres from p1 and p2? Both hemispheres would (presumably) operate
according to ways of each original person from whom the hemisphere was taken “and since memory and
character and their manifestation in behavior are dependent on factors present in both hemispheres, we
would expect each [hemisphere] publicly to affirm such apparent memories and to behave as if he had” the
original characteristics. Ibid., 498—499. Perhaps the behavior of p3 is misleading and it is not two people in
one body, but a new person. Surely, the different hemispheres began their own story separate from their
previous one once separated from their original companion, and once brought together they begin to pen
their own story. Thus, p3 is a new person – albeit one with a unique origin. For Swinburne, though,
however one attempts to resolve the conundrum, the point remains that no matter how “much we knew in
such a situation about what happens to the parts of a person’s body, we would not know for certain what
happens to the person.” Ibid., 499. Is p1 and p2 now dead because of the removal of the respective cerebral
hemispheres? If they are still alive, is it possible for them to remain the same person with half their brain
gone? Swinburne takes another route with this scenario as well. If we split the brain of one person and put
the hemispheres in two bodies (with no companion hemisphere), would we then have two people? He
answers that we simply do not know. It would take many complex experiments over time to render a
judgment. For example, to conclude that two people were now present, then we would need to perform a
comparison of beliefs regarding: sensations, general beliefs, desires, general character of good and bad,
inclinations, and patterns of limbic movement – and possibly other factors. In any case, the issue for
Swinburne is not “does the split-brain experiment disprove dualism”? But rather the further question of
“how many souls can share one brain”? Ibid., 506—507. Each of these questions is assuming that the
person is more than the biological parts, and that’s Swinburne’s point.
The second, thought experiment for Swinburne is borrowed from Bernard Williams. Ibid., 499. Cf.
Bernard Williams, “The Self and the Future,” Philosophical Review, 79 (1970): 161—180. Suppose a mad
scientist kidnaps you and is going to separate the hemispheres of your brain, putting one in one body and
the other in another. One body will be tortured, the other will be made fabulously wealthy. The scientist lets
you choose which body will be tortured and which will be rewarded. Further the scientist promises to abide
by your wishes and you believe him. Now, the question is: how do you choose which body will be
punished and which will be rewarded? Further, assume that you know all there is to know about
neurobiology, would this give you insight into which body should get the money and which should be
tortured? This all assumes that you recognize there will be something of a continuation of consciousness in
this experiment and you want to experience the pleasures of wealth rather than the bodily tortures meted
out to the “other.” No matter which hemisphere is rewarded and the other punished, there is a “risk”
involved. A “risk” for what? A risk that you chose incorrectly and your consciousness continues with the
body that is tortured. Swinburne, “Dualism and Personal Identity”, 499.
131

Ibid., 499.

132 “Knowledge of what has happened to a person’s body and its parts will not necessarily give
you knowledge of what has happened to the person, and so, that persons are not the same as their bodies,”
Ibid., 500.
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Further, the fact that we can talk about people apart from their physical parts is sufficient
to show that people are more than their physical parts. People are neither reducible to
their body, nor is bodily continuity sufficient for people to retain their identity. In his
version of the “conceivability argument,” Swinburne says that the fact that a disembodied
mind is a coherent concept (or at least it is not incoherent) indicates that persons can be
understood as being more than their bodies.133 Not only that, the laws of nature do not
seem to necessitate that people have bodies. That is, there is nothing in the natural order
that demands people be only physical. Indeed, there is nothing incoherent with the idea of
people “switching” bodies or at least having different bodies. Thus, Swinburne concludes
that since “the body which is presently yours could have been mine (logic and even
natural laws allow [this possibility]), that shows that none of the matter of which my
body is presently made is essential to my being the person that I am.”134
This leads Swinburne to the second stage of his argument. Here he wants to make
sense of the notion that persons do not need a material body for identity or existence. To
do this he makes use of what he calls a “quasi-Aristotelian assumption.” He states it like
this:
Quasi-Aristotelian Assumption: a substance S2 at t2 is the same substance as an
earlier substance S1 at t1 only if S2 is made of some of the same stuff as S1 (or stuff
obtained therefrom by gradual replacement).135

133 He says, “the mere logical possibility of a person surviving with only half his brain (the mere
fact that this is not a self-contradictory supposition) is enough to show that talk about persons is not
analyzable as talk about bodies and their parts.” Ibid.
134 Ibid., 502. Alvin Plantinga makes a similar point. See The Nature of Necessity (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1974), chapter 6.
135

Ibid., 503.
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When this assumption is combined with the “conceivability argument” (the notion that it
is logically possible a person can exist without a body) it follows that people have souls.
This is because, if it were the case that I were only a physical being and then all of my
physical parts were destroyed, then I would cease to exist. But if it is conceivable that I
could survive such a bodily annihilation (either all at once or gradual), then I must be
more than my bodily parts. But for Swinburne, this more than is the same as the
traditional notion of “soul.” Thus, our continued consciousness (which testifies to the
continuity of substance) is the “immaterial core” of the person – their soul.136
J. P. Moreland and Scott Rae argue that ethical actions and moral teachings bear
directly upon one's views of human person-hood. As such, a proper view of what people
are is of paramount importance. Now, Moreland and Rae hold that humans are best
described by a position they call “Thomistic Substance Dualism” (TSD). 137 Their
contention is that TSD provides the best basis for a Christian approach to anthropology.
TSD is best understood as the human person being identifiable with their soul. Thus, they
take it that an immortal and substantial soul exists which is the human person. The human
body is, therefore, an ensouled structure. In general, they claim that humans are
substances, not just “property-things.” That is, humans are not just a collection of various
properties or qualities. Stated differently, humans are not just a bundle of different
characteristics. They take it that naturalism and “complementarianism” – which tends to
accept naturalistic approaches to human nature – are both false. Indeed, for Moreland and
136

Ibid.

137 I find it doubtful that the authors have correctly labeled their viewpoint, since Aquinas
specifically repudiates some of the positions the authors take to be representative of Aquinas. See Christina
Van Dyke, “Not Properly a Person: The Rational Soul and ‘Thomistic Substance Dualism,’” in Faith and
Philosophy Vol. 26, no. 2 (April 2009): 186—204.
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Rae, the fact that humans are free and are able to maintain a semblance of identity over
their lives, indicates (for them) that TSD has something going for it. Basically, they argue
that certain features of human personhood cannot be adequately addressed by either
naturalism or complementarianism, thus TSD should be adopted.
As mentioned above with Jerry Fodor, Leibniz’s Law of the Indiscernability of
Identicals looms large for Moreland and Rae.138 They state LLI like this: for any x and for
any y, if x and y are identical, then for any property P, P will be true of x if and only if P
is true of y.139 In other words, if you want to test to see if two things are really not
identical then find a property true of x but false for y. The impact of this statement for
Moreland and Rae is quite profound in relation to human persons. Reminiscent of the
“conceivability argument,” they note that in light of LLI persons cannot be identical to
their bodies (which materialism ostensibly affirms) because there is no possible world in
which a body could exist in a disembodied state.140 Moreland and Rae take this as a
convincing reason to give some form of dualism a fair hearing.
With these ideas in place Moreland and Rae then consider how identity can be
maintained through change. Because of the nature of a substance and its relationship to
its various properties, they believe that a proper analysis will show how sameness
through change is possible. Essentially, during change it is the substance that remains the
138 Above this is simply called Leibniz’s Law of Indiscernables (LLI), and for simplicity sake, I
will use the same acronym.
139 “In general, everything is what it is and not something else. Everything is identical to itself and
thus shares all properties in common with itself.” Ibid., 56.
140 Ibid., 57. That is, we can imagine possible worlds were people are roaming around bodiless,
but if people were identical to their bodies, then this would be quite literally unthinkable (per LLI). If
people were identical to their bodies, then we should have just as hard a time imagining disembodied
persons as we do triangles with more than three angles – but we don’t. We can quite easily imagine people
being disembodied, but cannot imagine a triangle having more than three angles.
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same, but it is the various non-essential properties (e.g., accidental properties) that are
gained or lost.141 It is the substance that persists throughout the change, for indeed,
“change” presupposes that something remains the same in the process. And that
something for Moreland and Rae is the substance. When applied to the purposes of this
project, it should be evident why dualism persists despite a strong physicalist narrative. If
Moreland and Rae’s accounting of how properties and substances relate is true, then if
physicalism is correct, for anything that changes – no matter how minor – technically,
there was no “change” but rather a destruction of one entity and the construction of a new
entity. Per LLI if “I” am merely the collection of my physical parts, then if any of the
parts that make up “me” changes, then “I” can no longer be the same person. Stated
differently, under physicalism, there could be no “me.” Moreland and Rae take this as
evidence that if we can have the subjective experience of “me” throughout some change,
then this is strong (if not determinative) evidence that “I” am more than mere physical
parts.142
This type of broad “conceivability argument” is not the only arrow in Moreland
and Rae’s quiver. They pursue two additional reasons for thinking humans are soul-ish
creatures. The first is that humans have free-will.143 The second is the very fact we are
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Ibid.

142 Ibid., 82. Physicalists tend toward a property-view of people while dualists tend toward a
substance view of people. The main difference between the property-thing view and the substance view is
that the property-thing is structured as a series of external relations while the substance view is structured
as a series of internal relations. The strength of the substance view is being able to account for identity
through change. Its greatest weakness is that it cannot be observed or empirically verified – it relies on a
thick philosophical basis that is not particularly easy to penetrate and in which its concepts are not
altogether agreed upon. In other words, while there is a certain type of plausibility in Moreland and Rae’s
thesis, since it cannot be observed it will always be controversial.
143

Ibid., 121—155. Note that this is in direct contrast to E. O. Wilson’s position above.
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able to express rational thought indicates we are more than physical beings.144 For
rational and logical connections are distinct from physical connections.145 This
demonstrates that it is one subject undergoing the reasoning process. If the person is only
identified with their physical parts, then the person that recognizes that “it is raining
outside” would be different than the person that recognizes “an umbrella can keep me
dry.” Indeed, if strict physicalism is correct, you are a different person reading this
sentence now, than when you began this paragraph. Moreland and Rae find these types of
implications of physicalism to be absurd. But the clear alternative, as far as they are
concerned, that can account for these notions of persistence is one in which there is a
stable “self.” But if there is a stable “self,” then this would be the same thing as saying
the person just is a soul.
2.4 Brief Evaluation of Physicalism and Substance Dualism
Both physicalism and substance dualism have powerful reasons for affirming the
truth of either. Hence, someone could hold either position and they would not be
obviously irrational in believing that position. Likewise, each position has powerful
reasons for distrusting the other position. Now, both physicalists and substance dualists
alike take it that evidence for their position is evidence against the other position. For
example, physicalists believe that explaining how the brain works is sufficient for

144

This type of argument will be explored more deeply in the next chapter.

145 For example, the statement “it is raining outside,” is rationally connected to the statement “it is
wet outside,” which can be rationally connected to the statement “I desire not to get wet,” which can be
logically connected to the statement “an umbrella can keep me dry,” which can be rationally connected to
the statement “If I go outside, then I need an umbrella to stay dry.” What this chain of individual thoughts
express are rational and logical connections to various mental states: knowledge that rain is wet; the desire
not get wet; the belief that an umbrella can keep me dry; and so on. None of these ideas are physically
caused by the previous idea. For, what physically follows from the realization that it is raining outside?
Nothing. And that’s the point.
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explaining thought and consciousness – thus any recourse to a “soul” is, at best,
superfluous.146 Substance dualists often see something like the “conceivability argument”
as sufficient reasoning that the mind / soul cannot be equated with the body, irrespective
of what neuroscience says.
With both physicalism and substance dualism’s positions presented above this last
section will briefly examine what I find to be the most salient criticisms of each position.
Some of these criticisms have already been addressed above, but were not developed.
Nor were some of the implications of some other arguments explored. What follows is a
section detailing the salient problems with physicalism, followed by a section noting
serious problems with dualism. I am not claiming that any of these arguments are not
unassailable and that adherents to either position may not have responses to the
arguments. Nor am I saying that these arguments demand adherents abandon their chosen
system. What I am saying is that I find these following criticisms sufficient to look for
some other account of what it means to be human.
2.4.1 Problems with Physicalism
Physicalism’s insistence that all reality be accounted for in third person, scientific
terms, is both admirable and disappointing. It is admirable because the attempted
explanation of reality is so grand. Likewise, there is something appealing about a hardnosed empiricism – given how successful and powerful scientific studies have been,
scientific methodologies seem to be the way to true knowledge. But it is for this reason
that physicalism is also a bit disappointing. This push to say all true knowledge is based

146 John Searle remarks, “Dualism in any form is today generally regarded as out of the question
because it is assumed to be inconsistent with the scientific world view” John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of
Mind (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994), 3.
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in scientific methodology is self-defeating. For to say that only science is the way to
knowledge, must be known by some means other than the scientific method. That is, the
claim that all true knowledge is born of science, is not a scientific claim – it is a
philosophical claim.147 Thus, physicalism is simply too limited to fully explain what it
means to be human.148
There are four main criticisms of physicalism.149 First, is the fact that physicalism
has difficulty responding to the “conceivability argument.” Second, is that physicalism is
often charged with simply begging-the-question on trying to define what it means to be
human. Third, following the second problem, is that physicalism uses the wrong
methodology and philosophy to study the range of human beings. Finally, physicalism
has great difficulty in accounting for rationality.

147 Likewise, science depends on knowledge, beliefs, and principles derived apart from the
scientific method. Logic, mathematics, aesthetics, morality and value judgements, and the scientific method
itself are determined by means other than science. Philosophy, religious conviction, and societal pressures
supply most of the content for these areas.
148 Addressing E. O. Wilson specifically, Marilynne Robinson notes the main problem with
Wilson’s project. She says, “By identifying the soul with the mind, the mind with the brain, and noting the
brain’s vulnerability as a physical object, he [Wilson] feels he has debunked a conception of the soul that
only those who find the word meaningless would ever have entertained” Marilynne Robinson, Absence of
Mind (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 111—112. Stated differently, Robinson finds
Wilson’s conception of what the soul is to be so impoverished that it can only be convincing to someone
who already agrees with Wilson.
149 Marilynne Robinson notes a consequence of physicalist reductionism that could act as a fifth
criticism. She says, “If the brain at the level of complex and nuanced interaction with itself does indeed
become mind, then the reductionist approach insisted upon by writers on the subject is not capable of
yielding evidence of mind’s existence, let alone an account of its functioning. One who has inquired into
the properties of hydrogen and oxygen might reasonably conclude that water is a highly combustible gas –
if there were not his own experience to discourage this conclusion. As proof of the existence of mind we
have only history and civilization, art, science, and philosophy. And at the same time, of course, that
extraordinary individuation. If it is true that the mind can know and seek to know itself in ways analogous
to its experience of the world, then there are more, richer data to be gleaned from every age and every
culture, and from every moment of introspection, of deep awareness of the self” Ibid., 120.
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2.4.1.1 Problem #1: Physicalism has Difficulty Responding to the “Conceivability
Argument”
As explained above, one of the favored arguments by substance dualists is the
“conceivability argument” – that if you can imagine the mind existing apart from the
brain, then the two cannot be identical. Stated differently, if the mind just is the brain (or
brain states), then we could not even imagine a mind existing without a brain – but we
can. We can imagine angels, ghosts, gods, God, demons, spirits, and the like.150 It thus
follows that the mind and brain are not the same.151
A physicalist may reply, however, that the preceding reasoning is faulty because
we do not have any empirical examples of minds existing without some sort of brain.
Software always resides in hardware. Thus, it seems to be the case that the dualist is
simply incorrect that the mind can exist apart from the brain, for either: 1) there actually
is no mind, only brain; or 2) if there is a mind it can only exist as an epiphenomenon of

150 Note that none of these beings need actually to exist for the argument to work. These types of
beings just have to be possible. In other words, to falsify the “conceivability argument” one would have to
prove that we cannot even imagine these types of beings. A very tall order indeed.
151 Now while this argument may be problematic for the standard physicalist, many transhumanists
do not have a problem separating the mind from the brain. Indeed, this is primary assumption for Ray
Kurzweil who wants to upload minds to computers. Ray Kurzweil, “The Evolution of Mind in the TwentyFirst Century,” in Are We Spiritual Machines? Ray Kurzweil vs. the Critics of Strong A.I. ed., by Jay
Wesley Richards (Seattle, WA: Discovery Institute, 2002), 36—39. Ray Kurzweil, The Age of Spiritual
Machines (New York: Viking, 1999). Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near (New York: Viking, 2005).
For Kurzweil, it is the “pattern” of the neural firings that is important for consciousness and personality. He
is confident that by “mapping” the neural patterns of persons, we will then be able to recreate the same
patterns in other substrates. In theory, then, Kurzweil will have “uploaded” a human mind to a machine.
For Kurzweil, the mind can – in theory – exist in substrates other than biological brains, and he is awaiting
the day when this becomes a reality. For Kurzweil, like a computer, the mind is just software and the brain
is just hardware. Software can move to any medium so long as the hardware is sufficiently able to support
it. But, as Ed Feser asksError! Main Document Only. “if minds could possibly exist in physical systems
other than brains, how can they be identical to brains?” Feser, Philosophy of Mind, 69 (emphasis in
original). The answer, of course, is that they cannot be. Thus, in an interesting twist, at least some
transhumanists, while usually physicalists, generally accept this notion that minds and brains are not
identical – at least those that think mind uploading is possible.
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the brain. Either way, if there is a mind it cannot exist apart from the brain, for we have
no empirical evidence otherwise.
This type of response is indeed powerful, but ultimately misplaced. The substance
dualist can grant the empirical evidence and point out that the conclusion does not follow
from the argument.152 Just because all of the samples we have are of minds existing with
brains (ignoring for the moment the religious convictions to the contrary) does not prove
minds and brains are the same because we can imagine the mind existing apart from the
brain. In other words, just providing more examples of minds existing alongside brains
does nothing to strengthen the argument that minds just are brains. Nor does it weaken
the “conceivability argument” that minds can be thought to exist apart from brains. As
such, the “conceivability argument” provides a strong argument that humans must be
more than just their physical parts.
2.4.1.2 Problem #2: Physicalism often Begs-the-Question
From a traditional Christian perspective, perhaps the most serious critique of
physicalism is based in a worldview difference. For the traditional Christian, such as
myself, reality is simply more than the material world. Hence, when a physicalist insists
that only physical / material explanations are acceptable, this seems to the traditional
Christian as limiting what it is that is possible to know. Specifically, in regards to the
issue we have been considering on whether humans have minds / souls, it appears
inappropriate to the traditional Christian to remove a possible explanation of our

152 As Feser remarks, “If you really can conceive of the mind existing apart from the body or
brain, it is at least plausible that this would provide evidence that they are not identical . . . . But to conceive
of them existing together hardly proves that they are identical . . . . So the materialist conceivability
argument cannot, in the nature of the case, prove its conclusion.” Ibid., 60.
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experienced phenomena from the table before the discussion begins. For the physicalist /
materialist rules out from the beginning any non-physicalist understanding of human
persons. But if this is the case, then no evidence or argument is available to convince
them otherwise. For any physicalist / materialist / naturalist account – no matter how
unlikely – will always be more probable than appeal to immaterial minds / souls. As
such, if the physicalist is asked why they do not think humans have minds / souls, they
simply respond, “because minds / souls do not exist.” And when asked how they know
minds / souls do not exist, they can respond, “because we don’t have any empirical
evidence for minds / souls.” But if it is pointed out that minds / souls are not the sorts of
“things” that are detectable by empirical methods (precisely because minds / souls are not
physical), the physicalist replies “precisely! It is because minds / souls are not physical /
material we know they do not exist.” But this is just to argue in a circle. The physicalist
knows minds / souls do not exist, because they are not material, and only material things
can be known to exist. Circular reasoning, however, is not an attractive way to establish
one’s position.
Ed Feser remarks that physicalists tend to “give accounts of mental phenomena
that leave out everything essential to them: qualia, consciousness, thought and
intentionality get redefined in physicalistic terms, with the consequence that materialist
analyses convey the impression that the materialist has changed the subject, and failed
genuinely to explain the phenomenon the analysis was supposed to account for.”153 That
is, we have first person experience of sensations (qualia), our own consciousness, our
own thoughts, and our own intentionality. But if you review the physicalist philosophers

153

Ibid., 218.
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above, you will see a systematic attempt to redefine or replace each of these experiences
as being in some way illusory, or at least not literally true.154 Thus, we can see that a
problem for physicalists is that they must deny the existence of really experienced
phenomena. However, the only way they can deny these phenomena is by assuming that
only physicalist / materialist explanations are available. If there is more to the universe
than just matter, then other explanations are available, but the physicalist has ruled these
out before any analysis begins.
Much of the reason physicalists adopt this minimalist position is due to the rise of
materialistic reductionism – the idea that large scale interactions can be “reduced” to
smaller physical interactions. The operative notion here is that if we understand what is
happening at the most basic of physical reality, then we can actually explain all of reality.
When applied to humans, this takes the form of a biological reductionism. Thus, humans
are explicable in terms of their biological parts. But as philosopher Ric Machuga explains
this biological reductionism borders on incoherence. For to say that humans are nothing
more than the sum of their biological parts is just to commit the fallacy of composition.155
In other words, reductionism is attractive to philosophical materialists because of the

154 For example, some physicalists hold that qualia either do not exist, or are just explicable by
analyzing certain brain states. Likewise, they hold that consciousness – though mysterious – can be nothing
more than a properly functioning brain. And the same goes for thought and intentionality. For example,
review Dennett’s position on the intentional stance to see how he addresses the personal experience of
thoughts being about something – he says that intentionality literally does not exist, but we must act as
though it does to make sense of the world (i.e., we must take an “intentional stance”).
155 For example, saying that humans are just a collection of biological systems, would be like
saying Mozart’s Requiem is just a collection of musical notes and acoustic disturbances, or that this project
is just a collection of ink marks on paper. As Machuga says, “but they are not merely ink lines on paper;
computer software is a collection of electrons, but it is not merely a collection of electrons. In all of these
cases the whole is more than the sum of its parts, and thus any reductionist explanation of music, written
words, or computer software is always conceptually incoherent.” Machuga, In Defense of the Soul, 62
(emphasis in original).
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need to “fit” reality into a “causal network described by physical science.”156 However,
this desire to map reality has the side effect of “reducing” all of reality to its basic “core”
interactions and laws. The problem is that these philosophers and scientists choose that
the only interactions and causal networks worth studying are physical.157 They ignore all
non-physical reality, precisely because it is non-physical, and then state that there is no
non-physical reality.158 Of course, as stated above, this merely begs-the-question in favor
of philosophical materialism. It is not difficult to prove your conclusion when you
assume it from the outset.
And this type of methodology is not limited to secular scientists and philosophers.
For example, the Christian physicalist Nancy Murphy falls into the same trap. For
Murphy, human distinctiveness from other creatures is only a matter of degree, not
kind.159 This is telling in regards to her background. Because Murphy holds to a type of
(unstated) scientism, any philosophical positions at odds with scientism’s orthodoxy must
be wrong.160 Because Murphy has limited herself to purely neurobiological explanations,
it is no surprise that she can only find neurobiological explanations – even if it means
denying something that is an ontological possibility. Namely the possibility of souls.
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Feser, Philosophy of Mind, 146.
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Machuga, In Defense of the Soul, 25-26.

158 “What counts as ‘knowledge’ for Wilson is in effect only one kind of knowledge, not all human
knowledge.” Steve Pope, “A Scientist’s Search for Comprehensive Knowledge,” in The Christian Century
www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=84 (accessed March 27, 2012).
159

Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?, 117.

160 For example, a plant’s ability to grow and assimilate nutrients is of a different kind than any
inorganic entity. Likewise, an animal that has sensory powers to various stimuli is of a different kind than a
plant’s ability to “react” to sunlight or claps its “jaws” shut on a fly. In the same vein, the human ability to
reason and comprehend is of a different kind of activity than an animal responding to various stimuli.
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Murphy, however, wants to avoid the reductionism that is prevalent among
physicalist philosophers and scientists. She is after all convinced that God exists and has
a special plan for humans. She states, “Thus, I maintain that science studies the whole of
human life – there is no metaphysically distinct part of us that is immune from scientific
investigation. However, science gives us an incomplete account of human life, an account
that can only be put into perspective by a religious point of view. Science can say: in this,
this, and this way we humans are like the animals, and in that way and that way we are
different.”161 What is astonishing about this claim is that “science studies the whole of
human life” – except when it does not and “gives us an incomplete account” of it. She
may mean that science can speak to the whole of life in some ways more efficiently than
others. But the problem under either interpretation is that there appear to be aspects to
human nature that are not subject to scientific inquiry (as empirical research) only.162
Further, if there is a metaphysical aspect to humans, then it would necessarily be beyond
scientific investigation precisely because this metaphysical aspect would not be empirical
– metaphysical means “beyond / after the physical.” What Murphy is saying is that
because her preferred methods cannot reach x it must follow that there is no x. But this is
clearly fallacious thinking.163

161

Ibid., 120.

162 For example, logic; mathematics; metaphysical truths (i.e., there are actually other minds other
than mine; the world was created longer than just five minutes ago; etc.); moral truths (which Murphy
admits); aesthetic truths; and science itself (i.e., the scientific method is not proved by the scientific method
but by philosophical reflection).
163 As Etienne Gilson noted, just because you cannot shoot the moon with a bow and arrow, it does
not follow there is no moon. Rather, you need a different method to get there. Etienne Gilson, The Unity of
Philosophical Experience (1937; repr., San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1999), 249.
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Now the argument of the philosophical materialist is not often this blatantly
question-begging. It is often quite subtle. A biologically minded materialist may say
something like this. Natural selection and the phylogenetic continuity of nature has
created an amazing array of species. Through millions of years of evolution, humanity,
which is no more than the combination of “differential reproductive rates” and survival of
the fittest, has appeared in its current form, and for the first time may be able to guide its
own evolution.164 Humans differ from plants and other animals by their parts and degree
of intelligence. Plants have no “nervous system,” but all animals do. Humanity’s
difference in intelligence from other animals is by degree, not kind. All intelligence is the
biochemical reactions in the brain. Humans have a larger brain, hence greater intellectual
capacity than most animals.
This (brief) scenario must assume that there is no “formal” difference between
humans, other animals, and plants. Again, this simply begs-the-question. The only
differences considered are “material” differences. But it is precisely whether there is a
“formal” difference between humans and other objects that is at issue. It is only by
assuming that there is a discrepancy between science and philosophy that this position
would be adopted. If one (like Aristotle or Aquinas) rejects the notion that science and
philosophy are at odds and rather sees them as complimentary, then there is no need to
make those assumptions. A sufficient explanation of reality requires both “material” and
“formal” differences.165
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Machuga, In Defense of the Soul, 36.
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Ibid., 55 (emphasis in original).
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Further, there is no “material” difference why a plant with cambium layers cannot
“feel,” but an animal with a central nervous system can. There may be ontological
reasons why this is the case, but then that would be an appeal to non-material reality.166
Ultimately, this biological reductionism fails because it commits the fallacy of
composition. This position amounts to saying that an object is the sum of its parts, which
is false. Which is more valuable, a car that has been assembled and is ready to drive or a
box of parts for a complete car? Is Mozart’s Requiem merely acoustical disturbances? Are
the words on this page nothing more than the ink and paper? If biological reductionism
were true, then in the first question both cars are identical in value; the answer to the
second and third questions are “yes.” But because the answers are clearly false, then
reductionism cannot be the whole story. Likewise, any attempt to reduce humanity to the
sum of its biological parts is doomed for failure or worse – incoherence.167
2.4.1.3 Problem #3: Physicalism uses the Wrong Method and Philosophy
Related to the previous idea that physicalism often begs-the-question is the notion
that this is due to the wrong methodology and philosophy. For example, substance
dualists attempt to show that mind is non-physical. And since it is reasonable to think that
mind is non-physical, the dualist will object to the materialist that will only allow
166 Machuga summarizes this point well, “It is no use saying that nerve cells are necessary
conditions for the ability to feel and since trees lack nerve cells they can’t feel. The problem is that
‘nervous system’ means ‘a system which is able to feel.’ Or as a mocking Moliere might say, the reason
animals are able to feel is because of their sentient powers!” Ibid., 39 (emphasis in original).
167 Ibid., 62. Likewise, Machuga states “It is simply silly to suggest that biology, chemistry, or
physics has now proved that the human soul is really nothing more than electro-chemical actions of the
brain or that it is merely an ephiphenominal (sic) (and hence not fully real) aspect of the brain. This may be
true, but it cannot be discovered by these disciplines because these disciplines limit their subject matter to
physical stuff from the outset. If it is true that feelings and thoughts are identical to certain brain processes
or that they are not fully real, then this is a truth that could only be discovered – as opposed to merely
assumed – by taking an ontological point of view.” Ibid., 26.
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physical means of investigation.168 The materialist’s approach begs-the-question in favor
of materialism and fails to answer the arguments of the dualist from the start.169 Indeed,
Machuga thinks it is in principle impossible for science to one day prove that humans are
just complex biological machines. For even if science were limited to just physical
explanations, it will never be able to mitigate the distinction between mechanistic causes
and non-mechanistic causes. So long as this distinction exists humanity cannot be
completely reduced to a mere biochemical machine. Many events in nature simply are not
reducible to mechanistic causes.170 And since not every event is mechanical, it follows
that mechanical explanations are not all there is in describing reality. And this is the
problem, physicalist methodology can only look for mechanical explanations of reality.
As Machuga explains, this mechanical methodology simply cannot prove that the mind /
soul is nothing more than its biochemical parts (or an epiphenomena of the brain) because
a mechanical methodology is only limited to understanding material causes – which,

168 Steve Pope notes that Wilson’s “project rides on the dubious assumption that there is only one
kind of truth, the kind of empirically established explanations attained by scientists.” Pope, “A Scientist’s
Search for Comprehensive Knowledge.” But this criticism can be applied to any system of positivism or
scientism.
169

Feser, Philosophy of Mind, 207.

170 For example, where exactly any individual raindrop will fall, or how certain “S” shaped cracks
form in rocks, or the individual shapes clouds take. These events are bound by the laws of nature to behave
in certain ways. Hence, as the atmosphere becomes saturated rain will fail. As pressure in the crust builds
rocks will crack. And as water vapor is carried along by weather patterns they will continuously change.
None of these explanations or laws account for why these events happen the exact way they do. It is not
necessary or essential for a raindrop to hit in a particular spot. Nor is it necessary or essential for any given
rock to form a crack in the shape of an “S”. Nor is it necessary or essential any given cloud look like a
bunny or turtle. These events are properly called accidental and not essential / mechanical. Machuga, In
Defense of the Soul, 144. Bernard E. Rollin agrees. He says, that there “is no one set of rules or laws that
governs the behavior of all things, as the mechanists suggest, so even if everything is in fact made of atoms,
atomic explanations do not explain function; to think otherwise is to commit a category mistake.” Bernard
E. Rollin, “Telos, Value, and Genetic Engineering,” in Is Human Nature Obsolete? Genetics,
Bioengineering, and the Future of the Human Condition, ed. by Harold W. Baillie and Timothy K. Casey
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005), 318.
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again, mind / soul is not. Thus, the only way to know mind / soul does not exist is to
assume it does not exist is by adopting some ontological (i.e., materialistic) stance about
all of reality.171 As Bernard E. Rollins comments, mechanistic worldviews do not
disprove teleological ones, but simply reject them out of hand.172
The philosopher Allen Buchanan, who is sympathetic to both physicalism and
transhumanism, rejects the notion that humans are merely reducible to their biological
components,173 but the question is whether he is able to avoid this position given his strict
materialistic stance on human beings. It is not at all clear to me that Buchanan will be
able to hold both of these propositions: 1) human beings are a collection of biological
characteristics forged in the haphazard process of evolution; and 2) human beings are not
reducible to mere biological characteristics.174 Buchanan’s position will be explored
further in chapter 4, but for now, this simply highlights the methodological problem in
looking for only mechanistic causes. In the physicalist’s attempt to offer a unified view of
reality, they have neglected important aspects of that reality. Both empirical science and
(immaterial friendly) philosophy are needed to have a truly unified vision of reality. If
one views science as being in competition with philosophy (or vice versa), then one has

171 “It is simply silly to suggest that biology, chemistry, or physics has now proved that the human
soul is really nothing more than electro-chemical actions of the brain or that it is merely an ephiphenominal
(sic) (and hence not fully real) aspect of the brain. This may be true, but it cannot be discovered by these
disciplines because these disciplines limit their subject matter to physical stuff from the outset. If it is true
that feelings and thoughts are identical to certain brain processes or that they are not fully real, then this is a
truth that could only be discovered – as opposed to merely assumed – by taking an ontological point of
view.” Machuga, 26.
172

Rollin, “Telos, Value, and Genetic Engineering,” 319.

173

Allen Buchanan, Beyond Humanity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 43.

174 I commend Buchanan for wanting to avoid a “crude reductionism” but I have not seen how he
avoids this conclusion given his ontological position on what comprises human beings. If humans are
merely physical, then it remains mysterious how physicalistic reductionism does not result.
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not understood the true complementary nature of both disciplines. 175 If something is true,
then it cannot be contradicted by some other “truth” – for if something is really true, then
it cannot be displaced and its opposite must be false. Of course, determining what is true
is the difficult part.
A significant distinction physicalists often miss, which results in this collapsing of
reality into only mechanistic causes, is the apparent inability to distinguish between: 1)
methodical naturalism; and 2) philosophical naturalism. Modern scientific endeavors
operate according to methodical naturalism. That is, modern science must assume that
nature normally operates according to regular laws that govern the entire universe.
According to Cambridge Mathematician John Lennox, methodical naturalism is the
default position for modern science.176 And this method has been useful to distinguish
between good and bad science as well as avoiding “god-of-the-gaps” reasoning. But
methodical naturalism has one major drawback – it seems wedded to philosophical
naturalism, which is the position that only naturalistic causes exist (i.e., there is no
supernatural reality). However, Lennox disputes this, and notes that methodical
naturalism is neither supportive nor hostile to metaphysical or religious beliefs. It just
says this is the way we must look at the world to understand it. And science has been
enormously successful taking this methodical naturalistic approach. The problem, again,
is the assumption that methodical naturalism entails philosophical naturalism – the view,

175 “If materialism is true and reality is a single, gapless line moving from left to right, we could
only know that this was the case by adopting the philosophical perspective, i.e., by viewing it from the side.
In an Aristotelian understanding, science and philosophy are complementary disciplines. A complete
description of reality requires both. Any competition between them is the result of one or the other
trespassing in forbidden territory.” Machuga, In Defense of the Soul, 55 (emphasis in original).
176

John Lennox, God’s Undertaker: Has Science Buried God? (Oxford, GB: Lion Hudson, 2009),

34.

101

that there is only the natural / physical world. This, though, does not follow from
methodical naturalism, even though it is consistent with it. For methodical naturalism is
also consistent with philosophical supernaturalism. As Lennox notes, “science done on
atheistic presuppositions [philosophical naturalism] will lead to the same results as
science done on theistic presuppositions [philosophical supernaturalism].”177 As such, to
claim that philosophical naturalism / physicalism is the only compatible position with
methodical naturalism, not only begs-the-question, it simply does not follow.
Given these notions it should now be clear that the way to determine if minds /
souls exist is by philosophical reflection, and not scientific study. It is through
metaphysics and not physics that can help us judge whether humans have an immaterial
aspect to their nature. Dualistic arguments attempt to show that the mind / soul is nonphysical, hence any type of physical scientific inquiry to (dis)prove the notion of mind /
soul is ultimately inadequate to determine if minds / souls exist. Thus, if one insists on
only appealing to empirical science to resolve the matter, then they ultimately are
begging-the-question in favor of physicalism.178 For at bottom, the real issue is the
177 Ibid., 37. It should be pointed out that this is normally the case. So long as science is looking at
operational / experimental data, then either philosophical naturalism or supernaturalism should arrive at the
same conclusion. However, if one is looking at origin / explanatory data, then philosophical
presuppositions come into play. For philosophical naturalists there would be absolutely no “outside”
influence on any such data, but for philosophical supernaturalists, “outside” influence cannot be ruled out
before-hand. For example, when looking at the origin / cause of the universe, philosophical naturalists
cannot allow any sort of deity to be involved as this would require philosophical naturalism to be false –
and some (wrongly!) fear this would falsify methodical naturalism. Philosophical supernaturalists,
however, have no problem assigning a causal explanation to a deity. And the same principles at play in the
origin of the universe debate apply to the debate over a human soul as well. Philosophical naturalists seem
to fear that giving credence to any notion of “soul” will somehow discredit the methodical naturalism on
which modern science depends. This, however, is simply mistaken. Modern science was doing just fine
(and will continue to do just fine) given the belief that humans had / have souls. At bottom, the issue is not
against methodical naturalism and methodical supernaturalism – as this is not really an issue. At bottom,
rather, is the difference between philosophical naturalism versus philosophical supernaturalism. And it is
upon this distinction on which the whole debate lies. Ibid., 36—38.
178 “The proper approach to the study of the mind, in the dualist’s view, is via metaphysics rather
than physics, and philosophy rather than natural science. For since, in the dualist’s view, the arguments for
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ontological differences between humans and other creatures. Comparing the biological
parts is simply inadequate to discover if humans are in anyway unique among other
biological species.179 The only way to move forward is for physicalists to adopt a new
methodology and a new philosophy.
Finally, it must be noted that there is a fundamental difference between
mechanistic functionalism as defended by physicalists and the Aristotelian and Thomistic
hylomorphism (ensoulment) that this project will defend in chapter 3. “The crucial
difference is that, like other forms of materialism, functionalism is implicitly committed
to a ‘mechanistic’ conception of the material world on which it is devoid of Aristotelian
formal and final causes.”180 And it is this rejection of formal and final causes that is
precisely being disputed. For the argument goes, that one cannot get rid of formal and
final causes without eventually resorting to them at some point. As shown above, the
attempt to remove intentionality (which is a subspecies of final causality) cannot be
dismissed without using it. Aristotle accepted the reality of final causes because they are,
in a very real sense, obvious and self-evident. The lengths philosophical materialists and
other physicalists must go to (as demonstrated above) in order to eliminate final causality
has resulted in a position that approaches incoherence.

dualism show that the mind is non-physical, they thereby show also that it is only via inquiry other than
scientific inquiry that we are going to understand its nature, if we are going to understand it at all. For the
materialist to reject the possibility of such inquiry, a priori, would simply be to beg the question against the
dualist.” Feser, Philosophy of Mind, 207.
179

Machuga, In Defense of the Soul, 39 (emphasis in original).
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Edward Feser, Aquinas: A Beginner’s Guide (Oxford, England: Oneworld Publishers, 2009),
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2.4.1.4 Problem #4: Physicalism Cannot Account for Rationality
The final problem with physicalism will be further explored in chapter 3. For
now, however, it should be noted that physicalism has a distinct problem in accounting
for rational thought. For if physicalism is true, all neurological events are merely material
events and subject to material causes. That is, neuron x fires because of input from
neuron y which fires because of input from neuron z and so forth. In a very real sense, the
individual parts that make up the brain are all “dead” matter. In fact, as Feser remarks,
various forms of identity theory is based on the idea that each “type” of mental state can
be matched – one-to-one – with a particular “type” of brain state. But, the “trouble is that
it seems clear that there can’t be such a neat matching, because there can’t be such a
thing as a law-like correlation between mental states and brain states. . . . Any given
mental state, then, is never had individually, but involves the having of other mental
states as well; and it typically also involves there being rational connections between the
mental states one has.”181 For example, my having the current brain and mental state that
“it is raining outside” corresponds to other mental states that are currently not existing as
brain states: “If it is raining, then it is wet”; “I don’t like to get wet”; “Umbrellas can
keep me dry”; “If I go outside while it is raining, I should take an umbrella”; etc. But this
is important, because each of these statements are rationally and logically connected to
each other, they are not physically related to each other.182 But if there are existing mental
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Feser, Philosophy of Mind, 68 (emphasis in original).

182 “So there are logical relations between mental states that partially determine precisely which
mental states one will have, if one has any at all. . . . Neurons and hormone secretions have causal relations
between them; but logical relations – the sort of relations between propositions like ‘It is raining outside’
and ‘It is wet outside’ – are not causal. There seems to be no way to match up sets of logically interrelated
mental states with sets of merely causally interrelated brain states, and thus no way to reduce the mental to
the physical.” Ibid., 68 (emphasis in original).
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relationships that are not based in a physically caused relationship, then physical
causality is not the whole story. Rational connections, therefore, show that the mind
cannot be fully explained by a physical thesis.
Even having the “freedom” to be rational is denied under physicalism. As
explored above with Wilson, free-will is an illusion – even if vastly complex. Terrence
Nichols summarizes this objection well. He says that if our thoughts are merely
determined by some prior neural network operation in the brain, and one’s reaction
“whether of agreement or disagreement, is likewise determined to be what it is. I am not
really free to change my mind. So it is hard to see why I should seriously consider his
argument. He cannot argue otherwise than he does, nor can I respond otherwise than I
do.”183 If the physicalist’s notion of rationality and free-will are correct, then arguing
about competing theories is literally pointless. One cannot believe, react, or do otherwise
than they do. And Wilson’s suggestion that this process is so complex that it is the same
as if we have freedom, may serve some psychological need to avoid some sort of
biologically induced fatalistic determinism – but fatalistic determinism via
neurochemistry is the result. And any suggestion to the contrary is either: impossible,
since it denies the logical force of the argument; or pointless, since the person could not
argue otherwise due to their neurological determinism.184
183

Nichols, The Sacred Cosmos, 147.

184 When applied to ethical theory, the inability to express free-will implies that moral
responsibility is likewise an illusion. For if you literally can do no other than kill Jack, how are we to pass
praise or blame for that action? You could not do otherwise. And thus, you should bear no guilt if you
killed Jack in cold blood, nor should you be honored as a hero for killing Jack before he attempts to
slaughter a group of orphans. Either way, moral responsibility – the ability to act or refrain from acting – is
impossible. Your neural networks are simply responding to stimulae, “you” have no real control over your
(in)actions. Of course, if one is prone to take moral responsibility as a given – that is, we actually have real
moral responsibility, then it would seem strict physicalism would be a problematic position to adopt. Ibid.,
149.

105

One surprising implication of this inability to reason is that it renders science
impossible. If our brains operate according to impersonal physical and chemical laws,
then argumentation, experimentation, and the like can play no role in determining what
one thinks about some subject. Each person would be caught within their own subjective
bubble, there could be no objective knowledge.185 For under the physicalist paradigm,
there is no “mental” causation there is only “physical” causation. As Nichols puts the
challenge, “there must be room in the mind for ideas to cause other ideas. Yet if every
idea is correlated with a particular state of a neural network, and that state is caused by a
previous state of the same network, it is hard to see how ideas can cause other ideas.”186
The impact of this line of reason is not only can we not decide, choose, or deliberate
arguments and evidence, but it eviscerates one’s ability to do science, which is precisely
the practice of deliberating between arguments and evidence.
2.4.2 Problems with Substance Dualism
Just because physicalism has multiple problems, it does not follow that dualism is
therefore true. Indeed, substance dualism has issues of its own. Physicalists have often
understood these problems with substance dualism to be so significant that it warrants
dropping substance dualism from serious consideration. While that suggestion may be
taking things too far, it does suggest that substance dualism may not be the correct view
of human nature either. Whatever advantages substance dualism gains over physicalism

185

Ibid., 147.

186 Ibid., 148. Nichols provides a helpful way of considering the problem of mental and physical
causation. He says to suppose that N1 applies to a neural network state that corresponds to some particular
idea, I1. Now, suppose N1 is the cause of N2, which corresponds to I2. Even if the person claims that I1 led to
the idea of I2, this would be incorrect. It was the neural network (not the idea) that caused I2. As such,
mental causation must be an illusion for physicalist, but this means that both reason and science are
impossible.
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by pointing out the “conceivability argument” or that physicalism “begs-the-question,” it
suffers a disadvantage in having difficulty explaining just how it is exactly supposed to
work. Just because physicalists cannot disprove the existence of the soul, is not evidence
that a soul does, in fact, exist. It is the existence of a thing that requires explanation, not
its non-existence.187 As such, the burden of proof falls on the one making the positive
claim of existence. In this case, if the substance dualist claims there is a mind / soul that
makes up persons, then this claim must be demonstrated and defended.
As above, we are considering four primary problems with substance dualism.188
First, is the classic problem of accounting for exactly “where” the soul resides in body.
Second, is the classic interaction problem. Third, is the criticism that the soul is simply
unparsimonious as scientific advancement has done away with the soul. Finally, is the
problem of identification.
2.4.2.1 Problem #1: “Where” is the Soul?
Physicalists reject all theories of a soul and body dualism and take the primary
instance of this theory to be related to Descartes. Physicalists sees Descartes as the
paradigm in which to understand all forms of dualism. But for physicalists like E. O.
Wilson, Descartes made a blunder by trying to locate “where” exactly the soul interacts
187 “Existence requires an explanation; nonexistence doesn’t. In a dispute about the existence of
immaterial intellects, the burden of proof falls on the person affirming their existence, not on the person
who denies their existence. The mere fact that materialistically-minded philosophers cannot presently
disprove the existence of immaterial mind is not itself an argument in favor of immaterial minds.”
Machuga, In Defense of the Soul, 102 (emphasis in original).
188 Terrence Nichols lists what he sees as the three main reasons substance dualism has been in
decline: 1) the “rise of an evolutionary explanation for human origins” shows human souls are not
“unique”; 2) advances in modern neuroscience “prove” the soul does not move the body, just the brain; and
3) the contemporary theory that humans emerge from a complex “social matrix,” thus demonstrating
humans are not isolated beings as substance dualism suggests. Nichols, The Sacred Cosmos, 136—137.
These are certainly concomitant reasons for dualism’s lack of appeal in modern society.
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with the body.189 The inability of philosophers, theologians, and scientists to discover
exactly “where” the mind is supposed to be in order to interact with the body is taken by
Wilson and other physicalists to be strong evidence that perhaps there is no material mind
to begin with.
The problem of identifying the “location” of the soul intersects with the
interaction problem and has been a stumbling block for many. For example, Anthony
Kenny calls Descartes’ understanding of the interaction of the mind and body one of the
most “puzzling features of the Cartesian system.”190 The interaction problem is discussed
below, but Kenny notes that Descartes’ “solution” to this was to place the soul in the
pineal gland. But this just puts the problem back one step. For as Kenny remarks, this just
in effect, makes the mind a little homunculus. In other words, by placing the mind in the
pineal gland, the “mind-body problem is not solved, but merely miniaturized.”191
Though, Wilson and Kenny’s remarks are specifically applied to Descartes, the
general issue of the location of the soul in the body can be applied to any substance
dualist. For if someone wants to say that humans are of two parts – one material and the
other immaterial – then it is incumbent upon that person to explain how this sort of “twotiered” system works. Indeed, one can look the body over quite thoroughly and find no
“house” for the soul to reside. For the materialistically minded philosopher and scientist,

189 “According to the great philosopher [Descartes], the noncorporeal mind and hence the
immortal soul repose somewhere in the corporeal and moral body. Its location, he suggested, might be the
pineal gland.” Wilson, Consilience, 98—99. This is clearly false. The pineal gland secretes melatonin
which helps regulate the body’s “biological clock.” It does not act as the conduit through which the mind
interacts with the body.
190 Anthony Kenny, “Descartes to Kant,” in The Oxford Illustrated History of Western Philosophy,
ed. by Anthony Kenny (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 121.
191

Ibid.
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there is literally no “place” for the soul in the body, and the inability of dualists to locate
that “place” is taken as evidence that there is no soul. Thus, the mind-brain dualism of
Descartes and others has been rejected by the majority of scientists and philosophers of
mind / brain.192
2.4.2.2 Problem #2: “How” Does the Soul Move the Body?
But it is not just the location of the soul in the body that is problematic. As Kenny
noted just above, it is also how the mind and the body are supposed to interact. This is the
classic “interaction” problem.193 If the soul is separate from the body, then how can the
body provide any information for the soul, and how can the soul control the body? 194
Descartes’ understanding of how the body operates simply cannot allow for any outside
interference from a soul. Only the physical / material interacts with the physical /
material. How then can the immaterial soul affect the material body, or the body inform
the soul? It seems it cannot – hence, substance dualists have needed to opt for alternative
epistemologies.195

192 Wilson, Consilience, 98. “The brain and its satellite glands have now been probed to the point
where no particular site remains that can reasonably be supposed to harbor a nonphysical mind. . . . But
even as mind-body dualism is being completely abandoned at long last, in the 1990s, scientists remain
unsure about the precise material basis of mind. Some are convinced that conscious experience has unique
physical and biological properties that remain to be discovered.” Ibid., 99.
193 Terrence Nichols calls this the “great problem” Descartes’ system must face. Nichols, The
Sacred Cosmos, 136.
194 Kenny highlights the difficulty well, “The transactions in the [pineal] gland, at the mind-body
interface, are highly mysterious. Is there a causal action of matter on the mind or of mind on matter? Surely
not, for the only form of material causation in Descartes’s system is the communication of motion; and the
mind, as such, is not the kind of thing to move around in space.” Kenny, “Descartes to Kant”, 121.
195 I have in mind systems like Augustine’s “divine illumination” theory and Godfried Liebniz’s
“pre-established harmony” though strictly speaking, Leibniz is not a substance dualist. For Augustine’s
treatment on “divine illumination” see above. For Leibniz’s notion of “pre-established harmony” see his
The Principles of Philosophy Known as Monadology 50—59; 77—80.
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Along these same lines, Feser remarks that if something like substance dualism is
true, then the person could never know if their experiences were real.196 In some ways,
this is worse than epiphenomenalism. At least with epiphenomenal approaches, any
sensate experience one has is accounted for as happening because of a change to the
body. But for the Cartesian it is impossible to “even think about our mental states”197 or
qualia. As Feser says, “For if your beliefs – including your belief that you have qualia –
are physical states of your brain, and qualia can have no effect whatsoever on anything
physical, then whether you really have qualia has nothing to do with whether you believe
you have them. . . . if property dualism is true, then you cannot even be certain that your
own conscious experiences exist.”198 Surely, this is strange. Substance dualism is based
on the idea that one can be thought to exist apart from the body. But, if substance dualism
is correct, then it would seem to also follow that one’s mind (and self) cannot be affected
by that same body. For whatever sensations (i.e., qualia) are experienced by the body, or
whatever the mind experiences as a sensation, literally have no connection to each other.
And thus, it further follows that one cannot be aware of what is happening (at least,
directly) to the body. But since it seems obvious we do know what is happening to the
body, it would follow that substance dualism (at least as currently described) is likely
false.
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Feser, Philosophy of Mind, 110—111 (emphasis in original).
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Ibid., (emphasis in original).
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Ibid.
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2.4.2.3 Problem #3: The Notion of “Soul” is Unparsimonious Since Scientific
Advancement has Displaced the “Soul.”
Nancy Murphy explains this criticism well. The basic idea is that scientific
explanations of the world have been slowly eroding the older notions of spirit and soul.
More recently, neuroscience has nearly thoroughly displaced any explanatory need for a
soul, thus leaving the soul as an unsightly wart on the nose of theology and philosophy.
In other words, physicalism can account for several philosophical problems without
recourse to the “soul” as an explanation. For example, scientific advancement has shown
the unreliability of “philosophical intuitions.” And the notion of a “soul” is almost
thoroughly based in a philosophical intuition – obviously there is no empirical evidence
for a soul. But the problem is that if philosophical intuitions were true, then there should
not be much disagreement over what is or is not an intuition. But there is. Hence, what
Descartes takes as “clear and distinct” is “obscure and muddled” to someone else.
Likewise, even the idea of dualism being an intuition is suspect since many do not have
this intuition.199
Indeed, much of the way we think of ourselves is dependent on the language that
we use. Thus a study of language and its sources is needed to understand the self. In this
vein, dualism seems to have been employed to explain ethical problems. To better
account for moral responsibility people were attributed with souls, so that punishment
and blame could be dispensed even after much time had passed. Likewise, it was and is
thought that justice must be done. Yet, since justice is not always distributed equally in
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Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?, 113.
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this world, there must be some afterlife in which justice is served.200 And an afterlife,
seems to demand that there is some immaterial soul that can live without a body.
Further, Murphy notes that physicalism is doing very well in scientific research in
regard to cognitive notions and emotional health. But these scientific advancements are
under physicalist assumptions and not dualist assumptions. Indeed, dualism does not
seem to allow for any scientific advancement in these areas.201 This leads Murphy to say,
“Thus, however inconclusive the philosophical arguments may be, we can say that
science provides as much evidence as could be desired for the physicalist thesis.”202
While I am not necessarily impressed with physicalism as a system, it must be admitted
that there is a significant “optics” problem for substance dualism in light of physicalism’s
success in the scientific arena. If dualism is essential to what it means to be human, but
scientific study operates under a non-dualistic assumption about human persons, and
science seems to be successfully describing the human condition, then it follows that
dualism is superfluous to understanding human nature. As such, relying on the notion of a
soul seems to violate Ockham’s Razor – the idea that one should not multiply causes
beyond necessity.203 The existence of souls, thus, seem to be wholly superfluous to
having a sufficient (complete?) understanding of human beings.

200

Ibid., 114.

201

Ibid., 115—116.

202 Ibid., 116. The pitting of science against philosophy seems problematic, since science itself is
dependent on certain philosophical truths (e.g., logic; mathematics; morality; and science itself). Indeed,
Murphy’s conclusion here could be turned around and be just as compelling – ‘thus, however conclusive
the scientific arguments may be, we can say that philosophy provides as much evidence as could be desired
for the dualist thesis.’ Science and philosophy are not at odds, though scientists and philosophers often are.
203 See Ernest A. Moody, “William of Ockham,” in Vol. 8 of The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed.
by Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan Publ. Co., 1967), 307.
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2.4.2.4 Problem #4: Substance Dualism makes Identifying Persons Difficult (if not
impossible)
There is an aspect to physicalism and substance dualism that both have in
common. Both hold to a mechanistic view of material nature. Both affirm there are no
“final” causes in material nature. This presents a unique problem to both physicalism and
substance dualism – the problem of personal identity. The physicalist can either deny that
a “person” really exists (understood as a unified something), or can say that the physical
body just is the person. The substance dualist, however, has no recourse to either of these
options. Mainly since substance dualism is employed to explain how the person exists –
the person is primarily a soul. Second, the substance dualist denies that the person just is
a physical body. Indeed, recall Moreland and Rae’s contention above that the person is
best understood as an “immaterial soul.”204
So, what then is “the problem of personal identity”? Remember, one of the
motivating factors for adopting substance dualism is supposedly its ability to account for
stability through change. When a person grows from an infant into an adult, what is it that
makes them the same person? Physically, they are wholly different. But the substance
dualist can claim that what remains the same is their rational soul from infancy through
adulthood. Thus, there is an unbroken chain of experiences had by the soul. This is all
well-and-good, but it raises a different problem. Feser states it well, substance dualism
“seems to make it impossible in principle ever to know that one is dealing with the same
person from day to day, or even from moment to moment. A Cartesian immaterial
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substance is unobservable, devoid as it is of any physical properties.”205 Because you
cannot observe a soul, how do you know if you are dealing with the same person (or
anyone at all!) from moment to moment? It is important to note that the problem here is
not whether you can have any confidence that the person you are talking to is a friend or
spouse. If that were the case, then this would just be the philosophical problem of “other
minds.” Rather, what is significant for our purposes is the claim “that our inability to
reidentify immaterial substances over time poses a challenge to the very coherence of the
idea of an immaterial substance.”206 Because the soul has no necessary connection to any
particular body, we are left guessing whether we ever deal with the exact same person on
a daily basis. Above it was noted that some dualists claim that minds can (theoretically)
enter other bodies (i.e., “mind switching”). It is the implications of this claim that are
pertinent here. What assurances do we have under dualism that the person to whom I am
talking to “right now” is the same person as who I talked to yesterday? The answer, is
none.
Now, a substance dualist might reply that some psychological continuity shows
that the soul is the same from day-to-day and moment-to-moment. Thus, memories,
behavior, and personality all contribute to our identifying an individual as that individual.
But, again, Feser points out, the “problem with these theories is that it seems
conceptually possible that more than one person could be psychologically continuous
with some earlier person.”207 Even if the substance dualist insists that the issue is not
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Feser, Philosophy of Mind, 212.
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Ibid., 213.
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Ibid., 214—215.
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continuity so much, but instead “non-branching” continuity, then the problem becomes
that the solution seems just ad hoc. Worst of all, it seems to make identity based on
external factors – how others perceive you. If someone does not make a psychological
connection to you tonight, then how will they know if it is you tomorrow? Your thoughts
may continue on in one continuous stream, but for the other person, how could they be
convinced that you are you? Again, this just seems absurd. But since that is the case, it
should be taken as evidence that substance dualism has significant problems.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has explored the both the historical and philosophical reasons for
adopting a physicalist or substance dualist approach to human persons. Both were found
to have strong points in their favor as well as significant challenges to their overall
coherence. Physicalism was seen to have strong scientific backing from evolutionary
theory and from that several philosophical positions developed to address the human
phenomenon of “mind.” Whether one opts for eliminativism or functionalism,
physicalism provides an attractive position for empirically inclined individuals.
Substance dualism finds its strength not so much in providing scientific arguments, but
rather by the strength of the philosophical case for its position. Indeed, the
“conceivability argument” alone is a powerful reason to think humans are more than
mere physical parts.
The next chapter will offer a mediating position between the hard materialism of
the physicalist thesis and the abstract spiritualism of the substance dualist. Following the
systems of Aristotle and Aquinas, I will argue for a hylomorphic view of human persons
– called “ensoulment.” This position avoids the difficulties raised by both physicalism
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and substance dualism, and as such, provides a substantive basis upon which we can
understand the nature of human beings. The second half of the next chapter will also look
at the theological basis for human uniqueness and sacredness. Hence, the notions of
ensoulment tied to the theological framework that humans are the imago Dei provides a
compelling foundation for any further consideration of what it means to be human.
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Chapter 3
Anthropological Proposal: Ensoulment
Systems that are too spiritual and ignore bodily constraints and systems that are
too materialistic and ignore spiritual realities, such as free will and the soul, both
fail to reach a comprehensive view of the human person.
— Terrence L. Nichols, The Sacred Cosmos, 127
Whoever controls the definition of mind controls the definition of humankind
itself, and culture, and history.
— Marilynne Robinson, Absence of Mind, 32
3.1 Introduction
Both physicalism and substance dualism have impressive upshots in their favor as
well as significant difficulties. Physicalism provides a strong scientific basis for placing
humanity firmly within the flow of biological history. Humans are one among many
species vying for survival and domination, and physicalism has a compelling narrative to
explain how humans have arrived on the scene in our current state. Indeed, given this
information it is easy to see why this has become the dominant view among scientists and
philosophers regarding human nature. Substance dualism, on the other hand, has a strong
pedigree of philosophical reflection supporting it. When a position is held by such great
minds as Plato, Augustine, Descartes, and indeed most of western philosophy, then even
though substance dualism may not be able to strictly prove there is a soul to everyone’s
satisfaction, it should not be laughed off as simple folk psychology. As seen in chapter 2,
the “conceivability argument” all by itself provides a powerful (even if not fully
compelling) reason to think that humans are more than just their bodies and brains.
Of course the difficulties with each position falls along the same lines as their
respective strengths. Physicalism appears weakest in answering the “conceivability
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argument” and also seems to beg-the-question against the possibility of there being a
soul. Substance dualism has difficulty in explaining exactly how a soul and a body
interact, as well as providing certainty of personal identity for other people. Stated
differently, physicalism simply has not ruled out the possibility of persons having souls,
and substance dualism has not (indeed, cannot!) established basic knowledge of how the
soul and body relationship operates. Are we then stuck in a stalemate? Are there no other
alternatives to account for the body and soul relationship which acknowledges the
successes of these two rival systems but avoids each systems’ weaknesses? I suggest
there is.
Physicalism and substance dualism are not the only options available to examine
the metaphysical basis of human nature. There is a mediating position, one that attempts
to take the “best of both” and combine them into one coherent package. This chapter will
expound and defend this third option, attempting to walk the tightrope between the main
competitors explored in chapter 2. “Hylomorphism” is taken from the Greek terms “hyle”
meaning matter and “morphe” meaning form. It is matter and form, together. If
physicalism sees humans as bodies without souls (matter only) and substance dualism
sees humans as souls with bodies (form primarily), then hylomorphism sees humans as a
body and soul unity (matter and form). This position finds its roots in Aristotle and then
given its Christian formulation in Aquinas. This chapter will adopt the term “ensoulment”
to describe this view.1 While what follows will be a general defense of the classical
position, the term “ensoulment” is adopted because it will sound more familiar to modern

1 The theologian Terrence Nichols takes a similar tactic in discussing the body and soul
relationship. However, instead of calling the relationship “ensoulment” he prefers the term “holistic cause.”
The Sacred Cosmos: Christian Faith and the Challenge of Naturalism (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press,
2003), 167.
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sensibilities and “hylomorphism” tends to sound archaic and (perhaps) intimidating.
Ensoulment, then, attempts to walk the line between physicalism and substance dualism,
even as it “takes fire” from both sides. Nancy Murphy offers a nice critique of the
common physicalist rejection of the ensoulment tradition as based in Aristo-Thomistic
metaphysics. She first notes that the rise of atomism spelled the doom for Aristotelian
physics.2 Once atomism was adopted, the notion of a soul being the form of the body – as
Aristotle held – no longer seemed feasible.3 After atomism became the accepted position
in academia, the perennial philosophical problem of the interaction of the mind-body
problem arose.4 Murphy notes the “last gasp” of the medieval notion of soul was in the
20th century debates between the “vitalists” and the “emergentists.”5 The end result,
however, is that vitalism has essentially disappeared except for a few (mainly Catholic)
circles. Emergentists are just another name for physicalists. Murphy sees this historical

2 Once the Earth was no longer seen as the center of the universe, an Aristotelian style
hylomorphic / ensouled understanding of nature was untenable – particularly in regards to the nature of
“matter.” Nancy Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2006), 41. Harold W. Baillie notes the same critique. Namely, that any Aristo-Thomistic anthropology is
based on an outdated metaphysic. Harold W. Baillie, “Aristotle and Genetic Engineering: The Uncertainty
of Excellence,” in Is Human Nature Obsolete? Genetics, Bioengineering, and the Future of the Human
Condition, ed. by Harold W. Baillie and Timothy K. Casey (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005), 215.
3 As Murphy says, “in this new worldview there simply is no such thing as form.” Murphy, Bodies
and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?, 44. Allen Buchanan remarks that “Darwinian theory obliterated any hopes
that final causation would play an irreducible metaphysical role in the evolutionary process,” Allen
Buchanan, Beyond Humanity?: The Ethics of Biomedical Enhancement (Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press, 2011), 206n6. Of course a number of theologians and philosophers would disagree with this
assessment, but Buchanan’s observation cannot be simply brushed aside. If Darwinian evolution is true,
this could pose a serious challenge to any teleologically based metaphysical system.
4

Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?, 47.

5 The vitalists were Aristotelian and argued that there was some force to “direct the formation of
an organism and to account for its being alive.” While the emergentists affirmed all that was needed was
the “proper functioning of a suitably complex entity” to achieve life – life emerges and depends on a
complex organization, not some other thing like a soul. Ibid., 57.
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narrative pointing positively in the direction of physicalism and against the flow any sort
of dualism – substance or otherwise.6
What follows, then, are three sections. The first will establish the historical
backdrop for ensoulment in the thought of Aristotle and Aquinas and a modern
philosophical basis for the ensoulment view. The second section will look at the
theological reasons for accepting ensoulment as compatible with the Christian faith. Of
course, the argument will not be content to just leave the conclusion as “ensoulment is
permissible,” but rather that ensoulment should be the preferred theological position. The
final section will summarize the preceding remarks and contrast ensoulment against both
physicalism and substance dualism. This approach should establish ensoulment as a
reasonable base metaphysical understanding of human nature.7 And from this basis we
will then be able to turn to the moral implications of this viewpoint in chapters 4 and 5.
3.2 Philosophical Considerations
The following will expound two sub-sections. The first will be the historical
grounding for the ensoulment position. This will be accomplished by looking at the
relevant classical thought of Aristotle and Aquinas. The second section will look at the
issues relevant to human cognition as mainly interpreted through the admirer of Aquinas,
6 Ensoulment is, indeed, a form of dualism. However, it differs from substance dualism in that the
soul is not a separate “thing” from the matter it informs. Again, substance dualism would say that the
person is the soul. Ensoulment says the person is the soul and body unity.
7 Establishing the metaphysical basis of humanity is important for establishing a moral system,
since the moral system should be congruent with the metaphysical. As Harold W. Baillie observes, while
“the notion of personhood is an ethical concern, it must also have metaphysical roots. If genetic
engineering gives rise to concerns that go beyond an evaluation of the consequences of an action or the
political understanding of it, then it is because such a practice would be an alteration of the metaphysical
nature of the human being. Thus, if there are to be effective arguments about genetic enhancement, they
must represent a metaphysical discussion about human nature.” Baillie, “Aristotle and Genetic
Engineering,” 211—212.
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Edward Feser. Specifically, this section will look at issues related to qualia,
consciousness, reasoning, and intentionality. A brief examination of these issues will
show the difficulty that physicalism has in sufficiently accounting for these phenomena.
Likewise, it will highlight the inadequacy of substance dualism to address physicalist
criticisms.
3.2.1 Historical Considerations: Ensoulment – Aristotle and Aquinas
3.2.1.1 Aristotle – The Human Soul is the Form of the Person: The Soul Cannot Exist
Apart From the Body
Of interest and relevance to this project is the idea that Aristotelian physics can be
rejected, but one could still accept Aristotelian metaphysics. Though Aristotle did the
best he could in understanding the physical world with what he had and worked it into a
complete (and elaborate) system – it is clear (as Murphy noted above) his view of physics
was / is wrong. But this does not necessarily spell the end of his metaphysical system. For
the principles that are undergirding a system are more fundamental an explanation than
those on the surface. By analogy, the concrete foundation of Aristotle’s metaphysics is
still useable, but the house of straw built by his physics has blown away.
Aristotle's approach to human beings must be placed in the context of how he
views the world. Aristotle was operating in the early flow of western philosophy and was
a student of Plato. As such, many of the terms and concerns that Aristotle sees as being
essential to philosophical reflection can be derived from his historical situation. Briefly
put, Aristotle as well as the pre-Socratics, Socrates, and Plato, are responding to the
arguments of Parmenides.8 Simply stated, they are searching for the nature of “being.”

8 It should be noted that we do not have any writings from Parmenides directly. What we have that
is attributed to Parmenides comes from other authors. As such, there is disagreement among scholars about
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Parmenides put forward a simple, but profound, argument for Monism – that is, all reality
and all being is one. He said that for two things to exist, they must differ in regards to
either their being or non-being. Difference cannot be due to their being, since that is what
they have in common, and it cannot be due to non-being since non-being is nothing. As
such, there cannot be two things at all.9 For indeed, if the issue of “being” cannot be
settled, then all reality really is one. There cannot be different things, motion, change,
generation, corruption, etc. And yet, all of these events seem real. But if Parmenides is
right, this is just an illusion.
To see specifically how Aristotle accounts for motion against Parmenides it is
important to look at how Aristotle understands form, matter, and privation. These three
notions are the “principles of change.”10 For all change involves something going from
one state into another. Change involves something remaining partly the same and partly

just what exactly can be attributed to Parmenides. However, it seems that the argument I sketch seems as
though it accurately (if perhaps too simply) represents ideas commonly attributed to Parmenides. See
Patricia Curd, ed. A Presocratic Reader: Selected Fragments and Testimonia, trans. by Richard D.
McKirahan (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publ. Co., 1996), 43—44.
9 Simplicius attributes the following to Parmenides, “how could what is be in the future? How
could it come to be? For if it came into being, it is not, nor if it is ever going to be. In this way, coming to
be has been extinguished and destruction is unheard of. Nor is it divided, since it all is alike; nor is it any
more in any way, which would keep it from holding together, or any less, but it is all full of what is.
Therefore, it is all continuous, for what is draws near to what is. But unchanging in the limits of great
bonds, it is without start or finish, since coming to be and destruction were banished far away and true
conviction drove them off. . . . For neither is there what is not – which would stop it from reaching its like –
nor is what is in such a way that there could be more of what is here and less there, since it is all inviolate;
for equal to itself on all sides, it meets with its limits uniformly.” Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics,
145.1—146.25 (lines 18—28; 45—48) in Curd, A Presocratic Reader, 47—49. Frederick Copleston
summarizes this argument well: “change is impossible, because being cannot come out of not-being (out of
nothing comes nothing), while equally it cannot come from being (for being already is)” Greece and Rome:
From the Pre-Socratics to Plotinus, vol. 1 of A History of Philosophy (1962; reprint, New York: Image
Books, 1993), 311 (emphasis in original).
10 Henry B. Veatch, Aristotle: A Contemporary Appreciation (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1974), 31.
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different.11 For example, the tree in my front yard is taller now than it was last year. Or,
the leaves that were on the tree a few months ago are now no longer there. What has
changed in either case is the tree’s matter. It grew taller and it lost its leaves. The form of
the tree – as a tree – remained the same. As the tree grows taller, it does not become some
other plant. Likewise, as its leaves fall and regrow, it does not suddenly become
something else entirely, like an animal. Thus, the form of the tree remains the same
throughout the change in its matter – however, the form of the tree limits the ways it can
possibly change.
The operative principle at work here is the distinction between act and potency.
And it “is through the distinction between potency and act that Aristotle answers
Parmenides.”12 The actuality of the thing being a tree limits the thing to its “type” of
existence. This limitation of its being is its potentiality. Hence the tree has the potential to
grow a foot a year, but not thousands of feet a year. Likewise, its potential allows it to be
used for firewood, but not to turn into a whale. As Frederick Copleston remarks, even if
Parmenides remarks that these possibilities are either: 1) the result of being; or 2) coming
from nothing, then Aristotle can simply respond that the privation and potentiality
exhibited by the tree derives in a subject and not just being per se.13 And from this we

11 For Aristotle, the substance of something cannot exist in varying degrees. Something either is or
it is not. Using the tree as an example: either the thing is a tree or it is not a tree. It makes no sense to talk as
though the thing is “kind of” a tree. However, even though the substance of a thing cannot exist in degrees,
it can allow for divergent qualities – contrary accidents. The tree may be at one time green and another
time black. It could be at one time short and another tall. Whatever the quality under consideration, it does
not affect the substance of the tree. Indeed, these qualities adhere in the substance in some way that makes
them applicable to the tree so that it is the same tree that expresses contrary qualities (Cat., 3b.32—4b.4).
12

Copleston, Greece and Rome, 311.

13 Ibid. The tree has the potential to become fire, but it is not actually on fire. The tree has the
potential to grow taller, but it has not yet actually grown taller. These potentialities may or may not be
actually achieved. The tree may be destroyed by a zealous lumberjack and hence not grow anymore. Or it
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can see that for Aristotle form is related to actuality while matter is related to
potentiality.14 Thus, the principles of form and matter, and act and potency, provide a
response to Parmenides.15
This has everything to do with Aristotle’s understanding of human nature. The
starting point for Aristotle’s metaphysics is conducting an analysis of change in response
to Parmenides. For the principles that emerge from that analysis are applied to all other
areas of his philosophy – including human biology and psychology. Now, by analyzing
change Aristotle lands on four types of causes: material, formal, efficient, and final. The
material and formal causes have already been discussed. The formal cause is the
whatness of a substance – it is the unifying factor and what makes the substance what it
is. The material cause is the of which a substance is – it is what the substance is made of.
In a sense, these two causes can be thought to be the most obvious since they are the ones
most directly observable by our senses.16 However, these two principles are incomplete
as a full explanation of things. For what is missing is the agent of change – the efficient
cause. Now, the efficient cause is the who or what brings about a certain change – it is the
“moving” cause of the substance.17 That is, what creates or destroys the substance.
Finally, there is the final cause – which is the purpose of the substance. The final cause is

may not ever be turned into kindling. However, the potential for either future (or any other) is there due to
the potentiality inherent in the tree.
14 “And it is such an ability or capacity or potentiality for being other and different that Aristotle
calls matter.” Veatch, Aristotle, 33.
15 The response to Parmenides put simply is that it is a substance that undergoes change because of
the potential of its matter to be otherwise. Ibid., 34.
16

Though form is more remote than matter and is revealed by material reality.

17

Veatch, Aristotle, 46.
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the most obscure and hidden of the four causes, but for Aristotle it is just as much a part
of reality as the others.18
When these four causes are combined with the correlative principles of act and
potency, a more complete understanding of reality is possible. For Aristotle, all of reality
is understood by the various relationships these principles allow. For from them, flow
various categories that provide further understanding.19 Likewise, we can understand
human beings. For humans can be understood according to these principles and causes.
Thus, reflecting on the formal cause of humanity, the key question for Aristotle emerging
from the preceding consideration is “what is the soul?” (De Anima 2.412a.5).

18 We can understand these causes working together to provide a complete explanation of a
substance. Consider a chair. The material cause is the wood, nails, glue, screws, etc. whatever material
things go into making it a chair. The formal cause is its chairness – its shape, conventional and
ergonomical design, etc. The efficient cause would be the carpenter who builds it. The final cause is for
sitting – the chair was made so that someone could sit. This conventional example can be useful for
explaining Aristotle’s four causes. However, as we move to “natural” substances formal and final causes
have become difficult (though probably not wholly impossible) to identity. Thus, we see modern scientific
theory abandoning formal and final causality as too hidden to the senses and inaccessible by scientific
methodology. The trend, then has been to ignore formal and final causes or simply consider them as nonexistent.
19 “The categories, considered as a classification of the ways in which things may be determinate,
are thus simply a classification of the formal determinations or forms of things” Veatch, Aristotle, 32. For
Aristotle there are eight categories for determining being, though the same information can give ten
categories. These are the traditional ten categories: substance; quantity; quality; relation; place; time;
position; state; action; and affection. See Aristotle, Categoriae.
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The body is material and potential, the soul is formal and actual.20 The material
body must be organized by some principle which is the soul / form.21 The soul unifies the
body under one substance, thus the soul is the substance of a thing’s essence.22
As previously stated, western philosophers have tended to treat the soul as a
separate substance on its own. But “such a way of conceiving of the soul or the psyche is
seriously misleading in Aristotle’s eyes.”23 The soul is intimately connected to the body
as the form of the body, not as a wholly separate thing on its own. Rather, the soul
provides the foundational principle that grounds change for the subject.24 Now, this
conception of the relationship of the soul to the rest of the body has a significant
implication. If the form / soul is removed from a body / thing it is no longer that thing

20 As Veatch states it, “if for Aristotle the soul or psyche is to be regarded as no more and no less
than that formal principle of determinacy, in virtue of which living things are the kinds of things they are,
then such a formal principle requires a material principle as its correlative: there must be something that is
thus made determinate, or that takes on its specific character, through the reception of a form – namely,
matter” Veatch, Aristotle, 62.
21 “That is why the soul is the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it.
The body so described is a body which is organized” (De Anima 2.412a.29—30). “διὸ ἡ ψυχή ἐστιν
ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. τοιοῦτον δὲ ὃ ἂν ᾖ ὀργανικόν.”
22 “Unity has many senses (as many as ‘is’ has), but the most proper and fundamental sense of
both is the relation of an actuality to that of which it is the actuality. . . . [the soul] is substance in the sense
which corresponds to the definitive formula of a thing’s essence. That means that it is ‘the essential
whatness’ of a body of the character just assigned” (De Anima 2.412b.8—9; 12—13). “διὸ καὶ οὐ δεῖ ζητεῖν
εἰ ἓν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν κηρὸν καὶ τὸ σχῆμα, οὐδ' ὅλως τὴν ἑκάστου ὕλην καὶ τὸ οὗ ἡ ὕλη·
τὸ γὰρ ἓν καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἐπεὶ πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, τὸ κυρίως ἡ ἐντελέχειά ἐστιν. . . . τοῦτο δὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ
τοιῳδὶ σώματι, καθάπερ εἴ τι τῶν ὀργάνων φυσικὸν ἦν σῶμα, οἷον πέλεκυς· ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἂν τὸ πελέκει εἶναι ἡ
οὐσία αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦτο· χωρισθείσης δὲ ταύτης οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πέλεκυς ἦν, ἀλλ' ἢ ὁμωνύμως, νῦν δ' ἔστι
πέλεκυς. οὐ γὰρ τοιούτου σώματος τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ ὁ λόγος ἡ ψυχή.” For Aristotle the soul is related as the
actuality of the thing, and its body is the potentiality. Note well that Aristotle is not saying the soul is the
substance of the thing, but just the thing’s essence. It is the soul, as the form of the thing, which determines
what it is. As Veatch puts it, “it would be far more correct simply to regard the soul as being the ‘what’ or
the essential principle of a living thing” Veatch, Aristotle, 60.
23

Veatch, Aristotle, 60.

24 When a tree loses leaves, the “soul” of the tree remains the same, thus allowing us to say that
“this tree” once had leaves, but now it does not.
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(De Anima 2.412b.14). Hence, for Aristotle the form / soul is inseparable from the body,
the soul cannot exist without the body and the body cannot exist without the soul.25
For Aristotle, anything that exhibits life has a soul (De Anima 2.413a.21). The
soul itself is a ratio or essence, it is not a subject itself.26 The “subject” is the form and
matter unity – the whole being.27 This can be confusing, since by “substance” Aristotle
can sometimes mean: form, matter, or the composition of form and matter.28 “Things” are
studied as the composition of form and matter for us. The soul is the actuality to the
body’s potentiality. Thus the soul is relative to a body, though it is not a body itself.
Hence, Aristotle calls the soul the “substantial form” of the body.29
Henry Veatch summarizes Aristotle’s view of the soul’s relationship to the body
well:

25 “From this it indubitably follows that the soul is inseparable from its body, or at any rate that
certain parts of it are (if it has parts) – for the actuality of some of them is nothing but the actualities of their
bodily parts” (De Anima 2.413a.4—5). “ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ χωριστὴ τοῦ σώματος, ἢ μέρη τινὰ
αὐτῆς, εἰ μεριστὴ πέφυκεν, οὐκ ἄδηλον· ἐνίων γὰρ ἡ ἐντελέχεια τῶν μερῶν ἐστὶν αὐτῶν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔνιά γε
οὐθὲν κωλύει, διὰ τὸ μηθενὸς εἶναι σώματος ἐντελεχείας.” Remove the “soul” from the tree and you have
kindling. Remove the soul from the person and you have a corpse. Likewise, the souls of the tree and the
person are so intimately tied to the body, that once the souls are separated, the souls are no more. If the
body needs the soul to unify the substance, so too, do the souls need the body to perform their proper
functions.
26 “Further, since it is the soul by or with which primarily we live, perceive, and think: — it
follows that the soul must be a ratio or formulable essence, not a matter or subject” (De Anima 2.414a.13—
14). “ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ τοῦτο ᾧ ζῶμεν καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ διανοούμεθα πρώτως-ὥστε λόγος τις ἂν εἴη καὶ εἶδος,
ἀλλ' οὐχ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον.”
27

Veatch, Aristotle, 64 (emphasis in original).

28 As Aristotle explains it, “the word substance has three meanings – form, matter, and the
complex of both – and of these three what is called matter is potentiality, what is called form actuality.
Since then the complex here is the living thing, the body cannot be the actuality of the soul; it is the soul
which is the actuality of a certain kind of body” (De Anima 2.414a.14—19). “τριχῶς γὰρ λεγομένης τῆς
οὐσίας, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, ὧν τὸ μὲν εἶδος, τὸ δὲ ὕλη, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, τούτων δ' ἡ μὲν ὕλη δύναμις, τὸ δὲ
εἶδος ἐντελέχεια, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἔμψυχον, οὐ τὸ σῶμά ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' αὕτη σώματός τινος.
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οἷς δοκεῖ μήτ' ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι μήτε σῶμά τι ἡ ψυχή· σῶμα μὲν γὰρ
οὐκ ἔστι, σώματος δέ τι.”
29

Veatch, Aristotle, 63.
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When the soul is understood in this way as being the very whatness or quiddity or
substantial form of the body—as that which makes a living thing to be just that,
alive or living—then there is no longer a problem as to whether or how the soul
and the body can be one. As Aristotle remarks, it is no more difficult to
understand how the body and the soul can be one, than it is to understand how the
wax and the imprint on the wax are one. Thus as no one mistakes the imprint of
the wax for a separate substance existing apart from the wax, so likewise one
ought never to mistake the soul or psyche for a separate substance existing apart
from the living body, the latter being simply the matter which the soul animates or
renders determinate as an actual living body.30
This is the basic insight that separates Aristotle’s view of soul from that of the substance
dualist and the physicalist. The soul really exists (contra physicalists), but it exists as the
form of a substance, not as a substance all to itself (contra substance dualists).
Before moving on to Aquinas, one final note must be made about Aristotle’s
account of the soul. Because the soul is so intimately tied to the body and cannot operate
properly without the body, Aristotle took this as evidence that upon death (i.e., when the
soul separates from the body) the soul would cease to exist along with the body / soul
union that was the organic being. That is, when a tree dies it is no long a “tree” it is
kindling and when a person dies it is no longer “human” but a corpse – the body is just a
pile of matter with virtual forms. Aquinas, will disagree with this notion (obviously
influenced from the Christian tradition of life continuing after death), and finds
philosophical justification for this belief rather than punting wholly to theological
authority. Veatch summarizes Aquinas’ complaint well by noting that Aristotle wants to
hold to the dual belief that: 1) the soul is only related to the body and cannot exist apart
from it; and 2) the human rational soul can exist without matter.31 If Aristotle is correct,
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then upon death the soul ceases to exist. Aquinas will say that this is inconsistent with the
notion of the rational soul. That is, if the powers of the soul do not need the body to
operate, then immortality is possible since the mind can theoretically exist apart from the
body.
3.2.1.2 Aquinas – The Human Soul is the Form of the Person: The Soul Can Exist Apart
From the Body
Sections 1a75—78 of the Summa Theologiae establishes Saint Thomas Aquinas’
ontological position on the nature of human beings – this section is his treatise on what it
is to be a human being. Aquinas normally follows Aristotle in establishing the essential
components of what makes one human. Like Aristotle, Aquinas holds that humans are a
body and soul composite. As just seen above, the soul is to the body as form is to matter.
Now, for Aquinas “soul” is a broad concept and can be understood as animate, inanimate,
or as a principle of life.32 As in Aristotle, the soul functions as a substantial form which
gives humans their particular mode of being – that is, it gives us a “human” mode of
existence.33 The soul, thus, is the principle of life for a being, and it determines what that
being is to be (ST 1a75.1). Aquinas’ account of human nature, however, is not unrelated
to his overall project.34 Humans are just one aspect of the grand tapestry of reality.
To see how Aquinas’ account of humanity is relevant to this project, we will
explore the various components of Aquinas’ anthropology. Below are three sections. The

32 Norman Kretzmann, “Philosophy of Mind,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. by
Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 128.
33Ibid.,

131.

34 As Robert Pasnau notes, “Aquinas is arguing not just a particular account of soul but for a
general metaphysical theory, one that will extend over all natural phenomena, living and nonliving.” Robert
Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae 1a 75–89 (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 30.

129

first will look at the soul and its intellectual powers. For Aquinas, the human soul is
unique among all animals, because it is the human soul alone that is capable of abstract
reasoning. The second section will look very briefly at the importance of the body.
Unlike substance dualists, Aquinas does not think human identity is found in the soul
alone. The body is important, too. The final section will bring these two principles
together to show that for Aquinas, the human person is a body and soul composite.
Likewise, this section will explore some implications of Aquinas’ anthropology –
particularly as it contrasts with Aristotle.
3.2.1.2.1 The Soul and its Intellectual Powers
Given Aquinas’ metaphysical bent towards Aristotelianism, he is already inclined
to accept Aristotle’s four causes as well as the correlative principles of act and potency.
When these notions are applied to humans, it follows that the form of the human is not
something that is superimposed or commingled into a lump of matter. Rather, because
matter cannot exist at all without some form, it follows that the beginning of the human
person is when the form and matter unity begins. The soul is not like a hermit crab
inhabiting the shell of the body. Without the form there is no body.35 But the significance
of the soul is not simply limited to giving shape to the body (though that is part of it).
Depending of what type of soul informs the body will follow the various powers and
capacities of that being.36

35 “The human soul does not modify something that already exists, but brings a human being into
existence.” Ibid., 82—83.
36 For Aquinas, generally speaking, there are five powers of the soul: vegetative (ability to grow);
sensitive (ability to feel); appetitive (ability to want/desire); locomotive (ability to move); and intellectual
(ability to reason). These powers are listed in order from the lowest to the highest. Among living things we
can distinguish lower souls from higher ones. For example, plants grow but do not sense in any extensive
way (certainly not in the way insects and animals do), thus they have a vegetative soul. Some sponges grow
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For Aquinas, the intellectual principle is the form of the body.37 Thus, souls are
the forms of bodies and give the body life. Now, humans are unique among terrestrial
creatures for Aquinas, because humans alone use reason. But humans are not unique in
their ability to use reason, per se. God and angels are also reasonable beings, but they are
clearly not the same type of beings as humans are. The human intellect is the lowest of
the rational souls (God is the highest, then angels, and lastly humans). Aquinas then
defines human beings by mirroring the Aristotelean definition of humans as “rational
animals.”38 That is humans are “sensing” animals that produce “rational” thought. And it
is in this combination that Aquinas thinks properly defines humanity’s place in the
universe. In contrast to other animals, humans use reason. In contrast to spiritual beings,
humans have a material component – bodies.
The intellect is more than physical, it is a power of the soul, and the soul is the
form of the body. Because the human soul is rational, Aquinas views the human soul as
subsistent – in particular the internal power of intellectual activity allows for this

and sense but do not really show desires, thus their soul is vegetative and sensitive. Some shellfish grow,
sense, and desire but do not really have powers of locomotion. Other animals exhibit all of these lower
powers of the soul without intelligence. Only humans seem to reason and thus have the highest souls
among corporeal beings. Humans are the highest corporeal beings, but the lowest spiritual beings.
“Moreover, the only fundamental difference between the soul of a human being and the soul of a
nonrational animal is that the former contains mind or intellect: ‘our soul differs form the soul of an animal
only with regard to mind’ (3a 5.4c).” Ibid., 58.
37 “We must assert that the intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of
the human body. For that whereby primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which the act is to be
attributed. . . . Nothing acts except so far as it is in act. . . . Now it is clear that the first thing by which the
body lives is the soul” (ST 1a76.1). “Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere quod intellectus, qui est
intellectualis operationis principium, sit humani corporis forma. Illud enim quo primo aliquid operatur, est
forma eius cui operatio attribuitur . . . quia nihil agit nisi secundum quod est actu . . . id quo primo
operamur unumquodque horum operum vitae, est anima.”
38

Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 47.
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judgment.39 For Aquinas, while the human soul utilizes a body for perceiving the world,
it does not use the body to “process” that data.40 Reflecting on the nature of triangularity
can be accomplished apart from a body, but seeing a triangle or touching triangular
shaped things requires a body. However, if the intellect were wholly a material process,
then the intellect could be “biased” in its perceptions – but it cannot be wholly biased.41
Perceptions cannot be wrong, but the judgement of what is perceived can be. As such, it
appears that the distinctively vital human activity is our ability to use our intellect – our
ability to reason. For Aquinas, intellectual activity is a spiritual, not a corporeal, process.
Thus, the intellect does not rely on any corporeal organ to function per se.42
Basically, for Aquinas, the soul is not and cannot be corporeal, for if it were it
could not consider universals. But since one of the powers of the soul, the intellect, can
consider universals, it follows that the intellect (and the soul of which it is a power) is

39

Kretzmann, “Philosophy of Mind,” 132-133.

40 The powers of the soul are distinguished according to their operation as directed by the
transcendent soul; “for the whole corporeal nature is subject to the soul, and is related to it as its matter and
instrument. There exists, therefore, an operation of the soul which so far exceeds the corporeal nature that it
is not even performed by any corporeal organ; and such is the operation of the rational soul” (ST 1a78.1).
“Tota enim natura corporalis subjacet animae et comparatur ad ipsam sicut materia et instrumentum. Est
ergo quaedam operatio animae quae intantum excedit naturam corpoream quod neque etiam exercetur per
organum coporale, et talis est operatiio animae rationalis.”
41 For example, if I am wearing rose tinted glasses the world takes on a faint reddish hue, and
certain items that are the same color as the glasses become invisible. Now, if the intellect could be deceived
in a similar manner as my eyes, then the mind would not be able to perceive the deception. But if that is the
case, then the mind could literally not know certain material things due to this bias. Just like my inability to
see shades of red, the mind would not be able to discern aspects of physical reality. But the mind is not
limited in this way – the mind can attend to all material natures and abstract various concepts from material
nature. But if the intellect can do this, then the intellect itself is not dependent on a bodily organ. When “a
sensory organ is ‘biased’ in its perceptions in a certain direction, there are certain things it is incapable of
perceiving. . . . But if the intellect depended on some material organ for its operation, then it would be
‘biased’ in the direction of that kind of matter . . . in that case there would be certain material things whose
natures it could not grasp. . . . But the intellect is not limited in the sorts of material natures it can grasp.
Therefore, it must not depend on the operation of any material organ.” Feser, Aquinas, 152—153.
42
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immaterial. Corporeal things have determinate natures, but intellect does not, thus it
follows the intellect (i.e., power of the soul) cannot be corporeal. For a physical mind
results in absurdity.43
Since a physical mind results in absurdity, the only alternative is to affirm that the
mind is non-physical – it is immaterial. Because of this conviction a couple of
implications follow. First, “knowledge” is the mind’s possession of the forms of various
things. This is because the form / matter unities that make up the world of experience can
only have one substantial form.44 Material bodies can only have one substantial form
informing it, but the immaterial mind can consider many forms without being any of
them.45
The second implication is the answer the question: what makes my thoughts
mine? Pasnau notes that the most “straightforward” response would be to follow Plato
and say that the human being just is an “intellective soul.” The problem for Aquinas,
43 If “the intellect were material and thus became a cat when thinking about cats, it could never
think about anything else ever again (whether triangles or whatever) since it would in that case not exist
anymore – the parcel of matter composing it, having now become a cat, would no longer be an intellect at
all. . . . Similarly, if the intellect were material it could never think about cats and triangles at the same
time, for in taking on their forms (as it does in grasping them) it would then become both a cat and a
triangle at the same time, which of course nothing can be. . . . The point is not so much that the intellect can
know all material things, but rather that it can know enough of them to justify us in inferring that it cannot
be material. . . . Insofar as it can take on the forms of multiple things, both over time and at a particular
moment, the intellect has a potency that nothing material has or can have.” Feser, Aquinas, 154—155
(emphasis in original).
44 If material bodies had more than one substantial form then there would be conflicting powers of
operation, and it would violate the law of non-contradiction – something cannot be both A and not-A at the
same time and in the same sense. But if a material body could have two (or more) substantial forms, then it
would follow that that material body would be both A and not-A at the same time and in the same sense.
The immaterial mind, however, does not have this limitation – it can possess “a thing’s form without itself
being that thing.”Ibid., 157.
45 Feser remarks that this shows the intellect has “potencies” material bodies lack. “The force of
the argument depends instead on the way in which . . . the intellect takes on the form of the thing it
understands in the very act of understanding it. This capacity shows that the intellect has ‘potencies’ which
material things do not have (In DA III.7.680), and in particular that the intellect can, unlike material things,
take on the form of other things . . . without losing its own form (SCG II.49.3).” Ibid., 153.
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however, is that he has already rejected Plato’s answer (ST 1a75.4). Aquinas accepts that
the mind needs the body for sensitive experience of the world – the body supplies the
mind with content for it to consider. Thus, the body must be part of what it means to be
human.46 As such, to answer the question of what makes my thoughts mine, the answer is
that it is the mind / body composite being that is thinking.47
3.2.1.2.2 The Body
In developing a complete understanding of human beings, Aquinas certainly
prioritizes the role of the soul. It is, after all, the substantial form of the person and the
determiner of a thing’s essence. However, concentrating on the soul alone would be a
mistake, the body is important as well. Aquinas is trying to identify what it means to be
human. Since Aquinas thinks the definition of humans being “rational animals” as
appropriate, it follows that the fact that humans are animals presupposes certain qualities.
Namely, humans have sensory capacities as well as the potential for local motion. But
this is only possible if humans have bodies. Remember, for Aquinas, humans are a body
and soul composite.48
46 Pasnau concludes, “because I engage in intellective cognition, and yet am not identical with my
intellect, my intellect must be part of me; this is the only plausible way in which I could engage in
intellective cognition. So I have a bodily part and an intellective part; to speak of them as parts of me
entails that they are somehow unified, coming together as parts of a single thing, me.” Pasnau, Thomas
Aquinas on Human Nature, 75 (emphasis in original).
47 You (as a mind / body unity) have your own thoughts, and I have mine. If humans were souls
only, there would be no way to separate the thought from the person, and thus if two souls believed the
same proposition (i.e., thought), there would be no way to tell one soul apart from the other. If two souls
had no difference in their thoughts, then there would be no principle of differentiation between them – thus
there would only be one soul, not two. If those two souls, however, are unified with a body, then it would
not matter if there were no difference in their thoughts for each soul would retain its own unique identity
because of its body.
48 “Yet although material causes take a back seat to formal causes, still no definition of human
beings would be complete without reference to the bodies from which we are composed.” Pasnau, Thomas
Aquinas on Human Nature, 8.
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The body, for Aquinas then, is unified by the soul. For it is the soul that makes
something be what it is. Likewise, souls need bodies as a principle of differentiation,
bodies only accommodate one substantial soul at a time.49 It follows, therefore, that there
can only be one subsistent form for each body.
Likewise, human souls need the body in order to operate naturally and properly.50
Aquinas remarks, the human soul:
holds the lowest place among intellectual substances [i.e., God and angels];
inasmuch as it is not naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth [i.e., the mind is
originally without any content], as the angels are; but has to gather knowledge
from individual things by way of the senses . . . . Now the action of the senses is
not performed without a corporeal instrument. Therefore it behooved the
intellectual soul to be united to a body fitted to be a convenient organ of sense (ST
1a76.5).51
Put simply, it is proper for the human soul to be united to the body which can provide
sensory information about its environment. The operations of the mind may not be tied to
bodily organs, but the content of what the mind considers certainly is. Because sensation
is so intimately connected to the body – indeed, it is impossible without a body – there is

49 As Aquinas says, “it is quite impossible for several essentially different souls to be in one body.
. . . [For] an animal would not be absolutely one, in which there were several souls. For nothing is
absolutely one except by one form” (ST 1a76.3). “omnino impossibile videtur plures animas per essentiam
differentes in uno corpore esse. . . . quia animal non esset simpliciter unum, cuius essent animae plures.
Nihil enim est simpliciter unum nisi per formam unam.”
50 Though Aquinas prioritizes the soul as the substantial form for the being, as well as the principle
of life, the human soul would be impoverished without the body. For though the soul and its intellectual
powers are far “grander” than anything the body can do, the intellect cannot properly function without
content. If the mind has no content (i.e., forms or images) with which to consider, it cannot function. And
the mind cannot retrieve content on its own, it must be given objects of consideration. These objects could
be given by God, but mostly it is supplied by sensory experience. Humans need the senses to gain
knowledge, unlike angels which do not. Further, God cannot be properly said to “gain” knowledge. Thus, if
humans are to gain knowledge, then the human mind needs to experience the world around it. And this is
done through a sensing body.
51 “infimum gradum in substantiis intellectualibus tenet; intantum quod non habet naturaliter sibi
inditam notitiam veritatis, sicut Angeli, sed oportet quod eam colligat ex rebus divisibilibus per viam
sensus, . . . Actio autem sensus non fit sine corporeo instrumento. Oportuit igitur animam intellectivam tali
corpori uniri, quod possit esse conveniens organum sensus.”
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a strong materialistic component in Aquinas’ anthropology.52 Thus, in a very real sense,
Aquinas would have no quarrel with the modern day physicalist who wants to explain the
neurological implications of sensory experience. For this, indeed, is a physical process.
What he would object to is the insinuation that this analysis would comprise the entirety
of human cognition.
In examining the nature of “human beings” Aquinas is specifically asking a
theological question, and thus “supposes that an answer must be given in terms of the
human soul, focusing on the human body only as it relates to soul.”53 The soul is primary
for Aquinas, the body is secondary. This, however, should not imply that the body is
unimportant, for as shown above, the body is essential to human knowing and human
being. We can now summarize Aquinas’ position on the body. To begin, Aquinas notes
that things which do not have the principle of life within themselves can be generated and
corrupted. The body can be generated or corrupted, because it does not have the principle
of life in itself. But things that have the principle of life within themselves can only be
generated or corrupted per se. For things that can be generated or corrupted per se, are
substances. And substances either are or they are not. As such, the soul either exists, or it
does not exist – for Aquinas, it makes no sense for the soul to “sort of” exist. From this it
follows that accidents can be generated and corrupted since accidents exist only in

52 This component is so strong that Pasnau calls Aquinas a “semimaterialist.” “Aquinas thinks of
sensation as an operation consisting entirely of various bodily parts undergoing change in various ways.
There is no further, nonbodily or spiritual operation involved. Aquinas is what I call semimaterialist, in that
he believes some intentional states, and some forms of conscious experience, can have explanations that
are, in our modern sense, wholly physical.” Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 59 (emphasis in
original). Upon seeing a book on the table, my senses are bombarded by the physical realities of the book
on the table. Its smell, color, shape, feel, etc. is a purely physical process. For without the physical senses I
could not be cognizant of a book on the table.
53
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substances. Likewise, the souls of plants and animals can be corrupted because they are
tied so closely to their matter. Plant and animal souls could almost qualify as accidental
substances. Human souls, however, are subsistent within themselves. And as discussed
above, subsistent forms cannot be separated from themselves. The body is important,
because the body is the principle of differentiation between substantial souls and it
provides sensory experience of the world. The body is essential to what it means to be
human. Even though Aquinas believes the soul can exist without the body, the soul is
incomplete without the body. But if the soul is incomplete without the body, then
likewise the body is incomplete without the soul – indeed, there is no “body” at all
without a soul. As such, the body is not all that is needed to have a complete
understanding of what it means to be human. Humans are a body and soul composite.
3.2.1.2.3 The Unity of Soul and Body
Contrary to the thesis expounded by J. P. Moreland and Scott Rae in chapter 2,
Aquinas “explicitly and vehemently denies that human beings should be identified with
their souls.”54 Human persons are the unity of a body and soul, they are not to be equated
with either just the body or the soul. In general, humans are souls, but any particular
human is a body and soul unity. The relationship between the soul and body can be stated
this way: the soul and body are united, but the body needs the soul to exist in a way that
the soul does not need the body. The body without a soul is a corpse. As such, Aquinas is
not a substance dualist, but he shares a “key assumption” with them. That is, he does
think the soul is an incorporeal substance. This seems to “amount to a kind of dualism: a
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commitment not to dual substances, exactly, but to dual properties, perhaps, or to dual
kinds of entities.”55
The “soul” is the first principle of life. For the soul is responsible for giving life to
the person, and it also “contributes to the purpose” of the person.56 As the principle of
life, the soul is understood as the act of the body, but the soul is not a body itself. Rather,
the soul is subsistent in itself since the act of the intellect is itself incorporeal. The soul
has multiple powers that inform the body with the primary power being reason.57 For
Aquinas, the soul / mind / intellectual power is the substantial form of the body. It gives
the body life, but it also has an operation that allows it to survive the body. Namely,
rationality itself – the principles of intellectual thought – are not bound to matter per se.58
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Ibid., 70.
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Ibid., 29 (emphasis in original).

57 For Aquinas, reason is the definitive difference that separates humans from other animals. It is
why he takes it as sufficient the definition of human as “rational animal.” “Animal” is the genus, and
“rational” is the species (De Ente et Essentia [On Being and Essence] 3.1—2). As Aquinas puts it
elsewhere, “the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both incorporeal and
subsistent. . . . by means of the intellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things. Now whatever
knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature; because that which is in it naturally would
impede the knowledge of anything else. . . . Therefore, if the intellectual principle contained the nature of a
body it would be unable to know all bodies. . . . Therefore, it is impossible for the intellectual principle to
be a body. . . .
Therefore, the intellectual principle which we call the mind or the intellect has an operation per se
apart from the body. Now only that which subsists can have an operation per se. For nothing can operate
but what is actual: . . . We must conclude, therefore, that the human soul, which is called the intellect or the
mind, is something incorporeal and subsistent” (ST 1a75.2). “quod est principium intellectualis operationis,
quod dicimus animam hominis, esse quoddam principium incorporeum et subsistens. . . . enim quod homo
per intellectum cognoscere potest naturas omnium corporum. Quod autem potest cognoscere aliqua,
oportet ut nihil eorum habeat in sua natura, quia illud quod inesset ei naturaliter impediret cognitionem
aliorum. . . . Si igitur principium intellectuale haberet in se naturam alicuius corporis, non posset omnia
corpora cognoscere. . . . Impossibile est igitur quod principium intellectuale sit corpus. . . .
Ipsum igitur intellectuale principium, quod dicitur mens vel intellectus, habet operationem per se,
cui non communicat corpus. Nihil autem potest per se operari, nisi quod per se subsistit. Non enim est
operari nisi entis in actu. . . . Relinquitur igitur animam humanam, quae dicitur intellectus vel mens, esse
aliquid incorporeum et subsistens.”
58 “The rational soul is fundamentally different from other human powers, including the sensory
soul, in that it alone is entirely immaterial. The other powers are part of the material world and their
explanations are material explanations. Aquinas infers from the rational soul’s strict immateriality that it
could not be derived from the heavenly bodies.
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Since the intellect is not bound to matter per se it can exist apart from matter. Also, since
humans exhibit this type of intellectual capacity it follows that the human mind can exist
apart from the body – even though the state of a soul without a body hampers the mind’s
ability to perceive.59
The soul and the body are not two substances working at cross purposes. They are
two metaphysical principles that comprise the human person. These two principles,
however, do have their own functions. The soul is the unifying, intellectual, directive, and
willful principle. The body is the instrument of sensation and physical aspect of the
person. Sensation is not merely a bodily act, it is in harmony with the soul. Sensation is
an aspect of the whole person, not just either of the constitutive principles.60 However,
just because a body and soul unity is able to sense its environment, it does not follow that
the soul of that being is subsistent and able to exist on its own.61 Intellect and reason is

Aquinas thinks that phenomena like magnetism, nutrition, and sensation cannot be explained by
earthly corporeal is making an irreducibility argument of the sort that modern dualists often make. The
qualities, much like some now think that consciousness cannot be explained by neuroscience or computer
algorithms . . . . It must have seemed simply inconceivable that any combination of mere heating, cooling,
and so on, could result in, say, sensation.” Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 64.
59 This is a reason why Aquinas finds the doctrine of the resurrection so important. The human
soul may be able to exist apart from the body, but it is incomplete until reunited with the body (ST
Supp.75.1).
60 “Soul and body do not share in the activity of sensation in the way that two distinct agents
cooperate in doing one thing. Sensation is not like many men pulling a boat; instead, the soul and the body
together make up on agent performing one activity.” Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 61.
61 “The fact that the sensory soul of an animal is not subsistent entails that the sensory part of the
human soul is not subsistent, which means that its operations involve the body. (If this entailment did not
hold then it would be absurd for Aquinas to insist on the fundamental similarity between human and animal
sensation.) So by studying the way in which sensation involves the body, in both human beings and
animals, we can understand the degree to which Aquinas accepts materialism with regard to human
sensation. And this in turn sheds light on the sense in which Aquinas rejects materialism with regard to the
human mind.
I believe that Aquinas takes sensation to be wholly bodily process.” Ibid., 58—59. Sensation is
possible only for beings with physical bodies, and souls oriented to perceiving sensation. Rocks have
forms, but no sensitive soul. This is why Pasnau notes that Aquinas rejects strong forms of materialism /
physicalism – these philosophies disregard the role of a soul in sensing physical reality. For if materialism
is correct, then if animals can sense a tree, then so can rocks, for both are physical. The only difference is
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needed to rise to the level of subsistence. The soul needs the body to perceive the world,
and the “closer” the soul is to the body in its operations, the further that soul is from
subsistence.62 For rational souls, however, subsistence is practically assured because the
rational soul has its own per se operation, namely the ability to reason. The soul is a form
that “surpasses matter” and, thus, “can potentially exist apart from matter.”63 For it is the
soul that is the principle of life, but the body is the principle of differentiation for the
soul. It is this particular body that sets this soul apart from that soul with that body. Thus,
the soul can be separated from the body and still exist, but it will remain incomplete until
(or unless) reunited with the body. That is, the human being is a body and soul unity, but
the human soul can survive the death of the body.64
Aquinas is neither a substance dualist nor a strict physicalist, even though he
develops elements central to both of these positions. Similar to the substance dualists,

the complexity of the physical parts. For Aquinas, it is not the complexity that is at issue so much, but
rather sensation is different in kind than two material things coming together. The baseball bat does not feel
pain upon hitting the ball, but the batter does when hit by a pitch.
62 As Aquinas (following Aristotle) puts it, “. . . of the operations of the soul, understanding alone
is performed without a corporeal organ. On the other hand, sensation and the consequent operations of the
sensitive soul are evidently accompanied with change in the body; . . . Hence it is clear that the sensitive
soul has no per se operation of its own, and that every operation of the sensitive soul belongs to the
composite. Wherefore we conclude that as the souls of brute animals have no per se operations they are not
subsistent (ST 1a75.3). “quod solum intelligere, inter opera animae, sine organo corporeo exercetur.
Sentire vero, et consequentes operationes animae sensitivae, manifeste accidunt cum aliqua corporis
immutatione; . . . Et sic manifestum est quod anima sensitiva non habet aliquam operationem propriam per
seipsam, sed omnis operatio sensitivae animae est coniuncti. Ex quo relinquitur quod, cum animae
brutorum animalium per se non operentur, non sint subsistentes.”
63 “In saying that the human soul is subsistent, Aquinas means that the soul is a form that
somehow surpasses matter, meaning that it can potentially exist apart from its matter – that is, apart from
the body. This requires . . . that the soul has an operation that transcends matter.” Ibid., 57. It must be stated
also, that even though the human soul is a form, it is not like an “angelic form.” Angelic forms have their
own rational existence, but are not tied to a body in the way that human souls are. To paraphrase Aquinas,
human souls know by bodily senses, but angelic forms know directly and intuitively (ST 1a75.7).
Remember, for Aquinas, it is part of the definition of “human” to be bodily.
64
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Aquinas holds to the notion that humans do, in fact, have immaterial souls. He disagrees
with substance dualists, in that the soul is not a different kind “of property or entity.”65
Similar to the physicalist, he grants an essential role to the body – humans are essentially
bodily creatures. But he disagrees with physicalists that wish to reduce humans to simply
their material parts. Humans are more than their matter. The fact humans have a rational
soul is proof, for Aquinas, that humans have an incorporeal and subsistent aspect to their
being.66 Interestingly enough, neither incorporeality nor subsistence alone would be
necessarily incompatible with strict physicalism. For depending on how one understands
the term “forms” it follows that all forms are incorporeal – and if the term is understood
in a metaphorical sense, this is compatible with physicalism. Likewise, subsistence is not
necessarily incompatible with physicalism either, since “anything with its own operation
is weakly subsistent.”67 Under these considerations a contemporary physicalist could say
that the “soul” is really just a particular brain structure or neural function. This
conception of the soul is incorporeal, but not subsistent. Further, the “mind” since it
would be an operation of the brain, would not be incorporeal, but it would be subsistent.
Thus, we can now see why Aquinas’ view that the soul is both incorporeal and subsistent
is incompatible with contemporary physicalism. For Aquinas, it is the soul that performs
the functions of mind – the mind is an aspect / power of the soul. Likewise, the soul is the
substantial form of the body. Hence, there can be no real separation between the “soul”
and “mind” and “subsistence.” To separate these is to court incoherence as far as Aquinas
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is concerned.68 Thus, Aquinas wants to hold a middle-ground between substance dualism
and physicalism, since to fall one way or the other is to end in incoherence.69
Again Aquinas’ position entails that the intellect has an “act” apart from the body,
but this is possible only if it can subsist on its own – thus the intellect (i.e., soul) can
subsist apart from the body. Souls naturally unite to bodies but can be separate from
them. Each human being is individuated by their matter and their intellect, and these
intellects differ because each informs its own matter (ST 1a76.2). Likewise, since reason
can operate per se without the body, it grants the human soul the ability to exist apart
from the body (ST 1a77.8). These notions of the soul separating from the body,
functioning apart from the body, and ultimately being reunited with the body coincide
with Aquinas’ theological convictions of an afterlife. In traditional Christian theology,
souls that depart from the body await the day of redemption (Dan. 12:2-3; John 5:28-29;
1 Cor. 15:12-23; 2 Cor. 4:14; 1 Thess. 4:13-18). As such, Aquinas’ position allows for a
traditional understanding of the role of a soul in the economy of salvation and
redemption.70 A substance dualist allows for this as well, but the doctrine of the
68 “So Aquinas is not a dualist, not even when dualism is understood along the lines of property
dualism rather than substance dualism. Human beings are not the composite of two fundamentally different
kinds of properties or entities. But of course Aquinas is not a materialist, either. He rejects materialism
because he believes the rational soul is both incorporeal and subsistent. Its incorporeality alone is not
inconsistent with materialism, because all forms are incorporeal . . . . Its subsistence alone is not
inconsistent with materialism, because anything with its own operation is weakly subsistent . . . . A modern
materialist, for instance, might identify the soul with a certain brain structure or functional disposition. So
defined, the soul would be incorporeal but nonsubsistent (inasmuch as structures and dispositions exist in a
subject), and the mind would be corporeal and subsistent (inasmuch as the mind would be corporeal organ,
the brain, actualized by soul). Aquinas would reject this form of materialism because he believes that the
soul alone performs the functions of mind: the mind is a form, a subsistent form, and hence and incorporeal
substance.” Ibid., (emphasis in original).
69 “Aquinas believes not just that the form-matter relationship offers the best explanation of this
unity, but that it offers the only workable explanation. The challenge he extends, then, is not to show that
his Aristotelian account is wrong, but to offer a coherent alternative.” Ibid., 75 (emphasis in original).
70 “Aquinas believes that the relationship between the human soul and the human body is
fundamentally the same as all form-matter relationships. Soul actualizes body, with respect to both
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resurrection remains mysterious. For if the person is identified with just their soul, what
is purpose of reuniting the soul with a body? Further, Aquinas’ position stresses the
importance of the body for the person to be identifiable to others as well as naturally
interact with the world. Physicalists allow for this as well, but their denial of a soul
causes both theological and philosophical problems as far as Aquinas is concerned.
Hence, by taking this middle path, Aquinas believes he can appropriate the strengths of
both substance dualism and physicalism, but avoid their weaknesses.71
3.2.2 Philosophy of Mind – A Modern Interpretation
As discussed in chapter 2, the “conceivability argument” holds that if the mind
and brain are identical, then it is not just physically impossible for the mind to exist apart
from the brain, but it is also metaphysically impossible.72 A number of considerations can
be explored demonstrating the varying degrees of this metaphysical impossibility.
Specifically, four areas are commonly examined: qualia; consciousness; rationality; and
intention. Each of these progresses from being most explainable in physicalist terms to
least explicable in physicalist terms. That is, while qualia can provide good reasons for

existence and the various operations of life. The only distinctive feature of this relationship in the human
case is that the rational soul has an operation that surpasses matter, an operation that need not (and indeed
cannot) be performed by the human body. This difference has the important consequence of making it
possible (or so Aquinas believes) for the rational soul to survive when separated from the body. But the
difference is not a deep metaphysical one. The human soul is a form just like other forms, and is different
only in the extent of its operations. Moreover, because form or actuality is what is fundamental in nature,
there is nothing peculiar or unnatural about a form’s existing on its own, independently of matter.” Ibid.,
72.
71 “Aquinas’s hylomorphism aims to replace materialism with a more adequate metaphysics, while
at the same time avoiding any sort of mind-body dualism. Far from being an embarrassment to this
hylomorphic analysis, his conclusions about the rational soul’s status are an immediate consequence of the
analysis.” Ibid.
72
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thinking the mind and brain are not identical, it falls short of sufficient “proof.”
Consciousness seems to be more difficult to explain than qualia, but it is still insufficient
to disprove physicalism. Rationality and intentionality, however, provide strong reasons
for doubting the physicalist’s narrative. This is of central importance in the transhumanist
debate, since a number of transhumanists hold that rationality is strictly a physical
phenomenon. This has implications for artificial intelligence research as well as a
common transhumanist program to be explored in chapter 6 called “mind uploading.”73
But, if in principle mind as expressed in rationality and intention cannot be “described by
the laws of physics,” then this would be grounds for questioning the wisdom of pursuing
certain technologies – especially if those technologies cannot achieve their desired
outcomes without rationality being accounted for in a physicalist paradigm.74 While
qualia75 and consciousness76 are interesting in their own right and point to the
immateriality of mind, it is rationality and intentionality to which we turn our focus.

73 Transhumanist Ralph C. Merkle in discussing the possibility of “mind uploading” makes the
logic of this position explicit: “Your brain is a material object. The behavior of material objects is described
by the laws of physics. The laws of physics can be modeled on a computer. Therefore, the behavior of your
brain can be modeled on a computer. Q.E.D.” Ralph C. Merkle, “Uploading,” in The Transhumanist
Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, Technology, and Philosophy of the Human
Future, ed. by Max More and Natasha Vita-More (Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 157.
74 This is not to say that the end-goals could not or should not be pursued, but rather that the
proposed method would need to change. For if in principle mind cannot be expressed in only physical
terms, then any technology based on that premise (and however impressive it may be!) will never be
successful in holding mind in a purely physical form. For example, if mind cannot be fully physical, there
could never actually be a true artificial intelligence in the strong sense. At best we would only be able to
achieve very advanced virtual intelligences (or weak AI).
75 Qualia are those experiences that make up the “something that it is like to be in that state.” It is
to be aware of some being. It is the experience one has upon one of the bodily senses being activated.
Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Westview Press, 2006), 207 (emphasis in
original).
76 Jaegwon Kim says that to be conscious is to be awake or aware. For Kim, “consciousness is,
presumptively, a central and crucial feature of mentality – or at any rate the kind of mentality that we
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3.2.2.1 Reasoning and Thought77
The arguments put forward regarding reason and intentionality – both under a
physicalist understanding and ensoulment understanding – are independent of the
conclusions derived from considering qualia and consciousness, per se. Indeed, part of
the argument that ensoulment puts forward is that human consciousness is largely
comprised of reason and intentionality – which is inherently non-physical. Intentionality
will be considered in the next section, below will be a brief examination of how reason is
different than causes, the computational and representational theory of thought’s (CRTT)
inability to account for reason and logic, and how computation cannot be mindindependent.
3.2.2.1.1 The Difference Between Reasons and Causes
The issue at hand is that physical causes produce physical effects and these effects
are different than what happens at the rational level.78 The question, however, is if

possess and value.” Likewise, he holds that consciousness is indicative of one being aware of one’s own
mental state. A conscious mind knows it is conscious. Ibid., 205—207.
77 It seems that most contemporary philosophers of mind think qualia and consciousness pose the
most devastating challenge to the physicalist narrative of mind. The ability to reason via logic and the
capacity for intention are somehow relegated to a status that is more “easily” explicable in physicalist
terms. However, not only does this seem somewhat backwards, it appears “perverse.”Error! Main
Document Only. Contemporary “philosophers of mind typically take the problems of qualia and
consciousness to pose the most serious challenge to a materialist concept of the mind, with intentionality
and rationality being more readily explicable in naturalistic terms. . . . The suggestion that what we share
with the beasts is scientifically puzzling, while what appears to be unique to us is merely one, relatively
unproblematic material capacity among others, would have struck Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and
Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant as odd, even perverse.” Feser, Philosophy of Mind, 144. For it is
strange that those qualities that we share with brute animals is deemed more problematic than those specific
characteristics that separate us from other animals. It seems to be that by proving this lower capacity has a
physical basis, the higher capacity will be proved to have a physical basis as well – and a more easily
proved physical basis. I suggest this should be reversed, for a physical basis for qualia and consciousness
may indeed be possible (though I think unlikely), yet this would do nothing to prove that reason and
intentionality are physically based.
78 For example, that I stub my toe and experience the subsequent pain is (mostly) explicable in
physicalist terms. Upon my toe ramming into the table leg, nerve cells send a signal to my brain that
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physicalism can account for rational thinking, and it is at this point physicalism seems to
encounter a significant problem, but it is the only possible way allowed given the
physicalist paradigm.79 As the standard physicalist model of mind operates, the following
is what occurs:
(1) At neurological event N1 a certain idea I1 results (i.e., upon the C-fibers firing
the thought “My toe hurts” occurs)
(2) At neurological event N2 another certain idea I2 results (i.e., the C-fibers stop
firing “I feel no immediate pain” occurs)
Under this consideration, it is clear why I2 follows from I1 – it is based on the physical
state of the brain. Neurological event N1 resulted in I1, and N2 resulted in I2. However,
notice that I1 does not affect I2 in any way, for it is only the neurological events that have
any effect on thoughts – thoughts do not (indeed, cannot) interact.80
While this scenario may be able to account for the physical causes of our
reactions, it seems wanting in explaining rational processes. As noted above, it is unclear
what physical processes are involved that allow I1 to affect I2, but in rational thought this

damage may be occurring in that part of my body. The subsequent reaction and shriek of pain, again, may
be explainable in physical terms. However, suppose that I sit down take off my socks and examine the area
for any further damage. Why would I do this? Because I want to see if I can evaluate the extent of my
injury, and I believe that this could be more easily accomplished by observing the area directly. Something
very different is going on in this act of observing the toe as opposed to what happened when the toe was
injured. As already stated, the toe being injured and the resulting (largely involuntary) reaction is an
example of physical causes. However, removing the sock to observe any further damage is an example of
reasoning. Can physical reality account for the mental belief that: my toe hurts and I do not want it injured
further, as such I need to see if there is any observable damage so that I know what the best course of action
to take (i.e., go to the hospital; put ice on it; walk it off; etc.), but I cannot observe the area without
removing my sock, therefore I will remove my sock after I sit down so as not to fall and further injure
myself? Now, this string of varying thoughts have a logical flow to them all with the end goal of wanting to
observe the injured area.
79 “The trouble is that giving a materialistic or naturalistic explanation of any phenomenon seems
somehow to require fitting it into the causal network described by physical science.” Ibid., 146.
80 “For A to be the cause of B is one sort of relation; for A to be a reason for B is another. The
first concerns the impersonal realm of meaningless material forces; the latter concerns the personal sphere
of rational deliberation” Ibid.
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is what happens. For example, the classic deductive argument “all men are mortal, and
Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal” is an example of thoughts affecting each
other, not physical causes.81
3.2.2.3.2 The Computational and Representational Theory of Thought (CRTT)82
The British mathematician-logician Alan Turing, developed a thought experiment
whereby we could “test” whether a computer or any machine had become
indistinguishable from a real intellect relying on a purely physical basis for “thought.”83
81 “How can the wholly contingent tendency of certain neural processes to trigger certain other
ones account for our ability to think in accordance with the utterly inflexible laws of logic?” Ibid., 147.
Terrence Nichols states the problem well, “there must be room in the mind for ideas to cause other ideas.
Yet if every idea is correlated with a particular state of a neural network, and that state is caused by a
previous state of the same network, it is hard to see how ideas can cause other ideas.” (Nichols, The Sacred
Cosmos, 148). Nichols provides a helpful way of considering the problem of mental and physical causation.
He says to suppose that N1 applies to a neural network state that corresponds to some particular idea, I1.
Now, suppose N1 is the cause of N2, which corresponds to I2. Even if the person claims that I1 led to the idea
of I2, this would be incorrect. It was the neural network (not the idea) that caused I2. As such, mental
causation must be an illusion for physicalist, but this means that both reason and science are impossible.
The above example should now more clearly establish the problem for physicalism. I remove my
sock to further examine the damaged toe, but I have reasons for wanting to observe the toe (i.e., to evaluate
the extent of damage), when I observe the toe (i.e., after I sit down, so as not to further injure myself), and
how best to observe the toe (i.e., by removing obstructions to evaluating the toe – by removing the sock).
These reasons are not physically caused even though there is an attending brain state with them. The point
is that these thoughts cause each other, but are not caused by some neurochemical event – even though
there is an attending neurochemical event. Feser summarizes the complaint well, can “the vast network of
beliefs, desires, thoughts, and other propositional attitudes as a whole, which largely constitutes the mind,
can [these] plausibly be explained in terms of the network of causal processes that constitute the brain”?
Feser, Philosophy of Mind, 144. It seems they cannot.
82 While this is the first time I am using the term CRTT, the position was largely alluded to in
chapter 2 by Jerry Fodor. CRTT is a “functionalist” view of how the mind works. Examining CRTT is
important for this project because this is the primary way most transhumanists view how the mind operates.
See Susan Schneider, “Future Minds: Transhumanism, Cognitive Enhancement and the Nature of Persons,”
http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&context=neuroethics_pubs (accessed
February 4, 2016), 6.
83 Alan M. Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” (1950) in Introduction to
Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings, ed. by John Perry and Michael Bratman (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986), 375. The Turing Test was passed recently for the first time. “Turing Test
Success Marks Milestone in Computing History,” http://www.reading.ac.uk/news-andevents/releases/PR583836.aspx (accessed January 13, 2016). A computer program by the name “Eugene
Goostman” created by Vladimir Veselov and Eugene Demchenko, acted as though it were a thirteen year
old boy. Hence, the computer (intentionally!) misspelled words, used pop-references, and made juvenile
comments. 33% of the judges were fooled and deemed they were talking with a human – thus the Turing
test was passed. I think this actually exposes a flaw in the Turing test. The programmers had the program
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This purely physical basis for “thought” has become a standard paradigm for how the
mind operates. For physicalists, thought is a series of causes and effects illustrated as a
set of inputs, outputs, and transitional states.84 By applying an algorithm to these inputs
and outputs, almost any complex task can be achieved – or so the argument goes. Many
tasks we perform are so basic that a simple machine can mimic the behavior. The
question then is if we can achieve success at basic levels, why not have a machine mimic
human reasoning at more complex levels?85 If the brain operates on this type of
algorithm, why can we not program a machine to do something similar? Some have
suggested that this is precisely how the human mind should be understood: as “the
implementation of a set of algorithms constituting a program.”86 Indeed, the
transhumanist agenda of creating AI and uploading human minds is based on this specific
understanding that the brain (algorithmically) functions in a particular way that gives rise
to “mind.”87 If we should be able to emulate the human brain, then (in theory) we would

“intentionally” mislead the judges by introducing errors in grammar and spelling. It would be far more
compelling that the Turing test has been passed if a computer that operates at full capacity and without
“trickery” can get judges to believe it is a sentient being.
84

Feser, Philosophy of Mind, 148. I am indebted to Feser for the following discussion.

85 We already have basic machines that can carry out complex tasks more efficiently and
accurately than humans – even if the machine’s skill set is limited. For example, think of a pocket
calculator – it can perform complex math functions faster and more accurately than humans, but is limited
to just math. In a similar manner, because the calculator can properly interpret “4” as the correct answer to
“2” “+” “2” why cannot a slightly more complex machine be able to interpret “Socrates is mortal” from “all
men are mortal” and “Socrates is a man”?
86

Feser, Philosophy of Mind, 149.

87 See Randal A. Koene, “Uploading to Substrate-Independent Minds,” in The Transhumanist
Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, Technology, and Philosophy of the Human
Future, ed. by Max More and Natasha Vita-More (Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 147. Also see
Ben Goertzel, “Artificial General Intelligence and the Future of Humanity,” in The Transhumanist Reader:
Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, Technology, and Philosophy of the Human Future, ed.
by Max More and Natasha Vita-More (Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 128—129.
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have a fully synthetic and operational brain which would give rise to a mind of its own.
The assumption here is that the human brain is susceptible to the same cause and effects
as that are utilized in computers.88 And if this is the case, then there is “in principle, no
problem in explaining our capacity for rational thought in purely materialistic terms.” 89
3.2.2.1.3 Reason, Logic, and Some Problems with Physicalism / CRTT
There are a number of problems associated with CRTT.90 The first is to point out
that symbols have no causal efficacy – symbols have the “same causal properties” no
matter what their meaning is, or even if they have no meaning at all.91 It literally does not
matter what the symbols are, if they are “programmed” to operate according to some
algorithm then the algorithm will achieve its output regardless of what the symbol
“means”. But if this is the case, then symbols per se have no causal powers. The only
causal factor at work is the algorithm which is operating by physical necessity.
Of course, if this is how CRTT operates, then the symbols of our language play
no causal role in what follows. All that matters are the neurochemical properties

88 “Just as the implementation of a computer program is ultimately reducible to the network of
causes and effects instantiated in a piece of computer hardware, so too would the implementation of the
program that is the human mind be reducible to the network of neuronal firing patterns constituting the
brain” Feser, Philosophy of Mind, 149.
89

Ibid., 150.

90 Interestingly, Francis Fukuyama thinks that a main problem with CRTT is not that it cannot
replicate human thought, but that it will not be able to replicate human emotion. Francis Fukuyama, Our
Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnological Revolution (New York: Picador, 2002), 168.
91 “The meanings of the symbols are, in short, completely irrelevant to their causal efficacy, for
they would have the same causal properties whatever meanings they had, or even if they had no meanings.”
Feser, Philosophy of Mind, 151. To borrow an example from Feser, when a calculator computes “2 + 2 =” it
performs a basic electrical algorithm in which it is programmed to output “4”. However, if the
programmers wanted to, they could have the calculator output some other number, or even the statement
“math is fantastic.” Now, while we recognize that these outputs would be curious (as well as the wrong
answer to “2 + 2”) the calculator would be functioning the exact same way as when it output “4” as when it
said “math is fantastic”.
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implementing thought.92 Under CRTT, the symbols are divorced from their meaning. But
this odd outcome highlights a problem with CRTT, namely that the causal process
transferred by various brain states are wholly divorced from the meaning of the symbols
they express. CRTT can only be considered because it takes a mind outside of the
algorithm to determine the meaning of symbols.93
The problem with CRTT then is that mental states are irrelevant to thought – an
odd consequence indeed. For whatever mental states are under CRTT, they must
supervene on the physical states of the brain’s processes. But again, if this is the case, the
only “causal” power involved are the physical states of the brain. It does not matter what
some proposition or conclusion means for CRTT to function, all that matters is that the
physical process is completed. As such, if all of this follows as a consequence of the truth
about CRTT, then a painful conclusion follows – CRTT is self-refuting. It is counterintuitive to say that thoughts cannot affect each other, for if they cannot then we would be
quite unable to reason.94 Why then give arguments for CRTT? The brain functions out of

92 “If this is true of the symbols processed by a calculator it would be true also of the symbols
‘processed’ by the brain – it would be true, that is to say, of the contents of our thoughts as they are
characterized by the CRTT [computational/representational theory of thought]. . . . The electrochemical
properties of the neural process implementing the thought are all that matter to its causal efficacy, just as
the electronic properties of the symbols in a calculator are all that matter to their causal efficacy.” Ibid.,
151—152.
93 The number “2” only has the meaning it does because of the conventional meaning given to it
by society, there is nothing inherent to the number two that it must be represented by the symbol “2”. Just
as there is nothing inherent to the statement “Socrates is mortal” that it could not mean “it is snowing
today”. The fact that CRTT divorces meaning from the symbol so easily gives one pause as to whether
CRTT is the best way to construe human rationality.
94 “It is only in virtue of the meaning or content of thoughts that they can serve as a rational
justification for other thoughts . . . . Yet if the meaning or content of a particular thought plays absolutely
no role in bringing about any other thought, it would seem to follow that it can provide no rational
justification for any other thought. . . . Even worse, advocates of the CRTT obviously think they have a
rational justification for their own belief in the CRTT; but if the theory is correct, it would seem that they
can’t! The theory appears to undermine itself.” Ibid., 152—153.
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a physical necessity not tied to any meaning. Per CRTT, your beliefs and “rational
justifications” are wholly accountable by a physical process. Thus, beliefs, ideas,
thoughts, concepts, and arguments do not interact nor affect each other. But to hold this
view is to do away with rational thought, logic, mathematics, philosophy, and science. In
its attempt to explain rational thought, CRTT wholly undermines rational thought.
3.2.2.1.4 Computation and Mind-Dependency
Conventional symbols of language and mathematics are inherently meaningless.
There is nothing inherent in the shape of the letter “S” that determines it must make the
sound that it does, nor is there any particular reason why the shape “S” could not stand
for the meaning of an entire thought or phrase,95 or it could mean literally nothing at all.
“S” has the meaning it does in modern English because of sheer conventional use. But
what applies to “S” applies to all conventional symbols – it is we who give the symbols
meaning. But if these symbols have no intrinsic meaning, what about symbols derived
from electrical impulses in the brain? It would seem they do not. Whether it be neural
firings or electrical inputs in a computer, these are inherently meaningless physical events
– they have significance only because we give them significance.96
Remember, CRTT is based on the assumption that the human brain operates on a
type of biological algorithm that is analogous to algorithms run on computers. This
analogy is so strong that CRTT is essentially saying that the human brain is a type of

95 For example, think of the dialogue between Superman and Lois Lane, when she asks what the
“S” stands for on his chest. His reply was that it is not an “S” it was his people’s symbol for “hope.” Man of
Steel, directed by Zach Snyder, Warner Bros., 2013.
96
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biological computer.97 One problem with this type of reasoning, however, is that
algorithms and the rules they follow are not mind-independent phenomena. Rather, they
need to be interpreted.98 It is insufficient to explain the human mind by an algorithm
since an algorithm itself can only be interpreted by some mind. That is, mind precedes
any algorithm – biological or synthetic. But if an algorithm is used to explain the
existence of mind, but cannot itself exist without a mind, then it follows that mind cannot
be fully accounted for by attributing to it some inherent algorithm. And if this is the case,
then CRTT would appear to be false.99
What this all means is that algorithms and computation are all observer-relative
phenomena.100 Any “computation” in the world must be interpreted by someone. A basic
calculator or abacus only “make sense” because we recognize the symbols from these
tools as making sense. There is nothing inherent about the electrical impulse in the

97 Searle reminds us that a standard CRTT slogan is “the mind is to the brain as a program is to a
computer.” Seale takes it that this slogan must ask three distinct questions: 1) is the brain a digital
computer?; 2) is the mind a computer program?; and 3) can the operations of the brain be simulated on a
digital computer? Now Searle takes it that the answers to 1) and 2) are “no” but the answer to 3) is “yes.”
The brain is not a digital computer, nor the mind a program. However, neural operations could
(theoretically) be replicated by a computer. John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA:
The MIT Press, 1992), 200—225. Given Searle’s response to these questions, it is easy to see why many
physicalists think that mind is just a program. For even Searle acknowledges that a computer could
duplicate the functions of the brain, and thus for many physicalists this is sufficient to show that mind could
exist not just in brains, but computers as well. Searle’s response, however, is that these physicalists are
reducing the mind to mere function – a warrantless leap since properties of the mind cannot be reduced to
physical operations.
98 As Feser puts it, so “the fact that a computer is following some basic set of algorithmic rules
cannot fully account for its behavior, because that the set of rules . . . is to be understood in this way rather
than that requires some interpretation to be put on those basic rules; and since there is, by definition, no
more basic set to appeal to in order to fix the interpretation, we need to appeal to something outside the
computer – a mind that interprets the rules. Feser, Philosophy of Mind, 162 (emphasis in original).
99 By analogy, what CRTT is trying to do is explain the way George Washington (i.e., human
mind) looked by describing his picture on the one dollar bill (i.e., algorithm), and then taking the dollar bill
(i.e., algorithm) as the standard for Washington’s appearance, when the true standard of Washington’s
appearance was Washington himself (i.e., human mind).
100
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calculator that necessitates “2 + 2” equal “4”. We are the ones that programed the
calculator to solve that equation – and once it is programmed properly, it will carry out
that function very well. We are the ones that determined which electrical impulses would
result in which symbol to be manipulated. The algorithm functions properly only because
some mind above it determined the rules it would follow. But given the reality that
computation is observer-relative, a significant consequence follows – CRTT would
appear to be incoherent.101 At bottom, thought cannot be explained in terms of a program
– it can only be accounted for in terms of intentionality.102
3.2.2.2 Intentionality
Intentionality means to be about something else.103 It points to something beyond
itself. Intentionality is the “mark of the mental” and is the “essential feature of all mental
phenomena.”104 It is by intentionality that the mind recognizes things and is about other

101 “Computation . . . is an observer-relative phenomenon. There is nothing intrinsic to the nature
of anything in the material world that makes it a computer, or that makes it true that it is implementing a
program. It is all a matter of interpretation: our interpretation. . . . If computation is observer-relative, then
that means that its existence presupposes the existence of observers, and thus the existence of minds; so
obviously, it cannot be appealed to in order to explain observers or minds themselves. . . . [It] is
computation that must get explained in terms of the human mind, not the human mind in terms of
computation. The brain is not intrinsically a digital computer, because nothing is. So the mind’s ability to
think in accordance with the laws of logic cannot be explained in terms of the brain’s running a certain kind
of program. The computational/representational theory of thought [CRTT] thus seems incoherent.” Ibid.,
161—162 (emphasis in original).
102 The “argument from reason implies that the standard materialist attempts to explain human
rationality fail to account for the effect intentional mental states qua intentional have on the physical world;
and . . . the categories these materialist theories appeal to – computation, representation, language and
elements . . . – presuppose intentionality and the point of view of the conscious subject, and thus cannot
form the basis for a theory explaining the rational intentional processes of the subject. . . . There is an
inherent link between consciousness, intentionality, and subjectivity, and that one cannot account for one of
these without accounting for the others.” Ibid., 168 (emphasis in original).
103 The term “intentionality” derives from the Latin term intendere which means to “to stretch;
extend; to aim at; to direct; focus.”
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things. Knowledge itself is an intentional act, since to say “I know the grass is green” is
to mean that my mind turns its attention to the object grass, recognizes it as such, and
overlays the concept “green” to the object to which the mind is attending. Note, that I do
not need to be looking at grass to have this thought. I could be thinking this while
incarcerated in some dungeon. The question is, how can a mind be about something else,
especially if there is no object presently being presented to it?
Physicalists take this phenomenon to be a puzzle that neuroscience will one day
answer. Nancy Murphy, for example, seems to take it that “knowledge” is the brain
recognizing patterns and, thus, the key question in neuroscience is how the brain
recognizes these patters.105 In this conception, intentionality is just a series of neural
patterns. But under this conception it is indeed, mysterious how the brain – as a physical
thing – “recognizes” anything at all! How can something physical be about something
else that is also physical? This is the mystery of intentionality for physicalists. It is why
Daniel Dennett preferred the “Intentional Stance” as discussed in chapter 2. For Dennett,
intention is not real but we must act as though it is to make sense of the world. But this is
a curious position. The main reason Dennett drops the existence of intentionality is
because it conflicts with his physicalism, but if intentionality seems to be real, then
physicalism will need serious reevaluation.
But, why think intentionality is real? Certainly, it seems to be real, since we are
able to communicate meaning. Perhaps, the physicalist is correct and by studying the
neural processes more carefully we will be able to unravel the mystery of intentionality.
However, this project argues that this scenario is unlikely in extremis. Why? Because as
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will be argued below, intentionality is inherently non-physical. If intentionality is nonphysical and real, then it cannot be accounted for in physicalist terms. Aquinas, for
example, took intentionality to be the “distinctive feature of the mind” and “impossible to
explain” in principle in materialistic terms.106 Hence, the argument sketched below is
basically saying that “Whatever intentionality is, it isn’t physical.”107
John Searle notes that there are three types of intentionality: intrinsic, as-if, and
derived.108 To borrow Searle’s example, we can compare these three types of
intentionality by the following sentences:
1. I am now thirsty, really thirsty, because I haven’t had anything to drink all day.
2. My lawn is thirsty, really thirsty, because it has not been watered in a week.
3. In French, “j´ai grand soif” means “I am very thirsty.”109
The second sentence uses the term “thirsty” in a metaphorical sense. The lawn does not
really thirst, but is in a condition that if we were parched we would be thirsty. As such,
we identify that state with the lawn and apply it to the lawn. Hence, this is an “as-if” type
of intentionality. The lawn is thirsty “as-if” it could really experience thirst, but it cannot.
The third sentence is a “derived” intentionality. It is like the first sentence in that “it
ascribes intentionality,” and it is like the second sentence “in that the intentionality
described is not intrinsic to the system.”110 In other words, people can be intrinsically

106 “Aquinas instead takes what is now called ‘intentionality’ to be the distinctive feature of the
mind, and the one that it is in principle impossible to explain in materialistic terms.” Edward Feser,
Aquinas: A Beginner’s Guide (Oxford, UK: Oneworld Pub., 2009), 131. This can be seen in the way
Aquinas treats knowledge and intellect (ST 1a14.1).
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“thirsty” – they can experience thirst and their thoughts can be directed toward that
experience – however, there is no necessary connection between that experience and it
having to be expressed in any particular language (French, English, German, or
otherwise). As Searle puts it:
I literally ascribe intentionality to the French sentence, that is, the French sentence
literally means what I say it does. But the intentionality in the French sentence is
not intrinsic to that particular sentence construed as a syntactical object. That very
sequence might have meant something very different or nothing at all. . . .
Linguistic meaning is a real form of intentionality, but it is not intrinsic
intentionality. It is derived from the intrinsic intentionality of the users of the
language.111
As such, for intentionality to be intrinsic, there must be a connection of some sort that
necessitates that meaning point to some specific reality. For the purposes of this project,
it is the first and third sentence that will be important.
The first sentence is an intrinsic intention if it is spoken truly. If it is the case that I
am really thirsty, and I experience thirst, and I think the first sentence, then it can be said
that this is an intrinsic intention. The thought is directed towards the subjective
experience of thirst. I desire a drink, and my thoughts are toward that end. Now, Searle
takes it that intrinsic intentionality is something that humans and other animals
experience as part of their biological nature.112 For him, it is just a plain fact that animals
get thirsty or hungry or tired, and have mental events about those various states. It is
important to remember that for Searle the key issue is not that some system merely
behaves as-if it is thirsty or hungry, but that it must really be thirsty or hungry to exhibit
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intrinsic intentionality.113 A robot that acts thirsty or hungry but really is not, does not
have intrinsic intentionality – even if it were very convincing in its thirst or hunger. The
robot only has “as-if” intentionality.114 Thus, Searle wants to maintain a real connection
between the biological experience of being in some condition and the mental state that is
directed toward it.
The third sentence is a derived intention and it shows that “we often do literally
endow nonmental phenomena with intentional properties.”115 The third sentence is not
as-if, it is quite literally true – the French phrase means the English phrase (and vice
versa). In a similar way, road maps literally represent various areas to help facilitate ease
of travel. Portraits of famous dignitaries and celebrities really point to their name sake.
Notice, however, that even though the road map points to a real place, and the portrait
could be about a real person, these examples are all derived from some human agent.116
Someone made the map. Someone made the portrait. That is, someone had a direct
experience of some reality and recorded it in a format that could be expressed to other
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114 Note how Daniel Dennett would object to Searle. Whereas Searle wants to uphold different
types of intentionality, Dennett’s “intentional stance” reduces all intention to what Searle calls “as-if”
intention. Indeed, Searle finds the notion of the “Intentional Stance” problematic, and he uses the following
example to make his point. The intestinal tract is sometimes said to be a “highly intelligent organ” with a
“developed decision making ability” and can be called the “gut brain.” Searle takes this to be a clear case of
“as-if” intentionality – the gut acts as-if it were intelligent, but it is really not. Now, if Dennett were to
come along and say that this is just an example of the “intentional stance” and no different than the human
brain, then Searle would reply “just try in real life to suppose that the ‘perception’ and the ‘decision
making’ of the gut brain are no different from that of the real brain.” Ibid., 81. Can we really say that the
“gut brain” and the “brain brain” are equivalent? For Searle the answer is “no” and it surprises him that
Dennett would have to answer “yes.” For Searle, to deny this distinction is to face a reductio ad absurdum.
To deny the intrinsic vs. as-if distinction in the way that Dennett does is to make everything in the universe
intentional.
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persons. There is no necessary connection to make a road map look a specific way, nor
for a portrait to look this way rather than that.117
And here is the rub: brain processes are a series of inherently meaningless
neurological firings – brain states seem inherently empty of any intentional content. In a
way, brain states are the neurological versions of portraits and road maps. For the firing
of certain neurons creates a particular brain state, but does that brain state necessarily
need to correspond to some reality? It seems not. In the same way that sentences, whether
French, English, or German, could have any number of different structures, so too can
brain states. Brain states do not have to be the way that they are. Hence, if there is any
intentionality it cannot be attributed to the brain – it must be attributed to something else:
mind. The “mind is the source” of intentionality – the mind has intrinsic intentionality.118
Thus, we can now see the difference between the first sentence and the third sentence.
The first sentence is directly and necessarily connected to the experience of the person
(irrespective of the language in which it is put). The third sentence is indirectly and
contingently connected to the relationships between different language groups. The first
sentence is about the current experienced state of the person (i.e., they are thirsty). The
third sentence is about the expression of a mental state of persons (i.e., how to say “they

117 Maps can be super realistic (i.e., satellite imagery) or cartoonish (i.e., a kid’s placemat at some
restaurant), yet the level of detail may be sufficient to get us to our destination. Portraits can be photos,
photo-realistic drawings, or cartoonish, and yet we know who the portrait represents. But in all of these
cases, there is no necessary connection for why one thing is made this way rather than that – hence, this
shows that it is a derived intentionality.
118 Brain “processes, composed as they are of meaningless chemical components, seem as
inherently devoid of intentionality as soundwaves or ink marks. Any intentionality they have would also
have to be derived from something else. But if anything physical would be devoid of intrinsic
intentionality, whatever does have intrinsic intentionality would thereby have to be non-physical. Since the
mind is the source of the intentionality of physical entities like sentences and pictures, and doesn’t get its
intentionality from anything else . . . it seems to follow that the mind has intrinsic intentionality, and thus is
non-physical.” Feser, Philosophy of Mind, 172.
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are thirsty”). The “meaning” of the first sentence is found in the one experiencing thirst.
The “meaning” of the third sentence is found in the conventional expression between
language groups. Physical things cannot inherently mean something else (they just are
what they are), hence, any meaning that is applied to reality must be non-physical.
Therefore, the reality of intentionality is a strong reason to think physicalism is false.
3.2.3 A Brief Word on the Advances in Neuroscience
Neuroscience has rapidly become one of the more exciting fields in medical
research. With the development of technologies such as the CAT scan, MRI, and PET
scan, scientists and doctors are able to investigate the neural world as never before.
Likewise, these developments allowed neuroscientists to isolate “particular mental
functions in particular brain areas.”119 And due to these developments “most
neuroscientists believe that mental events are directly explainable by brain processes.”120
This has led to the conviction that brain processes demand that one deny the existence of
a soul.121 Likewise, other facets of human psychological life – emotions, morality,
religious belief, etc. – will be fully explained as brain processes.122
Advances in neuroscience has fueled “reductionistic naturalism” – the belief that
all of reality can be understood by “reducing” it to its most fundamental parts. Under this
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121 Neuroscientist Mario Beauregard agrees with this assessment, though he thinks the evidence
favors the reality of a soul. “The discipline of neuroscience today is materialist. That is, it assumes that the
mind is quite simply the physical workings of the brain” Mario Beauregard and Denyse O’Leary, The
Spiritual Brain: A Neuroscientist’s Case for the Existence of the Soul (New York: Harper One, 2007), x.
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assumption, if we want an “accurate account of consciousness” then philosophical and
theological reflection and introspection must be rejected. Rather, the only appeals can be
made to what brain science tells us.123 Neurons, and how they are organized, provide all
we need to properly understand humans.124 Modern neuroscientists generally say that the
ability to judge, believe, think, and so forth is a product of the whole brain, not just one
particular part. But as Nichols observes, this is just to say that the brain functions as a
holistic cause.125 Our thoughts can affect the release of hormones, which in turn, affects
how genes are expressed.126 The rub is that having a complete neuroscientific
understanding of the mind will simply be inadequate to fully understand the whole mind.
Neuroscience will be invaluable moving forward, and it will surely continue to expand its
knowledge base on how the human brain works. It seems likely that neuroscience may in
the near future actually be able to achieve breakthroughs in memory enhancement – not
only from curing Alzheimer’s, but in actual technical enhancement to the brain.127

123 Culture commentator Tom Wolfe, puts the issue poetically, “Since consciousness and thought
are entirely physical products of your brain and nervous system—and since your brain arrived fully
imprinted at birth—what makes you think you have free will? Where is it going to come from? What
‘ghost,’ what ‘mind,’ what ‘self,’ what ‘soul,’ what anything that will not be immediately grabbed by those
scornful quotation marks, is going to bubble up your brain stem to give it to you? I have heard
neuroscientists theorize that, given computers of sufficient power and sophistication, it would be possible
to predict the course of any human being's life moment by moment, including the fact that the poor devil
was about to shake his head over the very idea. I doubt that any Calvinist of the sixteenth century ever
believed so completely in predestination as these, the hottest and most intensely rational young scientists in
the United States at the end of the twentieth.” Tom Wolfe, “Sorry, But Your Soul Just Died,”
http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles/Wolfe-Sorry-But-Your-Soul-Just-Died.php (accessed January 19,
2016).
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of Evolution & Technology 22, no. 1 (2011): 97—109.
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However, it is unlikely that neuroscience will be the only discipline needed to
completely understand the working of the human mind. The above considerations on
reasoning and intentionality should be sufficient for showing that mind includes more
than just scientific (i.e., empirical) consideration. Indeed, Neuroscientist Mario
Beauregard explicitly states that materialism has “stalled” in neuroscience when it
addresses “spiritual” issues, and it “neither has any useful hypotheses for the human mind
or spiritual experiences nor comes close to developing any.”128 This is due to the fact that
for materialistically-minded neuroscientists, the spiritual realm is not empirical (and thus
illusory). By extension, any aspect of the “mind” that is unempirical is assumed to be
false. As such, many modern neuroscientists deny the existence of meaning /
intentionality, free-will, and feeling (as discussed above and in chapter 2).129 However, it
is important to note that neuroscience is not inherently materialistic, and neuroscience is
compatible with non-physicalist notions of human persons.130 Hence, simply appealing to
neuroscience (or neuroscientists) as “proof” that there is no human mind / soul is
unwarranted.
3.3 Theological Considerations
While this project has spent considerable time establishing a philosophical
position for ensoulment, it is important to remember that ensoulment has a theological
dimension as well. The basic proposal for this project is that the theological data relevant
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the human mind, see: Beauregard and O’Leary, The Spiritual Brain.; Jeffrey M. Schwartz and Sharon
Begley, The Mind and the Brain: Neuroplasticity and the Power of Mental Force (New York:
HarperCollins, 2003).
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to ensoulment is found in two notions: 1) the imago Dei; and 2) being loved by God. The
imago Dei operates as a baseline theological concept that establishes the sacredness of
human life. Humans are beings in God’s image. And since God is priceless, so too are
humans as a reflection of God’s image. Likewise, being loved by God further establishes
the importance of human life since humans are deemed as valuable by God. It is not, and
cannot be, the imago Dei alone that establishes human worth, for God’s image may be
found in many places in creation – even if, there is something special shared just with
humans. As such, the argument is that we should value those things that God values, and
since God values human life, so too should we. Thus, the conjunction of the imago Dei
and being loved by God, provides a powerful theological basis for establishing the moral
value of human persons.
3.3.1 On the Imago Dei
The concept of the imago Dei (Lat. “the image of God”) plays a significant role
for Christian anthropological theological speculation.131 The imago Dei is often
considered the locus of human dignity, human rights, human sanctity, and human worth.
For our purposes, we will mostly be considering human dignity as a “catch-all” for the
issues related to rights, sanctity, worth, value, etc. The problem that presents itself,
however, is that the notion of human dignity is not agreed upon. Socio-biologists (pace E.
O. Wilson) tend to collapse humans into just some class of mere animal – and to suggest

131 Francis Fukuyama acknowledges this fact, “Christian doctrine emphatically asserts that all
human beings possess an equal dignity, regardless of their outward social status, and are therefore entitled
to an equality of respect.” Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the
Biotechnological Revolution (New York: Picador, 2002), 89.
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that humans have some quality greater than other animals is to engage in “speciesism.”132
Under this view, human dignity (whatever that is) does not signify a special sort of status.
Human dignity – at best – would be whatever society generally designates as being
important to humans. The opposite pole of saying that humans are mere beasts is to make
humans nearly divine. That is to say that humans are the highest and most worthy beings
(i.e., they have the most dignity) in the universe.133
Gilbert Meilaender takes a middle path and says humans are “neither beast nor
God” but are somewhere in-between.134 Because humans fit this in-between status the
tendency is to focus on one or the other. Hence, some see humans as mere beasts (i.e., the
socio-biologists) while others see humans as nearly divine (i.e., some transhumanists).135
Orthodox theologian John Behr notes that the idea of humans having dignity is in a real
sense a matter of faith.136 This notion of dignity is so intimately wrapped within one’s
religious viewpoint that were one’s religion to “whither away” so too would one’s notion
of human dignity.137

132 Thomas Albert Howard, “Introduction,” in Imago Dei: Human Dignity in Ecumenical
Perspective (Washington, DC: The Catholic University Press of America, 2013), 3.
133 I am not taking into account the idea of theosis at this point. All this is doing is establishing the
spectrum of positions regarding human dignity. That is, on one end humans have no dignity and on the
other end, only humans have dignity.
134 Gilbert Meilaender, Neither Beast Nor God: The Dignity of the Human Person (New York:
Encounter Books, 2009).
135
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136 As he puts it, “we would nevertheless surely still want to say that there is something about
every human being as a person that is absolute, equal, and irreplaceable. But because this conviction is not
an empirical conclusion, nor even empirically verifiable, it is an a priori assumption, or, in other words, a
statement of faith.” John Behr, “The Promise of the Image,” in Imago Dei: Human Dignity in Ecumenical
Perspective (Washington, DC: The Catholic University Press of America, 2013), 17.
137 Ibid., 21. Indeed, David Bentley Hart comments that “If . . . the ‘human’ as we now understand
it is the positive invention of Christianity, might it not also be the case that a culture that has become truly
post-Christian will also, ultimately, become posthuman?” David Bentley Hart, Atheist Delusions: The
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Given the importance of religious conviction for establishing human dignity, it
should be no surprise that the modern notions of human dignity are deeply indebted to the
Judeo-Christian notion of the imago Dei.138 The reality is that much of the notion of
human dignity is due to religion in general and the Judeo-Christian tradition in
particular.139 And it is because of human dignity’s close association with certain religious
traditions that some (more skeptically minded) thinkers have taken the notion of human
dignity to be essentially worthless, or if dignity is to be preserved, then it must be
grounded in some rational capacity.140 As we will see however, placing human dignity
(or the imago Dei) in some form of capacities approach proves problematic.
There are different interpretations of what the imago Dei entails simply because
there is no clear cut definition of what it is and exactly what it involves.141 The imago
Dei is scarcely mentioned in Scripture, but plays a large role in Judeo-Christian
anthropology.142 The phrase “image of God” appears only ten times in the entire Bible

Christian Revolution and its Fashionable Enemies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 215,
quoted in Behr, “The Promise of the Image,” 21.
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141 James Peterson identifies three different ways that the imago Dei has been interpreted. The first
is that humans have unique “God-like” capacities, like the abilities to reason and make free choice. The
second is that humans are directed by God to have dominion over the world in a way that God would have
dominion. The third sees the imago as a type of relationship between God and other human beings. James
C. Peterson, Changing Human Nature: Ecology, Ethics, Genes, and God (Grand Rapids, MI: William B.
Eerdmans Pub., 2010), 19. Following Gregory of Nyssa, John Behr notes that while humans may be made
in the image of God, how this is the case may remain an eternal mystery. Behr, “The Promise of the
Image,” 30.
142 C. Ben Mitchell, “The Audacity of the Imago Dei: The Legacy and Uncertain Future of Human
Dignity,” in Imago Dei: Human Dignity in Ecumenical Perspective (Washington, DC: The Catholic
University Press of America, 2013), 86. John Kilner makes the same point, and further notes that the reason
for this is thoroughly intentional – it may provide “a model for how to think and communicate about the
divine image appropriately,” John F. Kilner, Dignity and Destiny: Humanity in the Image of God (Grand
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(including apocryphal texts).143 John Kilner remarks that the infrequency of the “image of
God” suggests that the text is trying to “affirm a core idea or two” about the relationship
between humans and God rather than showing that they are alike in “particular ways.”144
No wonder there are various interpretations.
For example, various views of “liberation” are often directly tied to the idea of
God’s image in the person, since the image of God ideally respects and protects “the
dignity and life of all human beings.”145 Indeed, a robust idea of the imago Dei combined
with a strong notion of the importance of Christian service in conforming to the image of
Jesus, provided the impetus in the early Church to help the poor, the sick, and the
oppressed.146 Prominent philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff agrees that human rights are
most often associated with humans being associated with the image of God, but the
attending speculation on what constitutes the imago Dei has promoted “fruitless

Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2015), 42; cf., 37. That is, there is little explanation because it
needs to remain somewhat mysterious.
143 The verses where the phrase “image of God” applies to all humans appear are: Gen. 1:26; 5:22;
9:6; Wis. of Sol. 2:23; Sir. 17:3-4; Rom. 8:29; 1 Cor. 11:7; 2 Cor. 3:18; Col. 3:9-10; James 3:9.
Highlighting specifically Genesis 1, 5, and 9, John Kilner notes that these are three of the more important
statements. Genesis 1 simply because this is the “statement about who human beings are,” Kilner, Dignity
and Destiny, 38. Genesis 5 because this instigates the genealogies and reiterates that there is something
about the “image of God” that is “irremovable from who human beings are.” Ibid. Even adding to that the
statement in Genesis 9 shows that the “image of God” – whatever it is – is to be valued because it somehow
connects us to God (Ibid). In a real sense, the “image of God” carries an inordinate amount of theological
“weight” considering its infrequent appearance in the text. Kilner remarks, “Some people, then, attribute
less significance than they should to humanity’s creation in God’s image simply because the divine image
seems to receive relatively little attention in the Bible” (Ibid., 40—41).
144 Ibid., 39. He goes on to say that this is a “strategic attempt in the Bible to use the image of God
concept as a ‘gravitational force’ or ‘seedbed’ to anchor and stimulate some understanding of humanity.”
Ibid.
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146 Ibid., 8—9. Kilner further notes that Christian reflection on the image of God was a driving
force for the abolition of slavery in the Western world. It also provided a theological perspective for the
protection of women against traditional patriarchal cultures. Ibid., 10—14.
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controversy.”147 As it is, the notion of the imago Dei has had far-reaching implications
for Christian theology – particularly in regard to the creation of humanity and its renewal.
Indeed, as Kilner notes, the idea of “God’s image plays a pivotal role in a Christian
understanding of God and all of life.”148 The importance of the imago Dei is
demonstrated by the fact that relational justice between humans is based in God’s image
and not God’s character.149 It is evil to murder a person primarily because they are made
in God’s image (Gen. 9:6), not because of some abstract moral principle.150 The image of
God, therefore, confers a worth to whoever bears that image.151
C. Ben Mitchell says that “As creatures, human beings belong to God in a special
way.”152 However, Mitchell notes that the Bible nowhere actually spells out in what the
imago Dei consists.153 So the imago Dei needs to establish the dignity of all humans, but
nowhere in the biblical text does it actually state how this is to be accomplished. Despite
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150 Abstract moral principles may still be relevant, but only provide supplementary support for the
primary motivation to value human life.
151 “I dare say no argument has to be offered for the thesis that being in the image of God . . . gives
great worth to those creatures who bear the image.” Wolterstorff, Justice, 347.
152 Mitchell, “The Audacity of the Imago Dei,” 85. As Kilner phrases it, “Human beings are
connected with God in a profoundly significant way: they are created in God’s image. God has a very
personal stake in the life of a human being. When one destroys (or badly damages) a human being, one is
affronting God.” Kilner, Dignity and Destiny, 116.
153 Mitchell, “The Audacity of the Imago Dei,” 88. He does note some various possibilities that
theologians have developed over the years, but the Bible does not explicitly state any of them. He says that
the imago Dei has been thought to be: 1) the erect human bodily form; 2) human dominion over nature; 3)
the ability to reason – a favorite among scholastic theologians; 4) human prelapsarian righteousness; 5)
various capacities; 6) distinction between man and woman; 7) being responsible and moral conformity to
God; or 8) some combination of the above.
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the lack of biblical data on what the image of God actually entails, the implications of the
imago Dei are so attractive that Christian theologians are simply compelled to develop
this concept.
One way to develop the imago Dei is to highlight that the Bible is clear that
humans are (in some way) in God’s image. Kilner opts for the position that humans have
the imago Dei but not yet in the way Jesus shares in God’s image. That is, Jesus is the
exemplar of what it means to be human and through God’s sanctifying power, people are
ever being conformed to Christ’s image – which is God’s image.154 Orthodox theologian
John Behr takes an eschatological perspective on the imago Dei.155 Because of this future
looking perspective, Behr comes to the intriguing position that we are not quite human
just yet – not until we are redeemed. For Behr, this is the case because Jesus was the first
true human (not Adam), and until we fully reflect Christ at the final redemption we are
not fully human.156 It is by following Christ that we become human.
It is better to see the imago Dei as being part of the human nature itself, all
humans have worth and dignity because all humans are the image of God – regardless of
attending capacities.157 The importance of the imago Dei in describing the worth of

154 People “are not God’s image now the way that Christ is; however, they are intimately
connected with God because God’s image is the very blueprint for humanity. . . . The distance is great now,
but because God is transforming people into the very image of God in Christ (2 Cor. 3:18), that distance
will eventually decrease substantially. The basic idea here is that God has a likeness-image, and God has
created people with that in view.” Kilner, Dignity and Destiny, 92.
155 The “human being in the image of God to Christ as the image of God, and to place this in
eschatological perspective—we are created looking forward to, in anticipation of, as a type of Christ.”
Behr, “The Promise of the Image,” 29.
156 Behr, “The Promise of the Image,” 31. This leads Behr to make an astute observation: if we are
not yet human because we have not been redeemed, then a post-Christian world cannot become posthuman.
However, a post-Christian world may not desire to even become human. Ibid., 37.
157 Wolterstorff, Justice, 350. Likewise, they are in God’s image despite their gender. It may be an
easy criticism to say that the imago Dei applies only to men (and indeed, historically some have understood
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human being is explained well by Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Yes, a human being in whom
human nature is functioning properly is of great worth, truly admirable. But why would
one think that a being in whom human nature us seriously malfunctioning is still of great
worth just because it has that [human] nature?”158 If the imago Dei is tied solely with
function, or if there is no imago Dei at all, then humans are only as valuable as their
capabilities allow. A fully functioning human may be considered to have great “worth.”
But what about the child with Down’s Syndrome? What about the person suffering from
Parkinson’s or ALS?159 If this approach is taken seriously, then humans who have less
functionality are of less worth, and may be treated accordingly as beings of less worth.
The Christian tradition has historically abhorred this idea. Humans are not disposable
simply because they have lessened capacities. The whole person is in the image of God,
not just some part.160 The whole human reflects God’s image regardless of functionality

the “image” to mean “men only”), however, John Kilner is quick to point the difficulty of such a view –
especially in light of the “image’s” connection with “glory.” He says, to avoid the conclusion that the
imago applies only to men “some commentators have suggested that he [Paul] is talking here [1 Cor. 11]
about Adam or Christ only — or not really about God’s image. However, there is no need to circumvent the
straightforward connection of men and God’s image in this text. Paul does affirm that men are God’s
image; but he does not say that only men are involved in the image and glory of God. He affirms this status
of men and then makes a different affirmation of women — that a woman is a glory of a man.
The contrast here between men and women involves glory only, with the understanding that God’s
image encompasses both male and female being so obvious from Genesis 1:27 that Paul does not need to
restate the woman’s image status here. . . . There is nothing surprising about men and women being God’s
glory in different ways.” Kilner, Dignity and Destiny, 93—94 (emphasis in original).
158

Wolterstorff, Justice, 351.

159 If worth is found in capacity and ability, then these persons have less “worth” than a normally
functioning human. The same implications apply to the very young and the very old – limited capacity
equals limited societal “worth.”
160 “We would do well then not to locate the imago Dei in some component of our identity, but in
the created whole.” Mitchell, “The Audacity of the Imago Dei,” 92.
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or capacity. However, even though humanity is supposed to be like God and reflect God,
because of sin this is rarely the case.161
Kilner summarizes well the preceeding consideration about the impact and extent
of the imago Dei for this discussion. Kilner is quoted at length:
Humanity’s creation, then, in the “likeness-image” . . . means the
following. All people are created according to God’s image, which the New
Testament identifies as Jesus Christ. . . . from before the beginning of creation,
God intended that humanity should conform to the divine image, to Christ. So
God created humanity well along the way toward that end. Even before the Fall,
humanity had a further way to go before becoming a full reflection of Christ,
having a transformed spiritual body and imperishability (not able to die).
However, after the Fall people lost most of their ability to reflect God. . . . they
continue to be in God’s image, unique among creation as those whom God
intends to become conformed to the divine image. No image has been damaged,
for God’s image is Christ — it is the standard of what God intends humanity to
become. Nevertheless, sin has severely damaged people, who desperately need
renewal according to the image of Christ.
Only Christ, then, currently is God’s image in the complete sense of what
it means to be the image of God: embodying a special connection with God and a
glorifying reflection of God. People are created in (according to) that image.
Simply by virtue of being in God’s image, people do have a special connection
with God. But it is not a connection of identity, as Christ (who is God) has.
Rather, it is a connection of similarity. . . . Simply by virtue of being in God’s
image, people can manifest some reflection of God; but it is far from all the
reflection that God intends. Only after death will people’s transformation into the
image of God in Christ be complete. Until then they are in (according to) that
image, accountable to God to develop increasing likeness to God.162
3.3.2 On Being Loved by God
The imago Dei goes a long way in establishing the moral worth of persons, but
there is one significant problem – it cannot establish a basis for guaranteeing universal
human rights. As Wolterstorff notes, even if the imago Dei is viewed as being inherent in
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Kilner, Dignity and Destiny, 131.
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Ibid., 132 (emphasis in original).
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our very being then “while all human beings possess the image, possessing it does not, as
such, give its bearers a very exalted status; among those who possess the image will be
human beings who are seriously lacking in capacities on account of human nature being
malformed in their case. The image of God is not adequate, all by itself, for grounding
natural human rights.”163 What is needed is a way to convey the worth of human beings
without that worth being grounded in human capacities. Above it was argued that this
capacities approach is insufficient for a proper view of the imago Dei. Wolterstorff takes
a slightly different tact and says that the most appropriate place to ground the worth that
the imago Dei conveys is in the fact that God loves human beings. It is the love of God
that bestows dignity to humans.164 Only humans are specifically said to be in the image of
God (Gen. 1:26-27; 5:1; 9:6; Col. 3:9-10; James 3:9). Modern thinkers may try to place
human dignity in some notion of human autonomy and / or respect for “persons,” but this
is not how Christians have (historically) viewed what grants humans dignity. 165
Christians are to love others as they love themselves (Lev. 19:18; Matt. 22:37-40)
because it is God who first loved us (1 John 4:19).
Now, being loved by God is an example of having bestowed worth.166 But, how
can “bestowing” worth give value? We can look at some human examples to answer this
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Wolterstorff, Justice, 352.

164 As Wolterstorff puts it, “if God loves equally and permanently each and every creature who
bears the imago dei [sic], then the relational property of being loved by God is what we have been looking
for [to ground moral worth].” Ibid., 352.
165

Behr, “The Promise of the Image,” 16.
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Wolterstorff, Justice, 353.
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question. Humans give (i.e., bestow) worth to paintings and relics.167 As Wolterstorff
notes, the worth of a painting or relic “is purely instrumental to the worth of the person –
or, more precisely, purely instrumental to honoring the worth of the person.”168
According to Wolterstorff (who is, himself, following Augustine) there are three
types of love: 1) love as attraction; 2) love as benevolence; and 3) love as attachment.169
In love as attraction there is something in the object that the subject finds pleasurable –
the subject is attracted to the object.170 In love as benevolence there is a desire to increase
the well-being of the other – whether it be a person or a thing.171

167 There is nothing inherently valuable about Leonardo Da Vinci’s, Mona Lisa, that makes it
valuable. Indeed, higher quality materials could be purchased at a local craft store. Nor can it be the case
that the artist, Da Vinci, gives the Mona Lisa worth. For even if Da Vinci did give the painting value while
he was alive, since he is dead he cannot be the one giving the painting value now. The reason the Mona
Lisa has value today is because we give it value as an exemplary piece of Da Vinci’s artistic genius. In a
similar manner, historical relics generally have no inherent value. The Declaration of Independence is not
“materially” special – without proper care it will continue to decompose – and like the Mona Lisa, better
materials could be purchased from any craft store. It cannot be the words of the Declaration of
Independence that are valuable, for while their specific combination may be powerful and inspirational
other powerful and inspirational writings are produced with great regularity. So, like the Mona Lisa, the
Declaration of Independence has value because we give it value as a powerful political statement of this
country’s historical conflict with Great Britain. In both cases, we may admire Leonardo Da Vinci and
Thomas Jefferson for their artistic, philosophical, and political genius, but again this has value only because
we think it has value.
168

Ibid., 358.
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Ibid.

170 A young lady may find a particular diamond breathtaking, or a young man may be “smitten” by
the beauty of his betrothed. In both cases there is something in the one that the other finds irresistible.
Interestingly enough, however, this type of love does not add any worth to the object. You may be attracted
to the diamond or the young lady, but your attraction to the item or person bears no relevance on the worth
of the item or the person. They retain their properties whether you find them attractive or not. Ibid., 359.
171 Often love as benevolence is associated with love as attraction or attachment, but it retains its
own distinct notion. That distinction, again, is found in wanting to improve a person or thing’s state. But as
with love as attraction, love as benevolence does not convey worth to the object either. It may improve a
person or thing’s lot in life, but it cannot be said that it inherently makes the person or thing worthy. It may
be good to give food to a starving person, thus making their life better, but it does not follow that they now
have worth because you gave them food. Ibid.
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Finally, with love as attachment. Here the love that is expressed is markedly
different than either attraction or benevolence – for here, one just loves the other because
it is to that object one has bonded. Wolterstorff gives the example a young child’s
attachment to their (hideous!) stuffed animal. Why does the child love this raggedy toy?
It is supremely ugly and mostly broken. There is seemingly nothing that the stuffed
animal offers that could not be better served by a newer, better conditioned toy. Yet, as
nearly any parent can attest, children can become attached to a singular toy to the point
that it is that toy – and only that specific toy – that the child has any interest. In other
words, the stuffed animal has worth because the child attaches worth to it.172
In a similar vein, God loves humans in a way that the child loves the stuffed
animal. For if love can bestow any worth, it must be a love by way of attachment. Both
love as attraction and benevolence are insufficient to bestow any relevant sense of worth.
As such, if humans are worthy of honor and respect it is because God has attached
Himself to humans in such a way that His love makes all bearers of the imago Dei
valuable – irrespective of capacities. In the same way the child’s stuffed animal is busted
and unlovely (i.e., it has lessened capacities; it is “broken”) but the child loves it anyway,
so too are humans often busted and unlovely – humans have lessened capacities (i.e.,
down syndrome; ill-formed limbs; sin; etc.) – but God loves humans anyway. Indeed,
God thinks humans are enormously valuable (Psalm 8:4-6; 144:3; Job 7:17; Heb. 2:6-8).
Thus, humans have value even if their capacities are diminished or if others do not find
them attractive. As such, Wolterstorff concludes, “if God loves a human being with the
love of attachment, that love bestows great worth on that human being; . . . I conclude
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that if God loves, in the mode of attachment, each and every human being equally and
permanently, then natural human rights inhere in the worth bestowed on human beings by
that love. Natural human rights are what respect for that worth requires.”173 Just as God
loves humans, so too are Christians commanded to love others (Lev. 19:18; Matt. 22:3740). And this love for others is a means of seeing the dignity that all humans possess.174
3.4 A Working Proposal for Understanding Human Persons
Gilbert Meileander noted that persons – human persons, that is – are replete with
dualities. It is the human person that is the locus of both freedom and finitude, body and
spirit. These notions can no more be separated in reality than words from sentences.
However, it is the fact that these realities are distinct by way of reason that we often
perceive that they are truly different. Though these dual aspects of human persons are
rationally distinct – and thus can be examined individually by rational reflection – they
are not really distinct and so cannot be actually separated without failing to consider the
whole person.175 Hence, we can see the importance of maintaining the different causes of
human persons as Aristotle observed. To only consider the mechanical and material
aspects of human persons is to neglect half of their nature – namely, the formal and
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Ibid., 360.

174 Behr, “The Promise of the Image,” 20. Behr points to Irenaues Against the Heresies (2.7, 19;
4.6.6; 5.6.1) as an example of this thought. Christina Bieber Lake notes that “love is what gives beauty” or
in this case worth or dignity. Christina Bieber Lake, Prophets of the Posthuman: American Fiction,
Biotechnology, and the Ethics of Personhood (Notre Dame, IL: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013),
101.
175 “The person simply is the place where freedom and finitude are united. Body and spirit cannot
be separated in our understanding of human beings; yet, because of the two-sidedness of our nature. We
can look at the person from each of these angles.” Gilbert Meilaender, Bioethics: A Primer for Christians
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1996), 4.
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teleological.176 Thus, there is a significant difference between mechanistic functionalism
found in physicalism and Aristotelian hylomorphism represented by ensoulment. “The
crucial difference is that, like other forms of materialism, functionalism is implicitly
committed to a ‘mechanistic’ conception of the material world on which it is devoid of
Aristotelian formal and final causes.”177 And what applies to mechanistic functionalism
also applies to substance dualisms like that of Descartes. Descartes’ error was assuming
that all causes were simply materialistic and efficient, for he too neglected the formal and
teleological causes of human persons.178
The mechanistic assumption by both physicalists and substance dualists creates
problems for fully comprehending the nature of human persons. Under a physicalist
conception of mechanistic causes the human person “disappears.” That is, under
physicalism “you” are not you – at least not in the self-reflective manner you think you
are. However, under a substance dualist conception of mechanistic causes the human
person “disappears” also, but in a different way. That is, under substance dualism, “there
appears to be no way, in principle, to identify anything as an immaterial substance.”179
The only way we are able to identify who people are is by physical and psychological

176 Bernard E. Rollin notes the importance of telos as a basic metaphysical category for
understanding living things. See his Bernard E. Rollin, “Telos, Value, and Genetic Engineering,” in Is
Human Nature Obsolete? Genetics, Bioengineering, and the Future of the Human Condition, ed. by Harold
W. Baillie and Timothy K. Casey (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005), 318.
177

Feser, Aquinas, 172.

178 “The mistake of Cartesian dualists and materialists alike, according to the hylomorphist, is to
think of all causation as efficient causation.” Feser, Philosophy of Mind, 223.
179

Ibid., 216—217.
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characteristics, but because the mind of a person is so radically divorced from their body,
we can (in no principled way) ever know with whom we are interacting.180
Ensoulment, as defended in this chapter following Aristotle and Aquinas, holds
that material substances are “inherently purposive composites” of form and matter.181
There is no real separation between them and, as such, there cannot be any purely
mechanistic and efficient causes (in the physical realm at least). Both physicalism and
substance dualism abandon the composite understanding of material substances and in
doing so introduce a number of conundrums that serve as the hallmarks of modern
philosophy: the mind / body problem; the problem of personal identity; the interaction
problem; etc. Ensoulment may seem an unhappy half-way house between physicalism
and substance dualism, but it does have the distinct advantage of not succumbing to these
modern paradoxes.
So, how then would ensoulment account for answering these classical puzzles?
The answer is by exposing the assumption in each and realize that ensoulment operates
on an understanding of a “holistic cause.” Physicalists (particularly those that are
functionalists) say that human persons are nothing but a collection of biological parts

180 “The upshot of both Cartesian and reductionist theories of personal identity seems to be the
complete disappearance of persons as such, and for similar reasons: in the case of Cartesian dualism, there
appears to be no way, in principle, to identify anything as an immaterial substance, and thus (in this view)
as a person, since no appeal to the only plausible criteria for making such an identification – bodily and
psychological characteristics – can suffice; in the case of reductionist theories, such characteristics are all
that really exist in the first place, so that talk about the persons who have the characteristics comes to seem
otiose or even empty. The reason for this consequence, some would suggest, is identical to the reason why
there is an interaction problem: the mechanistic conception of the human body that Cartesian dualism
shares with materialism.” Ibid.
181 “Materialism and Cartesian dualism alike eliminate formal and final causes from the
explanation of material things, replacing the classical hylomorphic conception of material substances as
inherently purposive composites of matter and form with a conception of them as collections of particles or
the like devoid of either intrinsic purpose or objective, irreducible form, and explicable entirely in terms of
efficient causation.” Ibid., 221.
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arranged in such a way that they have some “functional organization” – if the parts are in
the proper order, then they function in a proper way. For the proponent of ensoulment,
human persons are “irreducible to their component parts.”182 The soul unifies the body,
gives it direction, and gives it life.183
Even though the soul is the unifying factor of the body and the source of life, it is
affected by the body since the soul is part of a composite substance. For humans, this
means that damage to the body affects the soul in some way – especially damage to the
brain which has a special relationship with the soul.184 Nichols prefers to think of the soul

182 Feser, Aquinas, 172—173 (emphasis in original). Feser summarizes this position well. He says,
“The whole is also ordered to a certain natural end or final cause, and the various parts are themselves
ordered to various ends that are subordinate to this overarching final cause. Accordingly, the parts are
related by final causality as much as by efficient causality; and the unity between the parts is therefore
organic and necessary, not ‘mechanical’ and contingent” (Ibid., emphasis in original). It is for this reason
that Feser (among other Aristo-Thomistic minded thinkers) doubt the possibility of a true artificial
intelligence. As Feser puts it, “for the Aristotelian, a machine could not possibly count as a living thing,
precisely because it is an artificial construct whose parts are naturally ordered to various other ends, rather
than to the flourishing of the system into which they have been configured for human (and thus external)
purposes” (Ibid., 173, emphasis in original). A machine may give the similitude of life, but it cannot
actually be alive – there is no holistic unity as the parts are ordered to external rather than internal ends.
Terrence Nichols agrees with Feser’s assessment, “the soul is the ultimate organizing principle of the body.
It is not a separate, independent substance, as Descartes thought. Rather, it is an active, internal principle
that acts to keep the whole functioning as an integrated unit. We could think of it as a field of active
information, which informs the whole, keeping it in order.” Nichols, The Sacred Cosmos, 167.
183 Ric Machuga makes the point that the mechanistic view of nature found in physicalism and
substance dualism is often contradicted by our observations of nature. We may pride ourselves on
discovering the mathematical formulas that dictate how clouds form the shapes that they do, and it may be
possible (someday) to accurately predict the shape they take (pending the relevant conditions), but it will
still be the case that the causes involved in shaping the clouds are of a different sort than those of a finely
tuned time-piece. They operate on different principles of motion. A cloud must take a shape, but must it
look like a bunny? A properly functioning clock on the other hand, must keep a specific time. The problem
for mechanistic minded thinkers is that they take nature – all of nature – to be like a clock. The point is,
says Machuga, that “clouds are not clocks, and our universe contains many more cloud-like events than
clock-like events. Therefore, the fear that modern science might one day prove that humans are really
nothing more than complex machines is unfounded. Even if we limit our discussion to events whose causes
are wholly physical, there will always be a crucial distinction between mechanistic and nonmechanistic
causes, or what Aristotle and Aquinas called per se efficient causes and per accidens efficient causes.”
Machuga, In Defense of the Soul, 144. A cloud only accidentally looks like a bunny, even though it must
take some form necessarily to be a cloud.
184 “As an information field, the soul is embodied, and is therefore affected by any damage to the
body, especially to the brain.” Nichols, The Sacred Cosmos, 167.
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as both a “holistic cause” and a “field of active information.” This means that the soul is
able to direct the parts of the body to their natural end and affects the whole person. But
because he thinks of humans in these terms, it follows that humans have a sort of dual
causality – physical and formal. “The parts affect the whole, but the whole also affects
the parts.”185 This is a two-way street, not a one-way alley – the soul affects the body and
the body affects the soul (in different ways). As such, there is no conflict with the notion
of ensoulment and current studies in neuroscience or biology, for ensoulment affirms that
affecting the body or brain affects the mind / soul.186 What ensoulment holds in
distinction to physicalist studies in neuroscience and biology is that the mind / soul also
affects the body – a supposition often denied. How is this done? Nichols suggests that the
soul may affect the physical body at the quantum level. He takes it, that because states of
electrons and subatomic particles exhibit an element of indeterminacy, that this could be
a way for the immaterial soul to affect the physical body. As he puts it, an “input of
information could cause a change in the state of a quantum system, and so, possibly, in
the state of a neuron network.”187 But this could not just happen once, it would have to
happen many times to be a viable account. In other words, for this to work any changes at
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Ibid., 174.

186 “If the human soul is a holistic cause, whose effect as a field of active information is to order
and direct the whole person, this would be a complementary cause to the part-whole causality that is
investigated by the sciences. In the human person, then, there would be dual causality. The parts affect the
whole, but the whole also affects the parts. The hypothesis of a holistic cause need not conflict with any of
the work being done in contemporary neuroscience, which is principally focused on the influence of the
parts on the whole.” Ibid.
187 Ibid., 168. I tend to shy away from this type of speculation, for it seems to collapse the
discussion back into the issue of nature just being mechanically ordered. It seems to revert to the idea that
matter can exist apart from some form – which of course the ensoulment approach denies.
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the quantum level would have to be holistic, not particular.188 But this is just to say that
the soul affects the whole person.
3.4.1 Advantages of the Ensoulment Perspective of Human Persons
The primary advantage of ensoulment over physicalism and substance dualism is
the fact that ensoulment does not limit reality to only efficient and material causes. 189
Regarding the human person, this is significant. First, it values the body and the soul of
the individual – it does not privilege one to the neglect of the other. This is important for
ethical considerations. If a body has the principle of life, then a soul is present (even if it
is not functioning at peak capacity), and it follows that a living being is present and
should be treated with respect. This has obvious importance for issues related to
beginning and end of life ethical questions, such as abortion and euthanasia. Second, it
recognizes the close relationship between the body and soul. It recognizes that to harm
the soul or the body is to harm the person. Any view that says it is acceptable to torture
the body because the soul is not affected is despicable. Any view that says the body is all
there is and ignores the soul is mistaken.190 Third, an ensoulment view of reality leads to

188 Nichols notes four areas that science generally suggests that “holistic” causes exist: 1)
“entangled” particles operate as though they are connected to the same information field; 2) the Pauli
exclusion principle, which holds that no two electrons can share the same four quantum numbers in an
atom, indicates some holistic organizing principle for atoms – electrons, after all, do not “decide” which
spin they should adopt, or which atomic shell they should occupy; 3) “directed mutations” in biological
systems suggest that under certain conditions, organisms can affect which mutations take place – but this
seems impossible if all mutations are random. The fact this happens is taken as evidence that there is some
overarching (i.e., holistic) principle guiding the organism; and 4) holism appears in the brain sciences as
well, as discussed above. Ibid., 168—172.
189

Feser, Philosophy of Mind, 223.

190 There is a particularly pernicious viewpoint among the religiously minded that is of special
concern. Some religious believers value the soul so much, that they neglect the body – whether their own or
someone else’s (i.e., “What matters is salvation of the soul, not bread for today.”). The other, equally
incorrect view, is that the body is all that needs to be tended to and not the soul (i.e., “Here is some bread,
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the position that there are objective moral values. This follows from the fact that objects
have natures (forms and final ends). To act contrary to the form and / or its final end is to
bring objective harm to the object. However, to enhance its form or help it towards its
final end is to do objective good. For example, animals need food. As such, to give them
food is to do them good, but to deny them food is to do them harm. Determining what is
or is not objectively good or evil is not always easy, but it is possible. Thus, it follows
that any view (like physicalism) that does not hold that objective right and wrong exists
(to some degree) is ignoring a significant part of reality.
Ensoulment recognizes the richness of reality and is willing and able to express
that reality in its fullness.191 Both physicalism and substance dualism remove formal and
final causes from consideration in material things. These views replace the unity of things
with the conviction that all material things are nothing more than a collection of their
respective parts. These material objects, reduced to no more than their parts, are said to
be completely explainable in terms of efficient causality. As shown above, this is hardly
the case.192 To clarify, below are listed some specific advantages of ensoulment over
physicalism and substance dualism.

now go your own way.”). I think the Christian approach should account for both the body and the soul (i.e.,
“Here is some physical bread, now let me tell you about the ‘bread of life.’”).
191 Harold W. Baillie comments that ensoulment (in the Aristo-Thomistic tradition) can offer a
promising argument against certain genetic enhancements for two reasons: 1) ensoulment “avoids the
Scylla of the abstract comfort of freedom in the face of the material rootedness of the discussion of genetic
enhancement,” and 2) it avoids the “Charybdis of a materialism that issues in a genetic determinism that
undercuts the very idea that there is a moral dilemma in this discussion.” Harold W. Baillie, “Aristotle and
Genetic Engineering: The Uncertainty of Excellence,” in Is Human Nature Obsolete? Genetics,
Bioengineering, and the Future of the Human Condition, ed. by Harold W. Baillie and Timothy K. Casey
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005), 215. That is, ensoulment both sets limits against an unmitigated
desire to wholesale change human nature, and it recognizes the moral reality that genetic modification
conditions.
192

Feser, Philosophy of Mind, 221.
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3.4.2 Advantages of Ensoulment Over Physicalism
The obvious advantage ensoulment has over physicalism is that it is able to
account for our lived experiences of our conscious self-reflection.193 It can account for
qualia, consciousness, rationality, thought, and intentionality. It can also account for how
the mind affects the body and how the body affects the mind. Ensoulment resists the
temptation to strip teleological explanations away from reality. Rather, it embraces
teleology along with its other causes. One regrettable result of physicalism is that its view
of reality is voluntarily shallow.194 By limiting all inquiry to areas that only explore
efficient and material causes, materialistically minded philosophers and scientists miss
out on the richness of reality.195
Physicalism (understood as philosophical naturalism) further cannot adequately
explain religious experience. Whereas ensoulment allows for – and can endorse – such a
position. The argument runs as follows: if physicalism is true, then religious experiences
are simply natural phenomena; but religious experiences are more than natural
phenomena; therefore, physicalism must be false. Now, this argument does not depend on
the notion that the vast majority of humans alive today are religious. Rather, the argument
moves along the lines of any religious experience(s). And it is here where the data is

193 Terrence Nichols wryly remarks that the implications to reductionist physicalism are so
repulsive that many adherents “would probably want to disclaim” it. Nichols, The Sacred Cosmos, 150.
194 Jeffrey P. Bishop connects physicalism to technological mastery explicitly and notes that this
“shift in emphasis to efficient causation changes the relationship among other causes, such that the telos or
final cause no longer enters into scientific description, but becomes a political ideal.” Jeffry P. Bishop,
“Transhumanism, Metaphysics, and the Posthuman God,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 35 (2010):
707—708. Transhumanists tend to eschew formal and final causes in favor of efficient and material ones.
Thus, the most efficient way implement technological systems into society is by political means.
195 By relegating formal and final causes as a myth of a bygone era, these thinkers deny
themselves true wisdom. The real tragedy is that in their quest for an ever increasing knowledge of physical
reality, they propagate a view that is inherently and intentionally impoverished.
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interesting. People claim to have true religious experiences – personal, transcendent
experiences. The difficulty for the physicalist is that they must show how each individual
instance of a religious experience is explicable in naturalistic terms. General
pronouncements about delusion, hallucination, drugs, etc. are insufficient to dismiss all
instances of religious experience. Many experiences simply defy explanation in
naturalistic language – as many people really believe they have a personal relationship
with God.196
Another issue with various forms of physicalism is its inability to account for
free-will. As stated previously, under physicalism, all beliefs, thoughts, and actions are
materially caused. They are not (and cannot be) caused by previous beliefs or thoughts.
Simply declaring that freedom is a useful heuristic because the physical causes are so
complex – ala E. O. Wilson – does not solve the problem. For, even if it seems I am free,
then under the dictates of physicalism I am not, and can never be, really free. The key
issue here is that we are free not just because there are no external constraints, but that we
are also free from internal constraints.197 If our thoughts and beliefs are simply the result
of neurochemical reactions, then our beliefs are never our own. They necessarily come
about by the demands of chemistry and physics. However, freedom “has an element of
intentionality about it.”198 Electrons and chemicals operate according to fixed laws, and it

196 Ibid., 157. Nichols notes that this experience of God’s presence is not limited to mystics, but
also many sincere lay persons. Further, these experiences span multiple religions, in multiple countries,
over multiple ages. Religious experience is a persistent occurrence in human lives. William James makes a
similar observation in his The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (New York:
Touchstone, 1997). Neuroscientist Mario Beauregard has developed a similar argument. See Beauregard
and O’Leary, The Spiritual Brain.
197
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is this rigidity to their reactions that allow us to have scientific advances. Yet, no matter
how complicated these interactions are, no matter how unpredictable the outcomes may
be, it would be absurd to say that electrons and chemicals were “free.” Humans, on the
other hand, can choose to behave in certain ways undetermined by prior influences. As
Nichols summarizes it, “Material systems, even chaotic systems or highly complex
systems (like computers) might exhibit randomness (and therefore unpredictability), but
they do not exhibit freedom.”199
3.4.3 Advantages of Ensoulment Over Substance Dualism
Ensoulment has the distinct advantage of not neglecting the bodily processes in
favor of the non-physical mind. Both are needed. Brian Davies rightly reminds us that it
“is not my soul which understands and wills. I do.”200 Descartes made the mistake of
identifying people with only their souls to the neglect of the body. By making the body a
mere biochemical machine he set the stage for the rejection of supernaturalism in the
modern era. It is ironic that Descartes, a deeply spiritual man, developed a philosophy
that was used to block discourse of the spiritual. The Cartesian reduction of matter to
mechanical laws paved the way for the rejection of teleology in the sciences and
ultimately to the philosophical rejection of all non-physical realities (i.e., the mind / soul,
angels, and God).201
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201 Feser, Philosophy of Mind, 216-217. Commenting on Descartes mechanistic philosophy and its
implications, Timothy K. Casey states, the “ideal of a clockwork universe implied [by Descartes], among
other things, the denial of any natural teleology as anthropomorphic; the positing of unobservable entities
such as corpuscles or atoms as real and the demotion of perceptual qualities to, at best, useful illusions
generously provided by nature to aid in our survival; and in general an idea of the natural as dead,
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A second advantage of ensoulment over substance dualism is in being able to
identify persons via their body. Remember, under the dictates of ensoulment there is only
one substantial soul to a body, and any body that soul inhabits will take on the shape as
determined by that form. As such, for the proponent of ensoulment, souls cannot inhabit
other bodies and that body remain the same. The eminent philosopher, Alvin Plantinga
(who readily acknowledges his indebtedness to platonic metaphysics), very famously
stated that Socrates could have inhabited an alligator’s body.202 He can hold this position
because he identifies the person as being coextensive with just their soul. As such,
Socrates could inhabit not just an alligator’s body, but any body whatsoever.203 The
proponent of ensoulment denies this possibility, for part of what makes a person be who
they are is determined in large part to the experiences of a specific body. That body
provides the mind / soul with content from the world and the mind / soul provide form
and structure to the body. One cannot be wholly separated from the other without great
violence being done to the person. Hence, while the soul may exist without a body, any
matter that it informs would take on the shape as determined by the soul. The ensoulment

mechanical stuff emptied of any religious, aesthetic, or moral qualities. The mind (and with it all the
meanings and values not amenable to quantification) was simply locked up in a small part of the brain,
surrounded, if not yet engulfed, by an alien and alienating universe that could not but weaken previous
convictions concerning the reality of freedom and by implication moral choice.” Timothy K. Casey,
“Nature, Technology, and the Emergence of Cybernetic Humanity,” in Is Human Nature Obsolete?
Genetics, Bioengineering, and the Future of the Human Condition, ed. by Harold W. Baillie and Timothy
K. Casey (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005), 42.
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203 Plantinga makes it clear that this is the case only if Socrates is essentially immaterial. For if
Socrates is essentially immaterial, then Socrates can inhabit any body as neither Socrates nor the body
would be really affected by Socrates inhabiting the body. Ibid., 69. This notion is called haecceities and can
be understood as “a thing’s individual essence . . . it is a property such that . . . [x] has it in the actual world
and in every world in which he exists and nothing different from . . . [x] has it in any possible world. It is a
property essential and necessarily unique to [x].” Michael J. Loux, Metaphysics: A Contemporary
Introduction, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2002), 210.
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position thus states, that if we can identify the person via a body, then this is good prima
facie evidence that we are dealing with that person’s soul as well – given the unity of soul
and body. Under substance dualism, the confidence in this connection is severely
undermined.
3.4.4 A Key Objection to Ensoulment: When Was the First Human Soul?
The strength of this objection is that it essentially asks how one can one avoid
arbitrarily saying that today’s humans have immortal souls, but past human ancestors
along the evolutionary tree of life do not? Stated differently: when did humans first have
souls? Famed Oxford biologist, Richard Dawkins, criticizes John Paul II’s anthropology
along these lines.204 Modern theologians (at least those who adopt some form of
evolutionary theory) often believe that modern homo sapiens have immortal souls, but
earlier proto-humans like homo erectus did not. It thus seems theologians have a
dilemma: either, modern humans – and all of humanity’s ancestors – have immortal
souls, or if proto-humans did not have immortal souls, then neither do modern humans.
Some theologians (like Nancy Murphy) adopt the second horn of the dilemma and simply
deny that any human (or proto-human) has ever had a soul. These theologians say that the
notion of “souls” is all wrong and needs to be abandoned. I am unaware of any
theologians that take the first horn of the dilemma seriously. Rather, it seems most

204 In describing (or more accurately, mocking) John Paul II’s comments on evolution delivered to
the Pontifical Academy of Sciences in October 1996, Dawkins comments, “[according to the Pope] there
came a moment in the evolution of hominids when God intervened and injected a human soul into a
previously animal lineage. (When? A million years ago? Two million years ago? Between Homo erectus
and Homo sapiens? Between “archaic” Homo sapiens and H. sapiens sapiens?) The sudden injection is
necessary, of course, otherwise there would be no distinction upon which to base Catholic morality, which
is speciesist to the core,” Richard Dawkins, “Obscurantism to the Rescue” The Quarterly Review of Biology
72, no. 4 (1997): 398.
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theologians (or at least those that askew a special creation of Adam) must assign an
arbitrary time to the creation of the human soul. If a theologian wants to hold that humans
develop along evolutionary lines, and want to hold the position that early hominids did
not have souls but later hominids did, then this is the only option available.
The most common way to respond to this difficulty and still retain a notion of a
soul is to say that the human body developed via evolutionary means, but that God
implanted a unique soul in “Adam” at some point in the past.205 This solution has the
benefits of retaining the notion of a soul and maintaining the semblance of a creation
account. This belief often entails the conviction that God creates a unique soul at (or
shortly after) each human conception, for the pattern has been established that the only
way to have a soul is for God to create one.206
The most severe limitation of this account from an ensoulment perspective is that
this view of soul has more in common with substance dualism than the version of the soul
205 This seems to be approach taken by John Paul II. He says, “With man, we find ourselves facing
a different ontological order—an ontological leap, we could say. But in posing such a great ontological
discontinuity, are we not breaking up the physical continuity which seems to be the main line of research
about evolution in the fields of physics and chemistry? An appreciation for the different methods used in
different fields of scholarship allows us to bring together two points of view which at first might seem
irreconcilable. The sciences of observation describe and measure, with ever greater precision, the many
manifestations of life, and write them down along the time-line. The moment of passage into the spiritual
realm is not something that can be observed in this way—although we can nevertheless discern, through
experimental research, a series of very valuable signs of what is specifically human life. But the experience
of metaphysical knowledge, of self-consciousness and self-awareness, of moral conscience, of liberty, or of
aesthetic and religious experience—these must be analyzed through philosophical reflection, while
theology seeks to clarify the ultimate meaning of the Creator's designs,” John Paul II, “Message to the
Pontifical Academy of Sciences: On Evolution,”
https://www.ewtn.com/library/PAPALDOC/JP961022.HTM (accessed January 30, 2016, emphasis mine).
This “ontological leap” seems like John Paul II is saying God implanted a soul in an ancestor making them
essentially “Adam.”
206 See for example Aquinas, “Therefore, everything else acts by producing a change, whereas
God alone acts by creation. Since, therefore, the rational soul cannot be produced by a change in matter, it
cannot be produced, save immediately by God” (ST 1a90.3). The Catholic Catechism affirms the same,
“The soul . . . can have its origin only in God” (33). Likewise, it says, “The Church teaches that every
spiritual soul is created immediately by God” (366). Also, “The doctrine of the faith affirms that the
spiritual and immortal soul is created immediately by God” (382).
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expounded in this chapter. Thus, it appears ensoulment faces a significant dilemma: on
one hand, it cannot allow for God to create a new soul for each conceptus as this appears
to sever the connection of the form and matter unity ensoulment demands;207 on the other
hand it does not seem consistent for ensoulment to affirm that God implanted a soul in
some proto-human in the past as this would mean that proto-humans had capabilities
supplied by souls even though they did not have a soul.208 Ensoulment cannot affirm the
second horn of the dilemma and hold that God never implanted a form in some protohuman, which in effect just denies that modern humans have souls. This position cannot
be taken since, after all, this view is called en-soul-ment. But ensoulment does not seem
able to affirm the first horn of the dilemma either since that would be inconsistent with
the principles set forth by the position. Is there then a plausible alternative?
Terrence Nichols offers an intriguing account of how the proponent of
ensoulment can maintain both beliefs that modern humans have souls and modern
humans are derived biologically from proto-humans that also have souls. The distinction
that Nichols draws on, in good Aristotelian fashion, is not to deny that proto-humans
have souls. Indeed, per Aristo-Thomistic metaphysical principles all material reality must
have some form (i.e., soul) to be actualized. Thus, homo erectus had a soul, though the
powers of that soul may have been closer to modern animals that modern humans.
Likewise, the offspring of proto-humans are also ensouled, and this chain of ensoulment
continues to this day. The difference between modern humans and proto-humans then

207 In other words, if God implants a soul, then this means there is a body present before the soul /
form is present, thus invalidating the conviction that no physical bodies can exist without some form being
present.
208 This would, likewise, imply that there was some physical being (indeed a biological being!)
that did not have a soul / form.
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might seem then to be just physical differences – but while the body expresses the soul’s
holistic information on the body, this is not the key distinction.
Remember, for Aristotle, the soul is so united to the body and that upon the
body’s death, the soul dies too. Aquinas modified this to say that the soul, being
subsistent, could survive the body, but would be incomplete. Nichols’ suggestion is that
ensoulment accounts for both of these convictions. And the key difference that
determines if a soul is immortal or not is whether it has a personal relationship with God.
Under this conception, the soul develops naturally (there is no special implantation of a
soul), but at some point in the past, God decided to develop a special relationship with a
proto-human – thus making them the “first” human. God initiates a relationship with
every soul since then, and it is this (potential) relationship that makes the soul immortal.
As Nichols puts it, “My hypothesis is that the human soul is not naturally transcendent or
immortal. It becomes transcendent and immortal through a divinely initiated gift of a
personal relationship with God.”209 Evolution does not naturally lead to transcendence –
even if it increases complexity of an organism. This is because transcendence and
immortality lie outside of the “natural” realm. For the soul to be transcendent, it is God
who must make it so.
Thus, at some point in the distant past, God developed a relationship with a protohuman making them the “first” human person – the first “Adam” if you will. Just as grace
perfects nature, so too does the relationship with God elevate the natural soul to a
transcendent and immortal soul.210 Nichols favors Cro-Magnon man as about the time
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when God initiates this relationship, for it is at that time that burial practices seem to
begin – and along with it an apparent belief in an afterlife.211
Therefore, Nichols’ account offers an intriguing answer to the objection of
“when” the soul of modern humans began. His answer is that the question is ambiguous
on what we mean by “begin.” If you mean “begin” in the sense that proto-humans did not
have souls, then he answers this is the wrong view of souls – proto-humans had souls as
evidenced by their various capacities. For we can imagine a proto-human with the ability
to use a rudimentary language and comparatively significant intellectual ability, but still
not have a transcendent soul.212 If you mean “begin” in the sense that the soul had a
proper relationship to God, then this is the correct approach even if we cannot identify the
exact date of when this relationship began. In general, ensoulment in the relevant sense
began when God first nurtured a relationship with humans, elevating their concerns to the
transcendent and immortal. Thus, it appears the soul “began” about the time humans
became concerned with burial practices. This approach maintains a general evolutionary
view of humanity, but also explains why modern humans have a unique role in creation –
God develops relationships with these beings, thus elevating their souls to the divine.
Stated differently, to the beings that God develops this relationship of elevating the soul,
we can say that these beings exhibit the imago Dei.
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Chapter 4
Moral Alternatives: “Personhood Only” and “Human Nature Only”
If we say that certain capacities that we believe (perhaps wrongly) are peculiar to
human nature are important for our well-being, all the normative work is being
done by the idea that they are important for well-being, not by the claim that they
are part of our nature.
— Allen Buchanan, Beyond Humanity?, 138
Aristotle, together with his immediate predecessors Socrates and Plato, initiated a
dialogue about the nature of human nature that continued in the Western
philosophical tradition right up to the early modern period, when liberal
democracy was born. While there were significant disputes over what human
nature was, no one contested its importance as a basis for rights and justice.
— Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future, 13
4.1 Introduction
The Judeo-Christian tradition believes that human lives are sacred. However, as
the notion that humans are nothing but biological machines has become the dominant
position, the sacredness of human life has slowly evaporated. It is now believed by a
large swath of society (scientists, philosophers, etc.) that there is nothing sacred, special,
or unique about any living creature – much less human beings.1 As Francis Fukuyama
has pointed out, modern society has severed the connection between human beings and
“human rights.”2 That is, conventional wisdom is currently that “rights” are established
independently of “being.” Historically, there was widespread agreement that knowing
human nature was important as a basis for knowing rights and justice. Fukuyama
reiterates, however, that this historic approach is dying. Indeed, “the concept [of human
1 Ben C. Mitchell, Edmund D. Pelligrino, Jean Bethke Elshtain, John Kilner, and Scott B. Rae,
Biotechnology and the Human Good (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2007), 41.
2 “The connection between human rights and human nature is not clear-cut, however, and has been
vigorously denied by many modern philosophers who assert that human nature does not exist, and that even
if it did, rules of right and wrong have nothing whatever to do with it.” Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman
Future: Consequences of the Biotechnological Revolution (New York: Picador, 2002), 101.
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nature] has been out of favor for the past century or two among academic philosophers
and intellectuals.”3
What a human is is not easily defined, as the previous two chapters have
demonstrated. Often “humanity” is considered to be a “cluster concept” composed of “a
set of necessary and sufficient conditions.”4 For example, humans can be considered
under physical traits such as bipedalism or having opposable thumbs, etc. Likewise, they
can exhibit psychological traits like the ability to use language, higher reasoning skills,
exhibit a high level of sociability, etc. Or, one could consider phylogenetic traits like
being of the biological species homo sapien. Any number of other traits could be added to
this list, and it is not even agreed upon that having these traits make one a human being,
some beings may have these traits and not be human and others may be human and lack
these traits.5 How then can a notion of “human nature” be of any use in our contemporary
setting?
This challenge is heightened for the theologian who must provide a holistic
account according to multiple disciplines reporting on what it means to be human. For
example, the theologian must assess the philosophical, theological, anthropological,
scientific, as well as any other discipline that says something about human beings. This
holistic approach endeavors to avoid reducing human beings to simple technological
individuals as well as avoid constructing an individualistic morality without taking into
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account the social nature of human beings.6 Humans are certainly individuals, but we are
not solely individuals – we live in a particular historical and social context. How we view
ourselves is by necessity somewhat individualistic and self-interpretative, but it is no less
contextualized by society.7 Thus, the challenge is to neither deny our individual
autonomy, nor excise it from its historical and social context. We are individuals, but
individuals within a society. We are encultured creatures. By extension, our technology is
to be neither worshiped nor feared. Those who shy away from embracing enhancement
technology sometimes do so because of the assumption that if something is “natural” then
it is “good,” and to alter what is “natural,” would then be interpreted as doing something
“bad.”8 This viewpoint, while retaining a valid insight, is ultimately too limited be of any
real use. Sometimes, it may be good to alter our nature, just as it may sometimes be good
to leave our nature as it is.
Allen Buchanan takes it that critics of transhumanism have two overarching
concerns enhancement entails for human nature. First, that enhancement may alter or
destroy human nature itself – and given transhumanism’s tendency to foresee a
“posthuman” future, this concern is not unjustified. Second, that the alteration or
destruction of human nature will impede our ability to know what is “good” since this is

6 Stephen Garner, “Christian Theology and Transhumanism: The ‘Created Co-creator’ and
Bioethical Principles,” in Religion and Transhumanism: The Unknown Future of Human Enhancement, ed.
by Calvin Mercer and Tracy J. Trothen (Denver, CO: Praeger, 2015), 235.
7 John Behr, “The Promise of the Image,” in Imago Dei: Human Dignity in Ecumenical
Perspective (Washington, DC: The Catholic University Press of America, 2013), 23.
8 Allen Buchanan, Beyond Humanity?: The Ethics of Biomedical Enhancement (Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press, 2011), 143.
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determined by our nature.9 Both concerns have a key assumption that Buchanan
challenges. To the first, it is the assumption that altering human nature is inherently
wrong. To the second, it is that it is impossible to judge what is “good” apart from human
nature.10
Buchanan challenges the critic of enhancement directly, and states that there is
nothing inherently wrong with changing human nature. First, humans are a mixture of
good and bad, so why not increase the good and remove the bad? Second, even if humans
were eventually eliminated, perhaps a posthuman future actually is just objectively better
than one with just mere humans. Thirdly, he argues that the alteration of human nature
does not affect our judgment of what is “good.” Finally, he thinks that discussions about
“human nature” obscure, rather than clarify, the key issues.11
In what follows we will examine two broad approaches to establishing human
dignity in light of technological enhancements. The first section will look at the claim
that the only morally relevant criteria for the debate is by examining “personhood.” This
position is exemplified by Allen Buchanan, and this section will expound his argument.
The second section argues that the relevant moral issues are primarily found in “human
nature” and this banner is taken up by Francis Fukuyama. The last section will briefly
evaluate both positions, but ultimately determine that despite their insights, neither are
ultimately sufficient for establishing a proper moral system to engage enhancement
technology.
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4.2 Common Claim: “Personhood” is the Only Relevant Moral Factor
This section will focus primarily on the arguments put forth by Allen Buchanan,
as he has developed a powerful position prioritizing personhood over human nature.
Buchanan wants to ground any discussion about humanity in the scientific evidence. That
is, any discussion of humanity must start with a proper view of biology and Darwinian
evolution.12 He says, no valid (much less compelling) account of humanity can afford to
mishandle this essential point. There must be an insistence on using the proper scientific
evidence. Because of this approach and given our knowledge of how species come to be
and pass away, “human nature” will need to adapt to changing environments by
relinquishing or gaining new characteristics.13 The notion of a “fixed” essence, thus, must
be dispensed. Darwinian evolution simply does not allow for any type of a stable essence.
Thus, quite literally, posthumanism cannot be inherently bad as all creatures are “post”
some previous creatures.14 Modern homo sapiens are in a sense, post-homo habilis. The
term “homo-sapien” allows for a broad range of characteristics, but if this is the case,
then the emergence of the posthuman simply cannot be dismissed as inherently wrong. 15
Human nature is a mixture of both good and bad traits – we have powerful brains
for great comprehension, but we are fairly fragile creatures. Given that these sorts of
good and bad traits could be multiplied, Buchanan asks the obvious question: what is so
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wrong with removing the bad traits?16 Likewise, what would be wrong in enhancing the
good traits? These two questions highlight the problem for critics of the transhumanist
project, there seems to be nothing wrong – indeed, it seems to be morally required – to
remove humanity’s bad traits and enhance their good traits. Hence, Buchanan takes it that
appealing to some “biological essentialism” or “innate human dignity” as reasons not to
pursue this agenda is inadequate. Indeed, by accepting even common medical
interventions we already admit to some level of alteration to our biological selves.
Likewise, given the acceptance of Darwinian evolution, there appears to be no such thing
as “innate dignity.”17 And even in light of Darwinian evolution, Buchanan is not at all
convinced that the emergence of a posthuman future would necessarily dispense with
“human rights.” For indeed, Buchanan notes that depending on what features or
capacities ground “human rights” now, may also be applied to posthumans tomorrow.
And if his argument proves to be successful, then both humans and posthumans would
accrue some sort of rights on that common basis.18
4.2.1 Human Rights and Personhood – Allen Buchanan
For Buchanan, “human rights” are a “threshold” concept – once the conditions are
met, all rights are attributable to that being. And if rights are accorded by the capacity of
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17 As Brent Waters states, this “appeals to biological essentialism and innate human dignity are
ineffectual objections to the self-transformation imperative driving posthuman discourse, because in the
former instance no substantive claims can be made once the efficacy of medical intervention per se is
admitted, and in the latter case the central claim loses any substantive content, given evolutionary change.”
Brent Waters, This Mortal Flesh: Incarnation and Bioethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2009), 127.
18 Buchanan puts it this way, “the emergence of posthumans, even if this were accompanied by the
extinction of human beings, would not entail that the concept of human rights would no longer be
applicable. The concept of human rights would still be applicable if posthumans had the capabilities or
interests that ground (what we now call) human rights.” Buchanan, Beyond Humanity?, 214 (emphasis in
original).
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a being, then the level of that capacity should not affect that being’s moral status. For
example, a normal functioning human adult is accorded certain moral worth due to some
capacity met by that person – i.e., ability to reason, ability to feel pain or empathy, etc.
Whatever the criteria is, if the person fulfills said criteria, then they are of moral worth.
Likewise, this moral worth is not affected even if the person is not able to fully use their
capacities. A severely brain damaged individual may still have moral worth even though
their capacity for reasoning is greatly diminished – but the capacity is still there, and that
is Buchanan’s point.19 If a person has a capacity for some relevant criteria, then their
respective ability to utilize that capacity matters not.
Now, in regards to the enhancement debate, the concern is often put that the
enhanced will have a greater moral status than the unenhanced. This discrepancy will
result in comparative injustice between the enhanced and the mundane. The enhanced
will enjoy greater freedoms and privileges not available to the unenhanced. Thus, the
unenhanced will be perceived as less morally worthy than their enhanced counterparts.
That is, the worry is that the unenhanced will have a lower moral status than the
enhanced.
Buchanan is not ignorant of this concern. Indeed, he thinks the notion of “human
rights” plays a significant role in light of this possibility. For Buchanan, “human rights”
(or “person’s rights”) are best understood as a threshold concept, and our current
understanding of “human rights” is based on the types of beings we are now – not what
we were nor what we may become.20 But as a threshold concept, no matter how enhanced
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some person is – even to the point of a full-blown posthuman – you cannot violate the
rights of another person. In this way, Buchanan believes that he can alleviate the concern
of the enhancement critic. The critic is concerned that the unenhanced will be
undervalued, but Buchanan states that the enhanced will have a moral obligation not to
violate the rights of the unenhanced. Problem solved. Right? Not quite. Even Buchanan
acknowledges that it will not always be possible to protect the rights of those that are not
as privileged.21 Indeed, even in today’s world we already have a discrepancy between the
enhanced and the unenhanced. We understand this difference as that between the benefits
enjoyed by the first-world (technologically advanced and largely economically free) and
those missing in the third-world (technologically stunted and largely in economic
bondage). So, the question that arises, is how would the introduction of truly enhanced
persons be any worse than the situation we have now? For even today, the notion of
“human rights” plays an important role in the civilized world for the allocation of
resources and as a language of speaking about economic (in)justice. As Buchanan notes,
this language of “rights” conveys moral entitlements that grounds the duties of others.22
What today’s society fails at being able to accomplish in light of the relevant moral
demands, an emotionally and morally enhanced being would be in better condition to
meet those demands for the good of the unenhanced.
After consideration, Buchanan comes to three conclusions: first, enhancement
technologies can, and should, be pursued even if such enhancements altar “human
nature.” The upside to enhancement technology may simply be too beneficial to preserve
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some outdated and incorrect concept what it means to be “human.” Second, even when
expressing concerns about enhancement technology, one does not need to resort to terms
about “human nature” to make their point. Instead, Buchanan finds concerns about
enhancement technologies apart from “human nature” more compelling and appealing.
Finally, we can make sufficient judgments about what is “good” without appealing to
“human nature.” As such, even if “human nature” were to change, we should still be able
to discuss what is or is not “good.”23 Moral order, therefore, should not be impossible just
because we change what it means to be human.
4.2.2 Moral Status and the Moral Equality Assumption
One of the key concerns in the enhancement debate is whether the introduction of
enhanced beings means that a segment of society (i.e., the enhanced) would have a
“higher” Moral Status than the unenhanced.24 What seems to be the worry is that the
assumption that whatever it is that makes one a “person” and thus making all of them
“morally worthy” is demeaned if someone should appear on the scene who is thought to
be more “morally worthy.” Buchanan calls this the “Moral Equality Assumption.” Which
is “the assumption that all who have the characteristics that are sufficient for being a
person have the same moral status.”25 As such, if person P has certain traits associated
with retaining moral value, and person P2 has those same traits, then both P and P2 are
said to have the same Moral Status as they share the same moral value.
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Buchanan argues that since Moral Standing is a threshold concept, once you have
met the appropriate “conditions” one’s Moral Status as an equally worthy being is
established regardless of whatever “inequalities” may be present.26 As he puts it, “Merely
augmenting the characteristics that make a being a person doesn’t seem to be the sort of
thing that should confer higher moral status.”27 As far as Buchanan is concerned, it is
difficult to see how someone being enhanced, grants them a higher Moral Status than a
“person.” The arrival of posthumans would not spell the end of mere human rights. In the
same way it is morally wrong for humans to torture animals, so too it would be morally
wrong for a posthuman to torture a mere human just for fun. The fear that Buchanan
wants to allay is that the arrival of posthumans would not automatically spell “doom” for
non-enhanced humans. For the non-enhanced would still retain certain moral rights in
virtue of their Moral Standing as persons and not as human beings.28
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28 I find Buchanan’s argument here inadequate and borderline incoherent. On one hand, he wants
to maintain that the arrival of posthumans would likely introduce a set of additional post-person rights in
addition to those already attributed to persons. On the other hand, he wants to maintain that posthumans
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apprehension is either: a) overblown, since post-persons will be more morally aware than us and thus will
not violate our rights; or b) wholly incorrect, as this multi-status moral structure of the world is inadequate.
First, there is no guarantee that post-persons will be more morally aware than us, nor does it address the
cruel calculus that post-persons may conclude which determines it is best for posthumans to eliminate (or
restrain) mere humans – for their own good. Second, given how humans justify their treatment of rats even
in light of a Moral Status hierarchy, it seems absurd that posthumans would not consider mere humans
“beneath” them (in a moral sense) even if they acknowledge mere humans have certain rights. As such, I
am not bullish on Buchanan’s suggestion that moving the discussion into the realm of “person’s” rights will
actually solve the problem.
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It is important to note that Buchanan’s assumption on what “personhood” is here
is a fully Kantian approach. And the concept that is the central theme of Buchanan’s
project is in assuming that the key trait that makes one a “person” is rational capacity. 29
One criticism that will reoccur here is that if someone retains some different account
about what makes one a “person” apart from rational capacity or if Moral Standing is not
granted based on rational capacity, then Buchanan’s optimism for a relatively peaceful
human and posthuman coexistence may be unwarranted.
Finally, it is important to keep in mind the distinction between Moral Standing
and Moral Status. Moral Standing is understood as an essential non-transferable quality,
while Moral Status is a comparative condition. Buchanan takes it that something has
Moral Standing if it counts morally “in its own right.”30 That is, the thing has moral value
due to some quality or characteristic “essential” to that thing. Moral Standing then is a
non-comparative quality – you either have it or you do not. Whereas Moral Standing is
more-or-less an “essential” quality of a thing, Moral Status is a comparative quality
between multiple things that have Moral Standing.31 That is, it may be the case that when
two objects which have Moral Standing are compared, one object may have a higher
Moral Status than the other. Both a lab rat and a human child have Moral Standing, but
we consider the human child to have a higher Moral Status.

29 Nicholas Agar, Truly Human Enhancement: A Philosophical Defense of Limits (Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press, 2014), 159.
30

Buchanan, Beyond Humanity?, 209.
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Ibid., 210.
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4.2.3 “Personhood” Defined as a Functioning Set of Capacities
Gilbert Meileander acknowledges a trend over last several decades to “define
personhood in terms of certain capacities.”32 It has become fashionable to hold that a
person is a being who is conscious, self-aware, and productive. The problem as
Meileander puts it is that it is obvious that the class of human beings is wider than the
contemporary notion of “personhood” allows. Under this definition, there are quite
literally human beings who do not qualify as “persons.”33 For Meileander, this is a
disturbing trend.
We humans routinely create moral groupings that include some beings and
exclude others. Likewise, we frequently imbue some groups with special privileges that
others do not have. This is generally how we make moral distinctions between mere
animals and humans, and why we are willing to sacrifice animals for the “good” of
humans. We regularly use animals as biological test subjects for various experiments
before we move to human trials. Whether this is actually moral or not is beside the
relevant point. The relevant point is: we use animals in ways we do not use humans. This
practice points to the de facto reality that we (generally) recognize humans as having
some special Moral Status that mere animals do not have.
Now, the main reason we distinguish between animals and humans is because we
recognize some key distinction between humans and animals in which we judge one to be

32 Gilbert Meilaender, Bioethics: A Primer for Christians (Grand Rapids, MI: William B.
Eerdmans, 1996), 6.
33 “To be a person one must be conscious, self-aware, productive. The class of persons will widen
or narrow depending on how many such criteria we include in our definition of personhood. But, in any
case, the class of human beings will be wider than that of persons. Not all living human beings will qualify
as persons on such a view and, we must note, it is persons who are now regarded as bearers of rights,
persons who can have interests that ought to be protected.” Ibid.
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more valuable than the other. Humans have a greater moral worth (on the whole) than
some particular animal. The trend in ethics is to place moral worth with the expression of
some relevant capacity. Hence, to the greater degree a being exhibits the relevant
capacity, the greater moral worth that being has. Now, Buchanan wants to say that the
relevant moral capacity is rationality, but he also wants to hold that once the threshold is
met for rational capacity it does not matter how rational one is. A super-genius is no more
morally worthy than a dullard who just passes the threshold of rationality. Thus, while he
wants to mitigate his approach to Moral Status as being equitable to all who meet the
criteria, this by necessity means that he holds to a capacities based approach of morality.
“Persnohood” is quite literally defined as having sufficient rational capacity. Thus,
“personhood” is denied to any being that does not meet this nebulous rational threshold.
Below we will see how Buchanan argues that morality should be understood in an
Intrinsic-Based sense rather than an Interest-Based sense. He takes this position because
he sees an Intrinsic-Based approach to morality as a way to properly decide what should
or should not be done. He argues that an Interest-Based approach is simply too vague to
be of any real use. Likewise, we will look at Buchanan’s defense of an Intrinsic-Based
morality against a couple of objections. His position will then be summarized.
4.2.3.1 Interest-Based Morality vs. Intrinsic-Based Morality
Buchanan is not unaware of the difficulties this capacities based morality causes.
He thus seeks for a solution to this moral disparity.34 To that end, he notes that there are
basically two different ways that philosophers have attempted to explain moral reality.

34

The following discussion summarizes Buchanan’s account. Buchanan, Beyond Humanity?,

218—219.
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Philosophers resort to either an Interest-Based account of morality, or an Intrinsic-Based
account of morality. An Interest-Based account appropriates Moral Status centered in
how much “good” the life of the being involves – this is assumed in, say, virtue theory.
As Buchanan takes it, “good” here means the well-being of the individual. If a moral
action negatively affect the well-being of the individual more so than refraining from that
action, then the action is immoral (or vice versa). An Intrinsic-Based account of morality
holds that all beings with certain capacities have an inviolable worth (at least in some
sense). Under this consideration, there are no “degrees” of moral separation.
Buchanan finds the Interest-Based account of morality problematic. The main
problem as far as he is concerned is that an Interest-Based account seems to operate on “a
continuum or gradient of moral considerability.”35 If there are a range of interests for a
given individual, then some goods will “weigh” heavier than others. For Buchanan, this
understanding of rights – as existing on this gradient scale – is actually incompatible with
the understanding of rights as laid out in groups. Whatever moral groupings are created,
they retain “sharp” divisions about what is due to each group.36 But these distinctions are
largely blurred if the judgment of the individual comes into play in order to gauge how
important some rights are in comparison to others.37

35

Ibid., 218 (emphasis in original).

36

Ibid.

37 For example, some individual who views morality more as an Interest-Based enterprise may
view the needs of the family pet as being more valuable than the needs of a needy stranger. Even though
the pet deserves respect (as a member of a certain group – animal pets), the rights of the needy stranger (a
member of another group – human person) should take precedent even while trying to retain the rights of
the pet. However, to maintain that members of the group of human persons are to have their rights met
before those of the group of animal pets, only make sense if the individual is to recognize the rights of the
needy stranger and the pet. If the individual values the rights of their pet more than the rights of some
stranger (however, deserving they are of help), then this is evidence that the person has taken an InterestBased approach to moral reasoning. It should be noted that the Interest-Based approach to morality has
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Buchanan thinks the Intrinsic-Based account of morality is better all around. This,
of course, means that what matters most for moral reasons is one’s capacity in a relevant
area. Based on the dictates of reason, something is moral or it is not – there is no
ambiguity derived from the categorical imperative.38 The Interest-Based view above
cannot brook the rigidness engendered by an Intrinsic-Based approach. As Buchanan
states, the Interest-Based approach must recognize “degrees of moral considerability.”39
That is, there is a moral deliberation of sorts that takes place in an Interest-Based
approach that is absent from an Intrinsic-Based approach.40 An Intrinsic-Based approach
holds that having a certain capacity is what grants rights.41 If rights are intrinsic, then
they are best understood as a threshold concept – you either have it or you do not. If this

more in common with a traditional virtue ethic than that found in an Intrinsic-Based approach – which can
be adapted to either deontology or utilitarianism.
38 The overlap here with Kant’s deontological program is apparent. For Kant, having a certain
rational capacity develops a notion of duty, which in turn grants an inviolable “right” as per the dictates of
reason. Immanuel Kant, “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,” in Practical Philosophy, trans. and
ed. by Mary J. Gregor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 61, 65.
39

Buchanan, Beyond Humanity?, 218.

40 This acknowledgement is not unlike that of Alasdair MacIntyre who notes that moral
deliberation is noticeably absent from deontological approaches. The Intrinsic-Based approach is
reminiscent of some philosophers who tried to revive “the Kantian project of demonstrating that the
authority and objectivity which belongs to the exercise of reason. Hence their central project was, indeed is,
that of showing that any rational agent is logically committed to the rules of morality in virtue of his or her
rationality.” Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 66 (emphasis mine). This basically means that if morality is
rationally determined, then there is no such thing as an exercise in moral judgment. All that needs to done,
is to look at what is “rational.” In contrast, an Interest-Based approach (specifically a Virtue-Based
approach) must “weigh” outcomes and various “goods.” There must a deliberation on which path is “best”
to take in order to meet one’s goals. Ibid., 220. Such considerations are lacking in the Intrinsic-Based
approach adopted by Buchanan.
41

Buchanan, Beyond Humanity?, 218—219.
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is the case, then our psychological considerations or other motivations are simply
irrelevant to the moral calculus that determines rights and wrongs.42
The benefit to this approach according to Buchanan is that we can finally address
the “real” issue – it is persons that retain moral status, and it is persons that are the
objects of moral concerns (not just humans).43 It is persons that should be the locus of
moral value, not some ambiguous concept of “interests.” Indeed, as a far as Buchanan is
concerned there simply is no better locus for moral consideration than the concept of
“person.” Even under traditional religious thought, God, angels, and demons would be
considered persons even though they are not human. Further, should an alien from space
arrive in the near future or whether we bring forth a true “post-human” there is no reason
to think that they would not also be considered “persons” – assuming, of course, they
have the proper capacities. As such, the notion of “person” accomplishes in a moral sense
everything that “human nature” was supposed to achieve.
4.2.3.2 Objections and Responses to Intrinsic-Based Morality
For Buchanan, the person is the locus of moral value. As mentioned above, this
means that moral worth is a threshold concept – you either have it or you do not – and
anyone deemed to be a “person” would have moral worth. Indeed, higher capacities and
more abilities would not increase one’s moral worth any more than having diminished

42 Interestingly enough, Buchanan’s approach to moral status completely removes intention as part
of the consideration. Hence, for Buchanan it does not matter why I work at the soup kitchen, only that I do.
I find this to be a strange reversal of sorts regarding moral consideration. For, as a Christian, intention is
often thought to be the defining characteristic that makes some action moral or not. Thus, working in a
soup kitchen out of love for God and others is moral, but working in a soup kitchen to curry favor and
praises from others is not. Both actions may have good outcomes – the homeless being fed – but the
motivations for performing the act dictates that one action is moral and the other is not.
43
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capacities and fewer abilities lessen one’s moral worth.44 If a being can be considered a
“person” then they are due all rights and privileges pertaining there to. Given this
threshold concept of personhood, Buchanan finds it difficult to imagine even the
possibility of there being a multi-tiered approach to morality.45 For the multi-level
morality only introduces itself in an Interest-Based approach, an Intrinsic-Based approach
as Buchanan champions bypasses this whole discussion. It quite literally makes no sense
to Buchanan that there can be multiple moral levels when the only moral value of any
consequence is whether someone / something is a “person.” For if that being is a
“person” then they are due inviolable rights and retain moral value in virtue of the fact
they are a person. There are no higher thresholds to meet nor are there criteria to establish
before certain rights are granted. All that matters is whether one is a “person.”46
Buchanan takes a final consideration. Namely, if one is going to say that postpersons could sacrifice the rights of mere-persons, then one of two scenarios must hold.
Barring either scenario, it would be immoral for a post-person to sacrifice a mereperson’s rights. The first thing that could happen that justifies a mere-person’s rights to
be sacrificed is to supply a threshold concept that post-persons have that mere-persons do
not. Given that Buchanan already considers personhood a threshold concept, he sees no

44

Ibid., 220.
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Ibid.

46 In reply, I am not sure I fully agree with Buchanan here. For while he finds it difficult (if not
impossible) to imagine a multi-tier moral system, I find the concept not only possible, but actual. We
already live our lives based on the notion that there is a graded morality. We already determine that some
human lives are worth saving and others are not (and Buchanan acknowledges this). This is not to say that
this is the way it should be. Indeed, there is something attractive in Buchanan’s proposal. What I am saying
is that it seems unlikely (to me at least) that the standard approach to moral evaluation would be fully
adopted by society at large and by enhanced persons. There is simply too much psychological incentive to
retain an Interest-Based approach to morality instead of dumping it in favor of a Buchanan style IntrinsicBased approach.
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need for creating a greater threshold. Indeed, he has argued forcefully, that the notion of
“person” is itself a threshold concept that is morally inviolable. And it is this notion of
“personhood” that provides equal Moral Status for both post-persons and mere-persons.
The second route establishing a tiered morality is by adopting some sort of utilitarian
gradation of moral values. As Buchanan has already endorsed more of a Kantian
deontology, he does not find this route to be advantageous either. Hence, in answer to the
question could a biomedically enhanced person be morally superior to mere-persons,
Buchanan says that for an Intrinsic-Based approach (like his) the answer is “no,” but an
Interest-Based approach could answer “yes.”47
4.2.3.3 Summary
Unenhanced humans have made great inroads in eliminating rights violations,
despite the fact they still occur today. There is little doubt that modern humans have
greatly reduced injustice in the world, even while acknowledging that the project is far
from complete. The enhanced will know this history of rights violations (indeed, they
will know it better than we ever could in our unenhanced state), and as such, Buchanan is
confident that they will be able to avoid blatant violations of rights as well as increase
equality across all population sectors. As he states it, “it is premature to conclude that, in
a world in which biotechnology exacerbated the ‘enhancement gap’ among humans, the
enhanced would ‘inevitably’ mistake or callously ignore the moral status of the
unenhanced.”48
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Ibid., 224—225.
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Ibid., 226.

206

Nicholas Agar notes that among a capacity approach to Moral Status there are two
different ways to examine the issue. First, recognize that there is “some degree” of
difference between higher and lower capacity beings. As such, beings with a higher
capacity in some relevant criteria (i.e., intellect, moral sensibility, etc.) would enjoy a
higher Moral Status than beings with lower capacities. Hence, human beings with a
relatively higher capacity for intellect are generally deemed more important morally than
a garden variety lab rat (which has low intellect) or a fichus tree (which has no intellect).
The second option is to note that there is “no degree” of difference among beings that
meet a minimum of threshold. Hence, once the relevant criteria is meet (i.e.,
“personhood”) there is simply no higher Moral Status that could be granted. We may
recognize humans as higher than lab rats, but once a being has been granted the status of
“personhood” (whether human or not), then there is no higher moral category to which
they can appeal.49 It is to this second understanding that Buchanan appeals.
4.2.4 Would it be Morally Wrong to do Away with “Human Rights”?
Transhumanism and posthumanism are not the first philosophies to dispense with
the notion of “human rights.” Given the metaphysical naturalism that undergirds much of
the enhancement projects, humans are thought to be no more than one link in an
evolutionary tale – one that moves from microbe, to small mammal, to primate, to
human, to transhuman, and ultimately to posthuman. Nietzschean notions of the
Übermensch play a significant role in the language transhumanists use to describe their
project. The need to “overcome” our biological limitations. The need to “guide”
evolution. The desire to “master” nature. This, of course, is reflected in another
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Nietzchean idea – the “will to power.”50 Jeffrey Bishop notes that these converging
concepts reveal the “god of these tranhumanist philosophers” is the perceived ideal of the
posthuman.51 It is an idol of the mind. And the impact of this idol is the elimination of
human rights.
The only “rights” we have are the ones we claim. In effect, transhumanism is a
philosophy of power. Again, it calls forth Nietzsche’s notion of “will to power.” It is
what Bishop calls a “power ontology.”52 Transhumanists may claim that they do not want
to exert total mastery over nature, nor do they seek perfection, but these denials are
unpersuasive given the stated goals of the movement. How can a near immortal life span
be seen as anything other than an attempt to master nature? How can the pursuit of
cognitive enhancement be interpreted as anything other than a quest for perfect
knowledge? How can the prioritizing of autonomy in engaging enhancement technology
be viewed as something other than an exertion of will over “nature”? Since it is our wills
over nature that matter, there is nothing inherent in nature to which our wills must
conform. And since human rights based in human nature is thought to be a false belief, it
follows that if there are anything like “rights” then they are a reality that we create. And
since we are the ones creating these “rights,” there is no harm in doing away with the

50 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, trans. by
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), 21.
51 “The transhumanist metaphysical belief is that we human beings are on an evolutionary journey,
from human to posthuman; . . . The philosophy of transhumanism seeks to order evolutionary becoming. . .
. Here, however, the god of these transhumanist philosophers is the god that orders the creative power
toward a new being, a new god, that is to say toward the posthuman. Transhumanist philosophies, in my
estimation, are the coincidence of eternal and creative forces of becoming just as they turn in the conscious
moment toward control, toward mastery. Transhumanism seeks to differently embody the Übermensch.”
Jeffry P. Bishop, “Transhumanism, Metaphysics, and the Posthuman God,” Journal of Medicine and
Philosophy 35 (2010): 707.
52
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older morality that attempted to base rights in human nature. Put simply, because there is
no such thing as human nature, there cannot be such a thing as human rights based on it.
If there are “rights,” then we create them.
Further, enhancement technologies may change “human nature” (or at least what
is thought of as human nature), but even so, there are three reasons why this may not be
such a bad thing. First, appealing to “nature” in the past has resulted in an unsavory
human history. As Mark Sagoff comments, “The term unnatural can be used
thoughtlessly and indefensibly simply to denigrate practices or activities that some people
may find offensive.”53 For example, homosexuals are (or have been) routinely
condemned for not engaging in “natural” relationships. For a long time, slavery was
justified under the (incorrect!) pretense that some people were born to be servile. Second,
one could argue that we cannot derive an “ought” from an “is.”54 That is, we cannot use
statements about what is “natural” to determine what is “moral.” Again, as Sagoff notes,
even if we could tie morality to our genetic structure, given the poor ethical record of
human beings perhaps we should “sever that connection.”55 Finally, it has already been
noted that human beings have already changed their nature through harnessing various
technologies – hence, appealing to “nature” is pointless since we have already surpassed
“nature” in many respects. As such, the question is would it be truly wrong to do away

53 Mark Sagoff, “Nature and Human Nature,” in Is Human Nature Obsolete? Genetics,
Bioengineering, and the Future of the Human Condition, ed. by Harold W. Baillie and Timothy K. Casey
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005), 73.
54 David Hume and G. E. Moore have argued along these lines. See, David Hume, Treatise on
Human Nature (London: Penguin Books, 1985), especially 3.1.1, and G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1903).
55
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with the older notion of “human rights”? The answer can plausibly be answered, no. No it
would not be wrong to dispense with the old notion of “human rights” and insert our own
notions of rights. Whether that be based on rational capacity, moral capacity, emotional
capacity, or some other criteria. We can create new and different “rights” because we
have already been doing so all along.
4.3 Common Counter Claim: “Human Nature” is the Only Relevant Moral Factor
The transhumanist philosophy is largely based on the idea of reshaping things –
sexuality, gender, family, society, etc. It is typically a rejection of “conservative” views
on the general immutability of species – a backbone to “creationists” understanding of
the world.56 One area that is rapidly changing is what it means to have moral worth.
Traditionally, human beings were seen to occupy the highest rung of the axiological
ladder. The rise of transhumanism has favored a displacement of that ladder with a more
equitable approach.
There is no one definition of “human nature,” nor is there one single
understanding of what it means to be human or to have moral worth. Despite this nonconsensus, there nevertheless remains a general notion of what it means to be human.
And it is to this general notion of human beings and human nature that drives much of the
discussion in traditional and religious circles. Nicholas Agar reminds us that “‘Human
nature’ is a cluster concept. It comprises a range of conditions, none of which is
individually necessary or sufficient.”57 This “range of conditions” is precisely what
56 Stephen Garner, “The Hopeful Cyborg,” in Transhumanism and Transcendence: Christian
Hope in an Age of Technological Enhancement, ed. by Ronald Cole-Turner (Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Press, 2011), 91.
57 Nicholas Agar, Humanity’s End: Why We Should Reject Radical Enhancement (Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press, 2010), 21 (emphasis in original).
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Francis Fukuyama wants to explore. Taking a more Aristotelian angle to human beings,
Fukuyama argues that humans are identifiable within a certain genetic and behavioral
range. Anyone who falls within that range can be considered a human being, and if they
are human, then in good Aristotelian fashion some telos should be discoverable by
observing their behavior and desires. But if we are able to find a telos, then this could
serve as the basis for recognizing certain human rights. As he puts it, for “while human
behavior is plastic and variable, it is not infinitely so; at a certain point deeply rooted
natural instincts and patterns of behavior reassert themselves to undermine the social
engineers best-laid plans.”58 Fukuyama’s project, then, is to discover the genetic and
behavioral range to which we can say this is a human being and this one is not. From
there he hopes to establish a system of human rights. Whereas Buchanan denied the
existence of human nature and, thus, any rights based on it, Fukuyama affirms a human
nature and rights based on it.
4.3.1 Human Rights Are Based in Human Nature – Francis Fukuyama
Fukuyama follows the Aristotelian approach to determining moral worth. The
basic idea here is that human rights are based in human nature, and human nature is
determined by observing natural human desires, purposes, traits, and behaviors. For
without this knowledge we cannot make proper judgments about what is “good and bad,
just and unjust.”59 This, of course, is in contrast to more utilitarian approaches to human
good which often reduce human ends to the simple calculus of what brings the most
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“pleasure.”60 Human goods are grander, deeper, and thicker than a simple comparison
about what brings pleasure. Some things may not be pleasurable at all, but still be “good”
for us.61
Because Fukuyama takes human nature to be important, he needs an acceptable
definition to get the discussion started. He defines human nature as “the sum of the
behavior and characteristics that are typical of the human species, arising from genetic
rather than environmental factors.”62 This implies there is a range to the qualities that
comprise human beings. Genetics may limit certain characteristics, but it allows for a
wide variety of expression within the same species. Hence, humans can be very short or
very tall. They can be very thin, or very large. However, humans cannot achieve just any
possible height or body size. As Fukuyama states, “there are limits to the degree of
variance possible, limits that are set genetically.”63 A society that is malnourished will
tend to be shorter and thinner than a society that has an overabundance of nourishment.
But in either society, not just any possible height or weight will be achieved. Likewise,
behaviorally, humans can modify their actions and attitudes pending environmental,
cultural, and personal engagements.64 All of this points to the idea that there is not just
one ideal human person or culture, but rather that the range of characteristics and
behaviors must be taken into account for an accurate assessment.
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61 I may not like having a cavity filled (is there just about anything less pleasurable?), but this
would still be good for me and my dental health.
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Any account of human characteristics must note the “intimate connection between
human nature and human notions of rights, justice, and morality.”65 Western society’s
modern democratic political notion is thoroughly reflective of contemporary thought on
moral and ethical issues. And this in turn is reflects an ultimate basis for a human telos.
Humans have a purpose, an end, revealed by human morals and ethics, which is based on
some concept of human nature.66 However, it is currently unfashionable to establish
human rights on human nature – as explored above with Buchanan. Fukuyama takes this
trend to be “profoundly mistaken.” He notes that both philosophy and common sense
reveal that our moral sense is thoroughly based in our conceptions of “human nature.”
Hence, part of the reason he resists certain enhancement technologies (specifically
biotechnology) is precisely because he sees these sorts of alterations affecting us at the
level of our very nature. Thus, by altering what we are, we alter what we value.67
Harkening back to the early Greeks, Fukuyama acknowledges that the modern
notion of “rights” and “duties” is at odds with both Plato and Aristotle who (with much of
Western civilization after them) were concerned about what was “good” for humans.
Their approaches were decidedly eudaimonistic – what matters is for people to achieve
their end, their telos. As such, there was no language of “rights” and “duties” as
understood in modern parlance. Rather, any discussion they give of “rights” or “duties”
would be in service to achieving virtue. Because of the rich background that the ancient
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Greeks assumed, Fukuyama finds the contemporary discussion on “rights” and “duties”
shallow and “impoverished.”68
Nevertheless, the common language of “rights” and “duties” are the tools by
which the discussion proceeds. Hence, instead of dispensing with these notions,
Fukuyama attempts to reform them. Thus, a “right” is simply understood as a moral
judgment. Likewise, the term “right” is the basic principle for even discussing issues of
justice.69 No contemporary discussion on morality or ethics can do without some
understanding of rights. We endow the notion of “rights” with great moral significance.
Indeed, the notion of “rights” exceeds any notion of “interest” since an “interest” is
assumed to be malleable – it can vary depending on one’s mood. A “right,” however, is
often assumed to be stable and (somewhat) objective.70
Rights can be derived from religion, humanity itself, or nature. Rights based in
religion are difficult (if not impossible) to establish in a pluralistic and secular society.
There are simply too many different visions of what divine reality may or may not be to
establish any broad consensus of what rights are.71 Rights based in humanity itself are
understood as civil rights – these rights are granted to a citizenry in virtue of being a
member of that society. These types of rights are socially determined and vary from
society to society. Hence, one society may entitle their citizens to healthcare, but another
may not. These types of rights will be more or less dependent upon the foundational
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71 Ibid., 111. However, I have attempted to provide a reasonable basis for a religious view of
human nature in chapter 3.
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beliefs of that society and will vary accordingly.72 The remaining way to establish rights
is by examining nature. And it is to this notion of “human nature” that we can now turn.
The notion of human nature has been criticized for the past three centuries. Often
the claim is that appealing to human nature is to commit the “naturalistic fallacy.” That
is, “nature cannot provide a philosophically justifiable basis for rights, morality, or
ethics.”73 Fukuyama thinks the naturalistic fallacy is itself fallacious – it relies on a postKantian understanding of human beings. Fukuyama himself prefers a pre-Kantian
conception of human nature.74 He finds Aristotle closer to the truth of human nature than
Kant. So, why does he find the naturalistic fallacy problematic? He notes that the
naturalistic fallacy often relies on two arguments. First, the “is / ought” fallacy as
described by David Hume – that is “a statement of moral obligation cannot be derived
from an empirical observation about nature or the natural world.”75 Just because humans
seem to act in some genetically programmed way, it does not follow that this is how
humans should act. Moral obligations are thus thought to be based in some other source
than “nature.” Second, “even if we could derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is,’ the ‘is’ is often
ugly, amoral, or indeed immoral. . . . human nature . . . is not very pleasant to behold, and
would serve poorly as a basis for political rights.”76 The first argument says that human
nature cannot serve as a basis for morality because we cannot determine what is right and
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wrong from what humans do. The second argument says that even if we were to derive
right and wrong from what humans do, then it would be a terrible morality indeed. So, if
we look at moral values, we realize they are not based in human nature, and if we look at
human actions, we would not want to base morality on it. In either case human nature is
an improper grounding for moral rights.
In response to the first argument, Fukuyama (following Alasdair MacIntyre77)
argues that Hume did not really believe that you could not derive an “ought” from an
“is.” Instead, “oughts” cannot be established by an “is” in an a priori way. Hume, like
most western philosophers preceding him, thought the “ought” and “is” could be
“bridged by concepts like ‘wanting, needing, desiring, pleasure, happiness, health’ – by
the goals and ends that human beings set for themselves.”78 And if it is possible to use
human desires as the middle term between “ought” and “is” then there is no hard
separation between the two. As such, “oughts” can in some way be derived from an “is.”
It is the case that humans want peaceful and beneficial relationships, thus they ought to
act in a way that encourages such relationships.
Fukuyama goes on to note that bridging the “is” and “ought” can be more clearly
seen by examining their relationship and entanglement with human emotions and
feelings. As he puts it, the “oughts” that are derived by moral reflection are every bit as
complex as the human emotional state. As such, “there is scarcely a judgment of ‘good’
or ‘bad’ that has been pronounced by a human being that has not been accompanied by a
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strong emotion, whether of desire, longing, aversion, disgust, anger, guilt, or joy.”79
Hence, simply because of the emotional input in determining what “is” the case, how we
determine values is not wholly a rational decision (contra Kant).80 This relationship
between the emotions and morality was more clearly seen by the pre-Kantian
philosophers due to their general resistance to reducing humans to merely rational
capacity.81
Many of the pre-Kantian moralists were operating in the Aristo-Thomistic
tradition which stressed virtue. Virtue was thought to expand upon what “nature provided
us” since there could be no necessary conflict between what was considered “natural”
and what was considered morally “right.”82 This attitude has since shifted since the time
of Kant to stress the ability of the will to overcome our nature. Fukuyama must then ask,
“how can any particular ‘natural’ behavior be the basis of natural rights?”83 That is, how
can we establish what is right and good for humans based on what they do? Another way
of asking this is, how can human nature establish a system of rights? Fukuyama responds
by noting that we need to connect rights with human ends via philosophy.84 This is, of
course, a decidedly Aristotelian approach which attempts to identify the natural ends
(telos) of humans as what establishes rights.
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Fukuyama notes that establishing a list of rights based on human nature is not
easy – for both (human nature and human rights) are complex and flexible. What he
objects to, however, is that these are infinitely malleable. There is a range of human
nature, and with it attending rights.85 For example, it is insufficient to point at human
violence and oppression as the sole reasons that rights cannot be based on human nature.
While violence and oppression have shaped much of human history, humans are simply
more than violent and oppressive beings. Human nature “encompasses a great deal more
than” violence and oppression.86 Human history is shaped not just by violence and
oppression, but by love and compassion as well. Humans feel the need to create order and
curb violence, and they feel compelled to expand personal freedom and reduce
oppression. And it is these tendencies that speak just as much about human telos as does
the perpetration of violence and oppression. Indeed, the fact that humans exhibit altruism
is a testament that humans value some goods other than simply violence and
oppression.87
4.3.2 Insufficient Arguments Against Human Nature
Fukuyama lists three common arguments against the notion of human nature. The
first says that there is no true human nature, because there is no such thing as a universal
common nature applicable to all humans (this is a rejection of the platonic notion of
“humanness”).88 The problem with this objection is that it too narrowly defines what a
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universal is. It is true there is no median quality among all humans, but this does not
mean that there is no qualities that are not broadly shared among all humans. “A
characteristic does not need to have a variance (standard deviation) of zero to be
considered a universal, since almost none exists.”89 No broadly based society has all of its
citizens with the exact same attribute – even if there are significant similarities.
Fukuyama argues that the characteristic variant must be relatively small to be considered
a universal – but it does not need to be zero. The operative idea here is the idea of a bell
curve, not a point. There will be deviations below and above the average expression of
the quality, but not infinitely so. The characteristic under consideration will share close to
the same magnitude for the bulk of the citizenry.
A second objection is that genotype does not determine phenotype. Our genes are
affected by our environment and thus under varying conditions the actual being that
develops can fluctuate significantly. In theory, genetic twins exposed to radically
different environments from the earliest stages of development could look significantly
different even though their DNA is the same. Fukuyama finds this argument interesting
but not a substantive denial of human nature.90 For the parameters that DNA sets are what
is implied by human nature. The twins just mentioned may develop drastic differences,
but it is unlikely that one would develop wholly different biological parts than the other
(like a tail or scales). And it is the fact that there is a limit to the divergence between
these beings that establishes a common element between them. Human nature is found in
the parameters, not in any singular expression.
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The third objection Fukuyama mentions is that humans modify their behavior
through cultural expression and pass those teachings to their offspring, thus creating
wildly divergent behaviors. Thus, if there were a common human nature, then these
divergences would be mitigated – but they are not. Fukuyama thinks not only does this
create a straw-man of “human nature” but it is empirically false.91 There are indeed
noteworthy cultural values which conflict with other societies. However, there are also
substantial cultural similarities and shared moral values. As such, cultural expression
does not mitigate human nature, but rather reinforces its reality. For if there were no
human nature then the argument should be not that different societies elicit divergent
moralities, but that some societies have one morality and others have none.
4.3.3 Establishing Human Dignity
One basic category that establishes the rights of any sentient creature is if it can
feel pain – if it can experience suffering.92 Humans are often uneasy in causing
unnecessary pain to other creatures. The recognition of pain acts as a dividing line that
instructs us if some action may be immoral. Any action that results in pain may be
immoral – however, some necessarily moral actions may result in pain (i.e., root canal).
Now, this avoidance of pain is a primary reason why many humans routinely demand that
others recognize their dignity as members of religious, ethnic, racial, or gender groups.93
They do not want to feel pain, and we are often compliant in not wanting them to
experience pain. But despite the role pain plays in determining the morality of some
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action, it is thought to be insufficient for establishing true “rights.” Given the fact we can
clearly name examples when pain is necessary, the avoidance of pain per se cannot be a
sufficient moral guide.
Fukuyama proposes that we look for some universal feature that establishes
human dignity. He is looking for some characteristic that all people recognize the need
for equal treatment. As he puts it, what “the demand for equality of recognition implies is
that when we strip all of a person’s contingent and accidental characteristics away, there
remains some essential human quality underneath that is worthy of a certain minimal
level of respect—call it Factor X.”94 Factor X has been highly contested, but is often
understood as that most basic quality that is what it means to be human.95
Fukuyama thinks this Factor X is important for establishing human dignity. He
acknowledges that it cannot be reduced to moral behavior, rationality, language,
sociability, consciousness, emotions, sentience, or any other number of qualities. Rather,
Factor X is made up of all of these qualities. And this is based on the idea that every
human has a certain genetic capacity for being a “whole human being” distinguishable
from other types of creatures that may even share some of these qualities.96 Fukuyama
takes it as obvious that none of the qualities just listed can exist in any substantial sense
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without the existence of the others.97 Humans are complex creatures resistant to reductive
analysis.98
Human behavior evades the modern scientific drive towards reductionism. It is
simply too complex to be modeled in a simple fashion. Wholes may be traceable to their
simpler parts, but there is no predictive model that shows understanding the simpler parts
will be able to predict the behavior of the whole.99 This sort of reductionist puzzle may
work with purely material objects, but if humans are not purely material objects, then
reductionism will fail as a method to predict human behavior. Rather, what is needed to
understand human behavior is a model at the macro level, not the micro level. We need to
understand the complex relationships and environmental and cultural interactions in
which humans engage, not just examine humans at the cellular and biological level. 100
The human experience combines in a way that is unique to the types of creatures
we are. As Fukuyama notes, it “is not sufficient to argue that some other animals are
conscious, or have culture, or have language, for their consciousness does not combine
human reason, human language, human moral choice, and human emotions in ways that
are capable of producing human politics, human art, or human religion.”101 It is the
combination of these complex behaviors that are unique to the human experience and
97 For example, he notes that moral behavior is shot through with rationality and emotion. And
emotions are important for helping humans develop “purposes, goals, . . . wants, needs, desires, fears,
aversions” as well as establishing a source for human values. Human emotions are important for producing
“purposes, goals, objective, wants, needs, desires, fears, aversions, and the like and hence is the source of
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contribute to the notion of human dignity. The denial of human dignity is a perilous
path.102 Cheapening human worth will invariably lead to injustice for those deemed less
than human.
4.3.4 The Importance of Embodiment
Gilbert Meileander remarks that our personal histories (i.e., our memories) “do
not require the presence of ‘personal’ capacities throughout.”103 It is the living body that
is “the locus of personal presence.”104 Embodiment is often neglected for it is no longer
thought to be important to the definition of the person, and given the fact that the body
can be (relatively) altered with ease is taken as further evidence that the body is not
important for personal identity.105 Leon Kass reacts against the transhumanist push to get
past the body. For Kass, the body is not something to be neglected, nor is it something
that should be summarily discarded once it is no longer needed. As far as he sees it,
embodiment “is a curse only for those who believe they deserve to be gods.”106
That transhumanism is largely attempting to do away with the body is a
controversial claim to be sure. Many transhumanists will object to the characterization on
grounds that many projects specifically target enhancement of the body. Indeed,
“Embodiment as constitutive of personhood makes clear the distinction between cyborg
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and transhumanist anthropologies.”107 Cybernetics, genetics, nanotechnology, and the
like are premised on the assumption that the person must be embodied in some way. As
such, to claim that transhumanists do not approve of embodiment smacks of excessive
hyperbole. However, that some transhumanists wish to wholly transcend the body is also
commonly known. Ray Kurzweil’s mind uploading project is specifically pursued as a
way to transcend the body (as discussed in chapter 6).
As such, critics of transhumanism’s view of the body can be found in two stripes.
The first (and most common) critique is that transhumanism wants to do away with the
body in toto – which is contrary to human flourishing. The second critique is that
transhumanism’s belittling of the body is also contrary to human flourishing by not
appreciating (in some sense) the ways in which the admittedly limited human body is
“good.” Either way, transhumanists (as well as posthumanists) tend to disparage the body
and view it as an object to be controlled through technology.108 Meileander notes that the
problem is that transhumanists seem to be confused. As he puts it, the vision of the
person transhumanists want to achieve is incompatible with the vision of that person
“where they are wrong.” For example, he says that transhumanists tend to believe that
caring for some people is futile if that person does not behave or exhibit the types of
capacities that transhumanists value – even if the person is not terminally ill. Rather,
transhumanists support a vision of personhood that is divorced from the organic body.109
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Transhumanists and posthumanists generally see the body as a frail and limited
biological contraption that needs technological intervention in order for us to achieve our
desires and goals. As Brent Waters phrases it, the “posthuman solution is to free the will
from the bondage of finitude by constructing a better prosthetic of the will. . . . The will,
then, can become genuinely free only by diminishing the finite limits or constraints of
embodiment.”110 Under this constraint, the body must change in order to meet the needs
of the human will. As such, transhumanists tend to hold that our bodies are the problem,
but as J. Jeanine Thweatt-Bates notes, paying attention to our bodies is actually the
solution.111 This is because it is specifically our bodies that make us human, and the
assumption is that there is something special about being human – the human being is
worth preserving. Thus, critics of any movement to displace the body tend to be
unimpressed with efforts to do that very thing. As Waters comments, “the posthuman
project is predicated upon a fundamental contradiction: for humans to achieve their full
potential, they must destroy their bodies, but in doing so they destroy the very thing that
makes them human.”112 Gilbert Meileander agrees with this assessment and further notes
that the spirit (i.e., mind) cannot be accessed apart from the living body itself – the spirit
of each person is incarnated.113 That is, the body is of sacred importance. As such,
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enhancement technologies – especially genetic modifications – may offer only illusory
benefits since their goals are to replace the function of the soul (i.e., the formal and
guiding principle of the body). “The body is altered, but the soul is not”114 in genetic
modification.
The transhumanist tendency to repudiate the body is perhaps the biggest
conceptual obstacle for modern Christians to accept.115 The incarnation of Jesus offers a
critique against those who wish to escape the body and pursue some incorporeal form of
existence, digital or otherwise. “Embodiment matters, and those who choose to celebrate
the flesh as part of their being should not be denigrated.”116 However, this should not be
taken to mean that only the body matters. In a similar way that the incarnated Christ was
both physical and spiritual, so too are we physical and spiritual. Our bodily existence is in
some way also transcendent. Jesus’ dual nature has historically been celebrated by the
Church, and likewise we need to recognize the dual aspect of human nature as well.117
Humans are both mind and body. “The incarnation, birth, crucifixion, resurrection, and
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ascension are all physical landmarks. Matter matters.”118 And because, “matter matters”
radically disengaging from the body is a taboo to all Christian traditions.119
Given that the Christian tradition places such a high view of embodiment due to
the incarnation, it has commonly been interpreted that this must mean that our bodies say
something about human dignity. As Karen Lebacqz says, “our dignity must reside to
some degree in accepting our embodiment and honoring the limits that it places on us.”120
That is, the incarnation affirms that embodiment is both good and finite.121 And if this is
the case, then “personhood” is not something separate from our embodied experience.
We do not gain “personhood” at some point in time, but rather we are “persons
throughout the whole” of the finite embodied life.122 And being finite entails being
dependent on others.123 This dependence can be understood in multiple senses, by being
dependent on society or God. As social creatures we are dependent on society to fulfill
our temporal ends. No one person can achieve all that is needed to experience a
flourishing life apart from some cooperative society. Christians will also add that our
moment by moment existence is dependent upon God’s grace (cf. Col. 1:15-17). It is God
who “owns” the universe – we are but stewards of God’s creation. Even our own lives are
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owed to God, not ourselves. Our lives are not our own. And it is this understanding of
embodiment that permeates much of the religious critique of transhumanism.
Transhumanists often see the body as something that is “owned” by the person,
but for Christians the body is owned by God. The body is to be cared for and tended
primarily because it is not wholly ours. This in turn highlights why some transhumanist
critics disapprove of the transhumanist for wholesale alteration of the body – for
changing the body at its most fundamental level can be interpreted as a sin against the
body.124 If someone owns their home, then they can make any changes to it they desire,
but if they simply rent the home (i.e., it is owned by someone else), then any changes will
be inappropriate apart from the owner’s permission. Similarly, wholesale modifications
of the body can be appropriate if, at bottom, we are the ones who own our body. Since
many Christians disagree with the idea that we own our body, it would be inappropriate
to alter the body to any significant degree.
4.4 Brief Evaluation of Both Positions
Both supporters and critics of enhancement acknowledge that enhancements can
decrease human dignity. Karen Lebacqz remarks that “the preservation of dignity has
something to do the way in which things are done and with keeping them preeminently
human.”125 For Leon Kass, bodily limits must be honored to maintain human dignity. For
Nick Bostrom, the ability to choose certain enhancements is how human dignity is
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expressed – it is not limited to just the bodily elements.126 The transhumanist and
posthumanist proponent claims that to “be a person is to be, or have the capacity to be, an
autonomous chooser, to take control over one’s personal history, determining its bounds
and limits.”127 This sense of complete autonomy is challenged by the transhumanist critic
– we can neither control our personal history, nor can we be the determiners of the
absolute bounds and limits.
Above, two different accounts of the basis for human dignity were explored.
Allen Buchanan placed dignity in a moral notion of “personhood.” Francis Fukuyama
attempted to recapture the Aristotelian notion that “human nature” is the grounding for
moral order. Below we will look at the primary arguments against these two positions.
There will be a discussion on the problems associated with taking a “personhood” only
approach to morality, as well as the problems associated with a “human nature” only
approach.
4.4.1 Problems with “Personhood” Only
There are a number of problems associated with a “personhood” only approach to
human dignity. Below are four critiques. The first is a series of general criticisms of the
“personhood” project with the main critique being that it unnecessarily reduces human
beings to primarily a rational entity – “reason” is the most important quality. The second
criticism takes aim at the importance of autonomy as the moral impetus for pursuing any
desired goal. Does autonomy grant the sort of the broad, sweeping provisions needed to
pursue extreme enhancement technologies? The third criticism takes aim at Buchanan’s
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insistence that Moral Status will be equitable in a posthuman future. The criticism
revolves around the notion that Moral Status will not only be unequitable, it will be
exacerbated by the ontological differences separating posthumans from mere humans.
The final critique addresses some concluded thoughts on issues related to “personhood.”
4.4.1.1 General Critique
Buchanan opts for a “personhood” only approach because of some problems he
has with the concept of “human nature.” However, Buchanan’s account of “human
nature” meets with two objections from the start. The first is that his beginning definition
of “human nature” seems to beg the question in favor of a “positivistic” approach to
looking at human beings. By essentially defining away any non-physical aspect of human
beings (rather than arguing for it!), Buchanan limits the pool of possible candidates for
what “human nature” is. The second, and closely related, issue is that Buchanan seems to
just reduce “human nature” to its “scientific” account. He takes the evolutionary
paradigm as the sole interpretive framework for positioning human enhancement. This, of
course, is too restrictive and inappropriate from a theological perspective. The consistent
Christian tradition holds that while humans are not less than material / physical beings,
humans are more than their physical parts. By limiting the only relevant starting point to
being our evolutionary origins, he essentially neglects a whole realm of data that many
take as relevant to the discussion.
Much of Buchanan’s reason for adopting this approach to “human nature” (among
other transhumanists) is due to a prior commitment to scientism. Scientism tends to
reduce the human to their constituent parts, and the moral worth of the individual
disappears accordingly. Tying value and worth to current capacities rather than potential
230

capacities diminishes the individual consequently.128 By making humans the current
product of a haphazard evolutionary process, Buchanan has stacked the deck for reader to
accept the “need” for technological enhancement – as a way to curb blind evolution and
bend it to our will.
Fukuyama critiques a personhood only view (which he argues reinforces a
Kantian deontology) by noting that philosophers who attempt this route of establishing a
moral system invariably insert their own assumptions about what is essential to human
nature.129 Instead of dismissing the idea of human nature, they reinforce it in their own
terms.130 Kant, for example, made “reason” essential to humans – Buchanan makes the
same move. But in doing so, this does not empty human nature of qualities, but asserts
one quality above all others. Fukuyama comments that it is difficult not to just paraphrase
Hume and note that these deontologically minded philosophers shift “from ought and
ought not to is and is not, since they no more than anyone else can avoid basing what
‘ought’ to be on what typically ‘is’ for our species.”131 Buchanan essentially says we
ought to respect other persons, because a person is a rational being which is worthy of
respect. That is, he makes reason the essential quality that defines “person.” Thus, what is
essential to human nature (or at least what is most relevant) is one’s reason.
Meileander takes it that the issue is better understood in terms of control. He
remarks, “In an age supposedly dominated by modes of thought more natural and
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historical than metaphysical, we have allowed ourselves to think of personhood in terms
quite divorced from our biological nature or the history of our embodied self.”132 He
pushes back against the notions that “being a [human] person has more to do with being
in control than with being embodied” and “Human beings are neither essentially sexual
nor parental, but the technological impulse is central to their being.”133 Both of these
notions are misguided. The first, because control follows upon being embodied – if a
human is not first embodied, then they cannot later be “in control.” The second is
misguided because it is a direct denial of two central urges – procreation and
childrearing. Humans may suppress the urges as the celibate or the childless do, but to
proclaim that humans are not essentially geared toward sex and family seems to
contradict the entirety of human history, which is one great story of love, sex, and kinship
relations. This is not to say that the second part of the statement does not contain truth,
however. The technological impulse is certainly indeed part of human nature, but it is not
there in place of the sexual or parental inclinations. Thus, as a general critique of
Buchanan – he places too much emphasis on the rational aspect of human beings to the
neglect of the bodily and emotional aspect. Humans are embodied creatures in which the
emotions and primal drives deriving from that basic experience largely shape the types of
beings we are.
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4.4.1.2 Is Autonomy That Important?
Transhumanists often assume that persons have unlimited personal freedom and
autonomy as well as being primarily consumers who are looking for “easy” solutions to
life’s problems.134 Indeed, Americans are particularly impatient and easily frustrated by
failure and thus look to some technological fix for their present ailment.135 Autonomy is
quite probably the most important value for transhumanists. The perception of selfmastery and freedom is the clarion call and touchstone for most enhancement proponents.
American society in particular pushes for individual autonomy and often resists being
defined as by being in relation with others. As Christina Bieber Lake notes, that for
transhumanists what “matters most about our destiny is simply the fact that we get to
choose it.”136 Lake goes on to say that any ethic based on this personal freedom approach
instead of responsibility to the other is “doomed to fail.”137 The reason for this is that
persons are the types of beings that live within and depend upon a community. Persons
are not fully autonomous beings – we need others and others need us.138 Indeed, one of
the fears of basing an ethical system on personal autonomy and freedom is that the
“good” is often simply associated with the accumulation of power.139 If, however, an
ethical system is based more in a virtue format, then reference to a narrative is cultivated
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in a social context. And if this is the case, then community is needed to establish an
appropriate ethic. Again, transhumanism tends to prioritize individual freedom over (and
sometimes in opposition to) communal concerns.140 We fear that our autonomy / destiny
is determined by totalitarian rulers.141 Hence, transhumanists prioritize human autonomy
as a way to rebel against the potential totalitarian rules (i.e., nature, society, limitations).
The problem with this approach as Lake argues is that it makes love of others almost
impossible. She says, “when one’s ultimate value is freedom to remake the self through
technology, this value shapes a view of the other that makes love for particular persons
today almost impossible.”142 What room is there for others when the priority is one’s
self?
Fukuyama critiques the primacy of autonomy as found in much of deontological
thinking (which is adopted by many transhumanists) as “elevating individual moral
autonomy to the highest good.”143 The problem, as he sees it, is that the right to “choose”
is not an absolute good in itself. Indeed, if one is mentally impaired then they will not be
able to choose what is good at all – or at least in only a very limited sense. This notion of
dignity is applicable only if the person has a properly functioning capacity for autonomy.
The problem is that if someone lacks that current capacity (i.e., children, comatose,
mentally disabled, etc.) then these individuals cannot be considered properly a “person” –
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for they lack full autonomy.144 Transhumanists often see autonomy as the highest moral
value, Fukuyama disagrees.145 The need for an inherently meaningful life is of even
higher priority.146
A love first ethic could possibly provide that the meaning that Fukuyama insists is
necessary. This is because a love first ethic prevents the reduction of ethics to personal
freedom and autonomy. It assumes that other persons are worthy of respect and dignity. It
assumes that there is a “good” (i.e., a telos) for others. This view is often opposed to
techno-scientism which assumes the “good life” can be found in technological
advancement. As wonderful as modern science is, it cannot answer what is the “good
life.” At best technology and the science that creates it can only offer a “thin” version of
the “good life.”147
4.4.1.3 Can “Personhood” Adequately Account for Moral Status?
The problem this criticism highlights is that thinking in terms of science and
technology may prevent us from accepting people as humans – or at least as morally
worthy beings.148 The fear here is that significantly enhanced beings will be so
cognitively above current human capacities that they would not but be able to think that
they have a higher moral status.149 This can be seen in Buchanan’s insistence that

144

Mitchell, et al., Biotechnology and the Human Good, 65—66.

145

Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future, 123—125.

146

Ibid., 123.

147

Lake, Prophets of the Posthuman, 10—11.

148

Ibid., 54.

149

Agar, Truly Human Enhancement, 168 (emphasis in original).

235

“personhood” is a threshold concept. The problem with “thresholds” is that there is a
difference between “strong” thresholds and “weak” thresholds. A “strong” threshold
resists any improvement to the status of the being. That is, no improvements or
enhancements affect that being’s status. A “weak” threshold notes that beyond a certain
point of some enhancements could actually affect the status of a being. While Buchanan
argues for a “strong” threshold in order to maintain moral equivalency between enhanced
and unenhanced beings, Nicholas Agar justifiably doubts that a “strong” threshold is
possible to maintain. Indeed, Agar takes it that a “weak” threshold is more likely to be
held by an enhanced citizenry than a “strong” threshold view.150 Even though a “strong”
threshold view may seem to be more intuitive to our unenhanced moral perspective, there
is no reason to think that an enhanced individual would not then be able to morally justify
a “weak” threshold view. Indeed, Agar argues that the only relevant moral status being
“personhood” is improbable. Especially in light of how we already treat other beings –
both human and non-human.151 We treat animals decidedly differently than how we treat
other humans. Agar phrases the problem well, the “question of whether we should
recognize the existence of higher moral statuses becomes the question of whether beings
who are sufficiently cognitively superior to us and lack our imaginative limits would
recognize the existence of such statuses.”152 Agar is not optimistic that enhanced beings
would consider mere humans to be their moral equals.
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Buchanan wants to maintain a strong threshold concept in which there is “no
degree” of difference among “persons” for their moral status. The difficulty here is in
insuring that posthumans (and post-persons) maintain that same viewpoint. It seems far
more likely that enhanced individuals will opt for a weak threshold concept of
personhood which allows for “some degree” of difference between “persons” based on
their capacities. As such, cognitively unenhanced beings (such as ourselves) will not be
able to predict how a cognitively enhanced being will be able to morally justify a
differentiation in moral status. However, that such a differentiation is possible in light of
the fact that we already make such justifications among ourselves. We already judge
some humans (i.e., “persons”) as more valuable than others. Given significant
enhancement, the value judgments of “who” is more valuable are not only possible, but
inevitable. And there will be greater “moral clarity” for the beings making the moral
judgment. Unenhanced beings will simply be at the moral mercy of the enhanced beings.
As Agar puts it, “our observations of moral statuses make it likely that beings lacking our
cognitive limits will recognize moral statuses superior to personhood.”153
Agar lists two reasons why enhanced humans may not make mere humans a
moral priority. First, our current treatment of animals (such as the great apes) shows that
we make a moral distinction between ourselves and creatures we deem as less capable as
ourselves. But the relationship we enjoy with the great apes is one that is likely to be
mirrored with those who are enhanced. If we can make a moral distinction between
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ourselves and the great apes, then there is no reason to think that enhanced beings will
not be able to make the same sort of distinction between them and us.154
Second, Agar notes that while enhanced beings may be able to more rigorously
adhere to a moral code, there is no guarantee that the moral values that enhanced beings
adopt will be necessarily good for mere humans. As Agar puts it, we may have a good
idea about what cognitive enhancements will do to us but “we have a much less secure
grasp on the idea of moral enhancement than we do on cognitive enhancement. . . .
posthumans may cause suffering to humans not because they lack empathy, but because,
like parents who present two-year-olds for painful vaccinations and cancer researchers
experimenting on monkeys, they view that suffering as morally justified.”155 Even though
enhanced beings will emerge from us, and perhaps begin with our values, there is no
guarantee that they will maintain those values. Especially, if they judge that changing
them is morally or intellectually necessary.156 A society with both posthumans and mere
humans will be decidedly bad for mere humans.157 Establishing “personhood” will not
mitigate this moral reality.
4.4.1.4 Other Issues Related to “Personhood”
Christina Bieber Lake notes that persons are best defined not by qualities and
capabilities, but by relations.158 If this is correct then anyone who prioritizes a capacities
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approach to understanding what it means to be a person would by necessity be looking at
the wrong criteria for personhood. Yet, Buchanan has taken this precise approach to
determine what it means to be a “person.” Harold Baillie makes a similar observation.
Following Aristotle, he takes it that “personhood” is the entelechy of the body –
“personhood” is what makes the body a human body. As far as Baillie is concerned,
genetic enhancements at least threaten that entelechy as it introduces a notion of
inequality across the human spectrum that is currently absent (i.e., is it fair that some
people are genetically altered to be smarter, faster, stronger, healthier, etc.?).159 This is
important because the sorts of inequalities that some enhancement technologies introduce
reconfigure the foundation for how we determine human rights. That is, certain
enhancement technologies change “human nature” and by extension any rights based on
it.160
While I am sympathetic with Buchanan’s argument that “persons rights” is a
threshold concept and once met cannot be violated, I do think that in the enhancement
debate there is a subtlety that is missed in his explanation. Namely, is the correct concern
more appropriately that there could be “competing” notions of goods between the
enhanced and the unenhanced? That is, are there posthuman rights that conflict with mere
human rights? If the answer is “yes” then despite Buchanan’s optimism that there is
nothing for the unenhanced to worry about morally, their concerns would instead be fully
justified.
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4.4.2 Problems with “Human Nature Only”
Basic rights in “personhood” may have its problems, but so does basing rights in
“human nature.” The notion is far from uncontroversial, and below we will examine a
few reasons why “human nature” may not be a sufficient basis for establishing human
rights. There are three main arguments listed. The first holds that the notion of “human
nature” is simply an arbitrary construct – it is ultimately a vacuous notion. What we call
“human nature” has no real content to it. Secondly, it is argued that a sufficient moral
system can be established apart from any notion of “human nature.” Finally, it will be
argued that “human nature” cannot actually establish a telos – hence, the major reason for
accepting the idea of “human nature” in the first place is ill-founded.
4.4.2.1 “Human Nature” is Arbitrary
Just because something is “natural” it does not follow that it is necessarily the
best.161 Nor does appealing to human nature resolve the difficulty between distinguishing
therapy from enhancement (see chapter 6).162 As even transhumanist critic Brent Waters
observes, lines restricting certain types of enhancements from therapies are arbitrary seen
in light of evolutionary reality. How can one claim that natural selection is a “better”
alternative to direct technological engagement? If we must change, why not shape
ourselves into the types of beings we want to be?163 A significant problem for those who
support the notion of “human nature” as some sort of essential quality, tend to beg-the-
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question in favor of that essentialism.164 Essentialism, of course, is often thought to be
incompatible with evolutionary theory – and by extension, an incorrect paradigm by
which to understand human beings.
Further, Buchanan notes that even if there is such a thing as “human nature” this
would not prevent the possibility of pursuing enhancements. For example, even if you
think God has specially created humans with a certain essence, this would seem to
indicate that changing that essence would be to work against God. But this does not
necessarily follow. Enhancement may still be permissible barring some divine command
to not alter some essential “human nature.” Further, the existence of “human nature”
would not mean that some constraint were placed on us to not alter “human nature.” For
where would that constraint derive? If God, then God would need to inform us not to
violate that nature. In light of God not giving that command, we may be free to alter our
nature. Finally, altering some ambiguous “human nature” would not necessarily spell
doom for our idea of what it means to live the “good life.” Indeed, one of the primary
motivations for pursuing enhancements is to achieve and maintain the “good life.”165 So,
not only is “human nature” arbitrary for establishing human rights, but it is arbitrarily
used to limit the possibility of enhancements. For Buchanan and transhumanist
proponents, it is best to jettison the notion of “human nature” altogether.
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4.4.2.2 “Human Nature” is Not Necessary for Morality
Buchanan lists a number of problems for those that appeal to “human nature.”
First, Buchanan notes that utilizing “human nature” as a precondition for moral agency is
problematic. Practical rationality is generally thought to be essential to “human nature”
and it is often the basis for moral deliberation. But practical rationality does not need to
be limited to simply human beings, nor are enhancement proponents advocating the
removal of practical rationality. Indeed, “human nature” is not needed in order to have
practical reason or the ethical system(s) that proceed from it.166
Even if critics of enhancement appeal to some sort of intricate “connectedness” of
human beings (at the biological level) in order to warn against enhancement technologies
upsetting the balance, this is no reason not to pursue enhancements. For some risks may
be wholly worthwhile if we believe the benefits are sufficient. Further, many critics
simply make the assertion without providing any biological basis for the position that we
should not enhance ourselves.167 Further, if the issue is indeed the “extreme
connectedness” of our biological parts, then there is no need to bring “human nature” into
the discussion. This connectedness and biological complexity can be discussed apart from
any sort of essentialism.168 In addition to having no empirical support for this
connectedness, even if it were true, we humans have already altered our condition
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through mundane enhancements – i.e., agriculture, literature, domestication of animals,
etc.169 While the concern for not wanting to disrupt the biological “balance” of human
beings is laudable, it is in fact quite impossible to avoid. The real issue is to what degree
will human beings change, not whether human beings will change.
Further, Buchanan remarks that “human nature” is not feasible as a constraint for
moral reasoning. According to Buchanan, neuro-ethics reveals that our capacity for
altruism may be “limited by our evolved biology.” But rationally and ethically, if ought
implies can, then we should admit that our biology may limit our ability to do. As such,
enhancement may relax our biological moral restraints and allow for us to be more moral.
To actually follow through with oughts.170
4.4.2.3 “Human Nature” Cannot Establish a Proper Telos
Buchanan likewise contests the Aristotelian notion that “goods” are determined
by the “nature” of a thing – in this case “human nature.” Aristotle argued that if some
characteristic was indicative of a being (i.e., reason), then that being could have a good
life only if that characteristic was properly exercised (i.e., chance to utilize reason).171
Now for Buchanan, this understanding is insufficient for addressing the ethics of
enhancement. For, it “neither forbids nor condones enhancements that would alter our
nature.”172 All the Aristotelian position is saying is that the good is relative to a thing’s
nature, but if the nature changes, then so too do its goods. This cannot be an argument
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against enhancement since the loss of “goods” would only apply if the “nature” of the
being did not also change and gain new “goods.”173 For Buchanan (per the transhumanist
agenda), if per chance we were able to develop a technology that was “good,” then we
have the prerogative to pursue said technology even if it necessitates our “nature”
changes (pending, of course, that the projected benefits outweigh the projected risks). To
use an example from Buchanan, perhaps our limited altruism prevents us from opening
up some social realities for people because we are currently too afraid / stubborn to
engage them (e.g., helping to feed the homeless). Enhancement may allow us to express
altruism better.174
In a related vein, Buchanan challenges the notion that “human nature” acts as a
source of substantive moral rules. He spends considerable space explaining this type of
“normative essentialism” confuses judgments of what’s best for humans with judgments
about what is compatible with humanity’s Moral Status and dignity.175 “Normative
essentialism” thus disguises normative claims as descriptive claims. For example, if we
are able to genetically enhance people to the point they are no longer “human,” then we
have crossed a threshold that is objectively bad for humans – humans are engineered out
of existence. But, depending on the genetic enhancement, there may not be anything that
decreases the dignity or moral status of the enhanced beings. Put differently, “normative
173 It could be argued that Buchanan misses the point of the Aristotelian criticism. For example,
perhaps the issue is not that “goods” should change if a being’s “nature” changes, but rather that some
“goods” are so inherently valuable that pursuing a different nature to gain other “goods” is wrong.
Likewise, it could be argued that a being should not bring about a situation that eliminates its ability to
experience certain “goods” – even if those goods are objectively better.
174 Buchanan, Beyond Humanity?, 124. It could be argued, however, that limited altruism may
actually be a benefit as it may act as a type of defense against one being taken advantaged. While it is good
to be altruistic, it is also good to utilize wisdom and discernment in a situation so as to not enable the bad
behavior of someone, nor put oneself in a compromised situation.
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essentialism” is insufficient to account for moral consideration of enhancement
technology. Buchanan then notes a dilemma for the “normative essentialist”: if “human
nature” is rich enough to ground moral rules, then appeal to “human nature” will be too
controversial to be useful (since, moral rules are drastically different for many different
groups); but, if “human nature” so thin that different moral rules can be applied to it, then
“human nature” cannot be the actual grounding of moral rules.176 That is, moral values
are already drastically divergent. Hence, if they derive from some type of “human nature”
then there should be significantly more commonality in moral rules than there are. But if
moral values are already derived apart from “human nature,” then “human nature” is not
needed to ground moral values.
4.5 Conclusion: What Something Is Matters
Buchanan holds that anti-enhancement critics base their objections to
enhancement technology on some kind of fear, and they do so without any empirical
evidence. For example, he says, “Proceeding on the assumption that one should avoid
activities that might produce harmful results is a recipe for paralysis, not prudence.”177 In
response, it depends. What is the activity? And what are some possible harmful results?
Indeed, if the possible harmful results are significant, then avoiding the activity is the
most prudent course of action. Take the following scenario. A doctor is experimenting a
new drug on patients who have an annoying (but not debilitating) condition – say, they
endure severe migraines. The drug has a success rate of ninety-five percent, but the
failure rate of five percent results in near immediate death. Suppose, a thirty-year old
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mother of two visits the doctor and she is a candidate for the experimental drug. She has a
ninety-five percent chance of the drug curing her and a five percent chance of the drug
killing her. What should she do? Would anyone blame her for not wanting to use the
drug? Someone else in the same situation may do so, but it would hardly be imprudent
for someone to decline participating in the activity. Now, of course, Buchanan agrees that
risks have to weighed against the rewards of any enhancement. The issue at hand, though,
is that much of the enhancement debate surrounds philosophical speculation and not just
analysis of strictly empirical data. Indeed, moral imagination is itself not constrained to
strictly empirical data, nor should it be. The scientific method is a powerful tool, but its
scope is limited to empirical data. On the one hand, Buchanan seems unwilling to admit,
the enhancement debate is more than simple reflection on the empirical. On the other
hand, he is correct that a serious exploration into the scientific basis for our moral reasons
and positions must be undertaken. Even though moral exploration is broader than the
scientific data, it cannot be at the expense of empirical observation.
So, it comes to this. What something is matters for that thing’s telos. That telos is
revealed in the thing’s desires, wants, behaviors, and actions – and it cannot be
understood divorced from these notions. Likewise, the context of the thing helps to
interpret its behaviors, desires, and so forth. There are few truly autonomous beings. As
such, treating humans as both wholly autonomous and primarily as merely rational
entities does a disservice to understanding who and what humans are. This is not to
ignore our evolutionary origins, nor is it to deny the scientific data of human beings.
Rather, it is an attempt to place humans in their proper context so that we can have a
holistic account of what is the true human good. Given the arguments above, I am
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inclined to take it that “human nature” is an important concept necessary for determining
human rights and moral values. This, however, must be in a particular context and thus
some form of virtue theory is perhaps the best approach to achieving that end. Likewise,
a proper account of what it means to be human must be established (see chapter 3). Since
that exploration was covered earlier, I am inclined to think that the “personhood” only
approach is a valuable tool for expanding our moral knowledge for beings other than
human. Or at least for those beings that share significant capacities (to greater or lesser
degrees) with humans. Yet, “personhood” is insufficient to establish why humans are
special creatures since often it looks at only a singular issue (e.g., rationality). As such,
“human nature” provides a base understanding of certain rights that cannot be violated,
but it cannot fully establish a moral system that accounts for all other possible beings –
including posthumans. “Personhood,” however, can help develop a moral system that
goes beyond just human beings, but it should not violate the basic thresholds established
by “human nature.” In short, neither “human nature” nor “personhood” alone fully
establish a workable moral system for discussing enhancement technology, even though
both provide valuable input for moving us in that direction.
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Chapter 5
Moral Proposal: An Agency of Relational Responsibility
First it was nature that was ‘neutralized’ with respect to value, then man himself.
Now we shiver in the nakedness of a nihilism in which near-omnipotence is
paired with near-emptiness, greatest capacity with knowing least for what ends to
use it.
— Hans Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, 23
Our sense of responsibility is nothing less than testimony to the fact that we live,
move, and have our being before God. Christian ethics renders this fact explicit,
and thereby provides a way to understand the full meaning and scope of the
responsible life.
— William Schweiker, Responsibility and Christian Ethics, 216
5.1 Introduction
Braden Allenby and Daniel Sarewitz remark that the enhancement debate has
devolved into a tit-for-tat battle in which one side argues that individual choice and
freedom are paramount, while the other side argues that human nature and embodiment
of the individual preclude certain enhancement technologies. Thus, the enhancement
debate has centered almost exclusively on “individual” rights, for even those opposed to
certain enhancements still want to uphold individual rights.1 This is an incomplete view
of human moral action to say the least. However, it is easy to see why the debate has
taken on this character. For modern liberal society places a high value on the “libertarian”
freedoms we all enjoy – individual autonomy and various rights enjoyed by a society’s
members. Allenby and Sarewitz further note that there is a “reductionist rigor” in
discussing individual rights that is just not found in other discussions. But this is
understandable when we look at the alternatives: arguing for an individual right is

1 Braden Allenby and Daniel Sarewitz, The Techno-Human Condition (Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press, 2011), 87.
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concrete – we can make sense of it. However, arguing for “dignity” or “authenticity” is
ambiguous – it is much more malleable and prone to interpretation.2 It is this stress on
individual rights (i.e., autonomy) that enhancement proponents take to be the key
ingredient that previous generations of enhancement proponents missed. They argue that
the individual should have the right to accept or refuse any procedures. This individualrights approach which prioritizes freedom of the will and self-expression is key because it
is we that have given permission for the procedure.3
Another attending concern from this ultra-autonomous approach is that we are
drastically altering our understanding of what it means to be human. What we used to
think of as “human nature” is now commonly thought to be a social construct and thus
just as malleable as our imaginations allow it to be.4 Without being able to appeal to a
common nature, there cannot be a common morality – as such, ideas like individual
autonomy and individual rights rules the day.
The failure to bridge this moral divide is problematic. A well-functioning society
is dependent upon a well-ordered morality to allow full integration of life for its citizens.
However, as Tristram Englehardt notes a fully secular moral vision will resist integration
with certain elements of non-secular morality.5 Given the way modern society has
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progressed it would seem that the secular theorists have succeeded in grounding morality
in rationality. Secular rationality appears triumphant, but it has devolved into many
“rationalities.” There is no common element, and it is not clear whether secular morality
will be able to actually give a moral or metaphysical orientation.6 This waywardness has
resulted in a type of modern nihilism in relation to bioethics (upon which the
enhancement debate is situated) and moral reflection.7
This chapter seeks to provide an answer to this stalemate. It seeks to find the
various elements that could contribute to a language of moral reflection appropriate to the
enhancement debate. To examine this moral landscape I will explore a few elements I
think necessary for proper moral reflection. The end result will be an Agency of
Relational Responsibility (ARR). The first section will look at the various ways in which
human persons should be considered relational beings – we cannot be considered as
wholly autonomous (even granting the importance of autonomy as a moral principle).
Second, we will explore at what is involved in the notion of responsibility. The language
of responsibility is particularly useful for our purposes as it sets proper action within a
context of relationship with others – it establishes a moral rubric. The final section will
look at what it means to be a moral agent, with a particular attention being paid to a
Thomistic understanding of moral action.

justification of morality and the motivation to be moral, or even (4) justify the content of morality. Secular
morality and with it secular bioethics sunder into only partially reintegratable deontological and
teleological moralities. Unlike a religious moral vision grounded in the revelation of a personal, loving,
omniscient, and omnipotent God, a secular morality must be grounded in some generally accessible feature
of immanent reality such as the character of human reason, sympathies, inclinations, or nature.” H.
Tristram Englehardt, Jr. The Foundations of Christian Bioethics (Exton, PA: Swets & Zeitlinger, 2000), 75.
6
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5.2 Human Persons as Relational Beings and in a Living Context
Humans are historically and socially situated beings. We live in a particular time
and place, and within a particular culture. The result is that we are deeply affected by our
social conditions and we reflect the attitudes, beliefs, moods, and zeitgeist of that time.
Often, our most deeply held beliefs are fully attributable to our temporal and particular
location. However, just because we are largely the product of our historical position, this
does not mean that all persons in that environment believe the same thing or act the same
way, nor does it prohibit one from adopting new values and attitudes. What this does
mean is that we start our journey with a particular inclination. Another consequence of
this reality is that the values to which many people hold may be incommensurable with
the value systems to which others adhere. This is especially pronounced in the
enhancement debate, since many of the issues are really about competing value
judgments. Allenby and Sarewitz state the issue well:
The incommensurability of human values and value systems, and the real-world
complexity that makes it so difficult to know how actions in the present will
connect to consequences in the future, are direct and fatal challenges to the belief
that technological enhancement of human cognitive capacities will chart some
new and improved path toward better humanness and humanity. Humans do not
live lives unconnected to other humans, and the outcomes of human enhancement
will depend on the world into which enhanced traits are inserted.8
What they are saying, then, is that humans hold to incommensurate values developed by a
complex network of relationships. Likewise, even if we value the individual person, we
must acknowledge that we are not wholly autonomous – we live in a connected society,
both locally and globally.
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Another way of thinking about this is that human persons are a series of
relationships. Not only are we related at the local and national level, but we are ultimately
connected at the global and cosmic level on the large scale, and we are (in a real sense)
connected to our very selves at the most minute scale. We are relational beings, and it is
because we are relational that some critics of transhumanism fear it so much. They see
enhancement technologies as a way of mitigating our relationships – not improving them.
Celia Dean-Drummond makes this point while criticizing Nick Bostrom. She remarks
that transhuman philosophy, as promoted by Bostrom, divorces the mind from the body
(as it is a physicalistic and materialistic viewpoint) separating us from ourselves, but also
it divorces persons from society, separating us from others.9 For Dean-Drummond,
enhancement technologies break down relationships, it does not foster them.
Because we are relational beings, we need to examine the various relationships in
which we are currently involved. By studying how human persons view and relate to the
world, we can have a better grasp of how we should proceed with an appropriate moral
language. To that end, this section will build on the understanding of human beings as
established in chapter 3 by developing a working moral account of human persons.
Further, we will explore the cosmic, global, and local relationships that influence human
values. Finally, we will say something about how one’s (non) view of the divine shapes
their value system.

9 Celia Dean-Drummond, “Taking Leave of the Animal? The Theological and Ethical Implications
of Transhuman Projects,” in Transhumanism and Transcendence: Christian Hope in an Age of
Technological Enhancement, ed. by Ronald Cole-Turner (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press,
2011), 123.
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5.2.1 A Working Understanding of Human Persons
Chapter 3 has already put forward a proposal for an ontological understanding of
human beings as ensouled persons. This section will now explore the moral element that
comprises human persons. William Schweiker takes it as a basic assumption that human
persons are agents related to the world in a quest for wholeness and are interrelated in
two ways: first, to the world as a whole reality, and secondly as an individual trying to
make sense of the chaos in our individual lives. We are essentially fragmented beings
seeking wholeness.10 Likewise, for Schweiker the term “person” means a being that
respects multidimensional goods which permeate one’s life. Persons are “complex
creatures struggling for wholeness in relation to others” since our social relationships
bear directly to our own experience of what is “good.”11 As social beings, even the term
“person” has a social designation since we are moral beings – we are “role-bearing
individuals.” That is, we incur obligations that are owed to others.12
In the enhancement debate, the term “person” has taken on primarily an
autonomous and rationalistic role. Thus, the tendency is to remove human persons from
their social context. The issue is not that technology is not useful, nor is it that technology
cannot serve real goods in our lives, but the fear is that technology will break down the
fundamental relationships that make us human – individually and socially. Indeed, one
fear is that technology may lead us to see others as commodities and not as persons in
themselves. Recalling Emmanuel Levinas, Christina Bieber Lake notes that technology

10

Schweiker, Responsibility and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995),
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can “hide” the “face” of the other – and in essence, diminishing our moral obligation to
others.13 This need for the “face” of the other underlies Schweiker’s insistence that the
human person is “at its simplest level” a “Living body.” Human persons can be “seen,
touched, heard, and encountered.”14 That is, we are fully relational beings. As such, our
responsibility to others “arises from embodied existence” as we respond to the needs of
others in which we engage.15 As Schweiker summarizes it, “It is thanks to our bodies that
we are situated in the world as relational, vulnerable beings.”16 The role of embodied
existence cannot be overstated.
Thus, in a moral sense the term “person” means an “embodied human being” who
is “responsible” for their “incarnate life.”17 Associated with the ideas of embodiment and
being responsible in a social setting are the notions that this involves some concept of
personal identity as well as a robust understanding of love. First, identity is essential for
responsible living in society, since we must view “ourselves” as being in relation with
“others.” This duality of sorts establishes the underpinnings for obligations due to social
members. I “owe” it others to behave in a certain way, and they “owe” it to me to do the
same. This notion of personal identity makes the exercise of genuine freedom possible.18
Second, the notion of “love” can serve as a basic category of action towards others.
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Lake, Prophets of the Posthuman, 70.
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Schweiker, Responsibility and Christian Ethics, 160.
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17 Ibid., 162. The use of the phrase “incarnate” intentionally calls forth Jesus’ incarnation – God
become flesh (John 1:14).
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Classically, love was understood as “willing the good of the other.” The “good,” of
course, will be largely debated along one’s value system. The “other,” however, is the
embodied individual before you. And the “other” must be loved as they are, not as you
would have them to be.19 For if you must change them to find them “lovable,” then you
are not willing their good, but your own comfort.
5.2.2 Human Persons in Cosmic, Global, and Local Context
Individual human persons live at particular times and places. Indeed, as
Schweiker says, “Persons exist as selves in a moral space of relations through time.”20
Persons are relational and relative to their cosmic, global, and local situation. Hence, any
moral conditions laid upon human persons must entail that their responsibility for their
actions be consistent with the time and place of their action.21 Because humans are
historical and social creatures, it follows that human actions cannot be separated from the
context in which they occur. And the context for human action at the broadest
consideration is the cosmic level. That is, what is the human person’s place in the
universe? The universe, like the human, should be viewed holistically.22 Indeed, it makes
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Lake, Prophets of the Posthuman, 53.
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Schweiker, Responsibility and Christian Ethics, 167.

21 For example, a common mill worker in the industrial revolution is not morally responsible for
either the actions of a caveman before him, or the computer programmer after him. The mill worker is
ordinarily thought to be responsible for his actions alone. Ibid.,167.
22 As Charles Pinches puts it, “This is not a world separate from the world of human bodies and,
indeed, all the physical stuff of God’s creation, but rather one inextricably intertwined with it since, as the
pope [John Paul II] reiterates in the encyclical [Veritatis Splendor], human beings are created by God as a
unity of body and soul. This unity can never be broken if any full sense is to be made of human action.”
Charles R. Pinches, Theology and Action: After Theory in Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: William B.
Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2002), 73.
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all the difference whether we see human persons as mere specks of cosmic dust or as
precious beings bearing God’s image.23
Closer to home, however, we are more readily related to the globe. Over the past
couple of centuries, humanity has truly become a global creature.24 Whether one is
buying goods in another country, trading information, or engaging in tourism,
globalization is a reality and our neighbors are no longer those in our own provinces, but
in countries across the oceans. All of humanity is now our neighbor, and we bear a
responsibility to treat each of them with dignity – both through direct action, and indirect
choices.25
Schweiker notes that for most of human history it was difficult (if not impossible)
to “see that persons in one part of the world might be responsible for conditions of life
elsewhere on the planet.”26 Indeed, given the relatively minor impact of a silver smith in

23 I am reminded of the famed atheist Bertrand Russell’s statement that a philosophy that is not
founded on the hopelessness of cosmic meaninglessness could not possibly stand. He says, “That Man is
the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his
hopes and fears, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that all the labours [sic] of the
ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to
extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of Man’s achievement must
inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins – all these things, are so nearly certain, that no
philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the
firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul’s habitation henceforth be safely built.” Bertrand
Russell, Selected Papers of Bertrand Russell (New York: Random House, 1927), 3, quoted in William
Lane Craig, God Are You There? Five Reasons God Exists and Three Reasons It Makes a Difference
(Norcross, GA: RZIM, 1999), 5.
24 Given modern technology it is possible to be at any other point on Earth within twenty-four
hours. Whereas in the distant past some trips were impossible, and only much later on, the trip would take
years or months. Today, these once “impossible” journeys can be accomplished in mere hours. Not only are
we able to move about the Earth much quicker, but we can impact the lives of others around the globe
much faster.
25 For example, I should be careful with how much I pollute the environment since it affects more
than just myself. The world is now a global culture, and we must adapt to this new global reality. For an
example of how the global impacts the local and vice versa, see Robert J. Schreiter, The New Catholicity:
Theology Between the Global and the Local (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2004).
26
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England it is difficult to see how his actions could affect those of a tribesman in Papua
New Guinea. Nevertheless, small scale changes can accumulate over time and take a
global affect – even if minor. A social “butterfly-effect” if you will. Likewise, given this
global impact Langdon Winner reminds us that given the types of creatures we are, our
history and future prospects are intricately linked to this “blue planet that revolves around
the Sun.”27 We would do well to take care of what we have, for both “our happiness and
our good depend on the fulfillment of our social nature, and virtue requires society both
for its formation and its expression.”28 The context of our actions – their “home” as it
were – is this planet, thus making this a communal world with a communal story.29 The
story of Planet Earth is our story, and our story is a tale of this pale blue planet.
While we are both cosmic and global beings our immediate sphere of influence
and impact is our immediate culture. Indeed, in contrast to the cosmic and global, the
local community is used to identify a body of men and women bound together by
common moral traditions and / or practices around a shared vision of the good life, which
allows them to collaborate as moral friends.30 As Pinches remarks, morality is intricately
bound to a community. A communal language shapes and influences how one
understands their role in society, and determines to a large degree how they act. 31
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Winner, “Resistance is Futile,” 405—406.

28 Lisa Sowle Cahill, “Nature, Sin, and Society,” in Is Human Nature Obsolete? Genetics,
Bioengineering, and the Future of the Human Condition, ed. by Harold W. Baillie and Timothy K. Casey
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005), 339.
29 Pinches puts it like this, “the context of my human action, its home, is not set solely by my
intentions or even my individual story, but by the human world I inhabit, which is necessarily a communal
world, with a communal history.” Pinches, Theology and Action, 165.
30
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Schweiker concurs and states that notions of moral responsibility only make sense within
a community expressing a common outlook on the world.32 Because humans are
relational beings at the cosmic, global, and local level, any changes to the human person
should be made with these various relations in mind. Our individual acts in a quest for
“self-improvement” may adversely affect many others and greater society.
5.2.3 Human Persons in Relation to the Divine
There is one last relational aspect to human persons that must be examined – the
relationship human persons have to the divine reality. The trend in Western society and
reflected in contemporary ethics is a reduction in the influence of the Judeo-Christian
concept of theism – both its effect on culture and as a “source of value.”33 Yet, a
Christian understanding of human persons cannot operate from any other foundation than
to say that “we are created from dust of the ground — finite beings who are limited by
biological necessities and historical location. We are also free spirits, moved by the lifegiving Spirit of God, created ultimately for communion with God — and therefore
soaring beyond any limited understanding of our person in terms of presently ‘given’
conditions of life.”34 We frail beings are creatures made for communion with God.
Even though the trend in Western society is to reject classical notions of God, the
same trends show an increased awareness of one’s own “spirituality.” People are
rejecting older religious forms and adopting newer spiritual ones. However, even here
Schweiker notes that people are not just becoming “theists in general.” For these persons
32

Schweiker, Responsibility and Christian Ethics, 213.
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are shaped by a given “tradition of thought and life.” Indeed, he says that all discussion
about God and moral reality is situated in “the ultimate context of human existence” and
thus these discussions are molded by those human traditions.35 As such, even in rejecting
traditional religious notions of God, modern society is shaped by and reflects those
traditional notions. Stated differently, modern society has not fully jettisoned the bonds of
a Judeo-Christian notion of God.
But does modern society even need a conception of God in order to develop some
ethical basis? Indeed, Schweiker notes that in terms of developing an ethical system,
there is “nothing distinctive about Christian ethics.”36 However, he also notes that
Christian ethics is theistic and affects ethics at the worldview level. That is, Christian
theism offers the perspective by which one can judge what is or is not the “good life.”
Indeed, for the Christian it is one’s relation to God that establishes the “rules and norms
of conduct.”37 Stated another way, what we call the “ethical good” is “nothing else than
to constitute one’s life and community in God.”38 One’s understanding of God, does
indeed, play a role in how one shapes their ethics.
Finally, what it means to be an individual is largely determined by how we see
ourselves related (or not) to God. Meileander remarks that what makes us “true
individuals” is the fact that it is God that calls us individually. Thus, our individuality is
not an achievement attributable to our own prowess, but a result of being in “community
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with God.”39 It is because of this fundamental need for a relationship and communion
with God that many Christians have avoided “any attempt to overcome our nature” as this
would be considered “playing God.”40
5.3 The Language of an Ethics of Responsibility
Moral systems presuppose some level of obligation one person has for another. I
am obligated by moral reality to not harm you unnecessarily, and you likewise have the
same obligation not to harm me. This notion of obligation is nicely encapsulated by the
idea of “responsibility.” In the mid twentieth-century the idea of responsibility ethics
gained prominence within certain circles. The basic idea for this approach is summarized
well by Schweiker, to “be a moral agent is to be responsible for oneself, and perhaps
others, in and through responding to others and being accountable for bringing something
into being or acting on behalf of others through the exercise of power.”41 Elsewhere he
notes that an ethics of responsibility is concerned about the “realities” which form the
living situation of those “to, with, and for whom agents are responsible.”42
An ethic of responsibility attempts to be “deeply realistic” – that is,
thoroughgoingly pragmatic in its approach. It attempts to account for the lived realities of
the human condition and their real options for action and aspiration. The cost of holding
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Meilaender, Bioethics, 2.

40 Matthew Zaro Fisher, “More Human Than the Human? Toward a ‘Transhumanist’ Christian
Theological Anthropology,” in Religion and Transhumanism: The Unknown Future of Human
Enhancement, ed. by Calvin Mercer and Tracy J. Trothen (Denver, CO: Praeger, 2015), 24.
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42 William Schweiker, “Responsibility and Moral Realities,” Studies in Christian Ethics 22, no. 4
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this type of system, however, is that it requires a theologically cogent backdrop.43 This
type of system requires a de-anthropocentrism, recognizing that humans are not the
center of the moral universe. Morality is shared among multiple beings – thus, humans
are not the measure of what is “good.”44
A coherent notion of responsibility will connect the agent of an action with the
action itself. Likewise, there must be a level of responsiveness to the lived reality the
person is in. Remember, persons do not act in a moral vacuum. By accounting for these
ideas, an ethics of responsibility can provide a language of ethics agreeable to persons
from various backgrounds and cultures. It can also provide a way to think about real
human possibilities as an expression of their moral power.45 According to Schweiker a
robust ethics of responsibility will be able to perform multiple tasks: first, it provides a
new way to discuss “longstanding” ethical problems; second, it allows for theologians
and ethicists to account for the complexity of integrating varying cultural realities and
philosophical differences; and third, a robust ethic of responsibility can provide a way to
properly speak of God’s actions in the world and how it relates to God. “In sum,” he says,
“responsibility ethics enables the theologian or the believer to reflect on the orientation of
life in relation to the living God amid the actions and relations that constitute the moral
space of life.”46
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Bernd Wannenwetsch remarks that the term “responsibility” is useful for
“concealing the lack of clarity in the substance matter.”47 We may like the term
responsibility, but we must also recognize that this is a morally saturated word and we are
just as likely to assume it means certain things to some when it does not. With this
warning in mind, we can nevertheless still use the term for moral discussion. Gerald
McKenny notes that “responsibility” is an effective term to help “limit the ambitions and
self-assertion of the modern moral subject” as well as “address the paradoxical
coincidence of expanded human power and diffusion of moral agency characteristic of
contemporary societies.”48 In other words, the term responsibility – despite its morally
saturated nature – is a useful heuristic to: set limits on human action, and frame issues of
contemporary justice.
Responsibility can thus act as a regulator of sorts that helps us relate power to
personal and social goods – which is particularly significant in today’s society given how
much power is available through the use of modern technology.49 When coupled with the
decline in religious sentiment, “the good” is in particular danger. Now, for mid-twentieth
century Christian ethicists responsibility had two purposes: morally evaluate human
freedom; and provide principles of moral reflection.50 Below will be an examination of

47 Bernd Wannenwetsch, “‘Responsible Living’ or ‘Responsible Self’? Bonhoefferian Reflections
on a Vexed Moral Notion,” Studies in Christian Ethics 18, no. 3 (2005): 126.
48 Gerald P. McKenny, “Responsibility,” in The Oxford Handbook of Theological Ethics. Ed. by
Gilbert Meilaender and William Werpehowski (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 252.
49
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the role of responsibility for Christian ethics today, as well as an exploration into the
elements of responsibility – imputability, accountability, and liability.
5.3.1 The Role of Responsibility
John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza remark that the idea of “taking
responsibility” is an authentically historical notion which is revealed by “three major
ingredients”: first, the individual must see themselves as the source of their behavior –
they must take ownership of their actions. They must see themselves as a moral agent;
second, the individual must recognize that they are the target of reactive actions to their
own actions. The individual has a causal influence on the world and should anticipate
reactions to their causal influence; and finally, the individual’s view of self must be based
on the “evidence” – that is, the facts of their past actions.51
For Fischer and Ravizza, responsibility is associated with two types of control:
regulative and guidance. Regulative control is a type of libertarian freedom in which the
operative idea is that there are alternative possibilities for action.52 Fischer and Ravizza
focus mainly on Guidance control as Regulative control is too unmoored from one’s
social situation. As such, they see Guidance control is the central paradigm for
understanding responsibility.
There are two elements to fully understand Guidance control: the “ownership” of
the agent’s behavior; and the “reasons-responsiveness” of that behavior.53 Now for

51 Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 210-213, 238.
52 For example, I can love my children or alternatively beat them. Guidance control does not
address “alternative possibilities.” Ibid., 240.
53
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Fischer and Ravizza, individuals make behaviors their own when they take responsibility
for their behaviors.54 Taking responsibility means that at some point in life, a behavior or
a moral mechanism of some sort acts as a “standing policy” for that person.55 It is I, it is
me that engages is this behavior – this is my action(s). I have a belief that x action will
result in y. Thus, it is me that does x to gain y.56
The second component of guidance control is recognizing that there are different
ways to respond to actions – various reasons why people respond as they do to a
situation. Now, as persons have a reasons-responsiveness to any given action, they could
take either a strong stance or a weak stance. A strong response is morally demanding and
perhaps impossible since it requires a necessary reaction to any given action – not just a
possible reaction. As such, a strong stance would seem to mitigate the responsibility of
the reacting agent. A weak stance on the other hand requires far too little in the way of
responsible reaction.57 What is needed as an appropriate “in between” stance between the
strong and weak reasons-responsiveness – a “moderate reasons-responsiveness.” This
middle-ground approach to responsiveness is the hallmark of Aristotelian virtue ethics – a
search for the golden mean between extremes.58 Thus, there is a definite connection
between a search for responsible living and virtue ethics – the attempt to walk a
mediating path.
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5.3.2 Accountability, Imputability, and Liability
There are multiple conditions that contribute to a notion of responsibility, and it
should not be simply reduced to one aspect. For example, responsibility should not be
considered only an expression of the “forensic dimension” of accountability, for there is
more to responsibility than simply applying this legal aspect – Wannenwetsch notes that
it should also include an active listening for a divine call “that provokes a response.”59
While this may certainly be part of what it means to be responsible, there is surely more
to the concept than either accountability or listening for a “divine call.”60
For our purposes there are two conditions normally thought necessary to attribute
moral responsibility to some agent: a freedom-relevant condition and an epistemic
condition.61 Regarding the freedom-relevant condition (i.e., pertaining to the will), three
aspects must hold. First, “a person is morally responsible for his action only if he has free
will. . . . Second, . . . ‘free will’ is an expression of art, and that saying that someone has
free will is not intended to entail that he has a will with the property of being free. . . .
Third, . . . free will is connected with free action. Thus, a person has (or had) free will if
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60 Suppose for a moment that a person is morally responsible for some action – what are the
conditions that hold in which it is appropriate to associate praise or blame with that person? By what
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O’Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein, “Action, Ethics, and Responsibility: A Framework,” in Action, Ethics,
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and only if some of his actions are (or were) free.”62 Stated differently, for responsibility
to hold the agent must be expressing their free will (whatever that entails), which does
not necessarily have to be understood in a libertarian sense, but must allow for some
“free” action (in order for the action to rightfully be claimed by the agent).
Most philosophers understand free will in a libertarian sense – the absolute ability
to do otherwise. Some philosophers call this sense of freedom the “alternative possibility
of action.”63 And this gives rise to “the Principle of Alternative Possibilities”: “The
Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) A person is morally responsible for what he
has done only if he could have done otherwise.”64 There is a seductive element to this
definition, for we often want to say that we are free to do otherwise, but the reality is
much more limited – there are some actions that are simply beyond our ability, even if
they are not beyond our imagination.65 Once these factors are taken into account, it would
appear that the PAP is insufficient for accounting for free will.66

62 Campbell, O’Rourke, and Silverstein, “Action, Ethics, and Responsibility: A Framework,” 1
(emphasis in original).
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65 To take a morbid example, do I have the ability to kill my children? If the question is asked as a
simple matter of physics, the answer is “yes.” I am much larger and stronger than all of my children and,
therefore, it is assumed under PAP that killing my children is a real possibility. However, there is more to
the question than simply the physics of the matter. Do I have the moral and epistemological character to
murder my children? That is, do I have the disposition, the desire, and the motive to perform such a heinous
act – “no.”
66 For in a very real sense, I do not have the “alternative possibility” of murdering my children.
Because of this reality, PAP would say that I am not free, but surely not being able to murder my children
in cold blood is actually significantly more freeing than having that be a real live possibility! I am free to
love my children, without fear of intentionally harming them – what could be more freeing? Whereas if
PAP is correct, I should be in constant fear that one of my possible actions would be to wring their life
from their tiny body! That is not freedom – that is bondage.
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The main problem with the libertarian notion of freedom then is that it divorces
the individual from their lived reality. However, one can have a free will and yet not be
constrained by some form of PAP, for one can be free within certain epistemological
limits. As noted above, there is a free will dimension and an epistemological dimension.
Libertarian accounts of freedom stress the free will aspect of behavior but tend to neglect
the epistemological aspect of it.67
George Sher remarks that human deliberation on action is not a matter of truth but
of pragmatics – what should we do? For any deliberation will attempt to account for the
reasons beneficial and problematic for some action. Likewise, it will attempt to predict
the reactions of others and how that may affect our goals and desires. Further, this entails
that we are able to reflect on the act itself and that it is a real option for us to undertake.
As such, it would seem to follow that we can be responsible only for those actions by
which we are antecedently aware of their possible affects.68 Indeed, being aware of the
possible consequences of any given action is the key quality of responsibility.
Responsibility has three aspects: accountability, imputability, and liability.
Accountability means “being responsible to y.” Necessarily, there is a subject and an
object for responsibility to occur. Some subject x is responsible to object y. That is, I am
responsible to not harm you. I am responsible to help you in times of distress.
Accountability in these instances mean that there is an obligation of some sort that I must
fulfill to you. Of course, multiple strands of obligations may be at play at any given

67 I am epistemologically incapable of murdering my children, but this does not mean that I am not
free. I can be responsible for the limited set of possible actions available to my epistemological horizon –
even if I literally cannot have chosen certain alternatives.
68
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moment, but when we bracket the particular situation we can make sense of the
accountable relationship. Some theories of responsibility play up the internalization of
conscience rather than external action. That is, these theories focus on the interior act of
the agent. Other theories of responsibility focus on the object of the act – the receiver of
the action. These theories stress to whom the action is done as the appropriate locus of
responsible reflection.69 Given the understanding of accountability being responsible to
an object I tend to side with the second understanding of accountability. This does not
mean that the interior act of the agent is not important. Rather, this means that
accountability is not determined by the interior act. It is the object that places the
obligation on the agent, thus creating the need for being accountable. The interior
conscience of the agent does matter in determining a responsible act just as much as the
obligation that is placed on the agent by the subject of the act – but not for considering
accountability. Both aspects are needed to have a full account of a given responsible
action. It is the obligation placed on the agent by the object that allows us to truthfully
say that the “agent is accountable to the object.”
Related to accountability is imputability, which means “x is responsible.”
Accountability is the grounding for imputability, and while related, must be distinguished
from accountability. Accountability focused on the object of the act, but imputability
focuses on the agent. Even though we can make this distinction for evaluative purposes,
do not mistake this as being separable in reality. Each moral act includes both
accountability and imputability. We may be able to distinguish these aspects rationally,
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but they cannot be separated in reality.70 Indeed, since moral acts are social acts there is
no understanding of imputability that does not involve the community (and ultimately,
God), for it is to the community to which we ultimately answer and are either praised or
blamed by that community for our actions.71 That is, the community ultimately imputes
upon us (in a legal sense) praise or blame for our actions. And even this praise or blame
is assigned only after a lifetime of ethical evaluation of the whole person.72 Imputability
therefore is necessary to assign praise or blame to an individual, and is determined over
the moral lifetime of the agent as recognized by the community.
Whereas accountability focuses on the object, and imputability focuses on the
agent, liability focuses on the outcome of the act. When an agent performs some act
(either noble or heinous) what they do is what they are liable for. This is concerned with
the consequences of the action.73 If I ram my car into a power pole thus knocking power
out to the surrounding neighborhood, then I am liable for the damage the lack of power
causes to those homes. Since it is the fallout of my (poor) action – even though
unintentional – it was still my action that led to the outage. Thus, I am held responsible
for that action. Likewise, suppose that I encouraged some destructive behavior even
though I did not perform the act itself. Suppose I urged someone (as a joke) to knock out
the power to the neighborhood, but the resulting power outage caused significant harm.
Then even in this instance I am liable since I contributed to the problem even though I
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did not perform the action myself.74 Thus, it is important to note that we generally hold
people liable not only for actions they perform, but for failing to act rightly when they are
expected to.75 Hence, I can be liable for not performing an act just as much as committing
some act.
5.3.3 Models of Responsibility
5.3.3.1 Catholic: John Paul II – Veritatis Splendor
Humanity has a genuine autonomy, but it is only fully expressed when it operates
under the dictates of a moral law. For John Paul II, “Human freedom and God’s law meet
and are called to intersect.”76 Humanity is most free when it submits to the moral law of
God, for then humanity is at its most free to love with abandon.77 Actions based on our
choices reveals our spiritual condition.78 When we act morally good we are making
choices that conform to the true good (as established by God). Likewise, poor actions are
divergence from the true good (as established by God). For humanity’s true good is found
in its ultimate end – God. Hence, any other end (however noble) will fail to be the true
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good of the person. Thus, if one seeks happiness, then it can only be found by being
conformed to the good that brings one into communion with God.79
Because humanity has God as its end, this entails that the human moral life is
basically teleological in nature.80 Now, any teleological act is only as good as the object
to which it is directed.81 Further, this action not only shows a unity between reason, will,
and action, but it assumes a type of unity of the actor – the one performing the action.
John Paul II is seeking a holistic notion of morality, in the same way he seeks a holistic
notion of human nature. As such, the body and soul cannot be separated, nor can the
moral act from the reason and will that precede it.82 This holism of the person and action
cannot and should not be divorced when considering moral actions. It is for this reason
that John Paul II rejects the idea of saying that an action is good only if the intention is
good. A good intention is important (and necessary) for a good action, but it is not itself
sufficient for determining if any action is good per se.83

79

Ibid., 72.

80

Ibid., 73.

81

Ibid., 78.

82

Ibid., 49.

83 Ibid., 78. Therefore, John Paul II rejects proportionalism and physicalism as sufficient moral
theories. Proportionalists reject the notion that an action can be determined as good or bad by considering
the object of the act. Hence, we could not say if a given killing were right or wrong until we were able to
consider the intention and consequences of the action. Physicalism rejects the existence of moral law in
general and hence is a non-starter for the Catholic pontiff. “One must therefore reject the thesis,
characteristic of teleological and proportionalist theories, which holds that it is impossible to qualify as
morally evil according to its species — its ‘object’ — the deliberate choice of certain kinds of behavior or
specific acts, apart from a consideration of the intention for which the choice is made or the totality of the
foreseeable consequences of that act for all persons concerned. The primary and decisive element for
moral judgment is the object of the human act, which establishes whether it is capable of being ordered to
the good and to the ultimate end, which is God.” Ibid., 79 (emphasis in original).

271

Charles Pinches remarks that Veritatis Splendor is important for our purposes if
for no other reason than it affirmed that there are such things as “intrinsically evil acts.” 84
John Paul II addresses often what he sees as the errors of proportionalism, while putting
forth a form of natural law – which is itself often criticized for being too physicalist.85
John Paul II clearly wants to account for intention as part of the moral consideration of
persons, and actually argues that claiming natural law is reducible to simply physical
biological laws is wrong.86 What John Paul II wants to avoid is making persons nothing
more than simply their will – that is, pure intention.87
For John Paul II, human freedom and moral actions are subsequent to establishing
the body’s necessity. As such, discussion of moral actions appear to some as no more
than an attempt to justify the physical acts of the body, even though the pope’s intent is to
deny the “merely physical” aspect of human action.88 “In the end, however, the somewhat
slippery use of ‘intention’ in VS [Veritatis Splendor] does not cause it to fall in any clear
way into physicalism. In no passage does the pope imply that the object of the act is
rightly and completely described in terms of a series of bodily movements.”89
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John Paul II understands the mind and body in an ensoulment capacity as
discussed in chapter 3. The mind and body are unified. The body is not simply an
instrument, but integral to who the person is and how their actions are to be interpreted.
From the preceeding we can draw three implications. First, human freedom is not wholly
captured by the idea of autonomy. For, second, that freedom is tied to objective features
of reality which limits it. Finally, what makes an action right or wrong is if it is ordered to
the human good – that is, it is teleological in nature.
5.3.3.2 Protestant 1: H. Richard Niebuhr – The Responsible Self
The basic idea for H. Richard Niebuhr’s notion of responsibility can be found in
Douglas Ottati’s summation, “Agents act in response to actions upon them.”90 Humans
are ultimately responders to their environmental situation, and the one who responds and
is accountable for their (re)actions is the moral agent. For Niebuhr responsibility entails
taking ownership of one’s actions. That is, one is responsible for actions when they
accept the consequences of their actions and look forward to future reactions to their
involvement.91 For Niebuhr there are four elements to responsibility: response,
interpretation, accountability, and social solidarity.92 Response, is the ability to account
for and act accordingly given a particular situation. We are responsible for how we
respond to our situation. The second element is properly interpreting the situation so that
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one is able to respond in the proper way.93 The third element, accountability, carries a
“legal” ring to it and refers to the self-conduct aspect of our actions. In a sense it attempts
to anticipate responses and reactions to our (re)actions, but this leads to the fourth
element – social solidarity. Because humans are social creatures we often (though not
always!) attempt to act in the best interest of society as a whole. We adopt policies,
attitudes, and dogmas reflective of the types of societies we want to foster. These four
elements contribute to our understanding of what it means to be responsible. The giveand-take nature of action and reaction is the heart of Niebuhr’s notion of responsibility.
5.3.3.3 Protestant 2: William Schweiker – Responsibility and Christian Ethics
For Schweiker, the notion of responsibility is essential for any proper notion of
“self.” This is because we are social beings and our relationships with others are very
much measured by how we interact in our social environment. Given this network of
relationships, he sees responsibility as a wholly appropriate way to evaluate how well we
interact with others.94 Further, responsibility is important because it requires a view of
reality that allows for: 1) appropriate metaphysical beliefs; and 2) interacting agents
which can deliberate and suffer (or enjoy) the results of their decisions.95
Responsibility is essential to an authentic moral life.96 It can provide a “root
metaphor” for understanding moral action.97 That is, it can provide a locus from which
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various aspects of moral action can be considered.98 And this is done so that human
persons can seek some semblance of wholeness “through the exercise of power.”99 There
are different ways that power is “exercised, shared, evaluated, and justified” and
responsibility offers a language of discourse for evaluating human conduct and
conflict.100 Discussion of power is important because without some form of power agents
are unable to act – that is, moral agents cannot be truly accountable for their (in)actions if
they do not have the power to perform or refuse any given action.101
Discussions of power attribution are even more pertinent in our modern
technologically advanced society. At no point in the past was it possible for more
individuals to utilize more power in more destructive (or beneficial!) ways than today.
Today’s technologically empowered citizens bear a burden of responsibility for global
society unknown in previous generations.102 One major downside to such power seeking
is that it has effectively decreased the individual citizen’s recognition of their
responsibility to others throughout the globe.103 That is, people are not worried how their
actions and pursuit of power will affect others the world over, so long as they are able to
“get theirs.” Schweiker notes the irony of it all: “The irony of the technological age is
that with the increase of human power the goodness of existence is affirmed in human
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action while the policies which direct such action demean and destroy the possibility of
continued existence on this planet.”104 What is going to be the challenge for society is
how to utilize technology responsibly – how to enhance life rather than diminish it.
How then will we know if someone is being responsible (i.e., moral) in their use
of power? For Schweiker, then, moral actions flow “from character, and moral character
is shaped and constituted through social practices and discourse which mediates those
practices.”105 We both shape and are shaped by our social practices. Likewise, the basis
for all moral action is a notion of respect.106 Respect is an honoring, or a prioritizing, of
some principle, practice, or policy. Without respect, there can be no responsibility, and,
hence, no truly moral action.
This leads Schweiker to discuss what he calls the “imperative of responsibility.”
This notion has multiple aspects and each plays a role in understanding what he means by
the “imperative of responsibility.” First, it means “that in all actions and relations we
ought to respect and enhance the dimensions of value and their integration into a coherent
and truthful way of life.”107 The base understanding here is the need to improve life for
those with which we relate, but this must be done so with an eye to what is true and good.
Second, “The imperative of responsibility is a critical principle for judging current ways
of life and social relations. It specifies not only how we ought to live, but also what forms
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of life ought never to be lived.”108 That is, a proper notion of responsibility can allow us
to make appropriate judgments about actions and ways of living that are or fail to be
responsible. It allows us to say that some actions are unwise and irresponsible, as well as
to praise actions that demonstrate responsibility. Third, the “imperative of responsibility”
takes it as axiomatic that living a human life is good.109 This implies that there is some
objective characteristic to moral thought as affirming the good avoids mere subjective
preference. Likewise, there is the assumption that humanity has some universalizable
element, since it is “humanity” and not just any specific person or group that is to be
honored.110 Finally, the “imperative of responsibility” is universal since “all moral values
can be specified with respect to these forms of the imperative.”111 An imperative is
formal or rational command that resists violation. Kant’s categorical imperative cannot be
violated without undermining rationality itself (according to Kant). Likewise, the
“imperative of responsibility” cannot be violated without undermining responsibility
itself.
The Christian approach to an ethic of responsibility, then, draws on the insight
from the tradition to gain principles, attitudes, dispositions, and the like. Different
systems may arrive at similar principles as Christianity, and this shows that there is a
difference of degree between various moral systems, not differences in kind. There are
similar notions of good, virtue, justice, etc. the world over. These are not just uniquely
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Christian notions. As such, it is possible for Christians to engage with and contribute
moral insight to communities that are not traditionally Christian.112 No doubt, that
Christian moralists must address (or evade) criticisms of religion and Christianity, and
likewise must translate Christian principles into a vernacular familiar to the target
society. This can be especially challenging given the global wide skepticism that
pervades many societies.113 However, responsibility remains a robust concept from which
to discuss morality as many people accept the pre-critical idea that we are accountable for
our own actions, and that we are accountable to someone (or something) else as a
prerequisite for understanding what is or is not responsible.114 Thus, responsibility is a
wholly appropriate category of moral reflection.
Moral agency is essential for any theory of responsibility, for without “some
measure of control over their behavior,” moral agency makes little sense, much less any
notion of responsibility.115 Agential theories of responsibility focus on the acting agents
power to perform some action, and assigns praise or blame as appropriate.116 As such,
any theory of agency must make the connections that the agent is a cause in the world
(i.e., the agent can affect change), and the agent is held responsible for their actions.117
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An essential component to a theory of responsibility is a notion of human
efficacy. If someone is to be held morally responsible for some action, they minimally
could be said to have had the ability “to do otherwise.” If an agent was compelled to act,
or was under duress, or forced to act by some other factor, or they were ignorant of
relevant facts, etc., then we say their ability to do otherwise was “mitigated.” Thus, if
their ability to choose has been compromised, “it is difficult to hold that agent morally
responsible.”118 “Voluntariness” is often contrasted to “compulsion” – it is my action that
is performed irrespective of certain influences. I am the one who wrought some deed. It
can be said that one “acts voluntarily even if internal passion for some good overrides
better judgment.”119 Because of the voluntariness of moral action, the only mitigating
factors of responsibility are compulsion and ignorance.120
It is important to remember that moral identity is not determined by the mere fact
that one is an agent. Our self-understanding of our moral lives is contingent and can
change – even though having some sense of self-understanding is logically necessary for
a moral agent. The point is, while moral agents must have some sense of moral identity,
there is no necessary perception that one must have any particular moral identity. As
Schweiker notes, in theory “we can change or revise our self-understanding and thus our
identities.”121 This is true moral freedom – being in control of our moral lives. It is not
being free of all influences.
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5.3.3.3.1 The Integrity of Life
For Schweiker, being responsible has one major goal – to enhance “the integrity
of life.” Responsibility expresses a common set of moral values, which in turn, respects
and enhances the lives of those within the purview of the acting agent. The shared set of
moral values arise from within the various communities shaped by global realities.122 By
the phrase “the integrity of life,” Schweiker means the overall “good of persons,
communities, and the ecosphere as these manifest in different degrees pre-moral, social,
and reflective goods.”123 Actions that encourage this holism tend to be responsible, and
those that mitigate the integrity of life tend to be irresponsible. Thus, for Schweiker
having respect for the integrity of life (wherever it may be found!) “provides content to
what it means to respond rightly and justly to others.”124
This notion of respecting the integrity of life is central to Schweiker’s thought.
For not only does the idea of the integrity of life “demarcate the good” but it also carries
with it three interrelated ideas. First, it highlights the “dynamics” of living by human
persons – life is complex, and persons do their best to live their life as an integrated
whole. Second, since human persons seek a flourishing life they undertake a “project” of
integrating the “various levels of goods” with which their life is defined (i.e., physical
well-being, social relations, etc.). Finally, the integrity of life denotes that it is a particular
agent that attempts to have “moral integrity.” It is by and for the individual within a
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social context that the person lives and must navigate, and the idea of enhancing the
“integrity of life” can help them in that process.125
Schweiker is convinced that the imperative of responsibility demands that “In all
our actions and relations we are to respect and enhance the integrity of life before
God.”126 Basically, the meaning of responsibility is to enhance the integrity of life, for
“the integrity of life is the moral good; the source and goal of that good and thus the
scope of the moral community is defined in relation to the divine.”127 This relationship to
the divine cannot be dislodged from his account of the integrity of life. Indeed, a
theological grounding is necessary for the “conceptual means” to traverse the varying
rationalities that consider responsibility as an outlook on life.128 For Schweiker, the
Christian faith fully enlivens the integrity of life and provides a solid ontology in which
to integrate the realities of life.129 In other words, his Christian faith provides the
framework from which he can make sense of the world.
5.3.3.3.2 A Matter of Faith
Faith plays a major role in Schweiker’s grounding paradigm for maintaining the
integrity of life. And while Schweiker finds the Christian story the most likely and
consistent with a theory of responsibility, he does not mean to imply that this is the only
means for grounding a workable theory. However, that a theological grounding is
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necessary he leaves no doubt since he states that the “source of responsibility” is found in
God – not in just the increase of human power.130 Exploring classical theism, Schweiker
notes that the moral life was once understood to have its foundation in a personal deity –
this provided a telos to life and ontological grounding. However, since the erosion of
belief in God has in large measure been accomplished, the “metaphysical,
anthropological, and theological means for providing norms for life” has largely
disappeared with it. And with the loss of God, has come a desire to fill the void with
power over nature.131
For Schweiker, the Christian faith is a prophetic voice for contemporary culture. It
urges us to seek justice and mercy, act with integrity, and sets demands on our lives
which are possible only if one views their living as being before God. Put simply, living a
life of integrity before God is the hallmark of responsible living.132 The content of such
living is found in respecting and enhancing the integrity of life.133 The reality of our need
to be responsible is so basic to the Christian life that to deny it “is to deny the condition
of one’s own existence as a relational agent and likewise to deny the reality of God.”134
An obvious impossibility for a true believing Christian. Thus, Christian believers are
responsible persons who want to enhance the integrity of life for all people.
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Moral integrity is one of the goals of the Christian life, but it cannot be aimed at
directly. Rather, authentic integrity is discovered as one seeks to respect the integrity of
life before God. As Schweiker phrases it, one “must lose themselves in order to find
themselves,” for it is only in recognizing that there is a purpose to life other than selfish
fulfillment that true authenticity is found.135 It is being in service to God that true purpose
is found – or, at least this is the claim of Christians.136 But being in service to God does
not mean that there are not many goods that attend the human life. Indeed, the Christian
account wants to increase the goods in people’s lives, not diminish them. Classically, this
was understood as one ultimate good and many proximate goods. Some critics may claim
that Christians want to reduce all goods to one, but this is not true according to
Schweiker. The real issue is that Christians simply do not want to valorize power and
make power seeking the pinnacle of human ambition.137 According to the Christian story,
hubris is what separates us from God and each other. Hubris (i.e., pride) is what instituted
the Fall, and introduced sin into the world. As such, Christian approaches to moral
reflection tend to downplay the all-out search for power.
McKenny notes that “Schweiker advocates responsibility as the solution to the
problem posed not by the expansion of human freedom but by the expansion of human
power. The question is not how freedom can be exercised morally in the absence of
determinate norms, but rather how power can be exercised for the sake of the good
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without becoming itself the good.”138 Responsibility must ultimately be about the correct
use of human power and how it is subject to moral examination. Power must never be
sought for its own sake, but only for the sake of the good – which is God. Responsibility
then is a tool to enhance the integrity of life.139 As McKenny summarizes it,
“Responsibility nevertheless assumes a privileged position for Schweiker, precisely
because human power looms so large; the realization of the good is critically dependent
on whether human beings exercise power to respect and enhance life or to demean and
destroy it.”140 The enhancement of the integrity of life is the goal of a responsible life.
5.4 Foundations and Models of Agency
Classical natural law is based on “imitation” – that is, classical natural law is
based on the notion that humans somehow reflect God’s image.141 Part of what it means
to reflect God’s image is to be imitators of God. Since God is the primary acting agent on
the universe, it would seem to follow that humans are in some way secondary acting
agents on the universe. However, this entails that humans are in some way acting agents.
To be a moral agent is to claim that one’s actions flow from the subject in a substantial
way, so that the action can be said to be “owned” by the agent – they are responsible for
the action. Likewise, this assumes a community of various agents in which moral action
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takes place. Moral agents interact with other agents, and this creates a whole “field of
interactions and interrelations.”142 And it is the entirety of these relations that gives rise to
our moral horizons.
To account for agency, then, three areas will be explored. First, we will briefly
examine the elements of all moral action – what are the conditions that hold to say that
some action is moral. The second section will be an exploration of the contemporary
theologian Charles Pinches and his interpretation of Thomistic moral actions. The third
section will look more closely at a Thomistic ontology of moral action by inspecting the
arguments of Brian Green.
5.4.1 Elements of Moral Action
Albert Jonsen notes that there are six elements of moral action. Any moral action
must include at least: 1) the intention of the agent; 2) the motive of the agent; 3) the agent
must deliberate about their action; 4) the agent must act voluntarily; 5) the agent must act
without excuse; and 6) the agent’s actions reveal and contribute to their character. When
these six elements are considered, we can have a more complete account of the agent’s
moral action.
Intention is the “thought of an action” that is present to the mind of the agent.143
Intention is the cognitive goal of the agent and thus is the object of thought – that is, it
can be stated in words. And the fact that this is a rational category means that the action
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can take on a “distinct moral connotation.”144 Someone who has the intention of
misleading someone can be said to have the intention of “lying.” Likewise, to intend to
take money from someone without earning it is to have the intention of “stealing.”145
Hence, when we want to praise or blame someone for their action we often “require the
presence of a good intention” for someone can hardly be praised for a good outcome if
they tried to harm people, and they can hardly be fully blamed if they tried to help
people.146 Likewise, the absence of any sort of intention mitigates or nullifies blame for
wrong-doing or praise for “right-doing.”147 An unintentional act, then is when the
consequences do not match what the agent anticipated. In these instances, we can
rightfully say that “the agent had no intention at all.”148 Therefore, to allocate
responsibility upon a subject would seem to be most appropriate only if the agent’s
actions “in some way reflects” their intention.149 Without intention, there is no
responsible moral agent.
Related to intention, but holding its own distinctive nature, is motive. The
intention is immediate and localized – it is regarding a specific act. Motive on the other
hand is more holistic. As Jonsen distinguishes the two, motive “is that which determines
the agent to aim at the objective and engage in the designed action. A motive moves,
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urges, impels (motum).”150 Motive is the overall goals of the agent – the agent desires to
be rich. Intention directs the specific means to the goal – the agent tries to steal the
money. “Intentional actions, then, are undertaken for a motive, a reason, in the light of
which they are objects worthy of my attention and pursuit.”151 Motive, then is important
for properly attributing how much responsibility an agent incurs. By determining the
overall goal of the agent, we can more readily place their action in a larger context and
judge accordingly. Motive is sometimes taken as being the primary criteria for
determining if an action is good or bad.152 Thus, motive directs the intention of the agent
and puts the action in the context of the agent’s desires.
Also related to intention and motive is deliberation. Now, deliberation is different
from either motive or intention in that deliberation is the mental act of reasoning out
what one is doing. It is a fully conscious awareness of one’s acts. As Jonsen describes it,
when “we say that an act is deliberate, we mean that it has been reasoned out, with clear
awareness of what one is doing and what will come of it. An act may be intentional
without being deliberate.”153 Now deliberation works along several levels. An agent can
deliberate about their intentions, courses of action, their motives, or any other such
topics.154 “Deliberation, then, seems to involve both the planning of means to the
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intended end and the weighing of motives which incline to one or another decision.”155
Since deliberation is integral to moral action, it cannot be ignored as part of a theory of
action.
Most obvious is the idea that an action can only be morally attributable to an
agent if the action is voluntary.156 The action must correspond with the will of the person
and they cannot be coerced, tricked, or conned into acting a particular way. For if they
are coerced in any way, then their responsibility is mitigated if not absolved from the
action. A voluntary act means that the act in some way originates with the agent as the
cause – it is my action. The agent can rightfully claim ownership over the action and
accept the attending praise or blame that accompany it.
In connection with the voluntary nature of moral action is the idea that the agent
has no excuses for the action beyond their own doing.157 When an agent offers an excuse
for some action what they are attempting to do is show why they cannot be held
(completely) accountable for some action.158 Excuses, then, are attempts to mitigate
responsibility for moral actions.
The accumulation of our habits, actions, deliberations, and reflections all
contribute to our character – a fairly stable condition of behavior. Character is generally
marked by its durable and constant nature as well as its readiness to accept praise or
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blame for actions.159 Character can be thought of as the most important aspect of the
agent, for a “good” character will reliably perform praiseworthy actions, while a “bad”
character will not.160 Even the practice of honoring good actions and punishing bad ones
is an exercise in encouraging (or discouraging) certain moral habits. That is, praise and
blame are attempts to shape character.161
Given the preceding, it should now be clear that an agent is responsible for an
action and able to accept praise or blame when these elements align. To accept praise, the
agent must have the right intention as guided by the right motivation made by the proper
deliberation, and executed as a voluntary act without excuse derived from the agent’s
character. When these elements are properly aligned, then we can say that the agent is
morally praiseworthy. Likewise, when these elements are improperly aligned we can say
the agent is morally blameworthy. However, all of the elements need to be present to
fully attribute praise or blame to the agent.
5.4.2 Moral Action: Charles Pinches – Theology and Action
All actions require a “home,” for all actions are in some context.162 Stated
differently, all human actions take place within some narrative – they are contextualized
within history. Indeed, “homeless human behavior” puzzles us precisely because it is
without some context.163 If we saw a man coming out of a home improvement store with
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a wheelbarrow and series of gardening tools as well as a few plants, we would
immediately infer that he is working on a garden of some sort – probably his own, but
possibly for someone else. The actions of the man coming out of the store with those
items is “at home” in that context. If, however, we saw a man coming out of the same
store but instead of walking calmly to their vehicle with bags of garden equipment, the
man instead takes a step, twirls in the air, pats his head three times and then continues
repeating this process across the parking lot. Upon viewing this person, you are not likely
to think that this is “perfectly normal behavior.” For these actions are not congruent with
the context of exiting a home improvement store. These actions have no context – they
are “homeless.” Perhaps the man is doing this because he lost a bet. Or perhaps he has
some unusual religious belief that if he does not perform this ritual, then the world will
end. Whatever the reason, this would provide the needed context to make sense of his
actions.
Below we will explore Pinches’ account of moral action. For our purposes, this
will take place in three steps. First we will see how he describes human actions in
general. Then will examine how the virtues connect to moral action. Finally, we will see
how Pinches classifies moral actions and see why that is important.
5.4.2.1 Explaining Human Actions
People have explanations for their actions, and those explanations are needed to
fully understand a particular behavior.164 What this requires is an understanding of action
that avoids reductionism. While it may be true that some things are more completely
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understood when broken down into their constituent parts that is not the case with moral
action. Moral activity is analyzable only in relation to the whole and is not reducible to
distinct “events.”165 To use an example by Pinches, imagine a reductive account of
someone taking target practice at the shooting range. How are the various actions to be
understood in this “event”? Pinches notes (at least) six “distinct” actions that can be
collated into an “action tree”: 1) S’s willing to move her finger at t; 2) S’s moving her
finger at t; 3) S’s pulling the trigger at t; 4) S’s firing a gun at t; 5) S’s shooting at the
target at t; and 6) S’s violation of a prohibition on firearm use at t.166 Undoubtedly, more
“actions” could be accrued for this one event, and this is Pinches’ point. Does “S pulling
the trigger at t” really help us understand what moral action S is performing in itself? It
seems not, for it is the context of S pulling the trigger that matters. But the context is
itself, not part of the moral action – only S is responsible for the act. However, the
context frames the action into an intelligible moral account. The simple phrase “S’s
pulling the trigger at t” is wholly indeterminate for judging if pulling the trigger is
morally justifiable or not. It is pulling the trigger in light of the surrounding context that
makes all the difference. For example, pulling the trigger to mug someone in a dark alley
is morally reprehensible. Pulling the trigger as a soldier in combat may be morally
justified. Conversely, pulling the trigger for a little “target practice” even though there is
a prohibition on firearm use may be morally ambiguous (i.e., was S aware of the
prohibition? If not, then S is vincibly ignorant. If, however, S was aware of the
prohibition and pulled the trigger anyway, then S is fully responsible for any consequence
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that may ensue). The point is, without framing the context in which the trigger was
pulled, we have no way of judging the moral worth of the reductive action. Engaging in a
little prohibition violating target practice is the context from which we judge the pulling
of the trigger and the pulled trigger cannot be wholly separated from its context if it is to
retain any meaning for us.167 Put simply, moral actions cannot be reduced to discrete
actions.
In the same way moral actions cannot be reduced to single monistic actions, so
too does Pinches think that moral foundations cannot be reduced to a single monistic
principle – whether it be love, respect, justice, or any other such singular category. There
appear to be many moral principles that (while congruent) are not reducible to some more
foundational idea.168 Indeed, to insist on developing one overarching moral principle as
the foundation for all others, “cheapens” the human experience.169 Life is varied and
complex – it is messy. However, a singular foundational moral principle is “neat and
tidy.” But this is precisely how life is not.
Human actions then must be put in context. At the broadest level they are in the
context of God’s creation. Human acts are human works. As Pinches puts it, God is
known by His works, and humans are known by theirs.170 Since humans act for their
flourishing (i.e., classically understood as happiness), the end goal of human actions is
important to note. For Pinches (along with most Christian theologians) the end point of
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human action is union with God – God is the end goal of humanity. How we are to
achieve that happiness is, of course, the main question. For Pinches, the answer is found
in virtuous living that directs us to union with God.171
5.4.2.2 Moral Actions and Virtues
Human actions and morality are coextensive.172 Pinches agrees with Aquinas that
“moral virtues are nothing more nor less than the perfection of a power to act, or, in
another definition, they are operative habits.”173 Humans act, and they do so for some
end. As such, “good” acts are conductive for achieving that end and can be judged as
accordingly as appropriate for achieving that end.174 A common way of thinking about
this acting toward the end is by considering the classical virtues.
Virtues are similar to skills and are necessary because we are human beings, and
to “be born a human being is to be born into the game of morality.”175 Echoing Pascal’s
famous wager, life is a game that we must play – we do not get to choose to not play.
Similarly, we are involved in a game of morality and we cannot choose to not participate.
Whether we like it or not, our lives are set in a moral context and our actions contribute
to the overall package. Virtues are needed to see the world properly. Virtuous living
allows people to see the world truly – actions must conform with reality. Given the fact
that descriptions of virtue and vice are set in a moral context, it follows that one aspect of
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human action cannot be taken as the primary indicator of whether an action is moral or
not. For example, an action is “good” not just because the agent intended goodness.
Pinches, thus, disagrees with Kant’s assessment that all one needed was a “good will.”176
For Pinches, goodness is more than attitudinal, it involves the whole person in context,
which is exemplified by “virtuous” living.
5.4.2.3 Classifying Acts
“Species classifications of whatever kind fix a thing in a category from which it
cannot be easily moved.”177 This “fixedness” of the human act allows us to deliberate on
the moral appropriateness of an action. Further, having a “fixed” nature allows for the act
to have an essential moral truth that is known by God, and can be known by us. Likewise,
if there is this essential moral truth that applies to an act, then it can apply to multiple
similar acts. But if this is the case, then it is possible to classify a whole species of actions
as morally wrong (or right). To use Pinches’ example the use of the phrase “adultery”
shows that the “classification of an act under ‘adultery,’ therefore, conveys to us
something very important, namely, the truth that this act ought not to be done.”178
In contrast how would a physicalist categorize an action like “bravery”? Pinches
ponders:
If I say, for instance, that S did something courageous, you will want to know just
what it was that S did. And to get this description we will need to turn to the
world in which the action was done. But . . . this cannot be found in a
‘physicalist” or natural description. So if I say ‘S’s legs propelled S’s body and it
subsequently covered a small oval object,’ this does not help in displaying the
thing S did that I supposed courageous. What I need to say is that S smothered a
176
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live hand grenade. When I do this, I set the act plainly in the human world where
it belongs, the world of human ends and purposes.179
Physicalist’s descriptions of moral actions divorce the action from its moral significance.
Objectively stating the agent involved and the material processes in which the agent
engaged leaves the act morally barren. It is the significance of the sacrifice of S jumping
on a live grenade that allows us to judge that the action was “brave.”
All of this is to say that the circumstances surrounding a particular act matter for
being able to properly understand the act. The circumstances surrounding the act are key
to understanding that act, but the circumstances do remain separate from the object of the
act.180 Using the example above, the object of the act was S smothering the live grenade,
the circumstances are the overall context in which this took place. Was this a war zone?
“Friendly fire”? During training? Who was saved? What was the cost to S besides
sacrificing themselves? Etc. We can rationally consider each of the circumstances as
separate from the action, but we should not divorce them from the action as this would
render the action unintelligible in itself.
To choose a course of action requires an act of the will. It is the interior act of the
will that chooses a course of action, and it is that act of the will that makes us morally
culpable for said action.181 The will determines an object (i.e., action) in relation to the
agent’s goals and the best means to achieve them. This is an internal (i.e., private)
process. However, the action pursued is an external (i.e., public) process. And this action
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cannot be described or properly understood apart from its place in the world – that is, it
cannot be understood apart from its context, its circumstances.182
Good actions have both a good will and some form of a good result. Evil actions
have both a bad will and bad result. However, two indeterminate possibilities – actions
that are partially good and partially bad – results. Aquinas holds that for an act to be truly
good four criteria must be met: first, it must be good according to the act’s genus; second,
it must be good according to its species; it must be good according to its circumstance;
and it must be good according to its end (telos / intention).183 Only when all four of these
criteria are met can an act be said to be truly good. All other actions may be considered
good or bad depending on their degree of departure from these criteria. The point for us,
however, is that this indicates that for Aquinas there is such a thing as an “intrinsically
evil act” the same as developed by John Paul II in Veritatis Splendor.184 Given the above
understanding of moral actions in a particular context it would seem to follow that a good
will cannot undo an evil external act.185 But an “evil external act” is just another way of
saying “intrinsically evil act.” As such, the external (i.e., objective) action itself is what
matters. Any actions named as evil by their description are always wrong – hence, they
are called evil external acts. There is no redeeming an evil external act by circumstance or
intention. They are simply wrong. But the corollary does not follow. Just because an
external act is good it does not follow that the person is morally praiseworthy.
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As such, we must pay attention to our moral descriptions of actions – for how we
describe an act often assumes a moral position in naming that act.
Herein lies the future of moral inquiry: namely, the careful and critical attention to
the great variety of our descriptions. . . . Since, . . . moral descriptions are tied by
at least two cords to the human life — they are for us to use, but also about us the
users — then what we can say is inextricably tied up with who we are. Moral
notions, those notions human beings apply to human life, will in this way be less
stable than human descriptions of the nonhuman.186
In general, when we rename moral actions we do not just “change the name but we
change the thing.”187 But in doing this we change ourselves – which may or may not be
necessarily for the better.188 Names matter, and so does moral categorization. For how we
describe an action conveys the level of appropriateness in engaging in that act.
Of course, the appropriateness of an act is determined by the moral context of the
agent. Again, if this is a theistic world, then God must always be part of the consideration
of context. All actions are done in sight of God. But even apart from God, all moral
actions take place within a particular community. And because morality is learned and
performed within a community, how that society talks about morality will influence how
certain moral patterns and behaviors are received.189
The social and communal consciousness about what is and is not moral is largely
given by a communal narrative. The language, words, analogies, and stories often have a
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shared communal history and are told, retold, and reshaped within a community to
deliver a morality tale. These stories, in turn, explain what actions are and are not
appropriate within that society. As such, the use of a term or phrase in a moral context
cannot be separated from the context from which that term or phrase was learned and
how it was understood.190 For the same term can have different meanings in different
cultures. Nevertheless, the use of narrative can help one understand a moral system as
“stories themselves can serve as the foundation of genuinely new moral notions.”191
Again, human living is in a context, and it needs a “home.” My actions are not mine
alone, for my attitudes, values, inclinations – my story – is part of the community in
which I inhabit. This could not be otherwise, for the world is communal and my actions
contribute to the communal history of my society.192 Thus, I have a responsibility to
others as a moral agent.
5.4.3 Thomistic Ontology and Action
Gilbert Meileander hopes that bioethics will be able to return “to the metaphysical
richness that characterized its early years.”193 Part of returning to that “metaphysical
richness” will be coming to terms with some definition of “good.” For a definition of
“good” is central to finding meaning. “Enhancement technologies, and the debates
surrounding them, strike right to the core of how we define the good life.”194 We
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understand ourselves in narrative and this speaks to how we understand “the good life.”
This means that the moral life is primarily teleological, “since it consists in the deliberate
ordering of human acts to God, the supreme good and ultimate end (telos) of man.”195
Humans are made for communion with God, and in coming into union with God we
recognize that there are “true limits to human freedom.”196
Human freedom and moral consideration cannot be reduced to one aspect (as
shown above). Thus, framing human morality as only in intention is insufficient. A
consideration of the object of the act must also be taken into account. And in the
Christian context, can that object be ordered in some way toward God. For, again, in the
Christian context, all actions should be ordered to God as their ultimate end.197 One way
of examining this connection of acts and ultimate ends is by looking at the classical
natural law tradition.
The natural law tradition, expounded primarily by Catholics, is based on the
fundamental principle that “action follows being” – agere sequitur esse. What something
is determines what it is supposed to do. That is, “by knowing what something is (its
nature), we can know something about how it should act (its ethics).”198 In the natural
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law tradition, this points to the being’s happiness and fulfillment. To use AristoThomistic terminology, the transhumanist movement’s tendency towards “potency and
away from actuality is not necessarily a gain in ontological stature, but instead could be a
reduction.”199
The transhumanist pursuit of power “and reducing determinacy of action”
approaches nothingness, not existence.200 Transhumanism’s insistence on mastering the
material and the efficient, and distancing itself from the formal and teleological, means
that transhumanism embraces matter more than form. Again, in Aristo-Thomistic
concepts, the closer one comes to the purely material, the closer they come to nothing.
For in the Aristo-Thomistic system, pure matter is nothing – or more precisely, pure
matter is not anything at all. Pure matter does not exist. Pure matter is pure potentiality.
As such, the transhumanist quest to perfect the material, or at least, to master matter, is a
quixotic endeavor according Aristo-Thomistic philosophy.201
A future natural law ethic will need to do three things: 1) observe human nature
for changes in potential actions – for this may signal a change in telos; 2) safeguard the
five basic telei in classical natural law – survival, reproduction, education, society, and
truth seeking; and 3) recognize that as beings change, so too do the actions performed or
abstained that contribute to that being’s flourishment. New avenues of ethical discussion
will undoubtedly need to take place.202
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So, will natural law be “done away with”? Perhaps, it all depends on what is
meant by natural law. If it means the approach per se, that is by considering the idea that
“action follows being,” then the answer appears to be “no.” Natural law will remain, as
agere sequitur esse is a fundamental aspect of reality. As Green remarks, ethics can
always be based on this notion.203 If, however, what one means by natural law is the
normative conclusions of such an undertaking, then the answer appears to be “yes.”
Natural law will need to change. However, this change would be relative to the change in
the being. A relatively minor biological change may not move the natural law needle at
all, but a relatively major change may undermine an entire ethical system. The individual
school of thought will need to address the controversies as best they can. For example,
the rationalist school of natural law will have a relatively easier time adapting to this
brave new world than the physicalist school of natural law.204
As such, Green examines six interrelated questions relevant to the notion that a
change in nature may impact moral obligations. First, is human nature relevant to
morality? Historically, natural law theory has answered “yes.” For ethics is a study of
ends (telos). Ethics looks to the good of beings, often considered their fulfillment or
happiness. Ethics “mediates both nature and telos.”205 It is a middle-term that takes what
a thing is, sees the end of that thing, and then determines the means to best achieve that
end. Now, this perspective only makes sense if telos is in some way real. With the current
trend in philosophy to eliminate final causes (i.e., telos) from our considerations of the
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world, there has been no grounding for moral action. All with which we are left when the
ends are removed is the “is” of nature.206 With no ends to consider, there are no natural
ethics believed to exist. If, however, telos is a real feature of the world, then it would play
a crucial role in determining ethical activity.
The second issue to consider is if human nature is mutable. In consideration of
this issue, Green adopts Aquinas’ distinction that there are two natures in humans: a first
and a second (cf., ST 1a2ae32.2.ad 3). The first nature is the universal nature shared by
all humans – it is what metaphysically and biologically binds all humans together. The
second nature is group specific – it varies by geography and culture.207 Historically, we
have had very little control over “first” nature, but significant control over “second”
nature (even as we are shaped by it). Now, Green thinks that limiting the categories to
two is insufficient, and is better understood as four categories: 1) a metaphysical first
nature; 2) a biological first nature; 3) a cultural second nature; and 4) an individual
second nature.208 Further, natural law has historically held that fundamental moral
principles cannot vary from culture to culture because morality is based in what is
universal (first nature) not what is relative (second nature). As such, social guidelines
may vary, but not deep moral issues. The problem is that our first nature is
“underdetermined” in respect to morality – metaphysically and biologically we do not
know how we should always act.209 By what metaphysical or biological principle do we
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appeal to know what we should wear (if anything at all!)? Because of these sorts of
obscurities second nature picks up the slack and many issues of morality are determined
culturally. Hence, our culture helps determine what is and is not acceptable with respect
to clothing.
We can now consider the issue more fully: is human nature mutable? It depends
on what is being discussed. Clearly, human second nature (cultural and individual) is
mutable. There is a split, however, over first nature. Metaphysical first nature appears to
resist change. What it is that makes humans ontologically human seems to be outside the
scope of human manipulation. However, biological first nature is absolutely being
changed by technological interventions.210 Hence, we are feeling an uneasy “split” in our
identity. Technology produced by our second nature is deliberately altering part of our
first nature. The impact of this new reality is that as our biological nature changes, what
is “good” for us (that is, our telos) will change accordingly. It is good for us to eat, only
because our body needs food to achieve its ultimate ends. However, if we are able to
bypass the biological need for nourishment, then eating would no longer be good for us.
Because of this tension, morality will be ordered less to our natural (i.e., biological) telos
and more so with our will.211
The natural law tradition is thus arriving at a crossroads of sorts. For the natural
law tradition developed “an ethics for apes” it has not developed an ethic for
“demigods.”212 Green sums up the issue well, technological “second nature is growing to
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encompass biological first nature. Human nature has never been stationary; it has always
been evolving, but what was once a crawl has accelerated. If action follows being, and
our capacity for action has changed, then this implies that our being may have changed as
well.”213
The third issue is attempting to determine how we would know if human nature
had changed. The issue here is not if human nature has changed over eons – it is
generally accepted it has. The issue is recognizing a change in human nature that we
bring about in short order through technological mastery. The logic for this concern is
simple: “if transhumanism succeeds in changing humans, then natural law dictates that
these new creatures could have different moral requirements than do current humans.”214
Different creatures have different moral requirements and ethical expectations. By
looking at the human past, we may be able to see what the future holds. Biologically
speaking, we are essentially the same now as we were three thousand years ago.
However, culturally speaking we are vastly different. Likewise, our technological gains
increase our capacity to undertake certain actions. As Green puts it, we have a “far
greater potential for action than did our ancestors.”215 Transhumanists just continue this
historical trajectory, but at an accelerated rate. So, how would we know if human nature
changed? The answer may depend on one’s “school of thought.” For example, one who
tends towards a more rationalist natural law theory, may find no essential difference
between humans and transhumans since both exhibit rationality (which is seen as the
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foundation of moral action). However, one who holds to more of a physicalist natural law
theory may claim that human nature has changed once they judge that a significant
enough biological alteration has taken hold (this is because the body is thought to have a
“normative teleology built into it”).216
A fourth issue is whether cultural evolution could replace biological evolution as
the primary determiner of change. As above, the answer given seems to be determined by
one’s school of thought. Again, a rationalist natural law theorist may not have any
problem with a cultural takeover of biological evolution. The only reality that matters is
rational capacity, and so long as rational capacity remains the morally relevant criteria it
does just as well. On the other hand, one disposed to a physicalist natural law theory
would likely deny that radically altered humans are the same as unenhanced humans on
the basis of the differences in embodiment. For the physicalist natural law theorist,
embodiment matters.217
A fifth issue is in how to assess the relationship of the human will to a radically
altered nature. Would a human will (presumably disposed to willing what is good for an
unenhanced human) be properly attuned to the ends of a new, technologically enhanced
nature? As the natural disappears due to technology, the will becomes the driving force
for all things. Now, natural law operates under the assumption that the “built-in natural
purposes” (i.e., entelechies) of creatures are known.218 As Green puts it, being
“determines action because natural being is intrinsically teleological—nature aims toward
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something. If we can determine that transhumans still have a natural entelechy, then their
ethics could be read from their natures, not their wills.”219 The issue, of course, is that it
is not clear that a radically changed transhuman has a “natural entelechy.” We have a
general idea of what a “flourishing life” is for mere humans, but we are much less
confident about what a “flourishing life” would be for a true transhuman. And natural law
operates on the assumption that it knows what true flourishing is (or at least what its
criteria is) for a particular being.220 However, with the rise of relativism, the notion of
flourishing is no longer stable. And with the denial of telos in the natural world, the only
remaining refuge for establishing morality is in the will of the individual. The
transhumanist ethic places telos in the will of the individual – thus, the individual
determines their good. The will becomes the primary “force of nature” overtaking natural
selection. The transhumanist “would create themselves in their own images” and too their
own desires.221 And because it is the individual who determines what is their good the
relevant means to achieve that end is power. Power is not immoral per se, but when
contrary wills clash, power becomes a tool for oppression. A rationalist natural law
theorist may not be too troubled by such a prospect as, again, the relevant moral
apparatus is still in place – rational capacity. A physicalist natural law theorist will not so
easily be able to incorporate the sort of indeterminacy to which radical transhumanism
aspires.
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The sixth and final issue is for humans to develop a dynamic ethic able to adjust
to this changing landscape. As Green notes, there are three things we must do initially: 1)
we need to embrace the Socratic maxim and “know ourselves” – embrace a robust
anthropology that incorporates biology, psychology, anthropology, evolution, philosophy,
and theology. This injunction likewise includes being familiar with history, culture, and
the humanities; 2) we need to carefully consider the human telos. The classical AristoThomistic concept of human telos had five elements: survival, reproduction, education,
society, and truth seeking. If there is any merit to these elements, then any course of
action that inhibits these elements from meeting their true fulfillment should be avoided.
Further, as our mastery of technology becomes more powerful, the potential for the
destructive power of our vices becomes that much more potent. All the more need, then,
to carefully consider that which contributes to the human good; and 3) we need to
carefully consider what it means to “sin.” Traditionally, sin was understood to have two
dimensions: commission and omission.222 Now, Green takes it that with our increased
technological powers we will incur greater responsibility because our capacities for
responsible moral action will be proportionally expanded. For example, I am a limited
being, but I know it is wrong to intentionally harm innocent persons. However, suppose I
undergo a certain enhancement that allows me to make previously heretofore inaccessible
conclusions. Upon reflection on my everyday actions, I determine that many actions I
thought were innocent turn out to be highly dangerous (i.e., driving at an unsafe speed;
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etc.
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releasing toxins into the air; using certain types of plastics; etc.). Because I would now
know the effects of these actions, I would be more morally culpable for engaging in those
activities than I would be previously. Likewise, sins of omission carry greater weight as
well, for presumably, our enhanced abilities will give us the moral clarity to act. Hence,
inaction would carry a greater consequence.223
5.5 Conclusion: An Agency of Relational Responsibility (ARR)
What this chapter has set out to accomplish is show the different elements that
contribute to a holistic discussion of human good and right action. We are relational,
responsible, agents. Our lives and actions must be considered in their context as operative
within a web of various agents with their own goals, desires, and dignity. The various
strings of thought are not easily untangled, but to the degree that we can accurately
account for these various conditions, the more readily we can be said to have taken into
account the full range of moral criteria. The challenge within the enhancement debate is
that morality is very much rooted in what we are, but the radical forms of enhancement
will alter the very whatness of humans. The result is that this will give rise to a different
conception of morality reflective of the types of beings that will emerge.
ARR has an advantage in understanding human beings as persons. In traditional
Christian thought there is a unity to reality. There may be contrary ways of viewing truth,
but there cannot be contrary “truths.” When applied to the moral realm, Tristram
Englehardt rightly comments that for “the traditional Christian, any seeming tension
between the right and the good, as well as among goods, can ultimately be discounted. . .
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. there will not be a tension between the right and the good, between moral obligations
generally considered and run the true good of be achieved by loving God and others as
oneself.”224 There is a holistic view to reality that Christianity embraces. While Christians
may not succeed in accounting for all of the details, there is a general desire to embrace
reality in all of its diversity and give each aspect of reality its due. And all of this is taken
under consideration for the goal of implementing it into a robust account of reality.225
When we act as moral agents with an understanding that we are related to various levels
of reality (i.e., God, others, and ourselves), then the relevancy of responsibility is
impressed upon us. All acts of responsibility are acts of response to some relational
reality. For the Christian, we are responsible to ourselves, because we are responsible to
others, and this is because we are ultimately responsible to God. God is the primary
reality in which we are responsible and all of our actions should be in light of that.226
Because of this recognition that our actions are ultimately performed in service to God,
Christians trust that the grace that God grants is sufficient for meeting our responsibility
to others.227 An agency of relational responsibility recognizes our various relationships
and acts accordingly to the situation at hand. Thus, the advantage of ARR for human
persons is that it accounts for their lived reality and directs them to respond accordingly.
Likewise, ARR has an advantage over “personhood only” approaches to morality.
Specifically, the “personhood only” approach adopted by many transhumanists shows
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contempt for human frailty and believe there is no value in suffering.228 However, this
push has the side-effect of inhibiting moral growth in the person. It is by hardships (often
brought about by an embodied experience) that we learn and grow – we grow when we
experience difficulty, not when we wallow in pleasure.229 ARR accounts for the reality of
hardship by not minimizing struggle and pain derived from an embodied existence. And
it does this even while trying to eliminate suffering at many levels. ARR finds purpose in
embodied pain – it does not minimize it. Nor does it fear alleviating pain and suffering.
Rather it seeks to act accordingly to the situation – that is, the agent wants to act
responsibly given the variety of relationships involved – an agency of relational
responsibility.230 The problem with much of the transhumanist push to consider
“personhood only” according to Christian thought, is that it attempts to deny “the
goodness of God’s providence.”231 There is something important to embodied living, but
in the rush of many transhumanists to leave the body behind and treat people as only
rational beings, we miss the importance of embodied existence for our moral
development. ARR takes into account this embodied reality. “Personhood only” limits
moral reality to only one dimension – the rational. ARR avoids this unnecessary
reductionism.
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Further, ARR has an advantage over “human nature only” approaches to morality.
Affirming the necessity of a relational and embodied experience, implies that something
about being human matters for moral reflection. However, there is also something to be
said for affirming that moral principles extend beyond just immediate human concerns.
Indeed, as moral beings we can reflect and apply principles beyond human needs. We can
fulfill obligations placed upon us by unnamed future humans, other persons, and even
non-persons.232 As such, a morality based on “personhood only” is detached from its
ontological moorings, but a morality of “human nature only” seems incapable of applying
to beings that are not human. This is the gap that ARR fills. While it is largely based off
of human nature, it can be applied to different beings. As ARR stresses relationality,
different beings (human, non-human, and posthuman) can benefit from these insights.
Likewise, the insistence that agents be responsible to others before God, limits what types
of actions are acceptable. What needs to be remembered is that the objects to which we
have an ultimate moral responsibility are to individuals, not to a species. The “focus of
moral concern is always individuals.”233
5.5.1 A Key Objection to ARR: Is this Not Just “Virtue Theory”?
The main criticism for ARR is this: how is it significantly different than just
virtue theory? There are substantial similarities in how these two systems function and
what they propose to achieve. For example, virtue theory is ultimately concerned with
character development in pursuit of flourishing. ARR has similar concerns – it is
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concerned with the relational actions an agent takes in response to their environment. But
it would seem that an agent responding appropriately to the situation would just be
another way of saying that they need to act virtuously – which, of course, is just virtue
theory.
In reply it should be acknowledged that there are definite similarities between
virtue theory and ARR – they share a similar metaphysic, so they should share some
likeness. The difference comes in what is being stressed. ARR highlights the relational
aspect of agents and responsibility to the other. Virtue theory – while not ignoring the
other – stresses what is good for the agent. This is one of the major criticisms that
Nicholas Wolterstorff (following Augustine) makes of virtue theory.234 ARR, while not
overthrowing virtue theory, makes a significant correction in what is emphasized – the
good owed to the other. And it is in this distinction that ARR can stand on its own as a
theory of moral accountability.

234 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Justice: Rights and Wrongs (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2008), 177. Technically, Wolterstorff is addressing eudaimonism, but this is often seen to be an extension
of virtue theory.
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Chapter 6
Proposing a Theological Hermeneutic for Enhancement Technology
The question for any technology is: How can we develop this best to love God,
our neighbors, and the earth entrusted to us?
— James C. Peterson, Changing Human Nature, 52
Given the enduring characteristics of human life, the increased power given by
new technology will require greater care with making those choices if societies
are to thrive. . . . Godlike powers will not make us gods, let alone God.
— Charles T. Rubin, Eclipse of Man, 118.
6.1 Introduction
For modern transhumanists, technology is merely a tool – it is a neutral endeavor.
Technology allows us to better achieve our deepest desires, and as such our technology is
as varied as our preferences. Thus, to achieve any given ends all one need to do is “apply
the proper ethics and politics” to the technology to achieve what is desired.1 But this is to
introduce the precise problem of which ethics is really proper? That is, is there
hermeneutic for evaluating enhancement technologies?
In order to provide a workable hermeneutic, this project has examined both the
ontological and moral foundations for what it means to be a human person – that is, a
relationally responsible agent. And it is from this foundation that we can now begin to
construct a hermeneutic of enhancement, since these starting points will both limit and
guide what is and is not acceptable for human persons. Yet, there are just a few
preliminaries that must be addressed before constructing our hermeneutic. For the real
issue is which enhancements should be pursued, not whether we should pursue

1 Jeffry P. Bishop, “Transhumanism, Metaphysics, and the Posthuman God,” Journal of Medicine
and Philosophy 35 (2010): 707.
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enhancements. The hermeneutic to be developed in this chapter is designed to help us
make that determination – which enhancements to pursue.
6.2 The Problem of Limited Categories
Nicholas Agar notes that the choice is not about “whether to accept or reject the
goods enabled by the radical enhancement of our cognitive or physical capacities. Rather,
it’s about whether we should internalize or externalize radical enhancement.”2
Enhancements are happening, some just happen to be more profound than others. The
issue is not whether to enhance or not, but which enhancements are we going to pursue.
The issue is the degree of enhancement, not whether it is genetic or not.3 And it is
because of these realities, that a traditional “pros and cons” approach to evaluating
enhancement is simply insufficient for determining what enhancements to pursue or not,
even though taking stock of what is good and bad about an enhancement is certainly part
of the discussion. It just cannot be left at that, however. Likewise, given the realities of
technological advancement, there is a practical impossibility in abstaining from
technology. Modern humanity cannot avoid being a technological creature – technology
shapes nearly every aspect of our modern lives. One cannot absolve themselves from the
discussion. As such, is it even appropriate to claim that some people are “pro”
enhancement and others are “anti” enhancement? There is something to be said that
everyone is in a sense for enhancement, and there is something to be said for the fact that
not everyone is as enthusiastic as others about the future of enhancement technology.

2 Nicholas Agar, Truly Human Enhancement: A Philosophical Defense of Limits (Cambridge, MA:
The MIT Press, 2014), 50.
3

Ibid., 138.
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What does seem to be the case, however, is that there can be agreement that the key issue
to focus on is which enhancements should be pursued – which technologies may prove
beneficial for humanity – not whether we should pursue some technology or
enhancement.
Enhancement technologies are too commonplace and becoming too complex to be
addressed simply as being “for” or “against.”4 The issue then is how to shape the future
of enhancement tech, not whether to participate in it.5 Buchanan takes it that the
argument is conclusive in favor of accepting certain enhancement tech.6 For Buchanan,
humans are limited beings that need to be enhanced in order to address mounting
challenges in the near future. Indeed, Buchanan is arguing for straight-up enhancement,
not just therapeutic technologies – as there is no technological distinction.7 So, just as
there is no clear line between therapy and enhancement, there cannot be a clear line
between being “pro” or “anti” enhancement.
There is an interesting implication of allowing therapeutic / enhancement
technologies to infiltrate society. As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, human abilities fall
within a range – there is no precise, focused, ability. Human abilities resemble a bell
curve, not a point. Now, should those persons on the low-end of the ability scale receive
remedial (i.e., therapeutic) treatment to raise their abilities to the statistical average, the

4 Buchanan, Beyond Humanity?: The Ethics of Biomedical Enhancement (Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 2011), 11.
5

Ibid.

6

Ibid., 58.

7 James C. Peterson, Changing Human Nature: Ecology, Ethics, Genes, and God (Grand Rapids,
MI: William B. Eerdmans Pub., 2010), 125.
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result is that the bell curve shifts, but it does not disappear. In other words, with the
elimination of weakness and the pervasiveness of excellence, the general ability will
increase for all humans. The result is that what was once considered an “enhancement”
would become considered commonplace.8 If this is the case, then making a “pros” and
“cons” case for enhancement is almost quite beside the point, for any technological
engagement will result in an overall increase in human capacities – at least considered in
the narrow sense of that technology.
Because of this reality, Allenby and Sarewitz remark that the “pros” and “cons”
debate regarding enhancement is “desperately impoverished” and “beside the point.” In
order to understand human beings and the technology they create, it is imperative to
understand the system as a whole, not just some particular technology. Humans create
and are affected by the technology they produce. It is thus, quite inappropriate, to isolate
one given technology in a simple “pros” and “cons” tit-for-tat as if that were sufficient to
understand the import of the entire debate or of that specific technology.9
There is a dilemma of sorts that enhancement introduces: “the external goods of
radical enhancement could be so valuable that it seems absurd to worry about the low
intrinsic value of the activities that generate them.”10 The dilemma then is this: reject the
enhancement and the external goods it provides, but (perhaps) retain some intrinsic goods

8 Peterson remarks that “if all individuals are cured to the ‘usual efficiency of one’s class,’ some
individuals will naturally be better off than average and the average will consequently rise. Human abilities
fall in ranges. If everyone at the lower end of the typical range is brought up to the midpoint in the range,
the midpoint of the range will rise. . . . Over time, what was once considered enhancement beyond speciestypical functioning would become cure to reach the raised typical level.” Ibid., 110.
9 Braden Allenby and Daniel Sarewitz, The Techno-Human Condition (Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press, 2011), 83.
10

Agar, Truly Human Enhancement, 44.

316

by not enhancing; or accept the enhancement and the external goods it provides, but
(perhaps) lose some intrinsic goods by enhancing. In other words, some see two options –
enhance or not. If the enhancement has a high instrumental value with better external
goods, coupled with a loss of low intrinsically valued goods, then enhancement makes a
certain amount of sense. However, if the enhancement has a low instrumental value with
less external goods, with the loss of higher intrinsically valued goods, then enhancement
makes little to no sense.11 In the former case, the external goods gained by enhancement
overshadow the intrinsic values lost. In the latter case, the internal goods retained
overshadow the proposed external goods gained by the enhancement.
However, these notions of goods lost or goods gained assume some knowledge of
what is really “good” for the person. That is, the “good” can also be understood as what
allows the person to “flourish,” and the concept of human flourishing operates in the
background of many ethicists. Aristotle and Aquinas, for example, see flourishing as just
another way of describing human happiness which is the end of the human being. Thus,
our end is determined by the types of beings we are – what we are determines what is
good for us, what leads to our happiness / flourishing.
There is a real sense in which it is truly impossible to be either “for or against”
enhancement technologies, per se. There are three reasons for this: first, as limited beings
we need enhancement; second, being against enhancement is problematic; and finally,
being wholly for any and all “enhancements” is, likewise, problematic. What is needed is
neither a blind acceptance of all new technologies, nor a blanket rejection of technology
but a moderate evaluation of a given technology. Which is, of course, no easy task.

11

Ibid., 45.
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Humans must alter their environment to survive. We must create tools that aid in
our survival, but those tools in turn shape us.12 But it is not just survival that encourages
our drive for enhancement technologies, we also treasure certain goods that could be lost
without the development of certain enhancements.13 Buchanan remarks, that to “avoid
losing some of the good things we now enjoy, we will have to enhance ourselves in
particular ways.”14
Critics of enhancement rightly note that the same techniques that can cure disease
can slide toward a new-eugenics (if you will). Both “pro” and “anti” enhancement sides
agree that there is no clear distinction between therapy and enhancement, and thus this
cannot be used as the criteria to determine which techniques are acceptable and which are
not. However, it is this increasing of ability based on technological advancement that
allows the transhumanist to imagine new and “novel capacities” for human beings.15 The
promise of these new capacities drives the techno-enthusiast.
On the other hand, is it not reasonable to fear what our technologies have the
potential to do?16 Indeed, the strength of the “bio-conservative” movement is the
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Peterson, Changing Human Nature, 54—55.

13 To use a mundane example, we take photographs to help us remember special moments that our
own memories can distort or forget. Photographs also allow us to “share” memories with others and
preserve memories for family and friends. In other words, photography helps us to preserve the good of
memory in our lives.
14

Buchanan, Beyond Humanity?, 163.

15 Charles T. Rubin, Eclipse of Man: Human Extinction and the Meaning of Progress (New York:
New Atlantis Books, 2014), 124. Rubin adds, “Indeed, the more one thinks about how much better we
could do if we designed our own bodies, the more dissatisfied we are likely to be with the present model.”
Ibid.
16 Christina Bieber Lake, Prophets of the Posthuman: American Fiction, Biotechnology, and the
Ethics of Personhood (Notre Dame, IL: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013), 111.
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emphasis on enjoying the goods we currently possess and not threatening the existence of
those goods.17 Should some technology have the potential to endanger our most cherished
goods – even if that technology produces some real tangible benefits – then wisdom
dictates that we should forgo that technology.
Yet, there is a major problem with this line of thinking: human beings are
insatiably led to cross boundaries – terrestrial, spatial, moral, genetic, and technological.
As such, Buchanan notes that because enhancement has great social benefits it will be
pursued anyway – so why not attempt to regulate it? Likewise, it needs to be controlled
for social justice – for example, Buchanan desires to mitigate the disparity of
enhancement technology. Finally, it can help avoid inappropriate medicalization.18 The
stress on human autonomy is a foundational pillar of the modern transhumanist
movement. But enhancements will not be left at the individual level. No, the simple fact
of the matter is, that the country / civilization that can best harness enhancement
technology is the one that “will gain a huge economic and military advantage over
everyone else.”19 Indeed, the only way to guarantee enhancement technology does not
end up in the “wrong” hands is to make sure that the “right” hands are always one step
ahead of deleterious operators.20 And it is for these reasons why enhancement is needed,
and cannot be avoided.
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Gilbert Meileander remarks that critics of transhumanism cannot simply oppose
all advances in scientific medicine, since modern medicine thrives on innovation.21 In
looking at the arguments against enhancement, Buchanan identifies what he calls the
“Simple Conservative Argument” in which the opponent to enhancement simply states
that the potential risks to enhancement are too much.22 To this, Buchanan replies that the
critic offers no alternative and no guidance. Likewise, he points out that the critic makes
the “dubious” assumption that certain enhancements actually are “risky.” The term
“risky” is left vague, and even if it is not, we endeavor in other “risky” behaviors too (i.e.,
nuclear power; space flight; etc.). So, “risk” cannot be a sufficient reason to not pursue
some technologies per se. Finally, this approach assumes that we do not need certain
enhancements.23 Given how frail the human species is, Buchanan thinks we will need
enhancements and he doubts we will survive without them.
By way of response, some version of the Precautionary Principle is often put
forward as a helpful heuristic when discussing enhancement issues. In general, the
Precautionary Principle says if there are rising threats to humans or the environment, then
some “precautionary” measures must be taken to alleviate or eliminate the threat. This
could mean taking some positive action to counter the threat, or it could mean the
cessation of any action that may be perceived to be a threat. The key idea is that any
harms that are the result of human (in)activity should be avoided.24 This, of course, is an

21 Gilbert Meilaender, Bioethics: A Primer for Christians (Grand Rapids, MI: William B.
Eerdmans, 1996), 5.
22
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24 Ibid., 200—201. Daniel McFee makes the argument, see his “The Risks of Transhumanism:
Religious Engagements with the Precautionary and Proactionary Principles,” in Religion and
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extraordinarily vague notion as it does not define what “harm” means, nor does it account
for the fact that some goods may actually outweigh some harms that may result. A better
approach to the Precautionary Principle may say that one should “choose that option with
the best worst outcome” – pick the path with the least expected harm or damage.25 While
this may be a helpful notion, it too ultimately succumbs to the flaw that it is not always
possible to either gauge all of the possible negative effects of some action, nor does it
alleviate the possibility of allowing some harms to gain certain goods. As Buchanan
notes, even under its “maximum” interpretation, the Precautionary Principle overstates
our ignorance and understates the fact our knowledge base is growing in regards to
certain enhancement technologies.26 Indeed, Buchanan prefers a multi-pronged approach
to considering possible dangers from enhancements rather than seeking one single riskadverse heuristic. While I think Buchanan is correct that multiple heuristics will need to
be investigated, I still find the general impulse toward caution a necessary component to
evaluating the enhancement landscape.27
Just as there is a problem with being inherently “anti” enhancement, there is also
a problem with attempting to be inherently “pro” enhancement. As Michael Burdett puts
it, technology is not necessarily a progressive endeavor – that is, technology does not
“drive history.” Any bent towards technological determinism – the view that technology
necessarily arcs forward – tends to forget other factors that influence that technology. Put

Transhumanism: The Unknown Future of Human Enhancement, ed. by Calvin Mercer and Tracy J. Trothen
(Denver, CO: Praeger, 2015), 217—228.
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simply, “it is a questionable venture to assert technological determinism and then move to
social dictation because of the asserted technological determinism.”28
Allenby and Sarewitz say we can make two predictions with high confidence
about enhancement technologies. The first is that the primary beneficiaries of
technological enhancement will be institutions – not individuals. That is, the primary
“drivers for enhancement” will be “economic efficiency,” a competitive military, and
“cultural dominance.” Transhumanists often highlight the benefits technology will have
for individuals, but the technology will be coopted first by groups, not individuals. The
second prediction they make is that enhancements will not be viewed in isolation from
others. There is a tendency to consider only one dimension of a given enhancement and
neglect the impact it has on other facets of life.29
To highlight one aspect of this criticism – the notion that technology primarily
benefits individuals. As just noted, this is likely to not be the case. Institutions (especially
military ones) are likely to reap the “benefits” of the earliest advances in enhancements.
Today’s soldiers are already the first persons who benefit from advanced technology.
Countries have a vested interest in protecting their societies at a basic level, and this
means giving the military every advantage over competing countries. The impact on the
individual should begin to become clearer – the goals of the military may have little to do
with the goals of individuals. Better (i.e., more efficient) soldiers, who require less “class

28 Michael S. Burdett, “The Religion of Technology: Transhumanism and the Myth of Progress,”
in Religion and Transhumanism: The Unknown Future of Human Enhancement, ed. by Calvin Mercer and
Tracy J. Trothen (Denver, CO: Praeger, 2015), 144.
29 For example, the automobile was seen as a way to move (relatively) quickly from point A to
point B, but it had the impact of creating suburbs, vacations, road systems, etc. As such, one technology in
one area invariably affects and is affected by other technologies and other areas in a complex system of
give-and-take. Allenby and Sarewitz, The Techno-Human Condition, 28—29.
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room” education, who can better adapt to situations better, work with a squad more
efficiently, etc. Basically, the military will want to enhance soldiers, not for the
enrichment of the soldier’s lives, but so that they have a more efficient killing machine.30
As such, in the same way one cannot be wholly anti-enhancement, neither should one be
wholly pro-enhancement.
6.3 The Spectrums of Enhancement
One thing should be clear by this point in the project: enhancements are not
“black and white” issues. What is and is not an enhancement or therapy is hotly disputed.
Sometimes, one type of procedure is clearly a therapy and other times it is clearly an
enhancement, but many times this distinction is muddled. As such, it is best to view the
therapy-enhancement distinction as existing on a spectrum rather than as a simply binary
choice. Some techniques can fall into the therapy camp rather comfortably and others in
the enhancement camp without much controversy, but a whole host of issues seem to
fluctuate between these two poles. In order to evaluate these cases we can consider them
along two different spectrums: the “objective” spectrum; and the “moral” spectrum.
Below we will examine these two spectrums and show how they can be useful for
evaluating different enhancements.
6.3.1 The Objective Spectrum of Enhancement: “Mundane” to “Extreme”
The “objective” spectrum deals specifically with what a given technological
procedure is doing. This particular examination is unconcerned with the morality of the
procedure. It is only concerned with examining the procedure at a technical level – what
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is happening? To properly evaluate the objective level, we will explore the spectrum from
“mundane” to “extreme” technologies and why I have labeled them as such.31 The second
area to explore is to note the various “levels” of technology that are introduced by our
general technological advancement. Again, this is not making a moral judgment call so
much as it provides background information that will come into play when we examine
the moral spectrum in the next section.
6.3.1.1 The “Mundane” to “Extreme”
For this project, “mundane” is understood as enhancements that indirectly affect
the person physically or psychologically to greater or lesser degrees – but affect the
person nonetheless. Likewise, “extreme” is taken to mean a direct change to some
physical or psychological characteristic of the person. It is recognized that there is no set
“barrier” that separates the mundane to
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31 Please note, that given the nature of the case I have tried to be as fair as I can, but I readily
admit that distinguishing between some techniques reflects more of a judgment call rather than strict
objectivity – however, I have attempted to justify my judgments by providing a principle by which I
measure one technology as being more mundane or extreme over another.
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enhancements are more mundane or extreme than others.32
Notice that in Figure 6.1 the “Severity” column refers to the “mundane / extreme”
spectrum. It recognizes that there are not necessarily clean breaks from between the two
ends. The “Technology Types” column is taken to be representative of a number of
different types of technologies that can be rightly said to “enhance” human lives.
However, it should be stated that this is only a place holder and not taken to be
absolute.33 But as James Peterson remarks, “When an intervention is irreversible [like
germ-line genetic manipulation], one should be dramatically more certain of its use.”34
As such, the very fact that some changes are irreversible and direct would indicate that it
is a more “extreme” technique.
The third column is “Relation to Humans” and it is this column that has largely
determined the severity of the given technology. The more remote and indirect the
technology is in affecting the human person, the more mundane it is being labeled.35
32 No doubt, exceptions or challenges to this chart are possible and it is certainly liable to change.
However, it does offer a glimpse as to how a distinction between mundane and extreme enhancements can
be made.
33 For example, I have genetic manipulation listed as the last (and most extreme) of the
technologies for the sole reason that we are using technology to change us directly at the genetic level.
Now, it is recognized that not all genetic enhancement is the same – somatic and germ-line interventions do
not need to carry the same burden of impact. As such, some genetic enhancements may more appropriately
be moved up the ladder to a more mundane understanding. Buchanan notes five “realistic” modes of
biomedical enhancement: embryo selection; genetic engineering of the embryo; drug administration;
genetically altered tissue / organs; and brain / computer interfaces. Each of these modes of enhancement
fall under the more extreme end of the enhancement spectrum as each of these make direct changes to the
human person to greater or lesser degrees. Buchanan, Beyond Humanity?, 25.
34

Peterson, Changing Human Nature, 193.

35 Buchanan makes this distinction between external and internal enhancements, which is a
different way of saying the same thing I have in this chart. For Buchanan, literacy, numeracy, agriculture,
and social institutions are all external enhancements that have drastically affected us internally. To this he
would add computers and culture. As he says, “External or environmental innovations can change us
profoundly.” Buchanan, Beyond Humanity?, 39. Hence, agriculture, clothing, transportation, and data
management are all indirect (though important!) ways humans are enhanced beings. These technologies
highlight that we are a tool using species. Nevertheless, these technologies, though they greatly affect us,
only affect us indirectly at a physical level. The second stage is direct or indirect intervention in the issue of
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Genetic manipulation changes the fundamental physical makeup of the person and,
hence, is considered the most extreme of the enhancements on this list.36 Again, this is
not meant to be taken as a comprehensive, complete, or otherwise immutable table of
how enhancement technology should be viewed, but it helps to categorize the spectrum of
mundane to extreme enhancements.
Buchanan argues that the issue is not whether some given enhancement is
“reversible” or not.37 As such, the issue cannot be tied to the reversibility of certain
enhancement procedures – say, reversing a prosthetic or cybernetic implant. Thus, he
says, the “reversibility” of genetic manipulation, surgery, or any other therapeutic or
enhancement technology is simply beside the point.38 I take the opposite viewpoint, the
irreversibility of some genetic manipulation is precisely the point of what makes a
technology “extreme.”

sensory correction. For example, one may use glasses to correct vision or one could have lasik surgery.
Glasses are an indirect correction and lasik would be a direct correction. Prosthetic limbs (and the ever
growing cybernetic field) utilize non-organic tools and interface it directly with the body. The last area of
consideration is direct technological intervention. Drugs affect the body directly, but are generally
temporary enhancements. Acetaminophen may stop a headache, but its effects are temporary. Likewise,
surgery to repair, remove, or otherwise correct damaged body parts directly affects the human person, but
only at a gross anatomy level.
36 Buchanan takes it that what I have labeled “indirect” enhancements have actually changed
humanity in more important and lasting ways than any implanted computer chip could. In other words,
Buchanan takes it that these indirect / external technologies have been, in a sense, more extreme than any
direct enhancement technology. While I agree with Buchanan that many indirect technologies have
irreversibly enhanced us (for the better!) I simply disagree with his judgment that agriculture “affects us
more deeply” than direct technological engagement with the human person. It is agreed that agriculture has
broadly and significantly changed how humans live, but even in this change what it means to be human is
left largely untouched. However, once the cybernetic and genetic revolution takes hold, what it means to be
human is the issue at stake. Ibid., 40.
37

Ibid., 40.

38

Ibid., 40—41.
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6.3.1.2 Three “Levels” of Technology
Allenby and Sarewitz note that there are three levels of technology. At Level I we
attempt to solve some perceived problem. Hence, humans get sick from some disease and
so we develop some antibiotic to counter said disease. Level I technologies are the
immediate measures taken to solve a perceived and specific problem. It is at this level
most of the transhumanist debate takes place. Most arguments revolve around how some
particular technology can affect our lives. These technologies tend to be reliable at
solving the immediate problem under consideration. At Level II, we must address the
systematic complexity introduced by that technology. At this level we know there will be
unpredictable events and we can relatively prepare for their eventuality.39 Basically, at
Level II, complexity can anticipated but not predicted. We can somewhat prepare to
alleviate these problems, but make no mistake, these problems arose because we created
the Level I technology.
What we observe is that Level I technology gives rise to Level II issues. Whatever
complexity that arises at Level II is based on what is wrought at Level I. This is
commonly known as the problem of “unintended consequences” and it plagues all
examples of emergent technology. Humans are intelligent creatures, but we are hardly
omniscient and thus we cannot see all possible ends. Further, technology is not developed
in isolation. Technologies interact with other technologies as well as cultures and

39 For example, airplanes are strictly a Level I technology – they move people and goods from
point A to point B quickly and efficiently. However, this gives rise to issues at Level II. For example,
weather can delay flights. Strong turbulence can damage passengers and cargo. Overbooked flights can
throw some people off their schedules. Economic events may make the price of flying impractical for the
common person. Each of these events may be expected, but cannot be predicted. We make planes so they
do not rip apart at the first sign of turbulence, but that does not mean we know when any particular bout of
turbulence will occur. We can generally predict severe weather within a few days, but not any particular
snow and ice storm that could delay flights.
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societies. Not to mention that unexpected human use of technology outside its original
intention stresses and molds technology in unexpected ways.40
By distinguishing Level I from Level II technologies we can now think of the
transhumanist issue in an alternate way. Most proponents address enhancement
technology along Level I lines. Transhumanists highlight what a new and exciting
technology can offer us for a specific condition. These are great for determining “specific
and identifiable goals” (i.e., cognitive enhancement; longer life-spans; etc.). Detractors to
enhancement, however, often address Level II concerns – i.e., “enhancement x may be
great, but how will that affect persons p?” As such, Allenby and Sarewitz see both
transhumanists and their critics as talking past each other. Both concerns are valid, and
both concerns do not address the other’s points. However, it is necessary to bring these
two viewpoints into conversation. And for Allenby and Sarewitz, they are convinced that
any such discussion would ultimately be symbiotic. Any non-trivial technology should
affect both Level I and II in reinforcing ways. The problem for transhumanists and their
critics is that they often do not engage each other beyond “simplistic, anachronistic, and
contradictory conceptual frameworks.” This situation must change for real dialog to take
place.41 The seduction of Level I activity is quite obvious: there is a problem and we look
for a solution. There is a disease that needs to be cured, so we search for an effective
vaccine. Level I technologies meet “specific and well-defined social goals.” Level II

40

Allenby and Sarewitz, The Techno-Human Condition, 38—39.

41

Ibid., 61.
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technologies on the other hand are messy and unclear – there is very little precision
involved even if “broad brush-strokes” are possible.42
This brings us to Level III technology which operates at the complex “Earth
system” level. At this stage, the realities involved are too complex to predict or even
expect. We often simply react to the changes at this point. As Allenby and Sarewitz note,
Level III is “a complex, constantly changing and adapting system in which human, built,
and natural elements interact in ways that produce emergent behaviors which may be
difficult to perceive, much less understand and manage.”43 Level III systems simply resist
any type of predictive analysis. Allenby and Sarewitz comment that at this level all that
can be expressed is a type of existential despair. As they put it, at “this level, it’s not just
that you can’t handle the truth; it’s that you can’t even grasp it; it’s too complex to be
given in forms (ideology, scientific models, traditional values) that you can process.”44
Level III systems defy our attempts to control it.45
Allenby and Sarewitz lament the technological discussions making the rounds
today, since few are acknowledging these different levels of technological engagement.

42

Ibid., 63.

43

Ibid.

44

Ibid., 64.

45 To use the airline example once more – at Level I are the technologies that specifically allow us
to fly from point A to point B. At Level II are the technologies that help prepare for, but not specifically
prevent or avoid turbulence, bad weather, traffic delays, etc. However, at Level III we are dealing with the
effects that air travel exerts on society itself: world leaders make “short” trips across the globe rather than
months-long voyages as necessitated in years past; it was revealed that some people have a sever phobia of
flying; the airplane transformed modern travel and warfare and introduced us to the space age; etc. Despite
our best efforts, we have been thoroughly unable to predict when and how these types of activities would
affect us at a global level. There may have been some early prognostication about the possibility of simple
travel by air, but now we can move hundreds of people and several tons of supplies via aircraft. The world
could not and did not predict these sorts of activities when Orville and Wilbur Wright first took flight at
Kitty Hawk. Yet, within a few decades we were sending people to the moon.
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As such, they see the discussion devolving “into fruitless dichotomized conflict.” By not
recognizing these various levels of technology, the conversation has become confused.
Conflict abounds because complexity is being discussed at different levels. The
complexity at Level I is not the same as that at Level II, and the concerns at Level II are
often of little consequence at Level I. And Level III technology is often simply ignored
due to its overwhelming complexity and unpredictability. Nevertheless, it is imperative
for interlocutors to recognize and address the concerns at each particular level and resist
mixing categories.46
6.3.2 The Moral Spectrum of Enhancement: “Moderate” to “Radical”
Just as there is an objective spectrum of technology, there is also a moral
spectrum. Some technologies seem less problematic than others. The major advantage
that the objective spectrum has is that it is indeed, to some degree “objective.” There are
measurable aspects on which debate can proceed. The major drawback to the moral
spectrum is that it is largely “subjective” and dependent on one’s worldview and cultural
values. As such, some technology x may be deemed moral by one society, but devious by
another. Nevertheless, I maintain that it is possible to provide a workable moral spectrum
of evaluation, but I readily admit that the spectrum of value defended here is based in my
philosophical, theological, and cultural positioning.
Moral evaluation of enhancement technology is critical, because it is easy to shift
from explaining how technology is used “to express our choices to using it to guide our

46

Ibid., 65.
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choices.”47 Moral evaluation cannot be avoided, for whether one is arguing for or against
any given enhancement, they implicitly or explicitly tie moral recommendations to their
advocacy.
To address the moral spectrum, I will adopt Agar’s terminology as discussed
previously. Thus, “moderate” enhancement will refer to technologies that are either
morally acceptable or at least relatively uncontroversial – “moderate” enhancements will
be understood to have widespread appeal. “Radical” enhancements will imply a moral
rejection of the enhancement. These types of technologies will be deemed too morally
repulsive to be ethically pursued.48 Again, just as there is a range of possibilities for
objective enhancements, so too is there a range of reactions for moral enhancements. As
such, the “mundane” to “radical” designation is only occasionally clear, and often times
muddled. So the obvious question then becomes: why even use the designations at all?
The answer is that being able to designate a given technology as either “moderate” or
“radical” (however, difficult it may be to do so) gives a moral legitimacy or curtailment
of that technique. If it is possible label a given procedure as “moderate” then there should
be little controversy about its use. However, if one is able to label a given procedure as
“radical” then this would provide the impetus to forgo implementing such a technique.

47 Rubin, Eclipse of Man, 84. Rubin is specifically referring to Ray Kurzweil’s shifts in what
technology does, but I think the larger point stands in regard to most transhumanists.
48 For example, the use of acetaminophen to help alleviate headaches is a relatively
uncontroversial pharmaceutical therapy – doctors prescribe this all of the time and sometimes as a
preventative measure. As such, this would be deemed a “moderate” enhancement. It attempts to relieve
pain before its onset. While there may be some people unwilling to ingest any pharmaceuticals, the vast
majority of persons seem willing to engage in this activity, especially given the benefits it produces. On the
other hand, undergoing some cybernetic surgery to replace or enhance appendages may have the
undesirable effect of making one a social outcast or (more dramatically) socially dangerous. Such types of
proposed enhancements may be given the term “radical” due to their undesirable side-effects.
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The difficulty, of course, is determining what is / is not either a “moderate” or a “radical”
enhancement.
When we incorporate the “moderate” and “radical” spectrum, Figure 6.1 is then
further completed by Figure 6.2. Note that the last three columns are labeled “Moderate”,
“Potentially Moderate”, and “Potentially Radical”. For the “Moderate” column notice
that all “Indirect” technologies are considered moderate, but technologies that have both
a direct and / or indirect component and some that have a direct impact are normally (but
not always) considered moderate technologies. Only extreme and direct techniques
cannot be labeled as unquestioned moderate technologies. However, upon considering the
final two columns, “Potentially Moderate” and “Potentially Radical”, we see that the
same techniques could be considered as either one or the other. Both cannot be
considered under indirect technologies otherwise they would just be “Moderate”. Thus,
we must examine the specific technology to determine if it could be considered
“Potentially Moderate” or “Potentially Radical”. Should an extreme technique be judged
Figure 6.2
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potentially radical then the wise course of action would be to either cease development or
modify it so that it could be considered as “Potentially Moderate”.
6.4 Principles Towards a Hermeneutic of Enhancement
It is commonly thought that if some technology can make our lives more
enjoyable and our work more efficient, then that technology is “good.” This belief is not
irrational. However, it must also be acknowledged that some technologies (especially
biomedical ones) are thoroughly “value laden.” As such, the technology can only be
judged against the backdrop of a worldview and examined accordingly.49 From a
Christian perspective, humans are first and foremost beings responsible to God. Any
improvements to human life should facilitate a proper relationship to God, or at least not
hinder that relationship.50 And thus, we can state with certainty at least one axiom of
technological research: “Never must the existence or the essence of man as a whole be
made a stake in the hazards of action.”51 That is, we must not gamble with the entire
existence of humanity. For surely, it is an endangerment to humanity’s relationship to
God if we were to extinguish human existence completely.52
To that end, below are a number of principles that should undergird the
enhancement debate. Please note the similarity to common biomedical ethical principles
49 Ben C. Mitchell, Edmund D. Pelligrino, Jean Bethke Elshtain, John Kilner, and Scott B. Rae,
Biotechnology and the Human Good (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2007), 15.
50 James Peterson comments, “human beings are responsible to God to improve life for one
another rather than drift in complacency. This is the model of Christ held up for imitation repeatedly,
whether in the Gospels or in the apostolic letters (e.g., John 13:3-15 and Phil. 2:4-7).” Peterson, Changing
Human Nature, 151.
51 Hans Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age,
translated by Hans Jonas and David Herr (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 37.
52

Ibid.
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widely in practice today. The basic principles to be considered are the need for autonomy
– the knowledgeable willingness of those undergoing procedures. Likewise, there are the
correlative principles of benevolence and nonmaleficence – do good and avoid harm.
Finally, the principles of justice also must be addressed. These principles can help inform
how to evaluate enhancement technologies. For if it can be determined that some
proposed technology violates one of these principles, then the technology is most likely
immoral to pursue. On the flip side, just because some enhancement does not violate one
of these principles, it does not mean that the enhancement should be pursued. It would
just show that there is no prima facie problem in researching such a technology.
Likewise, the principle of double-effect can be useful here, or alternatively a sense of
proportionality. Finally, we will look at some specific Christian presuppositions that
come into play. Upon establishing these principles, we can then move on to developing a
hermeneutic for enhancement.
6.4.1 Autonomy
Autonomy is based in the notion that persons are endowed with dignity that
cannot be violated apart from their permission. It is an affirmation of the person’s moral
worth and recognizes that the person is in a society in which their rights are balanced
with the rights of others.53 Further, this assumes that people have a certain measure of
personal freedom to do with their bodies as they please (within certain limits). Attending
this freedom is the assumption of privacy. Likewise, this means that as autonomous
beings we are afforded this dignity whether we are currently aware of these rights or not.

53 Thomas M. Garrett, Harold W. Baille, and Rosellen M. Garrett, Health Care Ethics: Principles
and Problems, 3rd ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998), 27.
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Hence, a person’s autonomy is not forfeited just because they are asleep or in a coma. So
long as the person is alive (and in many traditions, even after they are dead), the person is
entitled to have their wishes and best interests protected.54
Steven Garner states that the “principle of autonomy concerns the priority of the
free and independent human individual in decision making, and in particular in decision
making about an individual’s body, health, and well-being.”55 The priority here is the free
consent of another, for it is in the context of a freedom of choice that further perpetuates a
culture of freedom – which will tend to avoid forcing procedures on the unwilling (or
those unable to consent).56 But it is not always clear, however, that a person fully
understands to what they are consenting.57 Indeed, external influences can be so
persuasive or the information provided is so obtuse that one’s autonomy is violated, since
in either case they do not fully (or really) understand to what they are being subjected. 58
Transhumanism primarily focuses on the desires of the autonomous individual
who chooses to be (re)shaped by technology. However, as Stephen Garner observes,
these decisions affect not just the individual, but society as a whole.59 “This
individualistic approach to technological development asserts that individual choices

54

Ibid., 28.

55 Stephen Garner, “Christian Theology and Transhumanism: The ‘Created Co-creator’ and
Bioethical Principles,” in Religion and Transhumanism: The Unknown Future of Human Enhancement, ed.
by Calvin Mercer and Tracy J. Trothen (Denver, CO: Praeger, 2015), 234 (emphasis in original).
56

Peterson, Changing Human Nature, 195.

57 Patrick Lin and Fritz Allhoff. “Untangling the Debate: The Ethics of Human Enhancement,”
NanoEthics 2, No. 3 (2008).
58

Peterson, Changing Human Nature, 194.
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Garner, “Christian Theology and Transhumanism,” 229.
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indirectly bring about health, longevity, and wholeness to all of society.”60 As such,
autonomy plays a central role in the contemporary enhancement debate, and the general
consensus seems to be along the lines of: no one is to be subjected to enhancement
technology that they do not want, nor should technologies be developed that hinder the
autonomy of the subject. Freedom of choice for both current and future society is a
primary value for both enhancement proponents and critics. Hence, technologies that
inhibit the autonomy of larger society may be justifiably mitigated in order to preserve
that autonomy.
6.4.2 Beneficence and Nonmaleficence
The basic idea of beneficence is to do more harm than good. It is looking out for
the other’s best interest. It is the active attempt to perform good for another. The
correlative idea of nonmaleficence means to avoid doing harm.61 If a course of action will
cause harm to someone, then that course of action is to be altered or ceased. Prima facie,
these are almost common sense notions and obviously acceptable – of course it is
desirable to “do good” and “avoid doing harm.” The problem with this approach is that it
is not always clear what is good and what is harmful. Indeed, given the types of creatures
we are we cannot avoid doing some harm, nor can we perform all goods.62
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Ibid., 236.
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Ibid., 237—238.
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Garrett, Baille, and Garrett, Health Care Ethics, 55.
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The moral notion of intention counts for a lot in ethical action.63 If the intention is
good, then while the action may not be justified, it does mitigate the blame that we place
on the actor.64 To borrow an example from C. S. Lewis, why do we blame the man who
tries to trip me but fails, but forgive the man who trips me, but did not intend to?65 Their
intentions make all of the difference. We can apply this notion of intention to beneficence
and nonmaleficence to see a way in which these ideas can help determine the morality of
a certain action or proposal.
Beneficence says that we must do the good, but it is not possible to do all good.
Likewise, nonmaleficence says we must not do evil, but it is not possible to avoid doing
some evil. We cannot escape from allowing some evil. Nor can we perform only good.
For, life itself is inherently risky. If we tried to avoid all harm, we would literally be
doing nothing else.66

63 This is a different understanding of intention than what was discussed in chapter 3, but similar
to that discussed in chapter 5.
64 For example, someone finds a person in distress who is choking on (presumably) food. The
person intends to help by performing the Heimlich maneuver (i.e., they are attempting to perform a good
act) – it is thus unfortunate that the person helping does not actually know how to do it. However, they give
it their best shot, but in the process the person who is choking passes out due to lack of oxygen. Further, let
us assume for the sake of illustration that the person doing the Heimlich actually makes the person’s
condition worse because of their poor technique. So, not only is the person not doing good for the person
choking, they have actually made things worse. Is the person guilty of simple assault because of their lack
of medical knowledge? Unlikely. Their intention was to help. Their desire was to benefit the person
choking, even though their actions were worse for the person. We may criticize the intended hero as
ignorant and foolish, but we would not call them evil or diabolical. On the other hand, if their intention
were to harm the person, but even accidentally helped the person, we would call their actions reprehensible.
These types of judgments are all based on the intention of the actor.
65

C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (1943; repr., Nashville: Broadman & Holman Pub., 1996), 29.
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Garrett, Baille, and Garrett, Health Care Ethics, 56.
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6.4.3 Justice
Stephen Garner remarks that the “bioethical principle of justice is typically
concerned with equitable distribution of limited resources, and in particular with access
to those resources and information. However, justice as a broader concept also engages
with the question of how the use of those resources might marginalize and disadvantage
others.”67 Healthcare itself has multiple goals: prolong life, alleviate suffering, and
optimize an individual’s chance for a “happy” life.68 Health care “is generally a good, but
with an indeterminate goal.”69 Yet, whatever specific goal it has, justice is the
overarching value that directs its movements. Within the enhancement debate “health and
disease are loaded with social and subjective concerns as well as objective scientific
criteria.”70 The problem is that there is no precise way to define either “health” or
“disease” even though there is a general sense when one is “healthy” versus when one is
“diseased.” Sometimes the distinction is clear, other times not so much. For just like the
fuzzy line between therapy and enhancement, so too is there a fuzzy line between health
and disease.71
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Garner, “Christian Theology and Transhumanism,” 239 (emphasis in original).
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Garrett, Baille, and Garrett, Health Care Ethics, 86—88.
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Ibid., 89.
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Ibid., 84.

71 For example, is the normal process of aging “healthy” or a “disease”? Your answer will
probably depend on your philosophical and theological values of aging and death. Nevertheless, we can
understand disease to be any deficiency in the physical body or psychological state of what the individual
and society expect for themselves. “Because of the influence of social concerns on the recognition of
disease, we define a disease as any deficit in the physical form or physiological or psychological
functioning of the individual in terms of what society wants or expects from that individual or in terms of
what the individual wants or expects for himself.” Ibid. (emphasis in original).

338

James Peterson comments that we simply cannot predict all possible effects of our
actions, but we must make decisions anyway. Further, this inability to “see all ends” does
not entail that all actions are equally desirable. As he says, acting “with insufficient
knowledge would be immoral, but if human beings gain sufficient knowledge so that an
intervention is not imprudent, it would not then be immoral on that count.”72 Of course,
the rub is trying to determine what is or what is not considered “sufficient knowledge” to
know which interventions are prudent. In general, however, this should not prevent us
from trying to make things better. For, we do have some idea of what may or may not be
helpful.73
Peterson offers four standards of justice that should guide any enhancement
discussion.74 First, it should be safe. At least it should be as safe as we can reasonably
predict. Certainly, technologies can be used for more than an intended end, but given the
potential impact scale of enhancement technologies, we should be cautious about any
enhancements we bring about. Secondly, it needs to be a genuine improvement. This is
more than a mere subjective desire. I may want to be a few inches taller, or have my skin
a little bit darker (or lighter), but it is debatable if these would be real improvements in
the relevant sense. Thirdly, any enhancement should create opportunities for people in
increasing their capacities. If an “enhancement” limits the recipient’s options, then it may
not be a true enhancement. In a sense, this standard could be restated as “avoid a Devil’s
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bargain.”75 Finally, we need to best use our limited resources. This is a question of
distributive justice. Should we invest heavily in some obscure (though arguably
beneficial technology), or should we put that investment toward the ameliorating of
known diseases?76
Peterson finds justification for these four standards by following the admonition
of the prophet Micah. “And what does the LORD require of you but to do justice, and to
love kindness, and to walk humbly with your God” (Micah 6:8, ESV).77 “Justice” is
accomplished by doing no harm – being safe, and properly allocating limited resources.
To “love kindness” is to offer real improvements and real expansion of opportunities.
Any “enhancement” that lessens (good) options for a person is questionable at best.
Lastly, is the reminder of why we exist at all – “to walk humbly with your God.” Indeed,
this last phrase is the overarching principle that guides the entire enterprise.
Enhancement, for the Christian, should not interfere with one’s relationship to God or to
others. Any technology that displaces a proper relationship with God is an idol, and any
technology that displaces a proper relationship with others cannot be a true enhancement.
Humans are social and relational beings and without proper relationships (to God and
others) their personalities and values warp. An enhanced person without developed

75 For example, suppose someone expresses compulsive tendencies. These tendencies range from
mildly annoying to pathological. However, there is an element of “responsibility, vigilance, and attention to
detail” associated with compulsiveness that is a virtue in some contexts. Ibid., 173. In other words,
eliminating the symptoms associated with compulsiveness because of an undesired trait may equally
eliminate virtues needed for other practices. Thus, it must be weighed if the reduction of impulsive
tendencies will create opportunities for the person or restrict opportunities.
76 Peterson notes how these four principles mirror the standards set forth by Tom L. Beauchamp
and James F. Childress for biomedical ethics: non-maleficence, beneficence, autonomy, and justice. Ibid.,
164. Cf., Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 4th ed. (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1994).
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ֶֽ ָּ
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relationships and proper socialization could be extraordinarily dangerous as they may not
be able to see the true value in being in relationship with others.
Those that favor safety over technological advancement often put forward the socalled “precautionary principle” which essentially says that if there is any doubt about an
action, the safest route is to avoid that action. Indeed, the “precautionary principle” has a
unique advantage for survival since it is risk adverse. You cannot be seriously harmed if
you do not engage in dangerous behavior. However, there is a significant drawback to
just relying on the “precautionary principle,” namely, circumstances may dictate that the
wisest course of action involves some risk. Sometimes inaction is just as risky (if not
more risky) than taking some action. As Peterson puts it, “Inaction is not always the
safest course.”78 Sometimes, the “safest” action is engaging in risky behavior. As a
counter-balance to the “precautionary principle” is the “proactionary principle” which
essentially states that we should actively pursue enhancements with an eye towards
limiting negative outcomes and promoting positive outcomes. Enhancement enthusiasts
tend to be more bullish on the “proactionary principle” and wary of the “precautionary
principle.”79
The Christian tradition has a long history of emphasizing “love of neighbor” (cf.,
Lev. 19:18; Matt. 22:39; 1 John 4:21). Christian love is inclusive, not exclusive and seeks
“to extend care as widely as practicable to fellow human beings.”80 Keeping people safe
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79 Max More, “The Proactionary Principle: Optimizing Technological Outcomes,” in The
Transhumanist Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, Technology, and Philosophy
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is one way to extend care. Another way to care for people is to make their lives and
various capacities for life “better.” Indeed, Peterson notes that in the attempt to avoid
harm, enhancement may be seen as the preferred option.81 And while we generally do not
question if it is “good to improve,” our notion of “improvement” is based squarely on
what we think is the purpose of our lives.82 One’s worldview informs the values that
allow us to determine if some technology is an actual enhancement or not. Different
cultures value different traits and capacities. What may be valuable in one society, may
be viewed as a defect in another. For example, what some may see as steadfast adherence
to principle, others may see as juvenile stubbornness.83 Further, to say that some
enhancement is a real, genuine good for the person, then their capacities and options for
real goods should be increased not limited.
6.4.4 Double-Effect and Proportionality
The therapeutic angle to biomedical research appeals to the Christian sympathies,
since it is Jesus’ ethic of love that provides the imperative to benefit others. Jesus healed
people, and so too should we try to heal people. As such, developing the proper
techniques to alleviate suffering is an admiral goal in Christian thought. Indeed, failing to
develop the technology within our grasp to alleviate pain, suffering, and illness may be
seen as a failure to fulfill our mandate as God’s ambassadors in the world.84 Thus, not
only should we not cause people pain, but we should utilize technology to overcome
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physical and psychological suffering which will increase human flourishing.85 Exactly
how this is to be done however is more complicated.
Perhaps the most popular way to mitigate the extent of harm allowed has been by
utilizing the principle of double effect. Some actions result in a mixture of good and bad,
and this principle states that an act that results in some evil may be allowed should four
conditions be met: 1) the action must be good, not be inherently evil, or it must be
morally neutral; 2) the agent must only intend the good effects, not the bad; 3) the bad
effect cannot be the means to the good effect; and 4) the proportion of good and bad must
be that the good outweighs the bad.86
Garrett, Baille, and Garrett, however find the principle of double effect
cumbersome and prefer to utilize the principle of proportionality. This principle states:
“Provided the action does not go directly against the dignity of the individual person (the
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intrinsic good), there must be a proportionate good to justify permitting or risking an evil
consequence.”87 Like the principle of double effect, the principle of proportionality has
four factors in which to consider. First, are there alternative ways to obtain the desired
good with less or no evil? That is, if there are ways to obtain the desired end with as little
evil as possible, then that is the path that should be pursued.88 Second, what is the “level”
of good desired compared against the “level” of evil risked or permitted? That is, “not all
goods and evils are equal. . . . At base, we recognize that some things are merely useful
for the life of the person, while others are necessary for human life and dignity.”89 Third,
what is the certitude of good to be gained or evil to be allowed? “Some serious evils are
remote; that is, the risk of them is so small that in practice we treat the evil as not serious.
. . . proportionality involves very complicated if not always precise balancing of the
levels of goods and evils with the probability or certainty of these same goods and
evils.”90 Finally, what is the causal influence of the agent? Some agents are more
relatively responsible for good or evil than others.91
Given these considerations on proportionality, Garrett, Baille, and Garrett propose
a refined understanding of beneficence and nonmaleficence. They say that
nonmaleficence should be understood as avoiding evil unless there is a proportionate
reason for risking the evil. Likewise, beneficence should be understood as doing good
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unless the consequences of said action produces a disproportionate evil.92 Whether one
prefers to appeal to the principle of double-effect or proportionality, the same thrust is
achieved – accomplishing only good with no evil appears to be impossible given our
limited and fallible means, as such, we need to operate according to some principle to
maximize the good and minimize the evil to the best of our knowledge and ability.
6.4.5 Presuppositions
Technology has without question shaped our social structures and how we interact
with each other.93 Humans are creatures that both make and are shaped by our
technology. As such, it is incumbent upon us to create “good” technology and not hinder
efforts to bring about human flourishing under the pretense of the newest technology.
Again, there is nothing wrong with technological advancement per se, but some
technologies may actually hinder the human good. This belief, however, makes multiple
assumptions – the least of which is not that “human” is a definable organism, or that
“good” is a generally agreed upon term. The previous chapters have sufficiently
demonstrated that this is not the case. However, also in line with chapters 3 and 5, this
project takes the notion of “human being” as understood in a certain way and “good” to
comprise a robust definition. Likewise, there are a number of presuppositions that should
be acknowledged as foundational to a Christian approach to technological enhancement,
that simply cannot be ignored.
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The first is that God is the creator of everything.94 The creator-creation distinction
is the one belief that sets monotheism apart from every other worldview. For atheism has
no creator and pantheism does not distinguish between the creator and the creation (for
they are one and the same). For the monotheist, however, the creator-creation distinction
is the framework upon which all else is understood. It sets the context for our actions and
beliefs. This is God’s creation and we are but limited stewards of it. Thus, all of our
actions are in light of God’s command over all things as the source for their existence.
Second, Christians will appeal to the Bible as the locus for how to believe and act.
The Bible informs us of ultimate end and how to achieve it.95 God has made us to be in
fellowship with Himself and with others, and the Bible provides us direction on how best
to facilitate those relationships. Likewise, the person of Jesus as revealed in the New
Testament provides a means of restoring our proper relationship to God. It should be
obvious that whatever particular wisdom that is found in the Bible is available to all
people that have access to it. However, the belief that the Bible is the final say in how we
are to respond to God is, of course, a matter of faith.
Third, as creatures in God’s image, all persons irrespective of age, development,
disability, status or health are worthy of respect and dignity.96 This was already covered
in chapter 3, but is reiterated here.
Fourth, following from the notion of the imago Dei is the conviction that humans
are more than just human tissue. Any technology that seeks to destroy or injure human
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persons at any stage of development should be resisted and wholly avoided.97 This
conviction has obvious implications for the abortion debate (which I will not engage in
here), but suffice to say, this is just a logical extension that the whole human person is
precious in God’s sight. To treat any human as simply a lump or collection of tissue and
cells is to perform an unwarranted reduction against what it means to be human.
Fifth, human beings are created for communion with God and others.98 This belief
finds its basis in the overall thrust of the Christian tradition which interprets the story of
Genesis through Revelation as the separation and long return of humans to fellowship
with God. It can be summarized in Jesus’ prayer in the Garden of Gethsemane in which
believers may be one just as the Father and Son are one (John 17:21). This idea is
reiterated by John the elder (1 John 1:3; 3:24). Humans are social creatures and made for
fellowship – with God and with others.
Finally, the key problem for mankind is not physical or mental limitations, but
sin.99 “Some technologies may ameliorate the effects of sin, but no technology can
eradicate the reality of sin.” 100 Sin is not a popular topic in our modern cosmopolitan
society, but according to the Christian tradition, it is precisely sin that sets us back. It
keeps us from being how we should be. It persuades us to take the easy route, rather than
seek the noble path. Sin alienates us from God and from others, and can be manifested in
a number of ways – pride, envy, jealousy, hatred, lust, greed, laziness, etc. The seduction
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of enhancement technology is that it offers to alleviate our greatest problems, but it is
only limited to the physical aspects of human life. If our most fundamental problem is
spiritual, moral, and willful sin, then no advancement in technology will be able to solve
our deepest needs – for our deepest needs are not physical, but willful and spiritual.
6.5 A Proposed Hermeneutical Schema for Evaluating Enhancement Technologies
Charles Rubin remarks that transhumanists are aiming for a self-perpetuating
system, a system that entrenches and improves upon previous advancements.101 Indeed,
in “a world of enhancement competition, consistent ‘bioluddites’ will be selfeliminating.”102 The pressure to become ever more enhanced is nearly irresistible. Brent
Waters suggests the need for a hermeneutic when he says, “The natural ethic derived
from creation’s vindication insists that a line can and should be drawn regarding the
extent to which humans, both individually and collectively, transform themselves. Yet in
our obedient freedom it is a line that will need to be redrawn in response to the
development of more efficacious technologies and medical practices.”103 The issue
ultimately is not whether we will shape our selves or our surroundings but how will we
do so and by what means. Will we do it conscientiously or not.104 As a Christian, the
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question can be further refined as how “can we develop this best to love God, our
neighbors, and the earth entrusted to us?”105
Buchanan lists a couple of considerations to evaluate if the risk is worth the
reward for some given enhancement. First, he says to determine the magnitude and
probability of possible harm. Second, determine the magnitude and probability of
possible benefits. Thirdly, “determine whether there are morally acceptable, affordable,
and effective risk-prevention or risk-reduction measures that would allow us to reap the
benefits of doing X without running an unacceptable risk of bad consequences.”106 If the
rewards do not outweigh the expected risks, then the enhancement should not be pursued.
Buchanan notes that it is possible someone may object to developing a “cost and
benefits” analysis of some enhancement, or developing a hermeneutic that attempts to
filter the same sorts of issues. Namely, the critique is that providing any sort of analysis is
both morally shallow and impossible to quantify.107 It is thought to be morally shallow if
reducing the complexity of the enhancement debate can be accomplished by a simply
“pros and cons” column. As discussed above, this is not what an enhancement
hermeneutic is trying to accomplish. Secondly, and more importantly, it may very well be
impossible to quantify some proposed enhancement or its effects. However, the answer to
this charge is not to then abandon the project, but rather attempt to account for as many
variables as possible. The hermeneutic is not iron-clad and should be adjusted as new
data is available. Indeed, if necessary, the hermeneutic could be wholly abandoned in
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favor of some other method. What is not acceptable is to ignore the issue and to cease
considering the realities before us.
Charles Rubin says that it is human life and “human details” that “decisively
shape how innovations come to be and how they are used.”108 The need for a hermeneutic
is exemplified by the fact that we already utilize technology to make life better, however
we need to fend off the hubris that so often attends human endeavors. What is needed is
modesty and humility.109 There “is no historical evidence that technology can be limited
by moral constraint, or that what starts as legitimate treatment of disease will not be used
beyond therapy.”110 The need for a hermeneutic is important because more “than
anything else, we must control our power to control who, and what, we are. Otherwise,
we are in danger of becoming victims of our own ingenuity, in which we make our
utopias into dystopias.”111
Therefore, I propose that we consider we consider a five stage process for
thinking and implementing enhancement technologies. These stages will be considered in
more detail below, but the basic flow of the hermeneutic is as follows. Stage 1 is
positioning human nature and considering human beings as the types of creatures as they
are in their current state. Stage 2 defines the proposed enhancement and determines the
limits that the enhancement is predicted to achieve. Stage 3 is the most crucial step and
the one susceptible to the most controversy, for it is at this stage when one begins to
make judgement calls on whether the proposed enhancement should be pursued or not.
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Below will be a series of questions and issues to consider so that a principled answer can
be given on whether to proceed with the project, cease it, or reshape it. Stage 4 oversees
the implementation of the enhancement at a small scale in efforts to limit the affected
organisms to a manageable number should something go drastically wrong. Stage 5 is an
evaluation of the effectiveness of the enhancement and recommendation to either proceed
with dispersing the enhancement, cease it, or reshape it. Should the enhancement be
acceptable and integrated into society, it would then follow that we would have a newer
understanding of human persons and thus we are back to Stage 1. This cycle of
evaluation can be repeated indefinitely, and of course, it can undergo changes as more
reflection refines the process. Nevertheless, these stages will help to minimize the
dangers of “radical” enhancements and maximize “moderate” enhancements for the good
of society to the best of our ability.
6.5.1 Stage 1: Positioning Human Nature
Much of Stage 1 has already been established in chapters 2 and 3, and as such,
there is not much to add at this point. Suffice to say, that having a robust view of who and
what humans are will direct and shape what aspects of human beings that researchers
want to alter. Thus, viewing humans as simply the current end product of an evolutionary
process opens doors to certain research avenues that thinking humans are holistic beings
in God’s image does not. Likewise, it could be the case that even depending on your view
of how evolution works, it may or may not be a good idea to pursue certain
enhancements. Francis Fukuyama, for example, takes it that even though evolution is
undirected it is ruthless in making us organisms fit for our environment. As such,
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changing ourselves in ways evolution has not directed us, may prove detrimental to our
ability to interact with our environment.112
It should be pointed out that one’s understanding of what makes us human will
change as one follows this hermeneutic. The point is, that this is the starting point for this
process and must be taken into account in order to properly place humanity in its context.
To remove humans from this context is to displace what the human person is and to
bracket them apart from their various relationships. Human persons cannot be considered
in isolation, nor can their parts.
6.5.2 Stage 2: Defining the Proposed Enhancement
Having considered human persons in their proper context, enhancement
proponents can now define what exactly it is they want to accomplish: make our
memories better; live longer; better eyesight; make us smarter; etc. This is the point at
which the proposal takes shape. The enhancement proponent notices a problem with the
human condition and seeks a way to remedy it through Level I technology. Humans are
not as intelligent as they should be, so we need to increase mental capacity. Or humans
do not live as long as we like, so we need to develop strategies to increase life
expectancy. These sorts of themes can be multiplied.
There are number of issues that are addressed at this point besides what the
desired change to be researched. Namely, why seek the change. For example, is human
mental capacity really so detrimental that we should risk tampering with it? What is so
wrong with the length of our current life spans? Etc. This is basically asking what are the
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values that motivate a particular approach to overcoming human limitation? “What are
the values that motivate a particular investment in science or technology?”113 Who is it
that holds these particular values?114 Are there alternative approaches to achieving the
desired end that may be better suited to the types of beings we are? For example, we may
want to increase the capabilities of human eyesight, but is cybernetic implantation or
retinal replacement instead of glasses or lasik really the best way to achieve these
goals?115 Likewise, if the proposal is genetic in nature, we should ask what the
modification is at the “is” level. That is, what does it propose to do ontologically to the
individual? The further question to then ask is at the “ought” level. That is, should we
indulge in this particular genetic modification?116 This question will emerge again in
Stage 3.
6.5.3 Stage 3: Evaluating the Implications of the Proposed Enhancement
As noted above, this is perhaps the most controversial – and crucial – stage for the
entire hermeneutic, for it is here that so many issues come together. Indeed, it is in this
stage that the most questions emerge and the most ambiguous questions need to be
answered. For it is here that Level I technologies engage Level II concerns. The overall
thrust of this stage is to answer the main question: is the proposed enhancement worth
pursuing or should we maintain the status quo? In order to answer this main question we
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can break up the process into three aspects. These three aspects correspond to the moral
program put forth in chapter 5. That is, questions will be structured around how they
address agency, relationality, and responsibility. If an enhancement is believed to cohere
with an agency of relational responsibility, then it can move to the next stage of the
hermeneutic. However, if a proposed enhancement forces one to violate one of the
principles of an agency of relational responsibility, then that particular enhancement
should not be pursued as it is.
6.5.3.1 Questions Related to Agency
In regards to agency there are two broad issues to address. The first is how the
proposed enhancement affects the integrity of life (discussed in chapter 5) and the second
is how the proposed enhancement impacts human flourishing. Both of these issues are
addressing the needs and wants of the subject and the effects of the enhancement on the
subject.
Thus, the first question to ask regarding agency is: does the proposed
enhancement value the integrity of life? That is, does the proposed enhancement
“commodify” human life? Does it intentionally or unintentionally “demean, debase, or
degrade individuals”?117 Does the nature of the technology require a diminished view of
human life, values, or existence?118 Does the technology highlight only one good and
tend to ignore drawbacks? For example, prolonging life is often very good, but this tends
to isolate lifespan as the only value worth pursuing. Someone whose brain is disease
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riddled with Alzheimer’s may not view such prolongation as a necessary “good.”119 The
over-arching fear here is that future “biotechnology is likely to offer us bargains that
trade off length of life span for quality of life.”120 In light of these questions, if the
enhancement technology can be shown to contribute to the integrity of life, then one is
free to move to the second set of issues related to agency. However, if the technology
cannot be shown to contribute to the integrity of life, or if it is believed that the
technology may diminish the integrity of life, then that technology should be avoided.
The second question to ask in regard to agency is: does the proposed
enhancement encourage true flourishing for the agent? That is, is the technology going to
actually make life better or is it concerned with promoting “technological and economic
imperatives”? Is the technology being developed for the sake of technology or for the
betterment of humanity?121 Scientific advancement is important and is a most persuasive
means of discovering truth, but it is not the only means of human knowing. Science is a
tool of human knowledge, it is not the sole means of human knowledge. As such, science
should always be in service to humanity, humans should not be sacrificed in service to
science – as this would violate that human’s flourishing and integrity of life.122
6.5.3.2 Questions Related to Relationality
Humans are social creatures and maintain a variety of relationships. As
established in chapters 3 and 5, humans are first and foremost to be related to God and to
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others. Thus, any activity that endangers those relationships should be avoided.
Therefore, there are three questions regarding relationality that must be addressed. Again,
so long as the answers given show that an enhancement can contribute to our different
relationships, then the enhancement may proceed to the next set of questions. On the
other hand, should an enhancement inhibit a relationship rather than strengthen it, then it
should be avoided as it is.
Thus, the first question in regard to relationality is: does the proposed
enhancement promote concern for others? That is, does the technology heighten our
awareness of another’s needs, or does it cater to our own narcissistic tendencies? Does it
cause us to yield to others, or wallow in self-absorption?123
The second question in regard to relationality is: does the proposed enhancement
make just use of limited resources?124 This, of course, is a question of distributive justice
and is not easily answered. However, there is a sense that some actions are simply unjust
in light of alternative courses of actions. For example, should society spend enormous
amounts of resources to slightly benefit one (or a few) people when those resources could
be diverted to benefit many people at significant rates? Likewise, there is a growing
concern of “technicism” in society in which we spend tremendous amounts on
“superficial” procedures (e.g., plastic surgery, Botox, etc.) in order to “maintain
competiveness in the marketplace.” Given the many needs in the world, is this not a sign
of “a widespread social pathology”?125 Similarly, our society prioritizes the young over
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the old – judging that older lives are not as valuable as younger ones. Society seems to
value more youthful vigor to aged wisdom.126 As such, society is ever more willing to
expend resources on youth, but not on the elderly. Put differently, the young are willing
to sacrifice the old by withholding certain resources. The question before us, then, is will
enhancement technologies exacerbate these discrepancies?
The final question in regard to relationality is: does the proposed enhancement
facilitate stewardship over our resources?127 This is similar to the previous question, but
instead of dealing with the just distribution of resources, this question addresses our
maintaining resources for future generations. Further, this concern is directly born out of
the “dominion mandate” found in Genesis 1:28-30.128 As such, there is an obvious
“cosmic” dimension to this question – are we “taking care” of God’s world? Are we
treating it appropriately? Thus, the issues become how are we treating our natural
resources? Are we creating or alleviating ecological problems with the development of
certain resources?129 The Christian worldview generally sees humanity as responsible to
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ִָ֗ [ וַיְׁ ָּב ֶַ֣רְך אֹ תָּ ם֮ אֱֹלהִ י ֒ם ַו ֹּ֨י ֹאמֶ ר ל ֶ֜ ֶָּהם א
ר־בֹו פְׁ ִרי־עֶ֖ץ זֹ ַ֣ר ַע זָּ ֻׁ֑ ַָ֑רע לָּכֶ ֵ֥ם
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God for stewardship of the earth. Indeed, preserving the environment is essential to
human flourishing as we are dependent on the environment for our survival.130
6.5.3.3 Questions Related to Responsibility
Responsibility is a blanket concept and binds together issues related to agency and
relationality. As such, there is a broader aspect to questions of responsibility which may
allow for a number of interpretations and answers. Like those questions addressed by
agency and relationality, if a technology exhibits signs of responsible use, then it can
move to the next stage of the hermeneutic. However, if a technology does not exhibit the
signs of being used responsibly, then it should be avoided as it is.
The first question to ask in regard to responsibility is: does the proposed
enhancement display signs of preparedness for relatively safe implementation?131 Are
measures in place that will limit any possible damage that could result from a disastrous
implementation? Essentially, this question gets to the issue of how “cavalier” the
enhancement proponent is being.132 Transhumanists insist that one of the best ways to
prevent powerful technology from falling into the “wrong” hands is to democratize
enhancement technology. The more people that have access to the technology, then the
less likely that technology can be used to exert one’s will over another. But does
democracy insure enhancement technology will not be used for ill? Or can it really
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decrease the impact of ill-used technology? Along these lines it can be asked to whom is
the likely beneficiary of a given enhancement? Or to whom will the enhancement
negatively impact?133 Further, who profits from an enhancement? Are there alternative
approaches that may achieve the same end?134 Will a given technology cause harm to
some people, or a loss of “well-being” to individuals and society? 135 Conversely, what is
the cost of not implementing the proposed enhancement? If it can really increase the
well-being of individuals and societies, then this would be a strong reason in its favor.136
These sorts of preparedness questions can be difficult to answer due to the fact we cannot
see into the future – all we can do is make an educated guess.
The second question in regard to responsibility is: does the proposed
enhancement encourage “holiness” or does it appeal to our most base inclinations?137
That is, does the proposed enhancement appeal to our pride, our materialistic tendencies,
our vain attempts at self-aggrandizement, or our quest for physical splendor?138 Does the
proposed enhancement appeal to our lust for power or sexual fulfillment? Does it
encourage our “commodification” of persons?139 Does it encourage a form of
“enslavement” to fashion or succumb to peer pressure?140 Can the enhancement be used
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as a bludgeoning tool for anger and hatred?141 Though the main question here is phrased
in religious terms, the sentiment addresses a broad range of generally accepted vices and
virtues. That is, one does not have to be religious to properly answer the question.
The final question in regard to responsibility is: does the proposed enhancement
have a therapeutic element to it, or is it strictly an enhancement of ability?142 As
discussed above, technologies that are (fairly) clearly therapeutic are pretty well
accepted, but this does not imply that clear enhancements may not also be acceptable. If a
technology is solely an enhancement, it is an open question whether it is acceptable or
not, but if it is therapeutic it will most likely be acceptable (assuming it has satisfied the
prior criteria). The questions listed above are to help provide an answer. Essentially,
though, does the technology “foster or inhibit” communal relationships?143 Does the
technology promote communal values and dignify individuals regardless of their
abilities?144 This is just another way of saying, does the proposed technology cohere with
the values established by an agency of relational responsibility? If the answer is “no” at
any point, then the technology needs to be avoided or reworked until the answer is “yes.”
If the answer is “yes,” then we can proceed to the next stage of the hermeneutic.
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6.5.4 Stage 4: Implementing the Proposed Enhancement at a Small Scale
Innovations that do not diffuse, give opportunity for domination and exclusion.145
The fear of distributive injustice has mainly two parts: deprivation and unequal access.
While inequality is a definite concern, the more dangerous option is deprivation of
enhancement.146 Actively keeping enhancement technology from certain people all the
while enjoying the benefits of said technology would be a willful disregard for the rights
of the person you are depriving. Inequality may result for any number of reasons, but
deprivation is a conscious decision to keep some people from gaining the benefits of
some technology.
Innovation affects distribution and alters constraints.147 Depending on what the
technology does one may find it easy or difficult to distribute. For example, genetic
modifications will be slow to implement due to the nature of how genes operate.
However, a pharmaceutical enhancement could theoretically be dispersed rather quickly.
Hence, pending the technology, access to it could be fairly simple or not. It is therefore
incumbent upon society to diffuse beneficial innovations as widely as possible.148
Justice is not served when basic research money goes to well-developed areas of
the world and not to help those less fortunate.149 Hence, the concern that if enhancement
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technologies are only available to a few privileged individuals, then an actual injustice
will have been committed. Buchanan agrees that enhancement innovations that are
available only to a few may be a cause for injustice.150
The notion of consumer choice, of personal voluntarism, is an essential guideline
of the transhumanist agenda. As Rubin states it, “the core belief is that people ought to be
able to choose for themselves the manner in which they enhance or modify their own
bodies. If we are to use technology to be the best we can be, each of us must be free to
decide for himself what ‘best’ means and nobody should be able to stop us.”151 Rubin
continues that this degree of personal choice (or “techno-libertarianism”) is necessary, if
for no other reason than to distinguish the contemporary transhumanist movement from
the modern eugenics movement – breeding people for certain desired traits. As Francis
Fukuyama notes, the specter of eugenics hangs over the entire enhancement debate.152 In
the eugenics movement in the early twentieth century, you did not get to choose the
alterations done to yourself. However, the contemporary transhumanist movement is all
about self-direction of modification – you choose your own improvements.153 Yet,
despite what transhumanists suggest, enhancements are not “just a matter of what one
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individual chooses to do or not do.”154 Parents will choose varying enhancements for
their children, the child will not get to choose what is enhanced.155 The real distinction
between the old eugenics program and the new genetic enhancement program is not
solely the issue of self modification versus forced modification (though that is part of it).
The real issue is whether the modification is state directed or not.156 But even this is not a
guarantee. Should some enhancements prove thoroughly beneficial, then it is not at all
far-fetched to see how some governments may not begin encouraging (or even requiring)
certain enhancements “for the good of society.”157 As such, innovation can affect justice
either positively or negatively.158
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To encourage a positive implementation into society, it is prudent to test the
enhancement at a smaller scale on willing participants. This must be done with an eye
towards containment if the technology proves harmful. Likewise, a controlled and limited
implementation will allow for a better understanding of what may happen to society if the
technology is dispersed at a larger scale. Essentially, by limiting the first instances of a
technology, one is attempting to curb anything that may endanger larger society.
Remember, the priority is always to preserve the integrity of life – and a small scale
implementation provides the best chance to preserve that integrity.
6.5.5 Stage 5: Evaluating the Results of the Proposed Enhancement
The final stage of the hermeneutic is to evaluate the results of the proposed
enhancement from the small scale implementation. This is to evaluate the unintended
consequences of a certain technology. Given the complexity of the world and the
potential disaster that some of this technology engenders the need to adapt and possibly
reverse course is paramount. However, evaluation can be a painfully slow process, and
depending on the technology may take years (if not decades) to determine if the data is
sufficient to conclude the relative safety of the technology.159 Given the stakes, it is
imperative that we have a full account of the effects of any extreme enhancement.
Mundane enhancements, however, could possibly be evaluated in a rather quick
manner.160
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Now, if it is determined that the small scale implementation is proving to be
beneficial, then full implementation may be warranted. The types of questions that are
looked for here are similar to those found in the third stage, but instead of asking the
question in the present and future tense, it phrases it in the past tense. As such, in regards
to agency: did the proposed enhancement value the integrity of life? Likewise, did the
proposed enhancement produce true flourishing for the agent? In regards to relationality:
did the proposed enhancement encourage concern for others? Further, did the proposed
enhancement make just use of limited resources? Similarly, did the proposed
enhancement facilitate stewardship over creation? In regards to responsibility: did the
proposed enhancement show evidence of being a relatively safe procedure? Additionally,
did the proposed enhancement encourage “good” behavior or “bad”? Finally, did the
proposed enhancement have any therapeutic value or is it strictly an enhancement? It is
by asking these questions that the final determination can be made whether full adoption
of the proposed enhancement should be made or not.
If major concerns are brought up, then the prudent action is to cease the
development of the technology as it is and look to either change it or scrap it altogether.
This can be a hard decision to make given that some people will have invested years of
research and a lot of money in making this technology a reality. However, if that
technology is proving to be detrimental to individuals and society as a whole then
cessation of production is necessary.

at Level III even though we can have a good idea of what happens at Level I but somewhat less clarity at
Level II.
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Finally, if after a thorough evaluation the benefits of the technology outweigh any
detriments, then it can more readily be implemented fully into society. However, even in
this full implementation it should be done only on willing participants. The pull for a new
eugenics will be overwhelming at points but must be resisted. The autonomous rights of
individuals to refuse treatment or enhancement must be preserved to the best of our
ability. Now, once a technology has been implemented our understanding of what it
means to be human will be altered ever so slightly, and it is from this new vision of
human nature that the hermeneutic begins anew. The following chart (Figure 6.3)
illustrates the process just described.
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Figure 6.3
Stage 1: Positioning Human Nature

Acceptable

 Current view of Human Nature
 View of Body and Soul
 Imago Dei

Stage 5: Evaluating the Results of
the Proposed Enhancement
 Questions Related to Agency
o Did it value the integrity of life?
o Did it encourage true flourishing for the agent?
 Questions Related to Relationality
o Did it promote concern for others?
o Did it make just use of limited resources?
o Did it facilitate stewardship over our resources?
 Questions Related to Responsibility
o Did it display signs of preparedness for
relatively safe implementation?
o Did it encourage “holiness” or did it appeal to
our most base inclinations?
o Did it have a therapeutic element to it or is it
strictly an enhancement of ability?

Stage 2: Defining the
Proposed Enhancement

Not Acceptable

 What is it?
 What does it do?
 How does it work?

Stage 3: Evaluating the Implications
Stage 4: Implementing the
Proposed Enhancement
 Limited / Small-scale?
 Controlled?
 Observable?

of the Proposed Enhancement
 Questions Related to Agency
o Does it value the integrity of life?
o Does it encourage true flourishing for the agent?
 Questions Related to Relationality
o Does it promote concern for others?
o Does it make just use of limited resources?
o Does it facilitate stewardship over our resources?
 Questions Related to Responsibility
o Does it display signs of preparedness for
relatively safe implementation?
o Does it encourage “holiness” or does it appeal to
our most base inclinations?
o Does it have a therapeutic element to it or is it
strictly an enhancement of ability?

Acceptable

6.6 Implementing the Hermeneutic: A Case Study
The case study will involve the controversial issue of mind uploading – a
procedure in which the mind of an individual is moved from a biologically based
substrate to a computer based one. This is in many ways a subset issue of cognitive
enhancement. Below we will look at two sections. The first will explore some of the
background information related to the topic in order to lay out some of the promises,
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pros, and cons of mind uploading and cognitive enhancement in general. The second
section will provide a sample use of the hermeneutic regarding mind uploading and how
it might proceed.
6.6.1 Background Information for the Case Study:
Issues Related to Cognitive Enhancement
One way transhumanists propose to extend life is by virtual immortality –
uploading our consciousness into a computer substrate.161 This is what Ray Kurzweil
proposes: “the information contained in the brain that constitutes a person’s memories,
experience, and personality might be digitized. . . . because the mind is not a material
object, and the mind is ultimately what a person is, then it cannot be anything other than
information. A personality consists of a pattern of organized data that are created and
stored over time.”162 According to this approach, human brains and computers function
essentially in the same way, so all that is needed, is to appropriately attune a computer to
sustain biological “consciousness.” This thought is not that humans are replaced by
technology so much as merge with technology. This is already happening to lesser
degrees in prosthetics and data integration. But the clearest sign that this is a reality is
when we begin to see the first true cyborgs on a frequent basis. This is only an

161 Brent Waters, “Flesh Made Data: The Posthuman Project in Light of the Incarnation,” in
Religion and Transhumanism: The Unknown Future of Human Enhancement, ed. by Calvin Mercer and
Tracy J. Trothen (Denver, CO: Praeger, 2015), 291—292.
162 Ibid., 292—293. See also Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend
Biology (London: Penguin, 2005).
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intermediary step, however, to the singularity – that moment when biology and
technology truly integrate.163
There are a number of “advantages” of enhanced mechanized minds: faster
processing; resistant to neurological disease / decay; and learning / sharing is made
easier. There is already a blurring between human and machine in today’s society. For
example, think of how “attached” some people are to their smartphones. As such, there is
no perceived reason why using machines to “improve” the human should not be
pursued.164
The conversion of the soft tissue of the brain into the hardware of circuits is at the
foundation of Kurzweil’s vision of the singularity and mind-uploading. For under
Kurzweil’s vision, the individual must leave their biological body behind – for it is too
slow, fragile, and inefficient to properly host a mind as powerful as he proposes. At the
core of Kurzweil’s philosophy of mind is “patternism.” This is the idea that “we” are no
more than the pattern of neural synapsis firing in the brain. Should a computer be able to
accurately copy the specific pattern that makes you “you,” then (in theory) you could
have your mind uploaded to a computer. The underlying idea here is that information
“can be stored, copied, manipulated, and transmitted in all kinds of ways. The idea that
‘I’ am just a pattern abstracts not just from bodily particulars, but from how bodies are
embedded in the larger world; or, perhaps more precisely, it assumes that we live in our
own heads, and we don’t even need to stay there. It wipes away much of how we
163 C. Ben Mitchell, “The Audacity of the Imago Dei: The Legacy and Uncertain Future of Human
Dignity,” in Imago Dei: Human Dignity in Ecumenical Perspective (Washington, DC: The Catholic
University Press of America, 2013), 82.
164 Nicholas Agar, Humanity’s End: Why We Should Reject Radical Enhancement (Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press, 2010), 41.
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experience and understand ourselves and our world.”165 Thus, neuroscientists and
cyberneticists (under the encouragement of Kurzweil) are trying to figure out how to get
the same neural pattern operative on two different substrates. Should their efforts prove
successful, then this would produce either: 1) the individual with the “full sense of selfpresence”; 2) an “echo” of the individual; 3) create a “second person with a distinct selfpresence”; or 4) a “pattern of data” in which there is no self-awareness.166 The basic
conviction that undergirds this entire project, however, is that the mind is to software,
what the brain is to hardware.167
6.6.2 Applying the Hermeneutic: Mind Uploading and Module Implantation
With this background information, we can now evaluate Kurzweil’s mind
uploading proposal using our hermeneutic of enhancement. The first stage is to position
human nature, and it is here that much of the debate is largely stunted, for there are two
incompatible visions of human nature at play here. On one hand, you have the physicalist
patternism of Kurzweil, in which humans are reducible to the activity of their neural
patterns. On the other hand, you have the idea of ensoulment (as championed in this
project), in which persons cannot be simply reduced to a single aspect of their identity –
their mind, body, and soul matter. Nevertheless, due to ensoulment’s rich connection with
the physical body, any proposal that promises an alteration of the physical could be
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considered. As such, while we may already see a potential for disagreement at this point,
there is a general agreement that the human mind is deeply connected to the “hardwire”
of the brain. Ensoulment may not hold to “patternism” per se, but it does have a strong
physicalist connection to the brain. Thus, we can proceed to stage 2.
Stage 2 now looks to what the proposed enhancement entails. Here we can see
that Kurzweil has multiple goals: first, he is seeking greater cognitive enhancement
through better substrate material than the human brain. The human brain could be a more
efficient mechanism. Secondly, this raises the possibility that human personality could be
moved to a computer based substrate. For example, suppose that we are able to replace a
couple of synapsis in the brain with more reliable computer chips without loss of
functionality (and even a slight increase in efficiency). Now, suppose that we slowly
replace more and more of the brain with more chips (again, without any loss of
functionality and slight increases in efficiency with each replacement). Suppose we
replaced the entire brain in this manner. Under this scenario, we will have essentially
uploaded a human brain into a computer. Alternatively, one could see the scenario as
being as not replacing the brain per se, but rather “copying” the brain through some type
of brain scan and the results being transmitted to a computer. In either case, or any other
scenario presented, the basic goal is to increase human intellectual capacity with the
result of increased life-span through a computer based substrate.
Stage 3 looks to evaluate this proposal in light of the background information
provided by stage 1. Here we can begin asking the questions related to a project that is
congruent with an agency of relational responsibility. First, does the proposed
enhancement value the integrity of life? This is difficult to say since we have no
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experience of what it is like to live as an uploaded mind. Given the discussion, however,
mind uploading seems to prioritize one aspect of life (i.e., the rational aspect) over others
(i.e., bodily experiences). Thus, while inconclusive, it seems to be the case that mind
uploading does not favor the integrity of life for human persons. However, it may be the
case that it does favor the integrity of life for mind uploaded persons. Put differently,
mind uploading may have its own integrity of life to that type of being, but not as a
human being.
Secondly, does the proposed enhancement encourage true flourishing for the
agent? Again, this is difficult to judge, and the answer appears to be similar to the first.
Because, mind uploading considers the rational aspect of existence as primarily
important, other factors associated with flourishing aregenerally neglected. In this sense,
then, mind uploading cannot be considered to contribute to human flourishing for the
simple reason that it reduces human desires to only one feature.
Third, does the proposed enhancement promote concern for others? This, too, is
difficult to judge since it is unclear what mind uploading implies for another – the
process itself is deeply interested in only the subject, not “others” per se. One could say
that living an uploaded experience should be experienced by everyone and in this sense it
is concerned with others. Likewise, one could claim that by uploading their mind and
become increasingly more intelligent they could help people by advising them and
solving complex issues mere human intelligence could not. However, the motivation for
mind uploading seems to have little to do with making other persons lives better rather
than fulfilling one’s personal desire for greater intellectual capacity and longer life.
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Fourth, does the proposed enhancement make just use of limited resources?
Again, the answer is – it depends. Computers do not generally involve using many
resources, there is a set number of components and other than power usage, they have a
relatively small “carbon footprint.” So in this sense, it would not use many resources.
However, the development of the technology and the research itself could be criticized as
too extreme and out of touch – thus, it wastes time and money on fanciful dreams when
real-world problems could better use those resources to solve problems now.
Fifth, does the proposed enhancement facilitate stewardship over our resources?
Again, it depends. For again, a computer based mind would use very little resources once
operational. However, again, developing mind uploading may not demonstrate the best
stewardship of resources – especially to the degree it requires us to ignore or divert
resources from immediate needs.
Sixth, does the proposed enhancement display signs of preparedness for relatively
safe implementation? This is hard to answer as the technology has not developed far
enough to answer affirmatively or negatively with any sort of confidence. Nicholas Agar
has noted muliple concerns with uploading and that even if it were successful the wise
choice of action would be to not do it as even the theoretical models for how mind
uploading take place could be disastrous.168 As such, unless there is a fully safe procedure
developed to mind upload, there could be real dangers in uploading. Alternatively, there
is a question whether larger society is safe upon the successful implementation of an
uploaded mind. For example, perhaps upon uploading, the individual determines that
some mere humans need to be eliminated for its own survival – as such, knowing who
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would like to see them shut down, the mind sets out to destroy would be detractors. This
is a dark scenario for sure, but certainly not outside the realm of possibility.
Seventh, does the proposed enhancement encourage “holiness” or does it appeal
to our most base inclinations? Considering that mind uploading is theoretically an
extension of the individual’s personality, it is hard to see how having one’s mind
transferred to a computer would make them a more moral person. It seems rather that
they would simply maintain the same sorts of moral values as before the transition, and
now be able to more efficiently and consistently adhere to them. As such, it seems as
though any character flaw would be just as a likely to be exacerbated as it is removed.
Further, there seems to be no way to guarantee that a generally moral person would not
then become immoral upon uploading as their circuitry ruthlessly determines that the best
way for its own survival is the elimination of certain groups. Again, this may be a bit
extreme, but at the same time it is wholly within the realm of possibility.
Finally, does the proposed enhancement have a therapeutic element or is it strictly
an enhancement? Mind uploading could be therapeutic as well as an unabashed
enhancement. For example, someone suffering with brain cancer may see mind uploading
as a way to beat cancer and continue living – thus, mind uploading would be therapeutic
in this sense. Likewise, a normally healthy person may decide that they want to just live a
rationally based existence in a computer and opt to upload as a blatant enhancement. As
such, mind uploading may have a therapeutic element, but would be primarily seen as an
enhancement.
Given the answers to these questions it would appear that mind uploading is not a
moderate enhancement at all and is best classified as a radical enhancement. As such, we
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have strong reasons to curb enthusiasm for such a technology. However, it must be
acknowledged that there are some desirable qualities found within the mind uploading
project that may still be worth pursuing. As such, we can send the project back to stage 2
for refinement. Suppose that instead of pursuing mind uploading, something more modest
is attempted. This would be a low-scale general enhancement to cognition via brain
implants along the parts of the brain not associated with personality, but with our
engagement of the world – its “modules.”169
Under the small-scale cognitive enhancement where we supplement limited and
specific parts of the brain with computer circuitry we can now return to stage 3 to
evaluate its efficacy. First, does the proposed enhancement value the integrity of life?
The answer appears to be yes. As it is an enhancement of the abilities that we already
utilize, but not so radically different that our basic experience of life would be different.
We would still be primarily biological organisms with some brain prosthetics to help with
cognitive actions. There would not be a wholesale change in what we are, nor how we
experience life.
Secondly, does the proposed enhancement encourage true flourishing for the
agent? Perhaps, or at least, there does not seem to be a concern that it would diminish
flourishing – and there is the potential to greatly increase flourishing. Better eyesight or
hearing, via module modification or even better memory would seem to be part of the
very definition of what it means to have a more flourishing life.

169 I have in mind here the module based theory of the brain put forth by Jerry Fodor, The
Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1983), and
expounded by Agar, Humanity’s End, 79—81.
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Third, does the proposed enhancement promote concern for others? Again,
perhaps, or at least there does not appear to be a diminishment of other people. Indeed,
the development of module enhancement for the brain could positively impact many
people and provide them with better lives. On the other hand, it could provide an immoral
person the cognitive resources to cause great harm.
Fourth, does the proposed enhancement make just use of limited resources? At the
scale of the circuitry itself, the answer seems to be yes. There would be relatively little
resources used for whatever is implanted into the brain. There could still be a concern
relative to the cost of researching this type of technology, and one would need to
determine if the cost of pursuing it outweighs the failure to divert funding to more
immediate needs.
Fifth, does the proposed enhancement facilitate stewardship over our resources?
Again, the answer is perhaps, for there is little in the way of resources that would be used
for the actual implants, but there may be something to be said for the resources needed
for development. Again, this would be a judgment call on the part of the individual.
Myself, I lean to the idea that this type of project has the potential to be a just use of
resources so long as progress is being made (this is a slippery condition, I know). The
basic idea here, is that given the goods that could come from this type of project there
should be some funding, but there is no use in continuing funding if no progress is made
after extensive investment. Just as, is it really worth it to continue to invest in the
alchemist who keeps trying to transmute urine into gold?
Sixth, does the proposed enhancement display signs of preparedness for relatively
safe implementation? Given testing module implantation may prove dangerous for the
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person undergoing the procedure, but any dangers seem as though they would be isolated
to those who have the procedure. So long as the persons are under careful watch during
and after the procedure to test effectiveness, there seems to be a high likelihood this
would be a relatively safe procedure for the individual and society.
Seventh, does the proposed enhancement encourage “holiness” or does it appeal
to our most base inclinations? Module implantation seems to be neutral in this regard. It
does not appear to either increase or decrease moral awareness. However, perhaps it does
appeal to our desire for better living through technological perspicuity rather than
reliance on God’s grace. However, given how we use other technologies, this argument
seems to be inapplicable here. For there does not appear to be any wholesale change of
what it means to be a human being. Hence, the individual after module implantation
would still be largely the same sinner or saint, but with a slightly better functioning brain.
Finally, does the proposed enhancement have a therapeutic element or is it strictly
an enhancement? The answer here is both. There are obvious therapeutic elements to this
type of proposal – someone’s eyesight or hearing is diminished, but a module implant
restores their natural abilities. Likewise, someone could want a straight-up enhancement
to their already normally operative functions. In either case, there does not seem to be the
radical change in human persons associated with wholesale mind uploading (even if this
is the first step down that road).
Given the relative possibilities associated with module implantation, it could be
fairly judged that movement to stage 4 of the hermeneutic is appropriate. At this stage,
module implants would be distributed to a controlled group of individuals and monitored
for a period of time to evaluate the effects of their new cognitive efficiency.
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Stage 5 then asks the major question: is the proposed enhancement worth full
implementation into society? Has the technology met our expectations? Has it increased
awareness of the integrity of life? Has it increased human flourishing? Has it allowed for
appropriate concerns for others? Has it been worth the use of resources? Has it been an
example of good stewardship of our resources? Have the participants and their
interlocutors been kept from harm (and have they caused harm)? Has the technology
encouraged moral behavior or has it caused participants to become more self-centered?
Finally, have the participants appreciated the difference in the technology in their lives
(have they even noticed!)? Should the answers to these evaluative questions prove
positive, then module implantation could proceed to be fully adopted into society and the
resulting change to human identity would then need to be accounted for. If, however, the
answer to these questions is negative – that is, module implantation has been detrimental
in a number of ways, then issue goes back to stage 2 and a scaled back version of the
technology is then pursued (by pharmaceutical means perhaps). In any case, this
hermeneutic can help us evaluate technologies that promise to make our lives better, but
may in fact have the potential to be damaging to us.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion: The Impact of an Enhanced Future for Christian Theism
I become a certain kind of person in reaction to what I believe the future entails.
— Brent Waters, This Mortal Flesh, 151
It is very likely that the world we will have in the future will not be exactly the
one laid out by today’s transhumanists.
— Charles T. Rubin, The Eclipse of Man, 7
7.1 Introduction
Enhancement technologies are often championed by transhumanists and
posthumanists. Indeed, as shown in chapter 1 the main vision of the transhumanist and
posthumanist is to improved the human condition through “reason, science, and
technology.”1 The transhumanist vision is based on the notion that our lives today are less
worthwhile than they would be if we were to develop x technology. Should we see the
value in bringing about a future and beings who are more intelligent, longer-lived, and
emotionally well-rounded, then we would see the importance of their project.2 Thus, the
implementation of enhancement technologies is nothing less than attempting to control
the evolution of the human species. While humans have always been shaped by their
technology, with the enhancement revolution underway, there is a determination to
harness technology in deliberate ways. Paul Ramsey agrees that future humans will be
“both a product and a conscious agent whose dignity is exhibited by his transcendent

1 Stephen Garner, “The Hopeful Cyborg,” in Transhumanism and Transcendence: Christian Hope
in an Age of Technological Enhancement, ed. by Ronald Cole-Turner (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown
University Press, 2011), 87.
2 Ted Peters, “Progress and Provolution: Will Transhumanism Leave Sin Behind,” in
Transhumanism and Transcendence: Christian Hope in an Age of Technological Enhancement, ed. by
Ronald Cole-Turner (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 70.
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control over his own evolution.”3 Enhancement technology is about the human future – it
is an eschatological project of sorts.
This eye towards the “end of humanity” is revealed in transhumanist literature by
recognizing the need for providing for social and individual welfare – this is a positive
development. And yet most tech enthusiasts “privilege enhancements of a physical
variety.”4 For indeed, this is the most obvious way to make people “better.” Our physical
limitations are the most readily available for enhancement. Physical abilities have an
objective quality about them, but immaterial values tend to exhibit more subjectivism. As
such, intelligent and honest people display incommensurate values. There is a diversity of
worldviews, and this makes total agreement among people difficult – since the
divergence in values often ensure some level of conflict. Hence, the differences in values
have led to aggression, hostilities, and war. Now, just because we are becoming able to
enhance human beings, it does not follow that we will be able to “sweep away” these
incommensurate values. That is, simply by introducing and diffusing various
enhancements we will not guarantee that world harmony will be the result.5 There is even
the concern that introduction of enhancements will actually make the destructive power
of ill-meaning persons more efficient.

3 Paul Ramsey, Fabricated Man: The Ethics of Genetic Control (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1970), 17.
4 David Grumett, “Tranformation and the End of Enhancement,” in Transhumanism and
Transcendence: Christian Hope in an Age of Technological Enhancement, ed. by Ronald Cole-Turner
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 44.
5 Braden Allenby and Daniel Sarewitz, The Techno-Human Condition (Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press, 2011), 88.
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To counter this possible outcome, enhancement proponents point out that two
main ethical principles are essential for this discussion. First, we need to respect the
technology produced – we must have a healthy fear and reverence for what it can do,
both good and bad. We need to increase the opportunity for the technology to be used for
good and deter the unwanted consequences. Secondly, we need to respect the persons
producing these technologies – the vast majority of technicians want to make the world a
better place and those efforts should be honored.6
Of course, the main problem with both of these ethical principles (as good as they
are) is that the notion of “respect” is a value laden term dependent on cultural,
philosophical, theological, and sociological factors. What is “respect” for one person,
may not be so for another. This indicates that the “most important problems, and those
most characteristic of the irreducible dilemmas of humanness, are not amenable to
radically improved solutions arrived at through rational analysis by individuals or small
groups. In particular, enhanced intelligence cannot tame two essential realities of the
human condition: conflict over values and uncertainty about the future.”7 Enhancement
proponents promote certain values (at the expense of others) in an attempt to control what
the future holds (to a limited degree). However, people are both resistant to abandoning
long held values as well as being thoroughly unpredictable. Thus, enhancement
proponents are facing some severe headwinds. At the base of the problem is that
technologies are inherently teleological – which entails certain ends and purposes.

6

Grumett, “Tranformation and the End of Enhancement,” 43.

7

Allenby and Sarewitz, The Techno-Human Condition, 88.
381

However, ends and purposes are wholly value laden. Hence, any given technology could
be used for good or bad ends. Technology, per se, is thus “not an unqualified good.”8
This project has sought to direct this complex conversation in a particular
direction. Thus, in chapter 2 we examined two incommensurate ways of viewing what it
means to be human. We expounded the physicalist and substance-dualist positions and
found strengths and weaknesses to both positions. Chapter 3 expounded another
possibility for considering human persons that attempted to use the best found in
physicalism and substance-dualism, but avoid their weaknesses. As such, in good
Aristotelian fashion, I offered the ensoulment position as an alternative to the other two
as the most appropriate in light of the data and criticisms that plagued the other two
viewpoints. Chapter 4 took a moral term for judging the value of human persons and
again looked at two incommensurate systems of thought. The first held that “personhood
alone” was the only relevant moral factor while the second denied that assertion and
opted for a strict “human nature only” approach. Again, both positions were shown to
have their benefits and drawbacks, and so chapter 5 was offered as a middle ground
between these two positions. Ultimately, I argue that human persons are best understood
as ensouled agents of relational responsibility. This takes into account not only our
nature, but also our rational capacities and various relationships. With the previous
chapters setting the backdrop, chapter 6 laid out a hermeneutic for evaluating
enhancement technology. The hermeneutic developed in this project operates on the
assumption that humans are ensouled agents of relational responsibility. Human beings

8 Ben C. Mitchell, Edmund D. Pelligrino, Jean Bethke Elshtain, John Kilner, and Scott B. Rae,
Biotechnology and the Human Good (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2007), 15.
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live in a context, and from the Christian perspective, that context is broadly theistic.
Hence, from a Christian viewpoint theological considerations must come into play when
deliberating the human future through technological advancement.
The remaining of this chapter discusses the fallout of enhancement technology for
the future of the Christian faith. Thus, below we will first look to see why Christianity
can accept “moderate” enhancements, but not “radical” (in the moral sense of the term).
Next, we will reiterate the importance for using a hermeneutic of enhancement. Then, we
will explore a number of concerns “radical” enhancement entails for the Christian faith –
namely, “radical” enhancement is a repudiation of some Christian beliefs. Finally,
enhancement technologies are contrasted with the Christian doctrine of the resurrection.
As wonderful as enhancement technologies are, and as powerful as some will no doubt
make us, enhancement is not the same thing as the Christian doctrine of resurrection.
7.2 Christians, Enhancement Technology, and the Theological Hermeneutic
Recall from chapter 6 that “moderate” and “radical” refer the moral spectrum of
enhancements and not the actual techniques or methods themselves. As such, a “radical”
enhancement refers to any technological change that would have deleterious moral side
effects. In contrast, a “moderate” enhancement would in general be morally acceptable.
For example, agriculture, housing, and clothing are clearly “moderate” enhancements to
our lives as we all partake in such technologies – from the very wealthy to third world
inhabitants – these enhancements to our lives are found the world over. As such, the
“moderate” and “radical” distinctions are short-hand for describing the moral value of
enhancements. It takes a specific evaluation of a given enhancement to properly label it
as “moderate” or “radical” and even this is done in light of one’s personal values and
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worldview. Thus, the terms “moderate” and “radical” are dependent on the perspective of
the one evaluating the technology. However, there are some technologies so widely
accepted that their status as “moderate” is undisputed (see, agriculture, housing, and
clothing just discussed). “Radical” technologies, however, are more slippery and subject
to different conceptions.
Now, some people fear that technological enhancement will bring about a new
species, and while this is possible, there is also the hope that technological enhancement
may very well create a more egalitarian society.9 Put differently, bringing forth a new
species would appear to be “radical,” but creating a more equal society would seem to be
a “moderate” enhancement. Thus, creating technologies that hasten the arrival of a new
species should probably be avoided, while technologies making society more equitable
should be pursued. As such, the former is labeled a “radical” technology while the latter
is labeled “moderate.”
The Christian perspective does not necessarily reject all enhancements. Indeed,
Karen Lebacqz argues that at least some enhancements should be specifically pursued
because redemption is more important than either creation or its fall.10 Likewise, as
creatures made in God’s image, we are in many ways “little creators” ourselves, and one
way to exhibit that creative power is by overcoming certain limitations through creative
uses of technology.11 Indeed, the actions of Jesus’ earthly ministry can be interpreted as

9 Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnological Revolution
(New York: Picador, 2002), 158.
10 Karen Lebacqz, “Dignity and Enhancement in the Holy City,” in Transhumanism and
Transcendence: Christian Hope in an Age of Technological Enhancement, ed. by Ronald Cole-Turner
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 55.
11

Ibid., 57.
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suggesting that we should overcome certain limits.12 Jesus healed the sick, thus there is
nothing wrong with seeking therapeutic technologies. However, the Christian approach
does suggest that there are limits to the human person and that not every limit should be
obliterated. As Lebacqz puts it, the “true essence of human dignity lies in accepting some
limits and not working toward every enhancement.”13 Humans should not “fear”
enhancements, so long as we are mindful of our sinful state – and propensity for hubris
(more on this below). Likewise, the purpose of life is to foster our relationship with God
and with others, and technologies that do not inhibit those relationships should not be
barred.14
Christians can accept “moderate” enhancements for the simple reason that since
technology is not inherently evil some technologies provide real tangible goods in service
to God and others. However, just because some technologies should be pursued, it does
not follow that all technologies are good. Technological advancement is not inherently
beneficial, nor is technological advancement inevitably good.15 Eschatological visions of
what is truly good and beneficial must be seen in light of God’s purposes for the future,
not what we would like it to be. Thus, technologies that work “against” God’s kingdom
either by inhibiting relationships with God, or others, or others with God – would be
considered inappropriate under a Christian consideration.

12

Ibid.

13

Ibid., 59.

14

Ibid.

15

Peters, “Progress and Provolution,” 81.
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Just as there are concerns about how technology affects our relationship with God
and others, there is also the concern with how technology can affect us and our rights.
Gilbert Meileander remarks that Christian ethics is largely shaped by deontological
concerns. Hence, there is a prevalence of notions about rights. This notion, thus, “reminds
us that others can be wronged even when they are not harmed. The only freedom worth
having, a freedom that does not finally trivialize our choices, is a freedom that
acknowledges its limits and does not seek to be godlike. That freedom, a truly human
freedom, will acknowledge the duality of our nature and the limits to which it gives
rise.”16 Humans are to be cherished and viewed as precious in themselves and not as a
means to some other end – technology should always be for persons, not persons for
technology. Thus, Christians can encourage research into various technologies (e.g.,
genetic and nano-technology) when the purpose is to improve human health. Even the
possibility for straight-up enhancements is not inherently wrong. The Christian can hold
these positions because they see the ultimate transformation in the divine advent of union
with God – again, so long as advances in science do not endanger our relationship with
God and others, those technologies would not be prohibited.17 That is, Christians have
very good reasons to pursue therapeutic research programs and even allow for some
enhancement ones – all(!) that is required is to avoid making idols of our technology.18

16 Gilbert Meilaender, Bioethics: A Primer for Christians (Grand Rapids, MI: William B.
Eerdmans, 1996), 5 (emphasis in original).
17

Peters, “Progress and Provolution,” 82.

18 Gilbert Meileander wisely states, “Christians therefore have no good reason to renounce the
cause of medical research, but our commitment to it ought to be a chastened one, liberated from the fear
that makes an idol of our hopes.” Bioethics: A Primer for Christians, 109.
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The fear of making an idol of technology is the heart of what it means for
technology to be considered “radical.” For “radical” enhancements and technology is
pursued for the sake of the technology and not for the sake of persons. Often the issue
will be phrased like, “imagine how great this tech will be for us in the future!” No doubt
many enthusiasts sincerely believe this, however we should not sacrifice individual lives
(or goods) merely for the promise of a future technology. We should not sacrifice many
of the goods we have now for the promise of future goods – especially if the future
“goods” are primarily for the sake of technology and not persons. Human persons should
always be considered as more valuable than things.19 For Paul Ramsey, posthumanism
(and to the degree transhumanism supports it) is bad for humanity, since posthumanism’s
future means the extinction of humans.20 For Ramsey, posthumanism (and
transhumanism) often value things over people, and this inversion of priorities will hasten
human extinction – of which there is no moral imperative to implement, and plenty of
moral obligation to avoid. This is the push-and-pull of enhancement technology, part “of
the pain of human life is that we sometimes cannot and at other times ought not do for
others what they fervently desire.”21 Some people really want some “radical”
enhancements, but it is our obligation to forgo “radical” enhancements in favor of
“moderate” ones – even though some people may not be as pleased with this position.

19

Ibid., 112.

20
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Karen Lebacqz reminds us we must “live within our limits”22 and the hermeneutic
expounded upon last chapter is a way to help do that. We should avoid the fallacy of
inevitability. That is, we should not just give up and say que sera sera – what will be,
will be. For the transhumanist project is first and foremost “a human technological
project, and one that is shaped by human society.”23 Because humans are the ones
directing the projects (at least for the time being) the conclusions and directions of the
projects are not “set in stone.” Technological growth does not have its own momentum
apart from human guidance.24 Humans should continually question the direction of
proposed technologies.
Christians can, and should, participate in the enhancement debate because as Lisa
Sowle Cahill notes, theologians are generally very good at utilizing multiple modes of
discourse “focusing especially on considerations of equity and the common good.”25
Indeed, she remarks, that theologians are “often better at narrative and prophetic
discourse than at ethical and policy analysis.”26 The benefit of theological reflection in
the enhancement debate, then, is a resistance to see humans as less than persons, and as a
prophetic voice to those in power on behalf of the destitute.
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23 Celia Dean-Drummond, “Taking Leave of the Animal? The Theological and Ethical
Implications of Transhuman Projects,” in Transhumanism and Transcendence: Christian Hope in an Age of
Technological Enhancement, ed. by Ronald Cole-Turner (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press,
2011), 125 (emphasis in original).
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25 Lisa Sowle Cahill, Theological Bioethics: Participation, Justice, Change (Washington, D.C.:
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Thus, Christian engagement in enhancement technology is to help guide research
and implementation to “safeguard the sanctity of the person who is the ‘image of God’
(imago Dei).”27 For, techno-science is not neutral, “it is itself a narrative force that
provides structure” in life.28 The technology pursued is done so precisely because the
researcher perceives a need or want in society and sees a way to meet it. This, of course,
is wholly dependent on one’s value system to determine what is and is not a true need.
As such, there is an obvious need to determine which technologies should be
pursued and which should not – or at least which ones should take priority over others.
So long as fantastical technologies are on the horizon, there will need to be a firm
grounding to reign in speculation. The headlines from the latest breakthrough whet the
imagination of a scientific future, but the disappointing realities and setbacks that
inevitably attend such grand promises set in. Given the complexity of these projects,
setbacks are to be expected. Thus, one should neither give up hope, nor become wholly
distraught when the technology does not come along as expected. Rather, what is needed
is a calm and principled approach to either reinvigorate efforts to develop the technology
or to recommend abandonment of the project in favor of more productive efforts.29 Amy
Michelle DeBaets notes that a responsible engagement is neither an uncritical acceptance
of all technology nor a wholesale rejection – rather, it is an intentional reflection of what
is good for us, and what we want. As such, enhancement technology should not be a

27 Matthew Zaro Fisher, “More Human Than the Human? Toward a ‘Transhumanist’ Christian
Theological Anthropology,” in Religion and Transhumanism: The Unknown Future of Human
Enhancement, ed. by Calvin Mercer and Tracy J. Trothen (Denver, CO: Praeger, 2015), 27.
28 Christina Bieber Lake, Prophets of the Posthuman: American Fiction, Biotechnology, and the
Ethics of Personhood (Notre Dame, IL: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013), 75.
29

Allenby and Sarewitz, The Techno-Human Condition, 35.
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selfish pursuit in our own interest, but should be a truly global conversation.30 The
hermeneutic put forth in chapter 6 is just such an attempt.
7.3 Some Specific Christian Concerns for “Radical” Enhancement
As stated multiple times, the purpose of human life is to foster a relationship with
God and others. As such, any technological project that interferes with those goals is
working against God’s will and should be rejected by the Christian.31 Given human
frailty and hubris, “we are always in danger of substituting our own judgment for that of
God.”32 But given the stakes in the enhancement debate, we must resist putting ourselves
in God’s place. Christians trust that God knows how best humans should behave. But this
narrative of trust in God, is no less than a view of what the future holds. Again, this is
ultimately an eschatological discussion.
Ted Peters notes that there are two different, but complementary ways of viewing
the future: futurum, in which sees the “future as growth, as an actualization of potentials
residing in the present or past”; and adventus, in which the future is something new is
anticipated, a new reality.33 Carl Braaten sums up the difference in light of
transhumanism nicely, a “crucial difference between secular futurology and Christian
eschatology is this: The future in secular futurology is reached by a process of the
world’s becoming. The future in Christian eschatology arrives by the coming of God’s

30 Amy Michelle DeBaets, “Rapture of the Geeks: Singularitarianism, Feminism, and the Yearning
for Transcendence,” in Religion and Transhumanism: The Unknown Future of Human Enhancement, ed.
by Calvin Mercer and Tracy J. Trothen (Denver, CO: Praeger, 2015), 191.
31
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kingdom. The one is a becoming and the other a coming.”34 Transhumanists embrace
futurum, while Christianity, by-and-large, accepts adventus. That is, Christians await the
coming of God’s kingdom.
A postmodern telos of no telos offers modernity a way out of its dilemma: if there
is no fate to be loved, then a suitable alternative can be fabricated. Moreover, those
constructing this alternative fate are simultaneously reconstructing themselves. To will,
rather than love, a fabricated fate is accompanied by a recreation of the one who is
willing. There is no need to wait for the Übermensch to evolve, for a similar being can be
created or engineered. Or more prosaically, to cross the postmodern divide is to enter a
malleable terrain that is not only navigated by incessant shaping and reshaping, but in
which the navigator too is relentlessly in flux, even merging with and re-emerging from
the landscape itself. The radical plasticity of the postmodern orientation is attained
because its telos is also its techne. The future will be largely what we make of it; what it
is willed to be. The postmodern telos of no telos is in fact a telos of techne.35
Brent Waters, a well-known critic of transhumanism, notes well the Christian
anxiety regarding technological advancement. The issue is not a failure to recognize the
potential in such technologies – Christians can readily accept some of the advantages
some technologies offer. The issue is that scientific research is not inherently progressive
– this is a moral judgement that science cannot make. As Waters poetically phrases it:
an inscrutable divine will was exchanged for an equally ambiguous human will.
Belief in progress was therefore as much an act of faith as was belief in
providence. Moreover, the Darwinian and Freudian glimpses into the human
34 Carl E. Braaten, The Future of God (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 29, quoted in Peters,
“Progress and Provolution,” 74 (emphasis in original).
35 Brent Waters, From Human to Posthuman: Christian Theology and Technology in a Posthuman
World (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub., 2006), 30.
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psyche suggested that any hope for a more reliable object of faith was unlikely.
Human behavior did not evolve along any discernible providential or progressive
trajectories, but adapted to changing environments.36
The problem is that world events and “scientific progress” are ambiguous. What one
person calls “progress” another may call an “atrocity.” Not all “progress” is really good –
nor is goodness a necessary outworking of “progress.”37 And for Ted Peters, the real
problem is that transhumanist proponents often do not see this ambiguity. There is great
potential to help humanity, yes. But there is also great potential to do untold harm as
well.38
Thus, many theologians fear that transhumanism removes the sense of mystery in
human life. There is an impulse within enhancement circles to uncover every aspect of
human living and subject it to technological dominance. Technological perspicuity is the
modus operendi of the transhumanist – everything is subject to scientific study. Thus,
mystery is removed.39 Likewise, aspects of human life that are not subject to scientific
pursuits are dismissed as either unimportant or unreal. The danger is that we are
promoting “hyperhumanism,” in which it is assumed we are actually able to control our
own future. We often we forget how much we are at the mercy of many unknown
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forces.40 Transformation of the “heart” is not something subject to technological
advancement – this is something possible only by divine grace.41
A key Christian complaint of the transhumanist agenda is its attempt to conquer
death and gain (near) immortality “by human effort alone.”42 A technological optimism
mixed with a basic notion that people generally mean well has contributed to a mindset
that both desires to change ourselves at a fundamental level and have the capability to do
so. Should humanity successfully increase their intellectual capacity and longevity, then
the elements are in place to further our own self-development. The idea here is that a
positive feedback loop will have been created which will accelerate human evolution – in
a sense, it will make humans godlike and some fear put the old religions “out of
business.”43 Although science is discovering that nature and human nature are more
plastic than first assumed, neither is assumed to be infinitely malleable. If this were the
case then any notion of progress would have to be abandoned. If the borders separating
progress from regress are merely temporary constructs imposed by varying subjective
preferences, then there are also no objective standards to plot the progressive direction of
history.44 Transhumanism often “seems” desirable because it offers less suffering and
healthier bodies, and these are goods in themselves. The extrapolation is then, why not
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have even less suffering and even better bodies (or no bodies at all!). But these further
extrapolations may actually not be goods per se, at least for human beings here and now.
Brent Waters is critical of posthumanism in general as he sees the movement as a
hyperbolic commentary on late modernity’s desires.45 He even notes that Christians
should be “rightfully skeptical of the posthuman project” since it “represents a
corruption” of the Christian faith.46 As explored below, Waters fears that the
enhancement projects will degrade Christian beliefs like the impact of sin, the
effectiveness of certain sacraments, among other issues. Likewise, there is a fear that
enhancement will provide a false sense of security – that is, that our technology will be
able to keep us from harm. However, our greatest dangers are not just physical
limitations, but moral lapses. Thus, there is concern that enhancement technologies will
mask issues of social and political problems. Enhanced society may be blind to real
suffering given their own values.47 Further, before electing to travel down the
transhumanist path and arrive in a technophile utopia, we should ask if it will actually be
we who get there. More likely it will be our progeny.48 That is, the “beneficiaries” of our
technology will not be us but our offspring. Yet, much of the talk in transhumanist
literature is based on the assumption that the author will be the beneficiary of any
advanced research, but for the more extreme forms of technology this is quite optimistic.

45 Brent Waters, “Flesh Made Data: The Posthuman Project in Light of the Incarnation,” in
Religion and Transhumanism: The Unknown Future of Human Enhancement, ed. by Calvin Mercer and
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With these ideas in mind, we can now look to some specific concerns that
Christians have in relation to “radical” enhancement technologies. There is a real concern
that cultivating “radical” enhancements will affect religious belief. Now, for the average
skeptic, this may be of no consequence. However, for the devout believer who has
invested so much of their identity in their faith, very little could be of more importance.
Technologies that strike at the very heart of their belief system creates a dilemma: accept
the new tech and disregard the values they hold dear, or side with their religious values
and avoid the new tech. Some of the concerns that Christians may harbor with “radical”
enhancement are: first, that it cannot cure “sin”; second, it will do away with certain
treasured sacraments; third, it will provide an alternative religious viewpoint; fourth, it
will offer a new (i.e., “wrong”) view of salvation; and finally, it misunderstands the
importance of the doctrine of the resurrection. The temptation for humanity is to create
“heaven on earth” but this is simply impossible as it requires the grace of God working in
His own inscrutable ways.49
7.3.1 “Radical” Enhancement Cannot Cure Sin
The Christian doctrine of original sin has four correlative notions: 1) sin is
contingent – it is not part of the original intention of what it means to be human. Humans
chose (and continue to choose) sin; 2) sin is radical – sin is a continual distortion of
human relationships. It distorts one’s relationship to themselves, to others, to creation,
and to God; 3) sin is communicable – somehow sin is able to infect persons even before
they become morally responsible beings; and 4) sin is universal – all have sinned and
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fallen short of the glory of God (Rom. 3:23).50 That is, there is something about the sinful
human mind that lends itself to the destruction of oneself and others. There is an inner
drive to reject the things of God and subject others to our own will rather than honor
them in their own right. This basic flaw in human character cannot be overcome by
simply increasing one’s intellectual capacity.51 Doing so just makes one more efficient at
manipulating and using people for one’s own advantage.
Sin distorts human relationships. It “leads the powerful to abuse” the weak and
silence the marginalized. Further, it does this in the name of the “common good.” This is
why chapter 5 was so insistent that every “individual’s dignity must be protected.”52 Lisa
Sowle Cahill comments, “Religious traditions warn us not to place too much trust in even
the most worthy human solutions to suffering, even though any humane solution should
be earnestly pursued.”53 Now, why would Cahill say something like this? Most likely it is
due to her conviction that the human race is inherently sinful and we tend toward selfish
motives – even in our attempts at being virtuous.54 This is just to say that sin warps all
that it touches.
As Ted Peters warns, we must be honest in recognizing human sinfulness and
how its impact risks infecting all human activity – even in the attempt to make humans

50 Todd T. W. Daly, “Diagnosing Death in the Transhumanism and Christian Traditions,” in
Religion and Transhumanism: The Unknown Future of Human Enhancement, ed. by Calvin Mercer and
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better.55 Envisioning a utopia requires a perfect citizenry. However, the “problem with all
efforts to imagine a perfect world is that they usually require writers to imagine perfect
people, and we have never known any.”56 One of the key arguments from a Christian
theological perspective is that enhancement enthusiasts fail to take into account this
pervasive sense of sin and how it has deeply affected human nature.57 The Christian story
is basically the redemption of humanity from the clutches of sin – sin is the chief villain
in the Christian narrative. To simply ignore the chief villain in human history is not
progress – it is blindness. Christina Bieber Lake comments that the traditional notion of
“sin” has been replaced by the contemporary notion of “pathology.”58 This is because we
believe we can “cure” a pathology through concentrated scientific research. Sin, however,
resists such diagnosis or cures. Sin is more than a pathology – it is a spiritual condition
that affects all humans.
Transhumanists and posthumanists should not be faulted however for their desire
to cure human ailments. Indeed, many of their stated goals are exemplary and honorable.
The trouble comes in misdiagnosing the problem for human beings. For example, humans
experience tribulations and evils, and the pain that evil causes creates a desire in
transhumanists to alleviate that pain (or at least suppress its cause). This desire is not
wrong, per se, but the solution often misses the point, because the cause is
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misidentified.59 As such, in order to “fix” the evil of humans harming other humans,
transhumanists propose both intellectual and “moral” enhancement. But the problem for
much of human on human evil is not due to a lack of intellectual knowledge, nor moral
unclarity – much of the evil perpetrated is wrought by intelligent people who truly
believe they are doing good (even though they really are not). Thus, enhancement
proponents often present a “thin” love for humanity that promotes quick fixes. “The
problem, which is shared by social engineers and biotechnological libertarians alike, is in
being led by scientism to think of individuals as patients who need their problems to be
solved, rather than as persons who need to be loved and cared for.”60
Social sins permeate human society. Dominant class groups, economic superiors,
and sexes will attempt to entrench their power. This prioritizing of one’s own “tribe” over
others appears to be the definition of pride.61 Now, pride (i.e., hubris) is the
“misidentification of what is actually good for a human being.”62 We can really believe
we are doing good, but in reality be doing great harm – thus, we need to always be
mindful of the impact of pride on our actions and attitudes.63 Indeed, the desire to control
nature through technology is often accused of being a prime example of human hubris.64
The sad reality of hubris means that the imperfections of enhancements that combine
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with human imperfections (like pride) will “create opportunities for people to take
advantage of one another.”65 Hubris is a motivating factor for the dispersion of injustice
in the world, and the Christian concern is that simply adding enhancement technologies
into the mix will not change that.
Another problem with sin is that makes humans weak – morally weak. We prefer
the “easy” road rather than the dangerous one that demands virtue. Further, our seeming
mastery over technology gives us the illusion that we have overcome these weaknesses.66
Charles Rubin remarks that because we can imagine ourselves without vice, we therefore
assume that our technologies can help us achieve virtue. However, the problem is that our
technology is the flawed product of flawed human beings. Thus, our technologies are
likely to continue if not exacerbate some of those vices of which we so want to be rid.
Stated differently, even our technologies will have the taint of human sin infecting
them.67
Technological enhancements are framed as a solution to a particular problem. As
Lake puts it, “technological enhancements are marketed with the language of illness and
pathology: in each case a ‘problem’ is named, and a ‘treatment’ is prescribed.”68
Technology per se “does not make life better, freer, or happier.” Rather, some
technologies are a means to some ends that “tend to amplify the effects of our choices.”69
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We are offered the illusion that technologies make us happy, but true happiness is not
found in technology. Happiness is found ultimately in God as our end and proximately in
our relationships with others. Technology is never an end in itself, but always a means to
some end – thus, our happiness is tied to our end. As such, technology can only make us
happy in so far as it tends to our final end.
Ultimately, the neglect of sin reveals the utopian tendency in which transhumans
indulge. Specifically, it reveals a type of simplicity of humanity that says that we can
overcome our most basic tendencies by a strategic “deployment of enhancement
technologies” in conjunction with “the maximization of individual freedom of choice.”70
But, again, the problem is that there is no justification for the belief that fundamentally
selfish humans will become altruistic through the engagement of enhancement
technologies. As Ted Peters notes, no “amount of increased intelligence will redeem us
from what the theologians call sin.”71 Increased intelligence is not the same as an increase
in moral fortitude nor an increase in inherent goodness. There is no reason to think our
inventions will make us better, nor is there reason to think our inventions will not retain
some hint of human sinfulness. Christian theology does hold to the notion of moral
progress, but it is not achieved through human history or human merit, but rather by God
interrupting history in the incarnation.72 The Christian story offers a reprieve from the
effects of sin because of the works of Jesus in human history. Apart from God’s
intervening grace in the person of Jesus, humans remain sinful, through-and-through.
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7.3.2 “Radical” Enhancement May Restrict Sacramental Practices
There are a number of ways that “radical” enhancement could affect sacramental
practices – especially, should we achieve Kurzweil’s goal of uploading minds. Below, I
describe the impact of “radical” enhancements on baptism, communion, and marriage.
Interestingly, it could be possible for certain viewpoints within Christendom that may not
be seriously impeded by “radical” enhancements to a certain degree. However, other
schools of thought would be wholly dismissed. On the other hand, a nourishment of these
sacramental practices could lead one to resist the siren call of “radical” enhancements.
That is, these practices are taken to be so valuable that the believer would do nothing to
risk their interruption.
7.3.2.1 Baptism
Baptism is the act of either immersing someone in water or sprinkling water on
their head. When seen as either a transference of grace as in Catholicism, or as a
symbolic act of obedience to Christ by many Protestants, there is a physical connection
between the water and the person. As a practice, baptism predates even the Christian
message as evidenced by John the Baptist's ministry in the Jordan River. The Catholic
Catechism holds that baptism is a necessary act for one to obtain salvation (CC 1257).
Others, like John Calvin, take baptism to be “a sign and evidence of our purification” and
not the cause of our sins being cleansed, since it is Christ’s blood that takes away our
sin.73 However one understands the necessity or purpose of baptism, the historical

73 John Calvin, ICR, Bk 4, 15.1-2. This does not mean that baptism could not be a means of grace,
but rather that it is primarily a sign and seal of what Christ has done in the life of the believer. It does deny
that water has any inherent salvific properties. See Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology (Peabody, MA:
Hendrickson Pub., 2008), 4:588—589.
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instances of baptism tend to show a necessary connection for the practice to
include both water and a bodily person. An “uploaded mind” can neither be submerged
under water nor sprinkled on the head – as there is no physical “body” present.
In addition, there is also the problem of conferring the sacrament to the uploaded
mind and not just the inability of receiving it. How would a pastor or priest go about
baptizing an “uploaded mind”? Let us examine some different ways this could take
place.
First, let us suppose that the pastor / priest is flesh and blood and the “uploaded
mind” downloads their consciousness into an artificial body. This seems the most
promising way of maintaining the practice as there is an actual act of baptismal motions
taking place. The pastor / priest confers the grace of baptism to the artificial body that is
housing the “mind” of the individual. However, it can be questioned how efficacious this
would be since there is no necessary connection between the artificial body and the
“mind” of the one desiring baptism. We recognize the connection between the mind and
the body of mere physical people in which we interact with on a daily basis. Yet, this
connection is severed if a “mind” can move to another body. Then again, some
philosophical positions of dualism are widely accepted by Christian believers today, and
yet hold this exact view. Alvin Plantinga and Richard Swinburne both hold minds can
theoretically “switch” bodies.74 Thus, it seems that some forms of non-Catholicism, at
least, may be more easily adaptable to this form of baptism, whereas Catholicism,
holding to a more traditional Aristo-Thomistic understanding of form and matter, would

74 Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), chapter 6.
And Richard Swinburne, “Dualism and Personal Identity,” in Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide,
ed. by William Lane Craig (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 502.
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probably consider the separation of mind and body too radical to confer any real grace to
the “uploaded mind.”
Second, let us suppose that the pastor / priest is communicating with the
“uploaded mind” via some virtual reality program, like “Second Life.”75 In this instance
there is a further separation from the physical world as any motions of baptism would
simply be digitally manifest. Hence, no real water would be present, but instead just the
digital representation of water. The pastor / priest and the individual seeking baptism
would likewise be digital manifestations interacting in this virtual medium. Again, it
would seem Catholicism would not consider this baptism since there is no actual form /
matter unities involved. Just representations. Indeed, Catholic teaching holds that baptism
must include the “true and natural” form of water – which would exclude virtual water.76
Hence, there could be no real grace transferred as there would be nothing for grace to be
transferred from or to. Some forms of Protestantism on the other hand may still be able to
say that this is baptism since many claim that baptism is merely symbolic
(though a highly significant symbol!) of one's commitment to Christ. Martin Luther even
commented that there were other types of baptism besides water baptism.77 Hence, these
Protestants may not have a problem with virtual water (which is a symbol for real water)
being used to baptize a digital person (which is a symbol for a fleshly person), since
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baptism itself is just a symbol of a particular relationship. For these Protestants a symbol
of a symbol can remain the same throughout the sacrament.
Finally, let us suppose that both the pastor / priest and the individual are simply
interacting as “uploaded minds.” In this scenario, there are no actual or virtual motions of
baptism. No water or virtual water. This interaction occurs at the speed of processing
power. As there is no actual practice that takes place, all that changes is the mere
conveyance of affirmation (information?) from the pastor / priest to the one desiring
baptism. And even this too, is near instantaneous. It has more in common with sharing a
data file than anything remotely recognizable as a sacramental practice. Under this
scenario, it would appear that both Catholics and Protestants have no resources to
navigate the sacramental landscape – as there is, in fact, no landscape whatsoever.
7.3.2.2 Communion
Like baptism, Communion / Eucharist has a physical component to it as well.
Here one takes bread and wine (or as the case may be a wafer and grape-juice) and
ingests it in obedience to Christ so as to be “in Him.” Like baptism above, the Lord’s
Table has been variously interpreted to be a means to confer divine grace, or
symbolically link the partaker of Communion to the Lord that it represents.78 Much like
baptism, Communion too relies heavily on the physicality of the action79 and so it too is
subject to the same limitations as expounded previously.

78 “Communion with the Body and Blood of Christ increases the communicant’s union with the
Lord, forgives his venial sins, and preserves him from grave sins” (CC 1416). John Calvin calls the
sacrament a symbol, see Institutes of the Christian Religion, Bk 4, 17.3.
79
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For example, suppose that a pastor / priest is naturally physical but the worshiper
is, again, an uploaded mind. How is the uploaded mind to partake in Communion? Again,
perhaps utilizing an artificial body would solve some of the issues as the body could be
used as the medium by which the mind “eats” the body of Christ. The same lines of
demarcation reappear here as they do with baptism. Catholicism would seem to be
resistant to such a notion of the Eucharist since there is no essential connection between
the body performing the sacramental act and the mind controlling the body. Some nonCatholics, again, may be able to justify this type of Communion
under some strong dualism so that there is no “real” difference between a natural body
and an artificial body – at least in relation to the mind of the person.
Further, the same sorts of options appear to emerge if both the pastor / priest and
the uploaded mind meet in a virtual world. Again, a virtual Communion would be a
sacrament of virtual bread and virtual wine. Catholicism's notion of transubstantiation
simply cannot support this virtual instance of the Eucharist, for how can digital
bits become the body and blood of Christ (CC 1413). Classically speaking,
transubstantiation follows upon the Aristo-Thomistic distinction between substance and
accidents. As such, the substance of the bread and wine become the body and blood of
Christ, but maintain the accidents of bread and wine (ST 3a2ae.75). Such an explanation
carries no credibility in a digitized world of ones and zeros. And yet, here again, some
Protestants are in a unique position to say that virtual communion might still have merit.
Again, for these Protestants if communion is a symbol of Christ's broken body, then
whether the person partakes in real bread or virtual bread, all that matters is partaking in
something that symbolizes Christ's sacrifice. As such, some Protestants may not only
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allow for, but may in fact endorse this form of virtual baptism and communion as wholly
compatible with the Christian faith.
Finally, we can consider what happens with just the uploaded minds of the
pastor / priest and the worshipper. And again, it seems as if this form of the sacrament is
impossible for both Catholics and Protestants as there is no sacred moment, just a file
transfer.
7.3.2.3 Marriage
Protestants typically do not see marriage as a sacrament the way Catholics do,
even though it is considered a sacred covenant. For our purposes, however, the
similarities regarding the importance and purpose of marriage sufficiently overlap to
make a point. For both Catholics and Protestants, marriage is seen minimally as a
covenant between people bound to honor, respect, and encourage the other in spiritual
growth. Historically, this has meant that the married couple provides the foundation for a
stable society by being the embodiment of a smaller society. The marriage relationship
was held to provide the best way to raise children in an environment that trains them to
become responsible and valuable citizens. Likewise, marriage and parenthood became a
way to pass down traditions, customs, morality, and social attitudes. Until recently, this
implied that marriage was only possible between males and females, as this was the only
viable means of producing the next generation of citizens.80

80 I am not interested in delving into the same-sex marriage debate, but I do want to point out, that
in the uploaded mind scenario we are considering, the primary reason given to uphold traditional marriage
(i.e., that it provides the only viable means of reproduction) no longer holds value as uploaded persons are
actually asexual. Biological markers and delimiting factors play no role for an uploaded mind. It is quite
literally impossible to have a male or female computer program. An uploaded mind may “identify” their
gender as masculine or feminine, but the biological markers of x and y chromosomes play no role in the
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Having said this, however, “marriage” as an institution will almost certainly end
for computer based consciousnesses. There will literally be no need for marriage. For
how would a digital mind even view what marriage is? Marriage, in our modern society,
is little more than state sanctioned “coupling” – a government endorsed relationship. The
line between couples dating and being married has sufficiently blurred that were it not for
the existence of the marriage certificate itself (and for some, a Church sanctioned event),
many outsiders may not even be able to tell if a given couple is married or not. Marriage
has thus been mostly emptied of its sacred and socially significant content. And there is
no reason to think that uploaded minds would alter this modern view on marriage. Rather,
they will just take the next logical step and not get married.
Paul Ramsey echoes traditional Christian thought when he says that sex is at once
both a procreative and unitive act of love.81 And thus, any ethic “that in principle sunders
these two goods . . . pays disrespect to the nature of human parenthood.”82 But some of
our technological enhancements have absolutely “sundered” these two goods. By
focusing on our intellectual lives and downplaying our fleshly ones, many transhumanists
deny in effect (if not outright) the procreative act of sex.83 Ramsey notes that Christian
teaching has never seen procreation as a “selfish gratification,” instead it is a duty for

identity of who the person is if they have been uploaded. As such, “marriage” in an uploaded mind scenario
wholly bypasses the traditional vs. same-sex marriage debate.
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“future generations.”84 This is not to say that some (or even many) Christians have not
had children for selfish reasons. Rather, he is saying it is part of Christian teaching that
procreation is theologically bound with subduing the Earth under the lordship of God.
Thus, Christians have a duty to future generations both in bringing them about and
leaving them with resources with which to thrive.
God created the world through His self-giving love, thus parents procreate
through a similar self-giving love. As Ramsey puts it, this love for one another “is a trace
of the original mystery by which God created the world because of His love.”85 God in a
very real sense “bound” Himself to the world, and the same sort of binding is found in
marital love – exemplified in the “nature of human sexuality.”86 Ramsey goes on to note
that this binding is none other than the language of covenant. Humans are created to be in
covenant with God and with each other. But the Christian notion of covenant is directly
related to that which tends toward Christ, from whom we are created and in whom we
have our very being (John 1:1; Col. 1:15-17). As Ramsey puts it, Christians then see the
telos of sex as being Christ Himself.
They will find in the strength of human sexual passion (beyond the obvious needs
of procreation) an evident telos of acts of sexual love toward making real the
meaning of man-womanhood, nurturing covenant-love between the parties,
fostering their care for one another, prefiguring Christ’s love for the Church—
whatever other substrata of purposes sexual energy may have that can be
discovered by intending the world as a biologist. And in human procreativity out
of the depths of human sexual love is prefigured God’s own act of creation out of
the profound mystery of his love revealed in Christ. To put radically asunder what
God joined together in parenthood when He made love procreative, to procreate
from beyond the sphere of love (AIDS, for example, or making human life in a
test-tube), or to posit acts of sexual love beyond the sphere of responsible
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procreation (by definition, marriage), means a refusal of the image of God’s
creation in our own.87
Due to the reductionism prevalent in our scientific culture, the “bonds and connections”
that Christians see as essential are eroded away. Replaced with an “atomistic
individualism” the traditional bonds of marriage in self-giving love and procreation are
removed.88 Self-gratification in pursuit of individual orgasm takes the place of the sacred
act within in a covenant relationship. Now, this is not to say that transhumanists or
posthumanists may not frequently develop strong bonds of companionship. Indeed, given
some views of emotional enhancement, these bonds may even be emotionally stronger
than experienced today. Rather, the concern is that the very foundation for the marital
arrangement (and sex) will be divorced from its original moorings.
In the posthumanist future, marriage as a covenant relationship between two
people for the procreation of humanity and establishment of a family unit will become a
relic of the past. For once (if?) we reach that point in the technological future, then
artificial wombs will replace flesh and blood pregnancy. That is, if there is any actual
reproduction at all, since some versions of the future have us living a digitally based
existence, and in that particular scenario, any “reproduction” would be digital and not
biological. If mind-uploading were to become a reality and minds can change substrates
at will, then sexual reproduction will have been effectively eliminated. As Amy Michele
DeBaets points out, if uploading were to become reality, then reproduction “comes to be
overtaken, morphing into self-dissemination.”89
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7.3.3 “Radical” Enhancement Offers an Alternative Religious Viewpoint
Transhumanist Anders Sandberg notes that some deliberately “constructed
transhumanist religious systems” exist.90 He says, the “idea of ‘doing God’s work’ in
perfecting creation or humanity shows up repeatedly [in transhumanist literature], both in
an explicit theist context and in secular versions.”91 That is, transhumanism has been in
some ways adopted into a quasi-religious belief. A few others have tried to combine
transhumanism with traditional belief systems. For example, there is a “Christian
transhumanist” organization, in which Christianity is the true transhumanism.92 Yet, other
strands of transhumanism can be described as religious, even while it maintains
significant differences from traditional faiths. However, overlap can be found in the fact
that both religion and transhumanism attempt to overcome our current and limited
condition. Transhumanists and Christians often have similar desires for transcendence.
Further, there is a similarity in praxis – Christians engage in sacramental acts,
transhumanists engage in technological pursuits.93 Likewise, there can be similarity of
thought between traditional religions and transhumanism in “metaphysical, soteriological,
and eschatological interests.”94 Put simply, transhumanism has emerged on the scene as
an alternative to traditional religious belief systems – complete with a rich and different
means of salvation, eschatology, and metaphysic.
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Jeffrey Bishop comments that the “ontotheology” (i.e., ontological theology) of
transhumanism is not easily accessible for scrutiny. This is because to question the
posthuman future is to call into question the evolutionary process and the philosophical
naturalism that undergirds the scientific method – this is unacceptable, and can be treated
the same as a medieval heresy. Further, questioning the posthuman future seems to
subjugate the will to something less than its own desired freedom – that is, it implies the
will wishes to be in bondage, a silly notion. Further, Bishop comments that questioning
the posthuman future seems to cast doubt on all of the gains from the Enlightenment and
its modern progeny, liberalism and humanism. As such, to challenge the posthuman
future is in a sense to expose oneself as a bio-conservative, anti-intellectual, fear
mongering luddite. Put simply, to question the posthuman future is to question the
posthuman ontotheology which is to question the posthuman god, and this is nothing less
than “a contemporary sacrilege.”95
The transhuman and posthuman ontotheology is thoroughly physicalistic (i.e.,
philosophical naturalism – there is no supernatural being, God). The implication of this
position is that everything that exists is “natural.” And since everything is “natural”
everything is in a state of becoming. Whether this this by “chaotic” means or
evolutionary power (the ever present guiding telos in a non-teleological explanation) or
95 The “ontotheology of transhumanism does not easily permit itself to be open to deep
questioning about what counts as desirable in our posthuman future. To question the posthuman future is to
question evolution and scientifically grounded ontology; to question the posthuman future is to question
our liberty to become what we will. To question the posthuman future is to question all the good that has
been produced from the Enlightenment, liberalism, and indeed humanism. After all, who can be against
relieving the human estate? One becomes ridiculous, a luddite when questioning enhancement. To question
the posthuman future is to be ridiculous, to be a bioconservative . . . , a priest or sage pedaling in fear,
telling precautionary tales . . . . To question the posthuman future is to question the theological grounding
of transhumanism; to question the posthuman future is to question the post human god, a contemporary
sacrilege.” Jeffry P. Bishop, “Transhumanism, Metaphysics, and the Posthuman God,” Journal of Medicine
and Philosophy 35 (2010): 717—718.
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by human will, all that matters is that everything is a resource for the human will – for it
is the human will that has become the posthuman god. For as Bishop comments, the
“proponents of transhumanism wish to acknowledge that they desire nothing different
than what religious traditions have sought for millennia, namely to transcend human
limitation, to commune with the gods.”96
Thus, transhumanism cultivates a different view of creation and God.
Technological advances give humans the mistaken notion we can control all of nature.
Since “technoscience assumes that nature exists solely for the forces it can produce, it
does not and cannot reveal the world outside of the frame of these types of questions,
outside of its experimental paradigm.”97 The transhumanist to the degree that they are
philosophical naturalists are bound to a particular view of the universe. They are literally
“boxed in” by their epistemological convictions – nature is, and can only be, understood
in a particular and limited way. But this view also extends to God, as Philip Hefner asks,
what does it say about God if the techno-human cyborg is in the image of God?98 It
probably says something about how we see technology as a mode to the divine. Indeed,
Hefner relays this sentiment well. He says that technology “is one of the major places
today where religion happens. Technology is the shape of religion, the shape of the
cyborg’s engagement with God.”99
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Transhumanism attempts to maintain a sense of order and progress in light of the
Darwinian randomness of evolution. Darwinian evolution does not brook any notion of
progress – this notion is imposed on it from the outside. But it is precisely the
randomness of Darwinian evolution that transhumanists resist. As such, Rubin notes a
paradox of sorts in transhumanist thought: on one hand, it rejects Darwinian evolution as
determinative of human destiny, while on the other hand, accepting it as the basis of
human origins.100 Due to this acceptance of how nature works, transhumanists are
inclined to reject nature and mold it to their will – again, under the guise of this is what
humans do: we shape and harness nature. However, in pursuing this avenue,
transhumanists reject any religious foundations of value and must appeal to social
constructive norms. This, however, leads to unpredictable results as human beings are
notoriously self-interested creatures. The fallout is that by appealing to changing social
norms, the transhumanist appeals to no norms whatsoever. Indeed, nihilism seems to be
the only appropriate position.101
Gilbert Meileander remarks that the human efforts in scientific advancement are
not themselves redemptive – even though they are often good for society. This is because
God has created humanity to deal with suffering in a particular (and mysterious) way.
The Christian story is that God takes suffering upon Himself in the person of Jesus – an
act that no other god makes. Thus, no other god(s) can sufficiently deal with the suffering
that defines much of our lives.102 Nicholas Agar notes a bit of irony in the transhumanist
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pursuit of enhancement. He remarks that the transhumanist hope for scientific
explanations that will enable “radical” enhancements has all the earmarks of a search for
“revealed wisdom.”103 It is a faith in scientific progress, not in a supernatural deity. Put
differently, the transhumanist faith that science will make us better resembles the
eschatological hope in religious systems that some deity will make everything right in the
end.
It is no secret that transhumanists tend towards some form of scientism, the view
that “a number of beliefs and attitudes that elevate science to a supreme level of
epistemic and ontological authority and, in its most extreme manifestations, to an almost
godlike status.”104 Some of these beliefs are that the methods of the “hard” sciences are
the only means to “achieve validity” and, thus, “science” as an empirical endeavor “is the
only really valuable part of human knowledge and culture.”105 Traditional religious
positions are then by definition found lacking, for there is no physical experiment that
one can run to (dis)prove God’s existence. Because religious claims are outside the realm
of empirical observation, they cannot be the basis for any knowledge and can, in fact, be
seen as contrary to knowledge. Religion is often depicted as inherently opposed to
scientific knowledge. It is claimed, one cannot be both scientific and religious (in a
traditional sense). Thus, some transhumanists have come along and attempted to “marry”
science and religion by making science the object of religious devotion. Religion cannot
be opposed to science in this view, since the religion is science.
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Related to scientism is technicism, the view that sees all reality reducible to the
technological – all problems and their solutions are susceptible to correction by applied
engineering and technology. As Stephen Monsma states it, “Technology is a savior, the
means to make progress and gain mastery over modern, secularized cultural desires. . . .
More specifically, technicism is marked by three key characteristics or beliefs: (1)
technological change— the development of ever more complex, ever more sophisticated
technological objects—is inevitable; (2) such change represents progress, leads to
improved conditions for humankind; and (3) there are technological solutions to the
problems engendered by technological change.”106 Salvation is viewed as technological
mastery. It is something we bring about via our own ingenuity. This is quite different
from the traditional Christian notion that salvation does not come by works, but by faith
in God.
Transhumanism has an eschatological dimension to it (as already shown above),
and this eschatology forms the basis for the direction of the technology developed. There
is a hope that through our scientific research that we can ease human difficulties and cure
human deficiencies. In other words, there is a hope that technology will make us whole
(or at least more of what we desire to be). But this aspect of hope is not like the
traditional religious view of hope. As Lake explains, the classical virtue of hope was
based in the recognition that people are directed by a higher power, not by themselves.107
The transhumanist version of hope inverses this – it makes hope dependent on our
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abilities, not at the direction of a higher power. To the degree that we have a future, it can
be truthfully said that we do not fully know ourselves – for there is a part of us that has
yet to be determined. Who I become is largely dependent on the choices I will make in
concert with choices already made. But this means that my future is fuzzy to me (though
it may not be to God!). I simply do not have access to my future attitudes, nor the
conditions and situations that will forge my “self.” But what affects me, also affects all
human persons. We are all ignorant of our futures. As such, overt confidence in human
abilities to bring about a particular ending are misplaced. We simply do not have the
knowledge or wisdom to make any sort of confident prediction about what the future
holds.108
As discussed above, sin is a primary element to the Christian worldview –
especially in how it affects the world. As such, from a Christian perspective any
transhumanist religion must take into account human sinfulness, which of-course means
that enhancing human intelligence does not alleviate the human proclivity to sin. While
transhumanists are aware that humans do not always act the best, there is a general
reluctance to accept that sin is as pervasive as Christians claim. Instead, transhumanists
tend to focus on the positive actions and attitudes of human persons. For example,
Russell Blackford criticizes Ted Peters as overplaying the idea of sin in human lives.
Blackford says, “humans are not universally inclined to malice and spite” only a “small
minority” of humans are like this. Indeed, he says that Peters is simply wrong and is
“operating with a philosophical anthropology that is unrealistically blind to the strong
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human propensities for sympathy, cooperation, and compromise.”109 Christian theology,
while not denying that humans can do some good things, has historically understood
Blackford’s confidence in human goodness as the one that is mistaken. Sin taints human
actions – even good ones.
Another issue contrasted between Christianity and transhumanism is the issue of
scientism – the idea that science is the only means to gain knowledge. Of course, the
traditional Christian response to any form of scientism is that as great a tool as science is,
it is not the “end all of knowledge and human experience.”110 There are aspects to human
knowing that are simply beyond the empirically verifiable. This was covered in chapter 2.
Transhumanism has taken quasi-religious overtones even while often operating in
competition with traditional religions. It offers its own soteriology, eschatology, and
metaphysic which is often incompatible with the historic Christian position. Thus, we can
see why some theologians are wary of the inroads from “radical” enhancements.
7.3.4 “Radical” Enhancement Offers an Alternative View of Salvation
The posthuman project exhibits “the mentality of apocalyptic eschatology.”111
And the “techno-scientific eschaton” is infused with human technology intended to heal
our wounds, and meet our desires for something approaching perfection. It is a search for
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the Kingdom of God achieved by human ingenuity.112 Waters comments that the
posthuman salvation narrative goes as follows: humans are essentially patterns of
information that constitute the mind and will, but this pattern of information is currently
confined to a biological body that is ill equipped for preserving the pattern of
information. As such, the body is something to be abandoned or changed into a more
appropriate substrate. “In short, humans must save themselves from their finite and
mortal bodies by building a superior prosthetic of the will.”113
This posthuman salvific narrative places science as the object of faith. The
posthumanist has faith that through our scientific pursuits we will overcome certain
ailments. They have faith that science will be able to solve their deepest problems. The
issue, from a Christian perspective however, is that science can resolve any problems that
are under the purview of science, but science cannot really give answers to existential
questions.114 To paraphrase Carl Sagan, science can tell you how the heavens go, religion
tells you how to go to heaven. From a Christian perspective, the answers to questions
like: how should we live? Who are we? Where are we going? What is our purpose? Why
are we here? are simply beyond the bounds of scientific inquiry. These are philosophical
and theological questions, not scientific ones. Hence, searching for the answers to these
questions through technological means is a wholly inappropriate use of technology.
The problem with elevating technology to salvific status is that it makes a
priesthood out of the scientific community – a magisterium that cannot be contradicted
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on pain of public humiliation and verbal flogging. It makes physicians dispensers of
salvation, not caregivers. It turns technology into the sacraments of grace. The hard truth
is that by mixing these categories, we have made technological matters, moral matters.
Indeed, there may be times when it is inappropriate for someone to always get what they
want. But by conflating technology with religion it makes it more difficult to refuse
someone what they desire.115 Lake comments that desire for enhancement may reveal
self-contempt.116 For the only reason to seek enhancement is a dissatisfaction with who
and what you currently are.
“Radical” enhancement makes physicians little saviors and scientists priests,
however it should be obvious that physicians are not saviors – at best they are clever at
cooperating with nature to heal patients from certain ailments. The problem as far as
Meileander sees it is that the power of physicians gives patients a false sense of
invulnerability – I can do what I want, because medicine will always be there to “fix me
up.” This attitude is a disaster “for our spiritual Health” since it puts faith in modern
medicine rather than the Great Physician.117 It should be obvious that science cannot
“solve” all ailments.118 Some wounds can only be cured by the touch of God. For all of
its wonders, technology cannot solve all of humanity’s problems, for not all of our
problems are susceptible to engineered solutions.119
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The enhancement debate takes mainly two approaches. The first uses technology
in an attempt to free us from our physical and cognitive limitations – this is the basic
approach of transhumanism. The second approach wants to use technology to alter
humans physically and cognitively far beyond the current limitations – this is the basic
approach of posthumanism. Patrick Hopkins notes that these two approaches create a
“salvation paradox.” That is, transhumanism is unlikely to save us, while posthumanism
is unlikely to save us.120 He states the problem this way. Transhumanism offers a form of
soteriology – an escape from the (frail) human condition. But the cost of this
technological soteriology is a transformation of both human nature and identity. As such,
if we remain human through the technological change, then we will never quite escape
the frailty of our human vestige – hence, technological enhancements cannot really save
us (in an ultimate sense). We will always need newer and better enhancements. However,
by utilizing radical enhancement technologies and embracing a posthumanist future we
may do away with the human frailty, but only at the cost of doing away with humans –
hence, radical enhancements cannot really save us.121 Transhumanism is unlikely to save
us, because we will remain as limited beings and thus be compelled to want more.122
Posthumanism is unlikely to save us, because we will no longer be the beings we were
before.
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As already stated, the transhumanist faith in technology is an act of faith. It is a
faith that claims technology is the means to better individual, social, and political
progress. It will allow us to make the environment more hospitable to humans – or
change humans to better relate to a hostile environment. Technology is the way to make
things better. Michael Burdett calls this the “myth of progress” and it holds “that not only
does technology transform society and the economy for the better, but also individual
human experience can be affected directly through bodily enhancement.”123 However,
believing in the myth progress is a religious action.124 And this belief shapes the actions
of enhancement enthusiasts. Thus, the problem with “radical” enhancement is that it
attempts to solve difficulties by making persons in ways they were never made to be.125
For example, humans are social creatures, but one concern for mind uploading is that it
will make us radically unsocial beings – this would hardly be an enhancement. Likewise,
take indefinite life-spans: humans may live forever with God, but this would be in an
alternate state of being, it is not entirely clear what an indefinite life-span would do to a
person who is functionally the same as we are now. We may long for death and find it
elusive. Brent Waters takes it that the main problem with the myth of progress is that it is
based on an erroneous anthropology that reduces human beings “to a will trapped in a
body.”126
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The alternative salvation offered by “radical” enhancements cannot be ignored by
Christians. For the Christian, God is sovereign and all power and authority lay with Him.
Thus, any attempts to claim sovereign power for ourselves (by pride or technology) is
“playing God” and quickly condemned.127 Ultimately, salvation is not an escape from this
world or a limited reprieve from our condition in it – instead, salvation is the fulfillment
of the world and a redemption of our condition.128 The Christian hope of salvation is a
redeeming of this world, not its abandonment. But this redemption is brought about by
God’s power, not human cleverness. The Christian notion of embodiment and salvation
are quite different than this posthuman notion of salvation.129
7.3.5 “Radical” Enhancement is not the Same as Resurrection
The doctrine of original sin (as briefly discussed above) notes the continual
temptation to embrace our own control over reality – hubris. We must constantly be
aware of our creaturely tendency to want control. Likewise, “insofar as transhumanism is
a manifestation of humanity sicut deus [like God – as opposed to imago Dei, the image of
God], it exposes sin as the root cause of the quest to defeat death through technology.”130
For the physicalist, death is neither to be hoped for nor feared, thus fear of death is
irrational.131 Nevertheless, life is an undeniable good and we all have a natural instinct to
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survive, and if given the choice to either die or live longer we are imminently rational for
choosing to live longer. As such, some proponents of “radical” enhancement have
targeted death as the number one enemy of human existence. For death is the ultimate
cessation of the freedom of the will. Hence, various strategies are pursued in an effort to
circumvent death – either cybernetics, biological replacements, pharmaceuticals, or mind
uploading.132
Since humans are beings with unusual powers of reasoning and foresight, we can
anticipate death in ways other animals do not. Thus, we have a stronger imagination for
what death entails and hence a great motivation to avoid it.133 Both Christianity and
transhumanism are united in the notion that death is the “final enemy” – that death should
be defeated and reversed.134 However, they take different approaches to how death should
be treated. For Christians, death is understood through the narrative of Jesus’ death and
resurrection. Through Christ’s death we find reconciliation with God, but through the
resurrection we have the promised defeat of death. “Christianity adopts a more prosaic
stance toward death that is guided by the narrative of the redemption and reconciliation of
humankind through God’ activity in Jesus Christ. Christianity proclaims Christ’s victory
over sin and death in his bodily resurrection and ascension. Death has been defeated (1
Corinthians 15).”135 Christians link death as intrinsically associated with sin.
Transhumanists do not. And this fundamental difference exposes the disparity between
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Christian and transhumanist responses to the reality of death. Christians view death as a
consequence of a moral reality – that is, as a consequence of rebellion to God.
Transhumanists see death as a material reality only – there is no moral connection for
why death exists.136
However, the seeming Christian acceptance of death here and now is problematic
for transhumanists. For it would appear that any proclamation that hints at accepting
death is “defeatist from a transhumanist perspective.”137 Thus, transhumanism and
posthumanism seek in many ways to overturn death. The idea is that there is no
theoretical reason for not subverting any given “cause” of death. Given enough technical
know-how, any biological cause of death can be overcome. As Daniel Callahan states
“No cause of death has been declared beyond hope; none could be. All of the known
causes of death can, in principle, be picked off, one by one.”138 But as Meileander points
out, the Christian is strangely “ambivalent” to this project.139 Christians certainly have
contributed to the prolongation of life – often in obedience to their faith – since death
“threatens to separate us from the One for whom we are made.”140 Yet, Christians also
believe that it is ultimately God who overcomes – and has overcome – death in the
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resurrection of Jesus. The danger, as Meileander sees it, is that medical success in
prolonging death encourages people to make an idol out of medical advancement.141
To take just one example from transhumanist literature to escape death, we can
look at radical life extension and the injustices it is likely to present. Now, radical life
extension will likely be possible only by pursuing morally questionable tests.142 People
are more apt to avoid loss than pursue gains. As such, normally healthy people are less
likely to volunteer for research in pursuit of life extension unless there are reasons to
think that the procedures are relatively safe. As Agar puts it, “Conventionally healthy
people will want an anti-aging therapy to have been extensively tested on other
conventionally healthy people.”143 The problem with anti-aging research and solutions
will be primarily concerned with side-effects. When life-extension is the goal – with the
assumption that the life being extended is relatively similar to how we are alive now – it
is no good to offer a procedure with detrimental side-effects in other areas. For example,
should we develop a procedure that extends telomeres but also increases our odds of
cancer, this would hardly be a trade-off that someone is likely to risk. To die of cancer
rather than old age is hardly a bargain worth pursuing. In order to test procedures for lifeextension enhancements, researchers will need many healthy test subjects – not terminal
subjects. Persons already sick are generally more willing to volunteer for risky and
untested procedures since they figure they have “little to lose, and much to gain.”
However, life-extension enhancements must operate with a control group of healthy

141

Ibid., 108—109.

142

Agar, Truly Human Enhancement, 114.

143

Ibid., 126.
425

subjects. Agar fears that the only reasonable pool of test subjects will come from the poor
and underprivileged who may see the “benefits” of participating in (possibly dangerous)
clinical trials as their only option. The rich and powerful will not need to participate in
clinical trials, rather they will wait until the procedure is relatively safe and predictable.
The poor and underprivileged, however, will not be able to wait nor refuse the promise
and possibilities that come with participating in clinical trials.144 Thus, a dilemma is
established. Agar notes:
Those who should be eligible to be volunteer risk pioneers for SENS [Strategies
for Engineered Negligible Senescence] face a practical dilemma. We can say that
they are either interested in SENS and desire to see it progress, or they are not.
Those who are not interested in SENS are likely to find other outlets for their risk
pioneering. Those who are interested in SENS and want to see it progress are
likely to be especially averse to the specific kinds of sacrifice its form of risk
pioneering demands. They are being asked to put at risk precisely the thing—the
possibility of a long life span—that commitment to SENS assumes. . . . Promoting
the cause of SENS requires risking precisely the thing—one’s health—that they
must be interested in to want to sign up in the first place.145
Radical life extension, whether through SENS or mind-uploading or what have
you, will require a transformation of what it means to be human. Indeed, there is a strong
case to be made that upon achieving indefinite (or radically lengthened) life spans, the
person may no longer be human (and may have actually become posthuman). Charles
Rubin, for instance, notes that should we achieve some sort of technological
“immortality” this would “fundamentally alter what it means to be human.”146 For in this
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instance, that individual would be a far superior example of a long-lived individual.
However, this type of transformation is inferior to the type that is hoped for by the
Christian notion of the resurrection. The Singularity, while indeed an impressive
technological milestone, would not achieve true transcendence, for it would still be this
worldly. No matter how advanced the life extension measures are taken, no matter how
long one is able to live (in whatever condition), they would “imprisoned within a time
bound universe.”147
The doctrine of the resurrection teaches something wholly different. It teaches
that a physical body is changed in peculiar ways that allows it to relate to God and others.
It operates in a redeemed universe – resembling the current one, but changed in some
way. The ancient theologians had different views on what this state would be like.
Origen, for example, understood that throughout life our material bodies are constantly
changing. How, then, can the body be raised? He appealed (in good Platonic fashion) to
the eidos the unchanging form of the body. It remains the same as we grow from infancy,
through childhood and adulthood, to old age. Hence, despite the body’s material
transformations, its eidos remains the same throughout.148 Origen, thus held to an
essentially non-physical resurrection. Shortly after Origen, Gregory of Nyssa (though
differing from Origen in some respects) held that in the resurrection our bodies will be
freed from all the consequences of sin—including not only death and infirmity, but also
deformity and difference of age.149 Hence, in Gregory we see the idea of the resurrected
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body being freed from the deleterious effects of sin. Saint Thomas reacts against Origin’s
notion of resurrection, and affirms a completely physical resurrection. “Therefore, the
body will be the same in species after the resurrection as before. And so it has to consist
of flesh and bones and other parts of this kind” (SCG 4.84.4).150 This physical notion of
the resurrection is the standard belief in Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox churches.
Now, the belief in the resurrection of Jesus as the “firstborn” is a promise for the
redemption of all creation – not just human resurrection.151 Nature is to be transformed,
not trashed. This based in the idea that God’s original creation is good, but corrupted.
God salvages what was made, He does not start from scratch. Humans especially are
given special status as God’s image bearers and are thus said to have a special destiny in
relating to God by resurrection. This is the primary reason why embodiment is so
important to Christian thought, and this idea undergirds the rejection of transhumanist
thought that makes humans merely patterns of information. This disparity also shows that
for Christians embodiment is a reminder and condition of our frailty before God – that we
are finite and limited creatures, dependent upon God for ultimate fulfillment.152
Brent Waters observes that Christians have a twofold understanding of mortality.
The first is that while death is the end of our earthly life, it represents the beginning of
our eternal fellowship with God – which is, of course, our end / telos which is good.
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Secondly, Christians should not fear death, but they should not go seeking it either.153
Even though Christians should not embrace death, mortality is not humanity’s greatest
curse.154 An unexplained assumption of the transhumanist agenda to achieve indefinite
lifespans is whether happiness can be achieved by simply adding more years to life. “No
one associated with transhumanism ever seems to question the main assumption that
people who live longer with younger cells will necessarily live happier or more
rewarding lives.”155 Christian theologians are likely to deny that life-extension or
“cybernetic immortality corresponds to the biblical vision of resurrection from the dead. .
. . Our redemption through resurrection into the new creation does not correspond to
physical longevity or cybernetic immortality.”156
Whatever medical advances we make in life extension, we are and will remain
finite creatures. As Meileander points out, we long for God, not just “more life.” As such,
death must be addressed by everyone in every age.157 This would even apply to the
transhumanist and posthumanist future. Indefinite lifespans are not the same as
resurrection. Indeed, there are a number of reasons one may wish not to live for an
indefinite time. Bernard E. Rollin gives four: 1) indefinite lifespans will alienate one
from love and friendship; 2) indefinite lifespans open the individual up to intense ridicule
and resentment; 3) they would be subject to constant heartbreak as family and friends die;
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and 4) the absence of death may actually lead to a loss of meaning in their life.158 David
Grumett marks the sad irony of these types of “radical” enhancement projects, “by
denying the possibility of a transcendent infinite acting on humans, the transhumanists
deny to finite humanity the very infinite end they seek to attain for them.”159
7.4 Enhancement and the Hope of Resurrection
It should be clear at this point that the Christian notion of resurrection is not the
same as that of the technologies produced through various enhancement projects.
Enhancement, no matter great or useful, will always be limited to this world – they can
never be truly transcendent even while offering a similitude of it. Because enhancement
technologies are so captivating for the goods they promise this side of eternity, they are
often condemned by those who see a danger in making our technologies idols. There is a
fear amongst theologians that we will look to our technologies to save us rather than
simply help us. We will (and do) look to our technologies to control nature rather than
cooperate with it.160 We have shifted our religious focus and devotion from the creator of
the heavens and earth, to our creations. Thus, in pursuit of happiness, wholeness, and
fulfillment through enhancement technologies, we miss out on our true and ultimate end
– fellowship with God. The stakes are of eternal consequence.
Transhumanists appeal to our desires for a better world, but as Charles Rubin
notes, they often abandon those promises in favor of “incomprehensible outcomes.” As
he puts it:
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When appealing to common sense, transhumanists promise a better world in
humanly comprehensible terms. However, their own assumptions lead them to
abandon those promises in favor of willful change toward incomprehensible
outcomes. They promise that science and technology will provide us with more of
whatever it is we want more of at any given moment—and it is indeed hard to
deny the attraction of that promise to people like us. The hitch is that people like
us are not going to be around to enjoy it. Indeed, we are not even supposed to see
our elimination as a cost at all, but as a great benefit. At least, for the
transhumanists, this outcome is in some fashion necessary, and we are supposed
to accept that technological might dictates right. The transhumanists believe that
their ideas represent progress— not just technological progress, but progress in
the much larger sense of humankind fulfilling its ultimate destiny (a destiny of
overcoming itself).161
The problem, of course, is that not only is “progress” an ambiguous term dependent on
one’s worldview, but also that we must overcome “ourselves” – a seeming impossibility.
Humans do the best they can and attempt to obtain “the good” as best they know how.
Yet, no matter what we do the strongest people we know become weak, the young grow
old and die, species go extinct, great civilizations rise and fall, and humanity is no less
part of this process. Though we may achieve some of “the good” through our
technological might, it will always be temporal and limited.162
It has been noted that life is really just preparation for death. Only the rare soul
catches a glimpse of “the good” this side of that chasm, and until the eschaton arrives,
death is the means of achieving a true vision of “the good” that awaits those in God, for it
is death that frees the soul to see God.163 Likewise, it is through suffering that our
character is shaped. Gilbert Meileander reminds us that though suffering “is not a good
thing, not something one ought to seek for oneself or for others. But it is an evil out of
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which the God revealed in the crucified and risen Jesus can bring good.”164 Stated
differently, our limitations can be used to develop the character of ourselves and others so
that we may all be better prepared for our ultimate destiny in union with God. As such,
Meileander continues, we should care for those that suffer, “but we should not imagine
that suffering can be eliminated from human life or that it can have no point or purpose in
our lives. Nor should we suppose that suffering must be eliminated by any means
available to us, for a Good end does not justify any and all means.”165
What this hope in resurrection and the beatific vision imply is that “Our true
humanity is eschatological.”166 We are beings with a purpose – a goal. Stephen Garner
notes that transhumanism and posthumanism often mirror Christian concerns and hope
for a better future.167 What is different is the means to achieve that better future. For the
Christian it is hope in God’s grace and mercy. For the transhumanist and posthumanist it
is in technological expertise. But, nevertheless, as eschatological beings we can look to
Christ’s resurrection as the prototype for how the new heavens and earth will be. Jesus’
resurrection provides the framework from which we can understand our place in the
world and in God’s creation. It provides the hope for a better tomorrow in light of today’s
troubles. It provides the groundwork for a truly flourishing life in light of God’s actions
in redeeming creation.168
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The resurrection of Jesus is the pattern for those that follow. The immortality of
the resurrection is not like that of enhancement technologies. Ben Mitchell et al. remark
that the “telos for humans is, therefore, not posthumsin but fully human, without the
presence, power, and penalties of sin. Human life, as it was intended to be, will be
attained.”169 It is a complementary doctrine that the immortal soul will ultimately rise
again in the resurrection, and this belief can be found not just in Christian thought but
also in some Jewish traditions.170 The soul at death exists in God’s presence until the final
resurrection at which time the soul is reunited with the body and the person becomes
whole. In the meantime, however, we live in a paradox of sorts. We can imagine the
fulfillment of this event, but we live with the frailty beset a body in sin. The Christian
hope is that by God’s grace His Kingdom will come and redeem what is corrupted. This
eschatological hope is the underpinning for the belief in the resurrection.171
However, none of this is to be taken to mean that enhancement technologies
should not be pursued per se. Indeed, this project has set out to develop a way to properly
explore enhancement technologies from a Christian perspective – for there are real goods
in not only developing therapeutic measures for people, but also enhancements.
Commenting on Revelation 21—22, Lebacqz states:
If ‘all things’ are made new, this must include human beings ourselves, and thus
there is reason to embrace enhancement that takes away pain, death, and limits on
human life. We are meant to transcend our limits, to draw close to God, to live in
the ‘Holy City’ described in the Book of Revelation. Doing so does not threaten
our dignity but rather expresses precisely what our human destiny and dignity are
intended to be—a life of abundance . . . , in which all are included . . . , all are fed
169
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. . . , God dwells at ease among the people . . . , and all ‘accursed things’
disappear.172
“Moderate” enhancements are part of what it means to be a good steward of God’s
creation. They can offer a foretaste of the heavenly treats, but will always pale in
comparison. It is my hope and prayer that this project can contribute just a bit toward
being a good steward of God’s creation as we harness human ingenuity for the betterment
of all.
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